JUDGMENT S.C. Ghose, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated December 6, 1977 passed by Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. By and under the said order Sabyasachi Mukharji. J, discharged the Rule Nisi obtained by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution and vacated all interim orders that were paned in the said proceedings. The facts giving rise to the moving of the said application under Article 226 of the Constitution by the appellant are set out hereunder. 2. The appellant carries on business of banking at various places in India including at no. 19, Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta. 3. Approximately, 1750 workmen are employed in the different branches of the appellant in Calcutta. Almost all of the said workmen are the members of the recognised union of the workmen of the appellant "National & Grindlays Bank Employee Union." The respondents nos. 5 to 17, were at all material times employed by the officers of the appellant as their Drivers. The respondent no. 3 the Commercial Establishment Employees Association (hereinafter referred to as the said Association) although never had anything to do with the appellant and none of the workmen of the appellant, was a member of the said Association, the said Association under cover of a letter dated September 21, 1974 forwarded a Charter of Demands for the above mentioned Drivers who had been working as the employees of the officers of the appellant. The said Charter of Demands was with regard to the pay scale, dearness allowances, privilege leave, casual leave, sick leave, festival holidays, working hours, overtime remuneration, medical facilities and various other demands. The said Charter of Demands appears at page 25 of the Paper Book. The appellant did not accede to the said Charter of Demands on inter alia the ground that the Drivers were not the employee of the appellant. 4. The Respondent Association thereupon referred the said matter to the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) for conciliation. The appellant represented before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) that the respondent Association did not represent any of the workmen of the appellant nor were the respondents nos. 5 to 17 employees of the appellant. 5. Thereafter, the Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order no. The appellant represented before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) that the respondent Association did not represent any of the workmen of the appellant nor were the respondents nos. 5 to 17 employees of the appellant. 5. Thereafter, the Government of India, Ministry of Labour by its order no. L 12011/15/75/D-II/A dated 26th July, 1975 referred the following dispute as Industrial disputes existing between the appellant and its alleged workmen to the Respondent No. 1 (Respondent Tribunal) for adjudication. The said disputes are set out hereunder: – "Whether the following 13 drivers employed by the management of Grindlays Bank Ltd., Calcutta, are entitled to the same wages, allowances and other facilities, enjoyed by the other drivers of the said Bank? If so, from what date and to what extent? 1. Maksood Ahmed 2. Md. Yakub 3. Kazi Mullah Khan 4. Md. Suleman 5. Lawrence 6. Md. Ansan 7. Md. Nizamuddin 8. Joseph Francis 9. Chandeshwar Kumar 10. Ali Mohammad 11. S.M. Rahman 12. Kayat Mohammad." 6. The said reference was numbered as no. 52 of 1975. The parties filed their respective statements in the said Reference. On or about 6th March, 1976, the respondent Tribunal fixed the hearing of the Reference at the office of the Tribunal on 28th February, 1976 at 10:30 A.M. On that date the hearing was adjourned at the instance of the appellant. The hearing of the Reference was fixed on 24th June, 1976 at the office of the Respondent Tribunal at 10:30 A.M. No hearing took place on that date. But the reference was adjourned to 19th August, 1976 on the ground that the President Officer of the Respondent Tribunal would not be in Calcutta. Intimation of the said adjournment was given to the appellant as well as the respondent Association by the notice dated 28th June, 1976. 7. On 19th August, 1976 when the said Reference was called on for hearing on behalf of the respondent Association an adjournment was prayed for on the ground that the Secretary of the respondent Association had gone away without handing over any records to the Lawyer of the respondent Association. Said adjournment was granted by the respondent Tribunal on payment of cost of Rs. 100/- to the Lawyer of the appellant by the respondent Association. The Reference was adjourned to 20th October, 1976. Said adjournment was granted by the respondent Tribunal on payment of cost of Rs. 100/- to the Lawyer of the appellant by the respondent Association. The Reference was adjourned to 20th October, 1976. On the adjourned date i.e. 20th October, 1976 hearing of the Reference was again adjourned to 9th December, 1976 at the instance of the respondent Association on the ground that the Senior Lawyer of the respondent Association had been suffering from fever. 8. On 9th December, 1976 the Reference was again called on for hearing when the Advocate appearing on behalf of the Association again prayed for an adjournment on the ground that he had received a telegram stating that the father of the Secretary of respondent Association of had died. 9. The prayer for adjournment was however refused and respondent Tribunal proceeded with the hearing of the matter. Evidence was adduced by the appellant and the Tribunal passed an Award on that date. The said Award appears at pages 35 to 37 of the Paper Book. By and under the said Award the respondent Tribunal negatived the claim of the respondents nos. 5 to 17 mentioned in the Reference for equal treatment with other employees of the appellant in respect of wages allowances and other facilities as were being enjoyed by the other employees of the appellant. 10. The said Award was published in the Gazette of India dated 25th December 1976 in terms of S. 17 of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 11. On or about January 19, 1977, the respondent no. 5 to 17 through the respondent Association applied by filing a petition before the respondent Tribunal for recalling and or setting aside the said Award on the ground that on the 9th December, 1976, the respondent Association and/or the respondents nos. 5 to 17 failed to present their case and participate in the in the proceeding inasmuch as the Secretary of the Union of the respondent Association was held up at his native place on account of the sudden demise of his father as stated in the above mentioned telegram and all the relevant documents, files and papers were lying with the said Secretary. 12. The respondent Tribunal directed the appellant to file its reply to the said petition filed on behalf of the respondent Association. 12. The respondent Tribunal directed the appellant to file its reply to the said petition filed on behalf of the respondent Association. The time to file such reply was extended till March, 1977 and the said application was heard by the respondent Tribunal on 12th April, 1977. On or about 12th April, 1977, the respondent Tribunal set aside the Award dated 9th December, 1976 and restored the reference to file for adjudication on merit. 13. Against the said order dated 12th April, 1977, the appellant moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained the above mentioned Rule. The said Rule Nisi was discharged as stated hereinbefore against which order of discharge the appellants has come up in appeal. 14. Mr. Dipankar Gupta appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted before us that the power to recall an award was a substantive matter and not a procedural matter and the respondent Tribunal had or has no such powers. Mr. Gupta's next contention was that setting aside an award as in the instant case was really re-calling an award, which would imply the power of making a second award by a Tribunal after re-calling the first Award made by the Tribunal. Thus, according to Mr. Gupta, the expression procedure in S. 11(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act means and implies procedure or procedural matters leading up to and culminating in the passing of an award. Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act confers the power to make an award specifically on a Tribunal. The Tribunal can only assume jurisdiction under specific power conferred by the Statute to make an award and on the passing of or making of an award such jurisdiction ends and there is no longer any power in the Tribunal to make a further award. Proceedings before a Tribunal according to Mr. Gupta come to an end on the submission of an award and the procedural part under S. 11 of the Act cannot travel beyond. The Tribunal indeed becomes functus officio and its power to make any other award becomes exhausted after the making of an award. In this connection Mr. Gupta drew our attention to the S. 17(2) and S. 20 and sub-sections thereto of the Act and submitted that finality attaches to an award after an award is made and the same becomes irrevocable. In this connection Mr. Gupta drew our attention to the S. 17(2) and S. 20 and sub-sections thereto of the Act and submitted that finality attaches to an award after an award is made and the same becomes irrevocable. According to Mr. Gupta, the Tribunal being a creature of Statute, had no inherent power to recall or set aside the award and it had no such power conferred upon it by the Statute creating the Tribunal. 15. According to Mr. P.S. Sengupta, the Tribunal has the power to set aside an ex parte award in the interest of justice unless the Statute imposes a bar thereon by express words or by necessary implication. Mr. Sengupta further submitted that S. 11(1) of the Act confers power upon the Tribunal to set aside an ex part award. Rule 22 of the Rules framed by the Central Government under the Act also confers such power on the Tribunal and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte award until it loses seisin of the matter by virtue of S. 20.3) Mr. Sengupta submitted finally that Rule 24(b) of the Central Government Rules attracts Order 17, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which by necessary implication attracts provisions of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus confers power upon the Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award after sufficient cause is shown in terms of Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. Section 11 sub-section (1) of the Act lays down that Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think fit. Sub-section (3) of that section lays down that Every Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), when trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely: – (a) Enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. (b) Compelling the production of documents and material objects. (c) Issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. (d) In respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. (b) Compelling the production of documents and material objects. (c) Issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. (d) In respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of S. 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). Section 11A of the Act lays down the power of Labour Court, Tribunals and National Tribunal to give appropriate reliefs in case of discharge and dismissal of workmen. Section 12 of the Act sets out the duties of Conciliation officers. Section 13 sets out the duties of Board. Section 15 lays down the duties of Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunals. Section 17 of the Act provides for inter alia the publication of awards of inter alia a National Tribunal within a period of 30 days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate government. Sub-section (2) of S. 17 lays down that Award published under sub-section (1) of said Section would subject to provision of S. 17A be final and would not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever. Section 17A of the Act makes an award enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date its publication under S. 17 provided the appropriate government or the Central Government does not by notification in the Official Gazette declare in the circumstance mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) of S. 17A that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the above mentioned period of 30 days. Section 18 enumerates the persons on whom settlements and awards under Act are binding. Section 19 of the Act provides for period of operation of statements and awards. Section 20 of the Act lays down the date when a proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Court or Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced or concluded and is material for the purpose of deciding the issue that arise for decision in the appeal Sub-section 3 of S. 20 of the Act is relevant for our purpose and is set out hereunder. "20(1).............................................................................................................. (2)................................................................................................................... (a)................................................................................................................... (b)................................................................................................................... (c)................................................................................................................... "20(1).............................................................................................................. (2)................................................................................................................... (a)................................................................................................................... (b)................................................................................................................... (c)................................................................................................................... (3) Proceedings before an arbitrator and S. 10A or before a Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of the reference of the dispute for arbitration or adjudication as the case may be and such proceeding shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award become enforceable under S. 17A." 17. Rule 22 and Rule 24(b) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 framed under the rule making powers conferred by S. 38 of the Act lay down that: – "22. If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding a before a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal. National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented." "24. Power of Board, Courts, Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals – In addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Board, Courts, Labour Courts, Tribunal, and National Tribunals shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely: – (a)................................................................... (b) Granting adjournment. (c).................................................................... And the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal may summon and examine any person whose evidence appears to it to be material and shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of S. 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898." 18. It should be noted that the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was enacted in order to provide machinery for settlement of Industrial Disputes between the employer and his workmen and to do social justice. Its, provisions, therefore in our opinion, should be construed in the background of the above mentioned fact. 19. It should be borne in mind that the Industrial Tribunal performs judicial function and the procedure to be followed by it must be such as would enable it to carry out judicial function and judicial duties. It is true that a Tribunal has only the powers with which it is invested by the Statute creating it. 19. It should be borne in mind that the Industrial Tribunal performs judicial function and the procedure to be followed by it must be such as would enable it to carry out judicial function and judicial duties. It is true that a Tribunal has only the powers with which it is invested by the Statute creating it. But nonetheless in our opinion a Tribunal has all the incidental and ancillary powers apart from that with which it is expressly invested by the Statute creating it in order to be able to do justice to the parties. Such incidental or ancillary powers are implicit in the express powers conferred upon it by the Statute creating the Tribunal. The Tribunal in our opinion have all the powers which are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the object intended to be secured. In the case of P.N. Thakershi vs. Prodyumansanghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , the Supreme Court in considering the S. 63 of the Saurastra Land Reform Act (25 of 1951) stated that there was no provision in the said Act from which the power of the State Government to review its own order under S. 63 could be gathered and it was obvious therefore that the delegates of the State Government under S. 63 could not review the order of the Government. The Supreme Court stated the law to be that the power to review was not an inherent power. The same had to be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. In the case of Gangaram Tea Company vs. Second Labour Court, 71 CWN 14, it was held by B.C. Mitter, J that the Industrial Tribunal was a statutory authority. It had no inherent power to direct the matter to be heard afresh after the recording of the fact had been closed. In the case of Gangaram Tea Company vs. Second Labour Court, 71 CWN 14, it was held by B.C. Mitter, J that the Industrial Tribunal was a statutory authority. It had no inherent power to direct the matter to be heard afresh after the recording of the fact had been closed. In the case of Malik Dairy Firms vs. Its Workers' Union, 1968(II) LLJ 523, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed in an application flied under Article 227 of the constitution challenging the legality of an ex parte award to the effect that where the Labour Court passes an ex parte award and the aggrieved party approaches the High Court under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Courts are unable to interfere with the award unless the Labour Court is found to be wrong in law in proceeding ex parte. In that case the Labour Court was not found to be wrong in proceeding ex parte and making an ex parte award under the relevant rule framed in Bombay and thus the application was dismissed. It should be noted however that in the instant case before us the contention of the appellant is that the ex parte award made by the respondent Tribunal could not be set aside by the Tribunal. In the case Md. Y. Kola vs. James D' Souza, 1974 Lab. IC 880, a single judge of the Mysore High Court was pleased to hold that in the absence of a specific power contended upon it the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte award. In Himat Singh Kuber Singh vs. Board of Revenue, AIR 1966 MP 43 , it was also decided that an inferior court or Tribunal like the Board of Revenue had no power to review its previous decision inasmuch as the proceeding initiated for the review of a decision was not a continuation of the original proceeding. It was a separate substantive procedure. The power to entertain a review petition must be conferred by statute and can be exercised inter alia within the limitation prescribed by the statute for the exercise of that power. It was a separate substantive procedure. The power to entertain a review petition must be conferred by statute and can be exercised inter alia within the limitation prescribed by the statute for the exercise of that power. In the case Sarbjit Singh vs. Nankana Sahib Transport, 1972, (II) LLJ 341, it was held by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana following the case of Dwarka Devi vs. Hans Raj, ILR (1963) 2 Punjab 458, that an Industrial Tribunal had the entertain an application for setting aside an ex parte order. 20. In the case Management of Dhenkanal Municipality vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, 1974(1) LLJ 44, a Division Bench of Orissa High Court held that an Industrial Tribunal had Jurisdiction to entertain an application to set aside an ex parte award. There the Industrial held that it had no power to do so and dismissed the application. The decision of the Tribunal was quashed and the Tribunal was directed to entertain the application for setting aside the ex parte award. The same was the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Metal Fabsicators (India) vs. B.D. Gupta, 1975 Lab, IC 1707. 21. It should be noted that under sub-section 3 of S. 11 of the Act a Tribunal has been invested with same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of matters mentioned in clauses (a) (b) (c) and (d) of sub-section 3 of S. 11. Rule 22 of the Central Rules quoted above empowers the Tribunal to proceed ex parte and make an ex parte award inter alia if any party to the proceeding fails to attend or to be represented without sufficient cause being shown. Rule 24 of the Central Rules confers the power upon the Tribunal to grant adjournment as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. Adjournments under the Code of Civil Procedure have been provided for in Order 17. Order 17, Rule 2 of the C.P.C. provides that where on any date to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fails to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the models directed in that behalf by Order 9 or make such further order as it thinks fit. Thus Rule 24(b) of the Central Rules attracts the provision of order 17 of the Civil Procedure Code to a proceeding before a National Tribunal and order 17 in turn makes the provision of order 9 applicable to such a proceeding before a National Tribunal. If provisions of order 9 is made applicable, an ex parte award may in our opinion, be set aside under the provision analogous to order 9 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus an ex parte award may be set aside provided such award does not become final in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 22. In the instant case the ex parte order was made on December 9, 1976. The award was published in the Gazette of India under S. 17 of the Act on 25th December, 1976. Before the expiry of 30 days from the date of the said publication on 19th January 1977 the respondent nos. 5 to 17 through the said Association applied before the Tribunal inter alia for setting aside the said ex parte award. The Tribunal set aside the ex parte award on 12th April, 1977 after giving opportunity to the appellant to file opposition to the application for setting aside the award and after hearing the parties. The proceeding before the National Tribunal commenced on the date of reference and continued under S. 20(3) of the Act until the award become enforceable under S. 17 A. But before the ex parte award became final in the instant case or in other words before the proceeding before the respondent Tribunal concluded, the above mentioned application for setting aside the ex parte award was made and the ex parte award was set aside by the Tribunal. It appears to us that as soon as the application for setting a side the ex parte award was filed the respondent Tribunal acquired jurisdiction to entertain the said application and decide the said application. In our opinion merely for the reason that that application was heard after 30 day from the date of publication of the award in the Gazette had expired was only a fortuitous event which was beyond the control of the respondents nos. 5 to 17 or the respondent Association and which wall not due to any default on the part of the respondent nos. 5 to 17 or the Association. 5 to 17 or the respondent Association and which wall not due to any default on the part of the respondent nos. 5 to 17 or the Association. In our opinion, the expiry of the 30 days did not affect the jurisdiction of the respondent Tribunal to entertain the application which was filed prior to the expiry of 30 day from the date of the publication in the Gazette and the respondent National Tribunal had jurisdiction to allow the application and set aside the ex parte award. The fact that the application was heard on 12th April, 1977 did not, in our opinion, take away the jurisdiction of the respondent Tribunal to hear and set aside the ex part award. 23. Moreover, in our opinion, the present sub-section (1) of S. 11 of the Act as emended by Act 36 of 1956 confers wide powers on the Tribunal. It empowers amongst other a Tribunal or National Tribunal to follow such procedure as it may think fit. Such procedure, however must not inconstant with the provisions of the Act or the Rule framed thereunder. An act or any of the Central Rules does not forbid the setting aside of an ex parte award. On the contrary Rule 22 of the Central Rule quoted herein above framed under the act empowers a Tribunal or a National Tribunal amongst others to proceed ex parte against any party to proceeding before it the party fails to attend or be represented without sufficient cause being shown. As we read this Rule it appears to us that it is award is made for being absent or unrepresented at the hearing, may apply before the Tribunal or National Tribunal amongst others before the award or order becomes final to set aside the said ex parte order or award by showing sufficient cause for not being able to attend or represent at the hearing when the ex parte order or award was made. The Tribunal in such case has the power, on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the party absence and non-representation at the hearing to set aside the ex parte order or award. 24. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the Impugned order was validly made by the National Tribunal which had ample power to make the said order and this appeal has no merit. 24. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the Impugned order was validly made by the National Tribunal which had ample power to make the said order and this appeal has no merit. This appeal is therefore dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.