Judgment On August 30, 1975 Sri C.K. Tewari, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Delai Special Police Establishment, Ranchi Brach, registered a case under S. 120B read with S. 420 of the Indian Penal Code and 5(2) and 5(i)(d) of the Prervention of Corruption Act, 1947 for investigation against (i) Sri M. Dasgupta, Senior Purchase Officer, Durgapur Steel Piant (for brevity DSP) (ii) M/s. S.N. Sunderson (Minerals) Pvt. Ltd., of 1/A, Vansitrat Row, Calcutta, (hereinafter referred to as the Company) and (iii) other concerned officers of DSP. In his complaint Sri Tweari alleged that Sri M. Dasgupta and other officers of DSP entered into a conspiracy with tea Company and in pursuance of the said conspiracy for the supply of 1,21,000 Metric Tonnes of Line Stone vide purchase order dated 9.10.74 at a rate much higher than the preventing market rate causing thereby a huge monetory loss to the DSP and a corresponding wrongful gtain to themselves or to the Company. It was further alleged that Sri M. Dasgupta, who was earlier a Senior Execute of the Company, in collation with the Company and other officers of Durgapur Steel plant awarded/caused to be awarded various other contracts during the years 1972-74 to the Company at a much higher rate than the prevailing rate and caused wrongful gain to the company or to themselves and corresponding loss to DSP. On commission of offence under S. 120B read with S. 420 of the Indian Penal Code by Sri A.K. Sarkar, Sri S.N. Beri and Sri T.K. Chowdhury, the General Manager, Managing Director and the Controller of Finance respectively of the Company. The cases constituting the offence as stated in the said police report are as follows : - 2. The Company was placed with an order by DSP for supply of 15,000 Metric Tonnes of Lime Stone vide purchase order No. PUR/OP/139(333)C dated 10.9.73 and 1,21,000 Mectic Tonnes of Lime Stone vide purchase order No. PUR/OP/139/355-A dated 9.10.74. As per the purchase orders the Company was entitled to siding charges as levied by the Railways. Investigation revealed that the Company dispatched Lime stone from Junkehi, Niwar and Mihar, Central Railways to DSP in between 1973 to 1975 and paid only Rs. 520.20p. towards siding charges to the Railways for their dispatches from Niwar (Rs. 66-70 p.) while the accused persons dishonestly claimed and obtained Rs. 8.890/- as siding charges. Investigation revealed that the Company dispatched Lime stone from Junkehi, Niwar and Mihar, Central Railways to DSP in between 1973 to 1975 and paid only Rs. 520.20p. towards siding charges to the Railways for their dispatches from Niwar (Rs. 66-70 p.) while the accused persons dishonestly claimed and obtained Rs. 8.890/- as siding charges. It was further revealed that while the Company was not required to pay and in fact did not pay any amount to the Railways on account of siding charges for its dispatches from Mathar Railway Station, they dishonestly charged and received Rs. 15,240/-. As regards dispatches by the Company from Jhukehi (Central Railways) the Company paid only Rs. 56,132/- to the Railways as siding charges while the accused persons dishonestly charged and obtained Rs. 76.722/-. 3. According to the police report the above facts disclosed that the three accused persons entered into a criminal conspiracy and in pursuance of the said conspiracy dishonestly and fraudulently obtained a sum of Rs. 442000/- so wards siding charges to which they were not entitled to and thereby cheated DSP to the extent of the aforesaid amount. 4. The Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate. Durgapur took cognizance upon the said police report and issued warrant of assets against the three accused persons. After the accused persons surrendered before the learned Magistrate and copies of documents referred to under S. 173 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure were furnished to them they filed applications praying for their discharge under S. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on identical grounds the learned Magistrate, by his order dated 11.7.78, rejected the said applications hold and inter alia that there was prima facie case for framing charge against each of them and fixed a date for the purpose. Before however the charges could be framed, the petitioners moved this Court by filing three separate application for quashing the proceeding of the case, including the order dated 11.7.78, and obtained these three Rules. The Rules have been heard together and this judgment will dispose of all of them. 5. Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners raised two points in support of the Rule. Mr. The Rules have been heard together and this judgment will dispose of all of them. 5. Mr. Nalin Chandra Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners raised two points in support of the Rule. Mr. Banerjee firstly challenged the legality of the investigation on the ground that Sri Tewari, who was an officer of the Ranchi Branch of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (hereinafter called DSPE) was not competent to investigate into the alleged offence committed within the State of West Bengal. According to Mr. Banerjee, DSPE is not one establishment but separate establishments in different States though the parent organization was in Delhi and as such an officer of the DSPE posted in the State of Bihar cannot investigate into an offence committed in the State of West Bengal. As a corollary thereto, Mr. Banerjee submitted that the congnisance taken by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, on a police report submitted that the cognizance taken by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, on a police report submitted by Sri Tewari, on such an investigation, was bad in law. The second contention of Mr. Banerjee was that the materials on record did not make out a prima facie case against any of the accused petitioners. Mr. Durgapada Dutta resisted both the contentions raised by Mr. Banerjee. Mr. Dutta argued that though the DSPE was an establishment Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) Sri Tewari was competent to investigate into offences committed in the State of West Bengal as the Government of West Bengal Consented under S. 6 of the Act to exercise of such powers. Mr. Dutta further submitted that the materials on record were sufficient to prove that case against the petitioners. 6. Per properly appreciating and answering the drat question raised by Mr. Banerjee it will be necessary to go into some details as to the legislative history of the Act a. it now standi. 7. In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 72 of the Government of India Act. 6. Per properly appreciating and answering the drat question raised by Mr. Banerjee it will be necessary to go into some details as to the legislative history of the Act a. it now standi. 7. In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 72 of the Government of India Act. as set out in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor General issued an Ordinance in the year 1943 to constitute a Special Police force for the investigation of certain offences committed in connection with the departments of the Central Government with power to investigate such offences wherever committed in British India; and to provide for the superintendent and administration of the said force, This ordinance was called the Special Police Establishment (War Department) Ordiance, 1943 (Ordinance No. XXII of 1943) and it came into force on July 12, 1943. Section 2 or the said Ordinance empowered the Central Government to constitute a Special Police Force to exercise thought British India the powers and jurisdiction exercisable in a Province by members of the police force of the Province and provided that the said Police Force which was to be called. The Special Police Establishment (War Department) was to have throughout British India, in relation to the investigation of offences made over to them for investigation under the Ordinance and to the arrest of persons concerned in such offences, all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities which Police Officers of a Province had in connection with the investigation of offences committed in the Province. Before the said Ordinance could lapse on September 30, 1946, it was replaced by another Ordinance on September 25, 1946 named the Delhi Special Police Establishment Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. XXII of 1946) to make provisions for the constitution of a Special Police Force for the Chief Commissioner’s Province of Delhi for the investigation of certain offences committed in connection with matter concerning department of the Central Government, for the superintendence and administration of the said force and for the extension to other areas in British India of the powers and jurisdiction of members of the said force in regard to the investigation of the said offences. The significant change that was brought out by this Ordinance was, that while under the former the force was to be constituted to exercise powers throughout the territory of British India under the latter it was to be constituted only for the Chief Commissioner’s Province of Delhi, but the Central Government was empowered to extend its operation to other areas of British India. This Ordinance was repealed by the Act passed by the Federal Legislature under S. 100(4) of the Government of India Act 1935 read with Entry 39 of the Federal Legislative list in its Seventh Schedule. The said Entry read as follows : - "Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a Police Force belonging to any part of British India to any area in another Governor’s Province or Chief Commissioner’s Province but not so as to enable the Police of one part of powers and jurisdiction elsewhere without the consent of the Government of the Province or the Chief Commissioner as the case may be ; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of Police Force belonging to any unit to railway art's outside that unit." The Act was adapted and amended by against others, the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950 enacted under Article 372 of the Constitution of India. Part B States (Laws) Act 1951. Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act 1952, the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, Adoption of Law Order 1956 and the Anti-corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964. In this connection it may be mentioned that Article 246(4) and Entry 80 of the Union List of the Constitution do the duty of S. 100(4) and Entry No. 39 of the Federal Legislative list of the Government of India Act, 1936 respectively. 8. Coming now to the provisions of the Act itself. the DSPE, which has been constituted Under S. 2(1), bas the powers to investigate offences notified under S. 3 of the Act Section 4 of the Act provides that the superintendence of the Establishment shall vest in the 'Central Government and the administration thereof shall vest in an officer appointed by the Central Government who shall have all powers of an Inspector General of Police in respect of the Police force in State. Section 5(1) entitle the Central Government to extend by order to any area (including Railway areas) in a State the powers and jurisdiction of the Establishment for the invention of such noticed offences. Subsection (2) thereof provides that while exercising such powers and jurisdiction in the extended area a member of the establishment may discharge the function of a Police Officer in that area and while so discharging such function the shall be deemed to be a member of the Police Force of that area. Sub-section 3 thereof, which was inserted by the Anti-Corruption Law. (Amendment) Act 1964, entitles the members of the Establishment of above the rank of Sub-inspector to exercise the powers of the Officer-in-charge of a Police Station discharging the functions of such an officer within the limits of his station. Section 6 bars exercise of powers and jurisdiction by the establishment in a State under S. 5 without content of the Government of that State. 9. There cannot be any manner of doubt therefore from the historical background of the legislation and the provisions of the Act that the legislation was brought on the Statute book to constitute is Police force in Delhi for investigation of notified offences in the Union Territories and to empower the members of the said Police Force to investigation such offences committed in a State with the consent of the Government of that particular State Any confusion as to the meaning of the words 'in Delhi' appearing in the long title of the Act or the words 'belonging to any State' appearing in Entry 80 of the Union list arising in this context, has been dispelled by the Supreme Court in the case of Advance Insurance Company Limited v. Gurudas Mall, reported in AIR 1970 SC page 1126 with these words : “Now the scheme of the Constitution is that the Union Territories are a part of India, the expression is equal to a police force constituted to function in an area. In this way the Delhi Police Establishment means a police force constituted and functioning in the Union Territory of Delhi. Previously the same force functioned in the Chief Commissioner’s Province of Delhi, then in Part –C State of Delhi and now it functions in the Union Territory of Delhi. In this way the Delhi Police Establishment means a police force constituted and functioning in the Union Territory of Delhi. Previously the same force functioned in the Chief Commissioner’s Province of Delhi, then in Part –C State of Delhi and now it functions in the Union Territory of Delhi. It is no doubt true that the words are susceptible of the other meaning also but so long as the words are capable of bearing the meaning we have given it is not necessary to discover another meaning under which the whole scheme would become void. Provisions of law must be read as far as is possible with a view to their validity and not to render them invalid In our judgment the expression ‘belonging to’ only conveys the meaning that it is a police force constituted and functioning in one area which may be authorized to function in another area. The change from ‘for’ to ‘in’ makes n o difference because both expression fit in with the meaning to the phrase ‘belonging to’ in the Entry”. The above judgment makes the position abundantly clear that the DSPE is a Police Force constituted in and functioning in Delhi and with the consent of the respective Governments it can function in different States. 10. In my considered view, a distinction has to be drawn between constitution of the Force and its functioning. By virtue of S.2(1) of the Act the DSPE has been constituted in Delhi and by sub-section (2) thereof it functions in the Union Territories including that of Delhi. By virtue of powers under S. 5 the same Police Force in a particular State to which it has been extended but does not constitute a Force jur cnens in the particular State. The contention of Mr. Banerjee therefore that the Ranchi unit of the Force constituted a separate establishment cannot therefore be accepted. 11. Relying on sub-section (2) of S.5 of the Act, which provides that a member of the Special Police Force shall be deemed to be a member of the Police Force of that State and be vested with the powers functions and privileges and be subject to the liabilities of a Police Officer belonging to the Police Force of that State, Mr. Banerjee submitted that the Police Officer was, for all intents and purposes to be treated as a member of the Police Force of that particular State Accordingly Sri Tewari, while functioning in Bihar shall be deemed to be an officer of the Bihar Police Force and as a member thereof. he cannot investigate into an offence committed within the State of West Bengal, argued Mr. Banerjee. A close lock of the different sub-sections of S. 5 impels me to reject this contention. Sub section (1) expressly provides that the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment can be extended to .any area in a State for investigation of notified offences. Sub-Section (2) speaks of the powers. functions privileges and liabilities of a member of the Establishment while discharging such functions Sub-section (3) gives further power, beside, these given in sub s.(2) to these members of the Establishment who are of and above the rank of sub-inspector, namely those of the Officer-in-charge of a Police Station of that particular area. Sub-sections (2) and (i) refer to the functions as provided for in sub-s. (1) namely, functions relating to only investigation of offences. In other words, sub-s. (1) relates to powers and jurisdiction of the members of the Establishment in respect of investigation of offences only and not any other powers and consequently the deeming provisions of sub-s. (2) and (3) is relatable to the investigation of offences only. 12. Mr. Banerjee also drew inspiration from the Police Act, 1861. Police Act 1888 and the Police Act 1949, in arguing that Police Force is constituted for a particular State or Union Territory and not for the entire country and that by the above deeming provisions Sri Tewari was to be treated 81 an officer of the State of Bihar governed by the Police Act. 1861 who cannot function in, or for that matter investigation into offences committed within the State of West Bengal. This line of reasoning of Mr. Banerjee cannot be accepted at the scheme of those Acts support the conclusion drawn by me that the Police Forces are constituted in and function in individual States or Union Territories and if provision are made under the relevant Acts empowering the Central Government to extend their area of operation to other State or Union Territories, the Police Force can function in those extended areas. In spite of such entitlement to function in those extended areas. the members still continue to be members of the Police Force of the State or the Union Territory in which it is constituted and located In the ultimate analysis therefore it must be held that the Force constituted under S. 2(1) of the Act Was in Delhi and members thereof did not cease to be members of that Fence while exercising functions in other areas pursuant to orders issued under S. 5 of the Act. In this instant case Sri. Tewari while posted at Ranchi continued to be a member of the establishment constituted in Delhi and he could investigate offences in Ranchi within the State of Bihar of requisite consent was obtained from the State Government. Similarly, by virtue of sub-s. (2) & (3) of S.5 and with the consent of the Government of West Bengal under S. 6 of the Act Sri Tewari was entitled to discharge the function of an officer-in-charge of Durgapur Police Station while investigating into the offences in question provided the offences were notified under S. 3 of the Act. 13. From the notification dated November 6, 1956 issued in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 3 of the Act it appears that the Central Government notified, amongst others, offence under S. 420 as also under S. 120B of the Indian Penal Code which can be investigated by the D.S.P.E. under the Act. By another notification date February 19, 1963 the Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (1) of S. 5 of the Act, extended the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the DSPE to various States, including West Bengal an d offences specified in the said notification include the above offences. The Government of West Bengal by its notification dated April 21, 1960 consented to the Delhi Special Police Establishment exercising powers and jurisdiction in the State of West Bengal for the investigation of the offences specified in the above notification date November 6, 1956. There cannot be any manner of doubt therefore that Sri Tiwari was competent to investigate into the alleged offences, now under consideration in these Rules. The first point raised by Mr. Banerjee must therefore be overruled. 14. To appreciate the other contention of MR. There cannot be any manner of doubt therefore that Sri Tiwari was competent to investigate into the alleged offences, now under consideration in these Rules. The first point raised by Mr. Banerjee must therefore be overruled. 14. To appreciate the other contention of MR. Banerjee relating to the merits of the case, it would be necessary to refer to the materials collected by the investigating agency and relied upon by the prosecution. As stated earlier the first information report was registered against the Senior Purchase Officer and other officers of DSP and the Company. It is not disputed that the case made out in the charge sheet and proposed to be presented by the prosecution, during trial, materially differs from the case made out in the first information report registered by the DSPE. According to the first information report Sri M. Dasgupta and other officers of DSP entered into a conspiracy with the Company and in pursuance of the said conspiracy awarded constricts to the company during the years 1972 to 1974 for supply of Lime Stone at rates higher than the prevailing market rates. In the charge sheet however the allegations are that the petitioners, as officers of the company, entered into a criminal conspiracy and pursuant to the said conspiracy cheated the company to the extend of Rs. 44.220/- by fraudulently representing that they have paid the said sum as siding charges or dispatch of the lime stone even though they did not actually pay the said amount as siding charges. Mr. Banerjee strongly relied upon this aspect of the case and submitted that the learned Magistrate should not have taken cognizance upon such a charge sheet and should not have held that a prima facie case was made out against the petitioners. Mr. Banerjee further submitted that the learned Magistrate having observed that the case as made out in the charge sheet was a different one form that made out in the fist information report and that in such circumstances the accused person may get benefit of doubt, should have discharged the accused-petitioners. 15. The observation made by the learned Magistrate that the accused persons might get the benefit of doubt was premature and uncalled for at the stage when he was to decide whether a prima facie case was made out or not. 15. The observation made by the learned Magistrate that the accused persons might get the benefit of doubt was premature and uncalled for at the stage when he was to decide whether a prima facie case was made out or not. The question of giving benefit of doubt to an accused in a criminal trial comes only after its conclusion and consequently there was no scope or occasion to consider this concept of criminal jurisprudence at this stage. Be that as it may, in my view the prosecution is not debarred from making out a case distance from that made in the fist information report but if the case presented during trial contradicts the earliest version, the defence may get benefit of the same when the question of proof or disproof of the prosecution case falls for consideration. In the instant case though has version narrated in the charge sheet in different from the one made out in the first information report, it is not contradictory to the latter. It may be, as stated in the first information report, that the SPE got information that the rates that were offered to the Company for supply of lime stone were higher than the prevailing rates and the contract was secured by the company with the connivance and collusion of the officers of DSP as mentioned therein. If the investigation agency found that the allegation. It was investigation into could not be substrate, but some other cognizable offence was committed in respect of the same transactions, namely supply of lime stone by the Company, nothing prevented the agency to present the case disclosed during the investigation. Whether the case to be so presented during trial, will be believed or not is another matter as the question that is required to be determined at this stage is whether the case made out in the charge sheet is prima facie supported by the materials referred to in S.173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am therefore unable to accept the argument of Mr. Banerjee that the prosecution case should be rejected only on the ground that it was different from the case made earlier. 16. That brings the question whether the material on record make out a prima facie case against the petitioners. I am therefore unable to accept the argument of Mr. Banerjee that the prosecution case should be rejected only on the ground that it was different from the case made earlier. 16. That brings the question whether the material on record make out a prima facie case against the petitioners. In this connection may attention has been drawn by the petitioners to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal reported in (1979) 3 Supreme Court cases, page 4 wherein the principle for determination of prima facie case has been laid down as follows : - “ 1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under S. 227 of the Code has the undoubted power of lift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. 2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. 3) The test to determine a prima facie was would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, be will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. 4) that in exercising his jurisdiction under S.127 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial." 17. Let me now therefore apply the above principle to the instant case to ascertain whether there are materials to frame charges against the petitioners. This however does not mean that the judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial." 17. Let me now therefore apply the above principle to the instant case to ascertain whether there are materials to frame charges against the petitioners. According to the prosecution case an order was placed with the Company by DSP to supply 15,000 Metric Tonnes of lime stone vide purchase order dated September 10, 1973 and 1,21,000 Metric Tonnes of lime stone vide, purchase order dated 9.10.74 and as per these purchase orders the Company was entitled to siding charges as levied by the Railways. According to the prosecution, the accused persons dishonestly claimed and obtained from Durgapur Steel Plant an amount much in excess of the siding charges levied by the railways. Relying on the turns of the above two purchase orders particularly item 18 and item 17 respectively thereof it was contended by the petitioners that the DSP Was obligated to pay siding charges to the company at rates mentioned therein and not actually levied by the railways. No doubt read in isolation, those two clauses support the case of the petitioners in as much while fixing the price for the lime stone it has been stated that the siding charges will be payable al the rates mentioned therein and according to the petitioners these clauses clearly show that the Company was entitled to siding charges at those rates, irrespective of the petitioners however cannot be prima facie accepted as the various clauses appearing therein have to be read together. If so read, it will appear that in the former purchase order under clause 10, which enumerates the dispatch instructions. It has been stated as follows : - "Haulage and siding charges levied by the Railways and as shown in the R/R will be to buyer’s account and will be paid by the buyer direct to the Railways. Shunting charges, if any, will be borne by the sellers." In the other purchase order the dispatch instructions, as appearing in Clause 9(c) recite that the siding charges levied by the Railways from time to time will be to buyer’s account and will be paid by the buyers. The above dispatch instructions therefore prima facie show that the siding charges were to be paid as levied by the railways. The above dispatch instructions therefore prima facie show that the siding charges were to be paid as levied by the railways. It is not disputed that the siding charge were paid by the Company and they raised their bills wherein they claimed the siding charges. In interpreting the clauses regarding siding charges appearing in the purchase orders the prosecution contended that the siding charge were payable by the DSP as levied by the Railways and the specific rates tint were given therein for four wheeler wagons and box wagons, were only to indicate the prevailing rates but it was never meant that the Company will be paid at the rates indicated in the purchase order irrespective of the siding charges actually levied and paid by the Company. Whether the interpretation given by the prosecution or the defence will be accepted, will have to be determined on the basis of materials adduced during trial but for the present this much can be said that the purchase orders prima facie indicate that the Company was entitled to claim and receive the siding charges levied by the Railways. 18. Coming now to the other part of the prosecution case that the accused persons dishonestly claimed and obtained amounts more than the sums levied by the Railways the prosecution relied upon different left of documents which were seized during investigation. The first set of such documents in the requisitions made by the Company for wagons. In these requisitions the Company asked the Station Master of the concerned railway station to allot certain number or wagons as mentioned therein and on such allotment being made they paid the freight charges under railway receipts which have also been seized. The loading and unloading book of the particular station shows the number of wagons which were allotted to the Company for dispatch of lime stone to DSP as also the siding points. The siding charges paid for dispatch of those goods are entered in the goods cash book wherein the amount actually paid are entered with reference to the wagon number. All these documents therefore prove the amount of siding charges levied by the Railways and actually paid. The siding charges paid for dispatch of those goods are entered in the goods cash book wherein the amount actually paid are entered with reference to the wagon number. All these documents therefore prove the amount of siding charges levied by the Railways and actually paid. The bills raised by the company with DSP show the contracted value to be received by them for a particular consignment, the Central Sales Tax payable in respect thereof and the siding charges receivable by the Company for dispatch of these goods. The payment vouches prepared on the basis of these bills also show that the amount shown in the bills were received by the Company. On a scrutiny of some of those bills and correlating them with other documents discussed above I find that there are materials to prima facie show that the Company claimed and received as siding charges amounts more than that was levied by the Railways. Materials also prima facie show that for Maihar station, no amount was levied by the Railways as siding charges but the company claimed and received a total sum of Rs. 15,240/- during the relevant period. 19. As regards the involvement of the three petitioners in the crime, materials are there to indicate that Sri S.N. Beri negotiated with DSP for getting the contracts while the other two submitted the bills on the basis of cheating therefore has been made out against the petitioners. In view of my above findings the second contention of Mr. Banerjee also fails. 20. In the result, the applications fail and the Rules are discharged. The learned Magistrate will now proceed with the case in accordance with law, without being in any way prejudiced by any of the observations made hereinbefore touching the merits of the case which were necessary only for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima facie case was made out against the petitioners or not. Rules discharged. ciJ. S. L. R. O. v. UKHRA fOREST \F. S.) 1979 (II) GHN 20. In the result, the applications fail and the Rules are discbarged. Rules discharged. ciJ. S. L. R. O. v. UKHRA fOREST \F. S.) 1979 (II) GHN 20. In the result, the applications fail and the Rules are discbarged. The learncd Magistrate will BOW proceed witb the case in accordance with law, witbout being in any way prejudiced by any of the obscrvations made hereinbefore toucbing the merits of the case, wh icb were necessary only for \he purpose of ascertaining whetber a prIma focle case was made out against the prtitionera or not. FULL HENCH REFERENCE N,S 1 and 2 of 1'J77 Ruies discharged.