JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff seeking interference with the judgment and decree made by the lower appellate Court after reversing that of the trial Court. The lower appellate Court has dismissed the claim for eviction by holding that since the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was not initially available on the date of the suit itself, there was no scope for decreeing the claim for eviction in the absence of any other ground as specified in section 12 (1) (a) of the Act, despite the fact that the case of the defendant tenant was hit by the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of section 12 of the act, which deprives the tenant from getting protection against eviction on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act, i. e. default in payment of arrears of rent, if he had already availed of such benefit once in an earlier suit. ( 2. ) IN order to appreciate the points arising for determination in this appeal, the facts relevant are that prior to the institution of the present suit out of which this appeal arises, one civil suit registered as Civil Suit No. 80-A of 1968 was instituted by the landlord claiming eviction of the tenant and in the said suit, the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act was pleaded and relied for claiming eviction. In the aforesaid suit, the tenant did make immediate deposits in compliance of the provisions of section 13 (1) of the act. However, as is evident from the judgment in the earlier suit, the claim for eviction could not be decreed because the quit notice relied in the earlier suit for determining the contractual tenancy was found to be invalid. It is true that the Court while dismissing the suit did make an observation that the tenant had complied with the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Act and as such he could also claim the protection under sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Act. Before institution of the present suit when the tenant again fell in arrears of rent, a notice of demand was served. The tenant, however, this time remitted the entire amount of rent by money order vide Ex. Before institution of the present suit when the tenant again fell in arrears of rent, a notice of demand was served. The tenant, however, this time remitted the entire amount of rent by money order vide Ex. D -1 within the prescribed period of two months and when the same was tendered to the landlord, he refused to accept the same. Accordingly, it was returned back to the sender with the endorsement made by the postman disclosing refusal by the payee. The landlord has also admitted in his cross examination that he had refused to accept the payment sent vide Ex. D -1. After trial of the present suit, the trial Court, however, decreed the claim for eviction by holding that since the tenant had already availed the protection under sub-section (3) of section 12 in the earlier suit, he was liable to be evicted irrespective of the fact that on service of the notice, on which the present suit is based, he had remitted the entire amount by money order within two months, because after the dismissal of the first suit, he had been in arrears for more than three consecutive months and that itself made him liable for eviction. The lower appellate Court was, however, of the view that since the claim for eviction in the earlier suit had to be dismissed for want of service of proper quit notice, there was no question of the tenant availing the protection under section 12 (3) of the Act in the subsequent suit. The lower appellate Court was also of the view that in the second suit, the ground under section 12 (1) (a)of the Act was initially not at all available because the tenant had remitted the amount of arrears of rent within two months from the date of service of notice of demand, and once the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act was not available to the plaintiff on the date of the institution of the second suit, there was no question of applying the proviso to section 12 (3) of the act because the claim for eviction cannot be decreed in the absence of a ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. The lower appellate Court accordingly dismissed the claim of the plaintiff for eviction of the defendant tenant. Being aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff landlord has preferred this appeal. The lower appellate Court accordingly dismissed the claim of the plaintiff for eviction of the defendant tenant. Being aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff landlord has preferred this appeal. ( 3. ) THE learned single Judge, who heard this ease on the question of admission admitted this second appeal for final hearing of the parties on the following two questions-: (1) Whether in view of the fact that the defendant was given benefit of section 12 (3) of the Act in earlier suit for ejectment was it sufficient to claim the decree for ejectment to establish that the defendant had committed three consecutive defaults in payment of rent thereafter or was it also necessary to make cut a ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act? (2) Does section 12 (3) of the Act over-ride section 12 (1) (a) and in cases based on the proviso to section 12 (3) of the Act, it is not necessary to show beyond showing three consecutive defaults that the tenant has committed default after service of the demand of notice for payment of arrears of rent? ( 4. ) IN the facts and circumstances of the present case, the points which need determination in this second appeal are two folds. Firstly, it has to be determined whether the defendant tenant could be said to have availed of the benefit of the provisions of sections 12 (3) of the Act giving protection against eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent when the claim for eviction in the said suit itself was not tenable and could not be decreed irrespective of the entitlement or no entitlement to the protection under section 12 (3) of the Act because the quit notice relied in the earlier suit was itself found to be bad in law and thereby invalid and ineffective. The other point which may need determination is if the first point is ultimately held in favour of the plaintiff landlord, the second question which will need determination will be whether in the subsequent suit the claim for eviction could be decreed when the ground under section 12 (l) (a) of the Act was not available because the defendant tenant had remitted the entire amount of arrears of rent within two months from the date of service of notice of demand. The third aspect which will need consideration and determination will be whether the fact of three consecutive defaults in itself will constitute a ground for eviction and there will be no need for serving a notice of demand for bringing a fresh suit on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act and even if any such notice is served on the tenant and the tenant tenders the amount within the period of two months, the plaintiff remains entitled to the relief of eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent for consecutive three months. ( 5. ) IN the opinion of this Court, the claim of the plaintiff must fail on the first ground itself. Actually speaking, the other questions do not arise at all because since the tenant could not be said to have availed the benefit of the provisions of section 12 (3) of the Act in the earlier suit, he remains entitled to claim such benefit in the present suit even if it was held that the suit was otherwise tenable despite remittance of the arrears of rent within two months from the subsequent notice of demand. In the earlier suit, there was no question of claiming protection against eviction by availing the benefit under section 12 (3) of the Act. The question for protection arises when there is otherwise the scope for decreeing the claim for eviction. When the quit notice itself was found to be bad and ineffective then irrespective of the availability of the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act, the claim for eviction could never be decreed by the civil Court in the earlier suit. Once it was so, it will not be possible to say that the tenant could avoid the decree only by availing the benefit of section 12 (3) of the Act. When the stage itself for claiming the benefit did not reach, there was no scope for holding that the party concerned availed the said benefit. ( 6. ) IN view of the aforesaid finding, it is not necessary to deal with the other two aspects of the case. However, for the reasons given in the case of vishnudayal (since deceased) through L. Rs. ( 6. ) IN view of the aforesaid finding, it is not necessary to deal with the other two aspects of the case. However, for the reasons given in the case of vishnudayal (since deceased) through L. Rs. Rameshchand and another v. Angoori bal, (Second Appeal No. 89 of 1974 decided by this Court on 18-9-1979), the other two points also stand determined in favour of the tenant. This Court has held in the above referred case that the effect of the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Act is that when once the tenant had availed of the benefit of the protection in the earlier suit, he will not be entitled again to claim the protection even by making compliance of the provisions of section 13 of the Act regarding payment of arrears of rent in the subsequent suit. This does not mean that continuous default for three months is in itself a ground under section 12 (1) of the Act. Even the subsequent suit claiming eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent must disclose the ground as contemplated by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act and for that purpose, it will be essential to disclose that despite service of notice of demand, the tenant failed to pay or tender the amount of arrears of rent within two months from the date of service of such notice. Once such a ground is again created then alone a suit for eviction on the ground of default can be brought and in such a subsequent suit, the tenant will not be entitled to claim the protection even by making the payment of arrears of rent in compliance with the provisions of section 13 of the Act which applies to a stage subsequent to the institution of the suit, if he had already once availed such a protection. If this contention raised by the respondent plaintiff is accepted, then it would mean adding one more ground for eviction under section 12 (1), namely default for three consecutive months by a tenant who had already availed of the protection of subsection (3) of section 12 of the Act. The question of giving protection arises only when there is a liability for eviction. The question of giving protection arises only when there is a liability for eviction. The liability for eviction arises only when there is a ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. Hence if there is no ground on which the subsequent suit could be based, there was no question of the tenant claiming protection and consequently no question of attracting the applicability of the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Act. ( 7. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant plaintiff cited a number of decisions of the Delhi High Court as reported in 1970 Rent Control journal, 12; 1970 Rent Control Journal Page 929; 1969 Rent Control Journal page 334 and AIR 1977 Delhi 129. Reference was also made to two decisions of this Court reported in 1966 J L J page 1028 and 1972 J L J Short note 23. On going through the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that in all the above referred cases, a second notice of demand was served before filing of the subsequent suit and the tenant defendant had not complied with the same by making payment within the prescribed period according to the provisions of the Delhi Control Act. Similar was the position in the cases giving rise to the two decisions of this Court as cited above. In these two cases also, the subsequent notice making a demand, as contemplated under section 12 (1) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 prior to the institution of the suit was served and there was a default. In these circumstances, neither the Delhi High Court nor this Court had any occasion to deal with this aspect of the case. Even otherwise, as discussed above, the legal position is apparently clear from the language used in section 12 (1) (a)of the Act and section 12 (3) of the Act and the proviso appended to the same. The fact of three consecutive defaults has been made a ground for depriving the tenant from availing protection if he is found liable for eviction in the subsequent suit on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. The mere fact of three consecutive defaults has not been made a ground for eviction at par with the various grounds as contemplated by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12. The mere fact of three consecutive defaults has not been made a ground for eviction at par with the various grounds as contemplated by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12. The stage for applying the proviso comes only when in the subsequent suit there is a ground for decreeing the claim for eviction as specified in section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. ( 8. ) IN view of the discussion made above, this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.