JUDGMENT V. Khalid, J. 1. The suit from which this second appeal arises was filed for a declaration of title and for removal of a shed unlawfully constructed in the property by the defendants. The suit property belonged to one Puthiaveettil Parsad. It was outstanding on kanom with the first plaintiff's deceased sister Lakshmi. She died leaving an infant male child. He also died. After his death, his right in the property devolved on the first plaintiff and his mother Kunjipennamma. Kunjipennamma died, whereupon the first plaintiff alone became entitled to the property. He died on 23rd January 1979. First defendant in his widow and defendants 2 and 3 his children by the first defendant. The second plaintiff is said to be the wife of the first plaintiff. She figured as a co-plaintiff on the strength of a settlement deed, Ext. P-1, in her favour executed by her husband. Her status as wife was disputed by the defendants. For the purpose of this second appeal, I will proceed on the assumption that she is only a concubine. 2. In the written statement filed by the defendants they pleaded that the suit was not maintainable, that they were the only legal representatives of the first plaintiff, that they were in possession of the property and that the settlement deed was not valid and binding on the defendants. 3. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that on the death of Lakshmi, the properties devolved on the tavazhi, of which the first plaintiff's mother and defendants were members. This finding was arrived at on the ground that Explanation 11 to section 19 of the Ezhava Act applied. It also held that the settlement deed could operate only to the extent of the plaintiff's share. This decree was confirmed in appeal. Hence this second appeal. 4. This second appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law: "In the case of an intestate male whether the term 'thavazhi' is to be understood as contained in Explanation 11 to Part IV or as defined in sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 3 of Travancore Ezhava Regulation III of 1100". 5. Before considering the question raised on merits, it is necessary to dispose of an application filed by the respondents to record them as legal representatives of the deceased first appellant. The first appellant died on 23rd January 1979. 5. Before considering the question raised on merits, it is necessary to dispose of an application filed by the respondents to record them as legal representatives of the deceased first appellant. The first appellant died on 23rd January 1979. An application was filed by the 2nd appellant as C.M.P.No. 2823 of 1979 on 21st February 1979 stating that the first plaintiff had executed a settlement deed in her favour prior to the suit by which she became entitled to the property. It was prayed in that application that an entry be made on the records to the effect that she alone was the legal representative. This application was allowed on 13th July 1979 as it was then not opposed by any one. Order XXII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "Procedure where one of several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives. Where there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one, and any of them dies, and where the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, the Court shall cause an entry to that effect to be made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants". The application mentioned above was strictly in conformity with the above rule and the order allowing the prayer was made since the application was in order. Subsequently, the respondents filed an application on 3rd October 1979 as CM.P. No. 13831 of 1979 to review the order passed in C.M.P. No. 2523 of 1979 and to declare that the appeal had abated because of the non-impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased appellant. This was subsequently not pressed and so was dismissed. This was followed by still another petition, C.M.P. No. 14598 of 1979, to record respondents 1 to 3 as legal representatives of deceased first appellant. That was filed on the basis that the rights of the first appellant devolved upon his wife and children who were respondents 1 to 3. It was also stated 'that the second appellant, if at all, was only entitled to continue the suit by virtue of Ext. P-1. 6. The second appellant had already been brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased first appellant. It was also stated 'that the second appellant, if at all, was only entitled to continue the suit by virtue of Ext. P-1. 6. The second appellant had already been brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased first appellant. She is entitled to rights in the properties under Ext. P-1. Under section 2 (11) Civil Procedure Code legal representatives include any person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes an intermiddler. The second appellant answers to the require­ments of this definition and hence it is not necessary to bring respondents 1 to 3 on record as legal representatives. If respondents 1 to 3 are brought on record, they will have to be impleaded as additional appellants, whose case is adverse to the 2nd appellant. The order passed in C.M.P. No. 2823 of 1979 is binding on the defendants. What is more, the said order was passed without any opposition. 7. The respondents counsel then put forward another contention. According to him, the first plaintiff had reserved a life interest in his favour under Ext. P-1. He was in possession till his death on the strength of this recital. He could pass on this possession to his legal heirs before Ext. P-1 took effect. So viewed the second plaintiff could get only the residuary right. On this reasoning also he pressed for his application to implead defendants 1 to 3 as the legal representatives. I have no hesitation to reject this contention. This contention vizualises an interregnum between the death of the first plaintiff and opening of succession. This would mean that Ext. P-1 comes into operation only after defendants 1 to 3 succeed to the posses­sion, which the first plaintiff had. Law cannot countenance such an argument. Ext. P-1, is valid. The contesting respondents cannot question it. The first plaintiff had affirmed it and the second plaintiff has accepted it. The life-interest in favour of the first plaintiff is subordinate to the full right created in favour of the second plaintiff under Ext. P-1. The possession, which the first plaintiff had, came to an end on his death. There is nothing to pass on to his legal representatives. There is no interval between his death and opening of succession. On his death the second plaintiff became entitled to the full rights. P-1. The possession, which the first plaintiff had, came to an end on his death. There is nothing to pass on to his legal representatives. There is no interval between his death and opening of succession. On his death the second plaintiff became entitled to the full rights. Thus, the application to implead respondents 1 to 3 as legal represent­atives and to declare that the appeal has abated is dismissed. 8. The question which then falls for consideration is, as to who are the legal representatives of the infant male child of Lakshmi. It is admitted that the parties are governed by the Travancore Ezhava Act, Regulation III of 1100 (for short the Act). The trial Court considered the question of succession with reference to section 17 of the Act and held that the rights of the infant devolved on the tavazhi of his mother. According to the trial Court this tavazhi consisted of all the descendants of daughters and sons of Lakshmi's mother Kunjipennamma. For this the trial Court relied upon Explanation II to section 19 of the Act. This was confirmed by the appellate court. 9. For a proper appreciation of the contentions raised by the appellants' counsel, it will be necessary to read section 17 of the Act and Explanation II to section 19: Section 17. "On the death of an Ezhava male, leaving him survi­ving none of the heirs referred to in section 15 or 16, his self-acquired or separate property left undisposed of by him at his death shall devolve on the tavazhis of his grandmother or on the tavazhis of his female ascendants, the nearer excluding the more remote." Section 19. "Explanation II. The expression 'children' in the case of an intestate male and the expression 'tavazhi' in the case of an intestate female shall, for the purpose of Part IV of this Regulation, include the issue of such intestate male or female how-low-so-ever." 10. Part IV of the Act deals with intestate succession. Explanation II extracted above makes it applicable to Part IV. Section 16 deals with devolution of self-acquired or separate property of a male in the absence of children. This section is not applicable to the case on hand. Section 17 deals with the devolution of self-acquired or separate property of a male in the absence of wife, children or members of his tavazhis. Section 16 deals with devolution of self-acquired or separate property of a male in the absence of children. This section is not applicable to the case on hand. Section 17 deals with the devolution of self-acquired or separate property of a male in the absence of wife, children or members of his tavazhis. It is this section that is applicable to the case on hand and about this there is no dispute. For the purpose of this case it is sufficient to note that the property of the infant male child has devolved on the tavazhis of its grandmother under section 17 of the Act. The question is as to which definition of 'travazhi' applies to the case. For finding out the meaning of the expression 'tavazhi', it is necessary to consider sections 4 (3) and 4 (4) and also Explanation II to section 19 of the Act. Section 4 (3) and (4) read: "(3) 'Tavazhees of a female' means a group of persons consisting of that female and her issue how-low-so-ever in that female line, or such of that group as are alive." "(4) 'Thavazhee of a male' means the tavazhee of his mother." If the definition contained in section 4 (3) is to be applied to the case then the tavazhee of the grandmother of the infant male child would be the first plaintiff alone since there are no other female descendants for the grandmother. The Courts below applied the definition of the word 'tavazhi' as seen in Explanation II to section 19. 11. Let us examine the Explanation. Explanation II is not happily constructed. There is a mixing up. For a proper understanding of the Explanation, it has to be read carefully keeping in mind its two parts. I will quote Explanation II once again and analyse its two parts and read them separately: "Explanation II Part I 'The expression 'children' in the case of an intestate male shall, for the purpose of Part IV of this Regulation, include the issue of such intestate male how-low-so-ever.' This part applies only to intestate males. If an intestate male leaves behind his children, then such children will take in children of those children both male and female how-low-so-ever. If an intestate male leaves behind his children, then such children will take in children of those children both male and female how-low-so-ever. The second part applies to intestate females and it reads: 'The expression 'tavazhee' in the case of an intestate female shall, for the purpose of Part IV of this Regulation, include the issue of such intestate female how-low-so-ever.' So read it will be clear that the expression "children" refers only to intestate male and the expression "thavazhee" to intestate female. Tavazhee here is not the conventional tavazhi. It takes in children, both male and female, and their children how-low-so-ever. This definition of tavazhee in Part IV comes into operation only when succession to the estate of an intestate female is considered and in no other case. It is unnecessary to air up the Explanation with the facts of this case. Here, we are dealing with the legal representatives of an infant male child, succession to whose estate is governed by section 17 of the Act. His heirs are the grandmother's tavazhi and that tavazhi as defined in section 4 (3). Tavazhee as defined in Explanation II to section 19 can come into the picture only if we are consi­dering succession to the estate of the grandmother. In this case, Kunjipennamma's tavazhi consists of 1st plaintiff alone. On Kunjipennamma's death 1st plaintiff alone is the sole surviving member of her tavazhee. His rights devolved upon the second plaintiff on the strength of Ext. P-1. 12. The following decisions of this Court were cited at the bar in support of the contention that Explanation II to section 19 should be read in such a manner as to import the special concept of tavazhi mentioned therein to a case not only of an intestate female but to an intestate male also. The decisions are reported in 1945 T.L.R. 122, 1954 K.L.T. 812, 1954 K.L.T. 862, 1962 K.L.T. 863 and 1974 K.L.T. 152. I am afraid the submission cannot be accepted. All these cases dealt with succession of an intestate female and none about succession of the property of an intestate male. These decisions on their facts are, with great respect, correctly decided. The principles laid down there­in cannot apply to the case on hand. 13. Similar in the case which the Supreme Court had to consider in Kunju Kesavan v. M.M. Philip (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 164). These decisions on their facts are, with great respect, correctly decided. The principles laid down there­in cannot apply to the case on hand. 13. Similar in the case which the Supreme Court had to consider in Kunju Kesavan v. M.M. Philip (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 164). That was against the decision of this Court in 1957.K.L.J. 1028. That case again related to the succession of an intestate female. Since reliance was placed upon this decision by the Court below, I think it proper to refer to the facts of the case. There, the son's son of one Bhagavathi Valli claimed the right to property on the strength of Explanation II to section 19. In fact, the appeal was disposed of by the Supreme Court on the basis of section 33 of the Act, which enabled a party to opt out of Part IV of the said Act. Even so, the Supreme Court considered the contention raised in paragraph 12. It reads: ". Alternatively, if the property became that of Bhagavathi Valli alone, then, succession to that property would be governed by sections 18 and 19 of the Ezhava Act, read with Expla­nation II, which Explanation governs the whole of Part IV where sections 18 and 19 figure. * * * * * From the Explanation, it would appear that the expression 'tavazhee' in the case of an intestate female includes her issue how-low-so-ever, and the word 'issue' indicates both males and females. Reading this, expression in connection with section 18, Dr. Seyid Mohammed contends that on the death of Bhagavathi Valli the whole of her separate property left undisposed of by her at her death, devol­ved on her own tavazhee, that is to say, her issue how-low-so-ever." The Courts below would not have slipped into the error into which they fell if only the distinction between that case and the case on hand was kept in mind. That related to a case of a female while the case on hand relates to the case of a male. If Explanation II and the words used in there are read properly, there will be no difficulty. That related to a case of a female while the case on hand relates to the case of a male. If Explanation II and the words used in there are read properly, there will be no difficulty. If the Explanation is read in the manner given above dis­junctively and if proper emphasis is given to the expression "include the issue of such intestate male or female how-low-so-ever" (the emphasis being on the word 'such'), the construc­tion that the respondents' counsel wants me to put on the Explanation will appear to be without foundation. By no canon of construction can it be said that the word 'tavazhee' in the Explanation relates to the males also. For this the Explanation will have to be read as follows:". and the expression tavazhee in the case of a female or male.". This is to read into the expression something what was not intended. I hold that the Court below went wrong in applying Explanation II to section 19 of the Act to the case. 14. A kindred question fell to be decided by Govindan Nair, J., as he then was, in Madhavan v. State of Kerala (1964 K.L.T. 563). This is the only case cited which deals with an intestate male. There, the learned Judge was considering the scope of section 16 since the male in that case had a wife but no children. The learned Judge after considering the Expla­nation observed as follows: "Explanation II to section 19 has imported a special meaning to 'children' and to 'tavazhi'. When this Explanation talks of an intestate male, it refers only to 'children' and not to 'tavazhi'. When the Explanation refers to an intestate female, it mentions 'tavazhi' but does not mention 'children'. The definition of the term 'tavazhi' as contained in sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 4 is different in its connotation and its implications and consequences from that contained in Explanation II. "Tavazhee" as it is normally understood in Marumakkathayam law and as it is defined in sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 4, can only comprise of a female's issue how-low-so-ever in the female line, but the 'tavazhi' as it is indicated and defined in Explanation II takes in the issue how-low-so-ever not only in the female line but also in the male line." I am in respectful agreement with what is stated above. 15. 15. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the appellant is entitled to succeed. In reversal of the decree and judg­ment of the Courts below, I allow this appeal and decree the suit as prayed for. The parties are directed to bear their costs.