BRISHKETU SARAN SINHA, J. The prayer, in this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, is to restrain the respondents from charging the petitioner in accordance with the amounts specified in annexure 1' and 4' appended to the application. By annexure 1' respondent no. 2 has Sent to the petitioner a revised bill from the 17th of July, 1975 to the 17th of July, 1976 and has made a demand for a further sum of Rs 5, 340.40 paise in accordance with the details of demand enclosed and by annexure 4' a further demand of Rs. 25,848.96 paise has been made for the period July, 1975 to May, 1978. The further prayer in this application, is that the respondents be restrained from giving effect to that portion of annexure 1' where in it has been said that the petitioner will have to pay revised energy, bills from the 18th of July, 1976 up-to-date according to high tension tariff as per Board's procedure, The petitioner is a partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, and carries on the business of manufacture of Fire and Insulation, Acid proof bricks, Electrical Procelain, Dinner and Sanitary wares etc, for which purpose it has a factory. 2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner has been running its industry since the year 1964 and at the relevant time applied to the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited, the licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as the Electricity Act) for the supply or low tension electrical energy which the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited started giving in accordance with its requirements. It is further the petitioner's case that it is supplied electrical energy through a transformer which has the capacity to supply 150 KVA at a time. According to the petitioner, it was billed by the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited on the basis of the supply of electrical energy of 75 Horse Power which were being paid. 3. By an ordinance being Bihar Ordinance 140 of 1975, which came into force on 17th July, 1975, the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited was taken over by the Bihar State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) and the supply of electrical energy to the petitioner was continued by the Board, and to begin with, the petitioner was billed on the basis or 75 Horse Power. However, by a letter dated the 20th of July, 1978, bearing reference no. 20 l7E/78/M-666, the petitioner was informed by the Assistant Electrical Engineer (Revenue) of respondent no. 1, the Bihar State Electricity Board, that for the period 17th July 1975 to 17th July 1976 a revised bill was being sent to it on the basis of the difference between the supply of 154 Horse Power and 75 Horse Power, the details of which were being attached. A copy of this communication is annexure 1'. In other words, the petitioner was informed that for the period mentioned therein i.e. from the date that the Board had taken over the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited, the Board would charge the petitioner not on the basis of 7 Horse Power but on the basis of 144 Horse Power. It may further be stated that in the very letter the petitioner was further informed that a second revised bill also would be sent to it and that would be on the basis of high tension tariff as per Board's existing procedure. This demand of a revised sum for the period was objected by the petitioner. However, by a bill dared 13th February, 1979 a copy of which is annexure 4' the petitioner was also asked to pay from July, 1976 to May, 1978, a further sum of Rs.25,848.96 paise. Against such a demand, the petitioner protested again on various grounds by its letter dated 6th February, 1979, a copy of which is annexure 5'. in reply to that the petitioner received a communication dated 22nd February, 1979, from the Special Officer of the Board, a copy where of is annexure 6' stating that the petitioner's objection with regard to the revised bills had been referred to the Electrical Superintending Engineer, Ranchi Circle, for decision. It was further stated in that letter that if in the meantime, the supplementary or revised bills, made on provisional basis, under low tension tariff, are not paid, then the supply of energy to the petitioner might be disconnected. In other words, the petitioner was threatened in the absence of payment, with disconnection presumably under section 24 of the Electricity Act. In other words, the petitioner was threatened in the absence of payment, with disconnection presumably under section 24 of the Electricity Act. I am making a social reference to this inasmuch as it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the instant case was not covered by section 24 of the Electricity Act, and the Board bad no right to threaten disconnection. 4. The petitioner's grievance, therefore in substance, is that as the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited had been supplying energy and billing it on the basis of 75 Horse Power the respondent Board, after taking over the aforesaid company in pursuance of Bihar Ordinace No. 140 of 1975 was not entitled to bill the petitioner at a higher rate on the basis of 144 Horse Power, nor was it competent to inform the petitioner that it would be billed subsequently from the date of the taking over on the basis of high tension tariff. 5. In support of this application, the main submission advanced by Mr. K.D. Chatterjee is that the respondents were not entitled to bill the petitioner on the basis of minimum guarantee of 144 Horse Power and they could only bill the petitioner on the basis of 75 Horse Power as was being done by the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited. His second submission was that the petitioner, in any event, could not be billed for high tension supply as it has been informed that it will be the third submission was that the minimum guaranteed charge could not be levied on the petitioner in the absence of a contract between the Board and the petitioner. 6. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, namely, the Board and its various officers in which it is stated that the petitioner applied for the supply of electricity to the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited in the year 1964, and their electrical contractor M/s Kataruka Agencies Private Limited had provided a certificate on 18th December, 1964 stating that the petitioner would be operating on a connected load of 175 Horse Power. It is further their case that the installation of the petitioner was inspected by the officers of the Board in presence of one of its owners Shri B.S. Jaiswal on 13th December, 1977, when it was found that the installed load of the petitioner was 144 Horse Power. It is further their case that the installation of the petitioner was inspected by the officers of the Board in presence of one of its owners Shri B.S. Jaiswal on 13th December, 1977, when it was found that the installed load of the petitioner was 144 Horse Power. On inspection, a report was prepared then and there which was also signed by Shri Jaiswal. Copy of the reports are annexures 2' and 2(a)' appended to the counter affidavit wherein reference is made to the total connected load of 144 Horse Power by the petitioner. It has been stated that as the connected load which is the same thing as the installed load or the petitioner was 144 Horse Power, therefore, in accordance with the tariff rules of the Board which have been published on the 12th of July, 1975, under sections 46 and 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Supply Act'), the Board was entitled to bill the petitioner on the basis of those rules and in accordance with those rules the petitioner was being billed for a minimum guarantee charge on the basis of 144 Horse Power It has further been asserted that the Board was within Its rights to bill the petitioner in accordance with the tariff provided by It and was not bound by the rates of the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited. Further it has been accepted in the counter affidavit that the transformer through which the supply of electrical energy is made to the petitioner is only 150 KVA. It is further the case of the respondents that although so far the Board has billed the petitioner on the basis of the minimum guarantee of low tension supply, in accordance with the tariff rules, it is entitled to bill the petitioner in accordance with the rates prescribed for high tension supplies and that is intended to be done. They have also asserted that even when the petitioner's establishment was inspected by the authorities of the Ranchi Electric Supply Company, they had found that the petitioner had connected load of 103.5 Horse Power. 7. The Petitioner has also filed a reply to the counter affidavit as also a supplementary affidavit and the respondents have also filed a counter affidavit during the course of arguments in this case. 8. 7. The Petitioner has also filed a reply to the counter affidavit as also a supplementary affidavit and the respondents have also filed a counter affidavit during the course of arguments in this case. 8. The first point that falls for consideration is whether on the take over of the Ranchi Electric Board, the Board was entitled to bill the petitioner at a different rate from that of the aforesaid company. In the absence of any contract between the petitioner and the Board, It is not disputed that there was neither a written contract nor a written agreement between the petitioner and the Ranchi Electric Supply Company Limited nor is there such a written contract or a written agreement between the petitioner and the Board. However, the petitioner has asserted that by the Ranchi Electric Supply Company it was being billed on the basis of 75 Horse Power. Therefore, in the absence of any written contract or agreement between the Ranchi Electric Supply Company and the petitioner and any averment made by the parties to the contrary, It must be accepted that by conduct there was an agreement between the petitioner and the Ranchi Electric Supply Company on the basis of which the petitioner was always billed by the Company on the basis of 75 Horse power 9. The question that still remains for consideration is whether the Board was bound by this contract between the petitioner and the Ranchi Electric Supply Company. In answering this question it is not disputed by either party that the relevant provision is section 49(1) of the Supply Act, which reads thus: "Subject to the provisions of this Act, and of regulations, if any, made in this behalf, the Board may Supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes and such supply frame uniform tariff. The above provision, therefore, clearly provides that the Board for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee is entitled to determine the terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit. It further provides that in determining the terms and conditions for the supply to persons not being licencee, the Board shall frame uniform tariff. In framing uniform tariff certain factors have got to be taken into account by the Board which are provided in sub-section (2) of section 49. It further provides that in determining the terms and conditions for the supply to persons not being licencee, the Board shall frame uniform tariff. In framing uniform tariff certain factors have got to be taken into account by the Board which are provided in sub-section (2) of section 49. It is accepted that the petitioner is not a licencee as provided for in the aforesaid provision. It is manifest, therefore, that it is for the Board, and Board alone to determine the terms and conditions for the supply of electric energy to the petitioner. The Board having taken over the Ranchi Electric Supply Company by virtue or the Ordinance mentioned above on 17th July, 1975, it was for the Board unilaterally to decide the terms and conditions on which electricity would be supplied to the petitioner. If the petitioner was not satisfied with those terms and conditions what the petitioner could do was not to take energy from the Board. But In any event, there was no question of any bargaining between the petitioner i.e. the consumer and the Board i.e. the Supplier. It is also not the case of the petitioner that under sub-section (3) of section 49 any special contract was made between the petitioner and the Board. It follows, therefore, that in terms of section 49 (1) of the Supply Act, it was for the Board alone to determine the terms and conditions under which the supply of energy to the petitioner could be made subject to the condition that it had to be on the basis of uniform tariff framed by the Board itself. 10. I have already stated above the tariff under the aforesaid provision has been made by the Board by a notification of 1975 published in the Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) No. 842 dated 25th July, 1975. This notification further provides that the revised tariff races as provided therein will come into force from the 15th of July, 1975. It is obvious, therefore, that the Board was entitled to charge the petitioner in accordance with the aforesaid tariff notification. 11. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the revised bills given to the petitioner are in accordance with those tariff races or not. If they are in accordance with the tariff rates there is an end of the matter and there can be no question of the petitioner having a grievance on chat score. 11. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the revised bills given to the petitioner are in accordance with those tariff races or not. If they are in accordance with the tariff rates there is an end of the matter and there can be no question of the petitioner having a grievance on chat score. This notification has various paragraphs, namely, 1 to 28 and, thereafter, there is a schedule appended to it. The first schedule deals with rates of tariff of low tension supply for domestic service and the second schedule is in regard to commercial service. Neither of them is applicable to the present case. The third is LDT industrial service and according to the respondents, the petitioner has been billed in accordance with this. This first Sub heading under LDT industrial service is applicability and the next is character of service. Under this sub-heading clause (b) of paragraph 1 provides for minimum guarantee charge which reads thus:- "Consumers of L.T. Industrial Service (Symbol LTIS) shall be liable co pay minimum guarantee charge based on a monthly consumption of 67 unh per BHP per month subject to a total adjustment at the end of the year of annual consumption of 800 units per BHP of the installed load at the rate of 24 paise per unit irrespective of the fact whether the energy to that extent is consumed or not.” As it is not relevant I have not quoted the note appended to it. This provision provides as to how minimum guarantee charge will be computed and it says that the minimum guarantee charge will be on the basis of annual consumption of 800 Unit per B.H.P. "of the installed load" at a particular rate. It has not been contended before us that for the purposes of at least deciding this case, there is any difference between the expression H.P. as used in the petition and the counter affidavit, and the expression B.H.P. as used in this tariff. Therefore, the method of calculating the minimum guarantee charge for the supply of low tension electric energy is on the basis of the installed load of the establishment concerned. In the case before us it has been asserted in the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents that the installed load of the petitioner is 144 H. P. and this fact has not been disputed. In the case before us it has been asserted in the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents that the installed load of the petitioner is 144 H. P. and this fact has not been disputed. Therefore, if the Board, on the basis of the inspection done by its officers having found that the installed load of the petitioners is 144 H.P., it seems to me that it was, in terms of section 49(1) of the Supply Act, read with the schedule of the tariff notification of 1975, entitle to bill the petitioner for tile minimum guarantee charge on the basis of 144 H.P.-That the petitioner was not consuming energy more than 75 Horse Power was immaterial because the minimum guarantee charge, it is obvious, does not take into account the actual consumption of energy but is a statutory undertaking by the consumer, that irrespective of its consumption, it will pay at least a minimum amount which has to be in accordance with the minimum guarantee charge stipulated in the tariff. 12. In reply, Mr. Banerjee for the petitioner urged and it had also been submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that the minimum guarantee charge must bear relationship at least to the capacity of the supplier to be in a position to supply as much energy as is provided in the minimum guarantee. In other words, it has been urged that if the respondents were not in a position to supply 144 Horse Power Electrical energy to the petitioner, the respondents could not provide for a minimum guarantee charge on the basis of 144 Horse Power. In supporting the submission that the respondents were not in a position to supply 144 Horse Power electrical energy, the petitioner has relied upon certain assertions made in the petition. Before dealing with them it would be relevant to recall that the transformer through which electricity is supplied to the petitioner has a capacity of 150 KVA and according to paragraph 18 of the tariff notification 1 Horse Power is equal to O. 933 KV A. It follows, therefore, that the maximum capacity of the transformer through which electricity is being supplied to the petitioner by the respondents is to the extent of 160.77 Horse Power. This calculation on the basis of the break up given in paragraph 18 of the tariff notification has not been disputed by the respondents. This calculation on the basis of the break up given in paragraph 18 of the tariff notification has not been disputed by the respondents. Therefore, it follows that the transformer at one point of time could not supply more than 161 Horse Power. In annexure 5' which is the letter written by the petitioner to the Special Officer of the Board protesting against the revised bill, it has been stated in paragraph 11 that through the same transformer, electrical energy is supplied to various other consumers. Their names are given as also connected loads or those installations which altogether total 155 Horse Power. It is, therefore, urged that if through this transformer electrical energy of 155 Horse Power had to be supplied to other consumers then it was not possible for the respondents to supply electrical energy to the extent of 144 Horse Power to the petitioner as well. It has, therefore, been argued that the respondents not being in a position at any point of time to supply electrical energy to the extent of 144 Horse Power to the petitioner, they could not provide for the minimum guarantee to that extent. This submission has got to be rejected for various reasons. 13. The first reason is to be found in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. In paragraph 18 it has been stated that all the establishments connected through the transformer which supply electricity to the petitioner do not operate at the same time and, therefore, it cannot be said that the respondents are not in a position to supply electricity at the connected load to the petitioner whenever it is demanded. In the supplementary counter affidavit filed by them during the course of argument they have also stated that from experience and information the respondents have found out that in the supply of electricity there is always; what is called a diversity factor which is a ratio of the sum of the maximum demands of the several consumers or loads to then simultaneous maximum demands. In other words it seems that although the consumers might be many and if all demand their maximum demand at the same time the respondents might not be able to make the necessary supply but on experience it has been found that such demands are not made and whatever be the individual demand at a particular point of time, it is always available. By itself, I must say, that the averments made in the counter affidavit by the respondents are too vague and normal and they would not be sufficient to establish what the respondents have stated. However, in the case before us, it is not the petitioner’s assertion that at any point of time it demanded the maximum load of 144 Horse powers which was not available to it. It has been said that for quite some time now there has been load shedding and tripping etc. For a few hours every day without giving any previous notice which puts the petitioner to serious inconvenience and loss. That, however, is a matter which cannot be taken into account in considering the minimum guarantee charges. I am further of the View, that on the face of it, it seems rather difficult to hold that in determining the minimum guarantee charge this Court can take into consideration the capacity of the respondent to supply the requisite amount of electrical energy at all times. As I have pointed out earlier, it is for the Board to determine the terms and conditions of supply and it has also the power to determine the uniform tariff rates. The tariff rates for minimum guarantee charge on low tension supply having been filled by the Board, I have my grave doubts, if it can be said that that rate must be qualified by determining whether the requisite supply at a given time could be made by the respondents. In support of the submission that this Court can go into the reasonableness even of this rate reference has been made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramans Dayaram Shelly v. The International Airport Authority of India and others' wherein it has been stated that the rule inhibiting arbitrary action by Government must apply equally where the Government or the authority created by it is dealing with the public whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise. Learned counsel had emphasised on the expression entering into contracts. It is not necessary to consider this decision at length in view of the fact that the petitioner has, as noticed earlier, not asserted any where that at any time, it had wanted the supply of its installed capacity of 144 Horse Power which the respondents were not in a position to fulfil. 14. For the reasons given above I am of the view that the respondents were well within their rights to bill the petitioner on the basis of a minimum guarantee charge calculated for the supply of low tension on 144 Horse Power 15. The question that still survives consideration is from which point of time this revised charge could be demanded. It will be recalled that I have earlier stated that the Board has the normal power of fixing terms and conditions of supply to any consumer and to fill tariff rates. However, in the instant case, it seems that such revised tariff rates could not be demanded from the petitioner for the period 17th July, 1975 to 16th July, 1976. Bihar Ordinance no. 140 of 1975 has been repromulgated from time to time and has now been replaced by Bihar Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition Act.1979, Act, 5 of 1979). Sub-section 3 of section 7 of the aforesaid Act, is in same terms as section 7 of the first Ordinance namely, Bihar Ordinance no. 140 of 1975. Sub-section (3) of section 7 reads thus :- "In the case of an undertaking which vests in the State Government under this Ordinance, the licence granted to it under part II of the Electricity Act, shall be deemed to have been terminated I on the vesting date and all the rights, liabilities and obligations of the licensee under any agreement to supply electricity entered in to before that date shall devolve or shall be deemed to have devolved on the State Government. "Provided that where any such agreement is not in conformity with the rates and conditions of supply approved by the State Government and in force on the vesting date, the agreement shall be voidable at the option of the State Government: Provided further that the State Government or in the case of transfer of the undertaking to the Board, the Board may alter the tariff and other terms and conditions of supply of electricity to the consumers in the different areas served by the different licencees, but only on expiry of a period of twelve months from the vesting date.” The second proviso, therefore, provides that where the consumer was paying tariff at a rate different from that which is provided by the Board then the tariff as provided by the Board will be levied only on expiry of a period of twelve months from the vesting date Section 4 provided that the vesting date will be the date of promulgation of the Bihar ordinance no.140 of 1975 at 1l.30 P.M. The Ranchi Electric Supply Company vested on 17th July, 1975. Therefore on the basis of second proviso quoted above, the rates of tariff of the petitioner could only be revised by the Board in accordance with its tariff rates from 17th July, 1976 and not before that date. I have already noticed above that by annexure 1' the petitioner was asked to pay at a higher rate i.e. on the basis of 144 Horse Power from 17th July. 1975 to 17th July, 1976. This annexure 1' itself says that the petitioner was previously being billed on the basis of 75 Horse Power. In that view of the matter the petitioner was entitled to be billed at the rate of 75 Horse power till the 16th of July, 1976. 16. Mr. Ramnandan Sahni Sinha for the respondents submitted that there was no alteration in the tariff rate as referred to in the second proviso. The argument of the learned counsel was that there was change in the amount of the bill and not in the tariff rate and that the tariff rate was constant. I have not been able to understand this argument. The petitioner was being billed by the Ranchi Electric Supply Company on the basis of 75 Horse Power Supply of electricity to it. I have not been able to understand this argument. The petitioner was being billed by the Ranchi Electric Supply Company on the basis of 75 Horse Power Supply of electricity to it. The petitioner, after the take over by the State Electricity Board is being asked to pay on the basis of the minimum guarantee charge which has been calculated on the basis of installed capacity of 144 Horse power. In that view of the matter it is obvious that the rate has been altered. The word 'tariff' in the proviso refers to the rate of payment. Therefore this argument must be rejected. Annexure 1' to the extent that it made a demand for a revised rate from 17th July. 1975 to 17th July, 1976, is illegal and is struck down. 17. Now I will take up for consideration the question whether the respondents are entitled to bill the petitioner according to high tension tariff. I have already noticed that in the communication dated 20th July, 1978 a copy of which is Annexure 1, it has been said on behalf of the respondent that revised energy bill will be sent to the petitioner for payment within a short period according to high tension tariff" The stand of the Board as stated in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit is as follows:- "That the statements made in paragraph 25 of main writ petition are not correct and are denied. That the petitioner was given supply by the ex-licencee at 3 phase 400 volts which is also applicable to high tension service having installed load of more than 100 H. P. As such the electrical energy supplied to the petitioner, was of the nature of high tension.” 18. Mr. K.D. Chatterjee for the petitioner urged that there could be no bill on the basis of high tension supply taking into account the character of service as provided in the low tension industrial service of the tariff notification 1975 which reads thus : “A. C.50 Cycles, single phase at 230 volts or three phase at 400 volts'. Mr. Chatterjee has urged that the supply to the petitioner being on the basis of 440 volts its supply is a low tension supply. He has further submitted that the character of service of general high tension supply is A.C. 50 cycles, three phase at 33 KV, 11 KV. Mr. Chatterjee has urged that the supply to the petitioner being on the basis of 440 volts its supply is a low tension supply. He has further submitted that the character of service of general high tension supply is A.C. 50 cycles, three phase at 33 KV, 11 KV. 6.6 KV or 3.3 KV and it further provides that general high tension service will be of three kinds, namely (1) 11 KV, 6.6 KV. or 3.3 KV service, (2) 33 KV service and (3) 33 KV Mini Steel Plant. Mr. Chatterjee further said that as the supply to the petitioner is neither of 33 KV, 11KV, 6.6 KV or 3.3 KV it cannot be said that it is a high tension supply. Further in an affidavit in reply filed by the petitioner to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of some of the respondents, it has been stated that for a high tension supply the requirements are, Air Break Switch, Transformer, low Tension Oil Circuit Breaker 400 v. and Distribution Board' and that the Board final to supply 'High Tension Meter and Air Break Switch' but which the petitioners factory was not provided. This fact has not been denied by the respondents. although they have filed, as I have pointed out earlier, a supplementary counter affidavit even during the course of the argument. It has not been stated on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner is in accordance with the tariff notification or high tension supply. On behalf of the respondents our attention, however, has been. Drawn to the heading 'Applicability' under low Tension Industrial Service of the tariff notification which reads thus; This rate of tariff applies to supply of electricity for use for motors and other industrial appliances for installed loads of less than 100 BHP : On the basis of the above provision it bas been submitted by Mr. Sinha that there is low tension supply only when the installed load is less than 100 BHP. As, in the Instant case the installed load is of 144 BHP it is not covered by low tension and it become high tension supply. While there might be some force in the submission of the learned counsel that if the installed load is more than 100 BHP, it is not low tension. As, in the Instant case the installed load is of 144 BHP it is not covered by low tension and it become high tension supply. While there might be some force in the submission of the learned counsel that if the installed load is more than 100 BHP, it is not low tension. I am unable to accept his submission that whatever is not low tension supply is high tension supply. There is nothing in the tariff rules, at least pointed out to us, which would show that every supply of an installed load above 100 BHP is high tension. In fact, on the contrary, it might be urged on behalf of the petitioner that energy supply which does not have the three phases at 33 KV, 11 KV, 6.6 KV or 3.3 KV is law tension supply. Even for the general high tension service the applicability states that these rates of tariff apply to installation with a minimum contract demand of 75 KVA for 3.3 KV, 6.6 KV and 11 KV supply and a minimum contract demand of 1500 KV A for 33 KV supply, There is no material before us to show that at present any of the applicability’s, as stated above, fit in with the supply to the petitioner. 19. It may further be pointed out that it is indeed very strange that if the supply to the petitioner is in the nature of high tension how a minimum guarantee charge was levied against it. There is no provision for minimum guarantee charge for high tension supply. However, this contradictory stand seems to have been taken by the Board in annexure 1' itself where it is said that they were being billed on the basis of minimum guarantee of 144 Horse power but would subsequently be billed for high tension tariff. If the authorities were so certain that it was high tension supply there was no occasion for them to bill the petitioner under the provisions for low tension supply. 20. For all these reasons I am inclined to take the view, that things, as they stand there is nothing to show the at the Board is entitled to bill the petitioner on the basis of high tension supply. In annexure 1' it has been stated that the petitioner will be billed from 18th July, 1976 up to date according to high tension tariff. In annexure 1' it has been stated that the petitioner will be billed from 18th July, 1976 up to date according to high tension tariff. Having held that there is nothing to show that the respondents are entitled to bill under high tension tariff, annexure 1' even to that extent has got to be quashed. 21. From what I have held above, the whole of annexure 1' is quashed but the demands as made for annexure 4' have got to be upheld. If any payment has been made on the basis of the demands made in annexure 1', the respondents will take immediate steps to adjust it against the due bill of the petitioner, 22. In the view that I have taken, it is not necessary to consider Mr. Chatterjee's argument as to whether the respondents were justified in threatening the petitioner to disconnect its electric supply if the payments as demanded under annexures 1" and 4' were not made within a reasonable time, I would, however, like to make it clear that if subsequently there is some change in the nature of supply to the petitioner, it will be open to the Board, in accordance with the tariff notification, to determine whether it is a law tension supply or a high tension supply. 23. In the result, this application is partly allowed to the extent indicated above but in the circumstances of the case. I would make no order as to costs. Application partly allowed.