Judgment This Rule is directed against an order of suspension dated 25.9.71 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Midnapore under Regulation 880 of the Police Regulation Bengal, 1943. 2. Petitioner was appointed in the year 1976 as a Sub-Inspector of Police in the West Bengal Police Service. He was required to be on probation for three years including one year training period at Barrackpore Police Training College. On 6th July, 1978 he joined as a "probationary" Sub-Inspector at Daspur Police Station in Midnapore District. On 2nd September, 1978 there was a ravaging flood in Daspur area. No official quarter was allotted to the petitioner. So he stayed in a rented private home. As the flood water approached the police station, he had to rush to his residence situated at a distance of about half kilometer from the police station, It is stated in the petition that the petitioner had to stay with the landlord on the 1st floor of that house at the night as there was a bout 4'ft water inside the rooms in the ground floor. On 3rd September, 1978 he made all efforts to contact Daspur Police Station, but could not reach there because of strong current of the water. Furthermore there was about 5'ft water all round. As the petitioner himself was facing danger of his life, he took a risky attempt to go out on the 4th September, 1978,after plodding through chest-deep water. He found a private boat proceeding towards Kalmijore. On reaching al Kalmijore which took about 7 hours by boat, he availed of a bolt which was going towards the Bombay Road. He reached Kolaghat and from there took a train to Howrah. On 5th September, 1979 he reached his home town at Bankura. Thereafter, he fell ill and was under medical treatment. He sent a petition to the respondent No.1 on the 7th September, 1978, informing him all the facts and praying for necessary instructions the Officer-in-Charge of Daspur Police Station was also lent a copy of the said petition. He, however received no instruction as prayed fur, from the respondent No.1. On 18th September, 1978 on recovery from his illness, he resumed duties at Daspur Police Station. On the same day, the respondent No.1 paid a surprise visit and threatened that the contemplated departmental proceedings would cause an end of his service career. He, however received no instruction as prayed fur, from the respondent No.1. On 18th September, 1978 on recovery from his illness, he resumed duties at Daspur Police Station. On the same day, the respondent No.1 paid a surprise visit and threatened that the contemplated departmental proceedings would cause an end of his service career. On 25th September, 1978 the respondent No.1 passed the impugned order placing the petitioner under suspension on the alleged ground that the continuance of the petitioner in office would be prejudicial to public interest pending inquiry into his conduct in a departmental proceeding By the said order petitioner was directed to attend all Roll Calls at Midnapore Police Lines until further order. On the 26th September, 1978 petitioner prayed for reconsideration of the decision of the respondent No.1. On 9th October, 1978 the petitioner went to the orderly room to know the fate of his petition dated 26th September, 1978 when he was told by the respondent No.1 that the decision already taken in the matter was final. On 23rd October, 1978 petitioner was served with a charge-sheet alleging inter alia that the petitioner left the police station on 4th September, 1975 without any leave or permission and remained absent till 17th September, 1978. It was further alleged that the petitioner neglected his duties, showed utter cowardice and behaved in an indisciplined manner, Petitioner being aggrieved by the said order moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained the present Rule. 3 Mr. Banerji appearing on behalf of the petitioner raised three points. In the first place he contended that on the 25th September, 1978 when the impugned order of suspension was passed, no inquiry against the petitioner was pending and as such the order of suspension in terms of Regulation 880 could not have been passed in the present case. 4. In a Single Bench decision of this Court- Sisir Kumar Chattopadhyay v. State of West Bengal & Ors. 77 CWN 300 that particular Police Regulation bas been construed and this Court held that an inquiry in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding is an inquiry under this rule in absence of any express or implied provisions to the contrary. The said decision was followed by me in G. R. 4193 (W) and 4194 (W) of 1914 decided on March 7, 1977. The said decision was followed by me in G. R. 4193 (W) and 4194 (W) of 1914 decided on March 7, 1977. So it is immaterial whether any actual inquiry in connection with the disciplinary proceeding was pending or not. 5. The second point raised by Mr Banerji was that charge as framed was erroneous. Regulation 875 authorised a disciplinary action for misbehaviour only incase of unauthorisod absence. The charges of wilful negligence of duties. behaving in an indisciplined manner were contrary to Regulation 875 and the petitioner was not required to face such illegal proceeding. 6. The main charge is unauthorised absence. The delinquent was absent thereby he wilfully neglected his duties and showed cowardice and behaved ill an indisciplined manner because he was afraid of the situation when the area was seriously affected by flood. Section 29 of the Police Act provides penalties for neglect of duty. Police Officer who shall withdraw from the duty of his office without permission or who shall be guilty of cowardice shall be liable. to conviction before a Magistrate to a penalty not exceeding three months pay, or to imprisonment with or without hard labour, for a period of not exceeding there months or to both. So, it cannot be said that the charge as framed is contrary to Regulation 875 of Police Regulation read with S. 29 of the Police Act. 7. The third point raised by Mr. Banerji is that, the impugned order of suspension has been passed mechanically and without application of mind. The statement in the said order that the continuance of the petitioner in office during the pendency of the inquiry would be prejudical to public interest is merely reproduction of the language used in Regulation 880 of the Police Regulation. The satisfaction of the respondent No. 1 in this behalf I was without any actual or factual basis and such satisfaction if any, was passed on irrelevant and extraneous consideration not germane to the issue. 8. In the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Pranab Prasanna Biswas, Superintendent of Police, Midnapur, it is stated that after due inquiry and consideration-, the petitioner was placed under suspension under District order No. 0532 dated 25.9.78 and the deponent after satisfying himself that his continuance in office was prejudicial in public interest, passed the order pending inquiry into his conduct in a departmental proceeding. 9. Mr. 9. Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the respondents contends that when the competent authority considered that in the public interest the petitioner should be suspended after taking into account all relevant circumstances, it is not for the Court to substitute its own reasoning and come to a different conclusion that the suspension pending inquiry into the petitioner's conduct was not prejudicial to the public interest. Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Mayengbau Radha Mohan Singh v. Chief Commissioner (Administrator) Manipur & ors. AIR 1976 SC 2581 . 10. It was a case of compulsory retirement of a Government Officer under Fundamental Rule 56(1). In the affidavit affirmed by the Chief Commissioner it was stated that the order was made because he was of opinion that it was in public interest to also. The Supreme Court observed following the decision of J.N. Sinha's case AIR 1971 SC 40 , that whether the order is correct or not is not to be gone into by the Court. 11. In J.N. Sinha's case the Supreme Court said that the right conferred by Rule 56(1) of the Fundamental Rules on the appropriate authority to retire a Government servant compulsively is an absolute one, but that right or power can be exercised only subject to the conditions mentioned In the Rule and one of these conditions is that, the appropriate authority must be of opinion that it is in public interest to do so. It the authority bona fide forms that opinion, correctness of the opinion cannot be challenged before Courts. But it is open to the aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or that the decision is based on collaterial grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision. In order that the decision may not be arbitrary it should be based on some ground or material which is germane to the question whether it is in public interest to retire the Government servant. If the decision is based on no such ground or material or is based on a ground or material which is not germane to the issue, it would be an arbitrary decision. 12. If the decision is based on no such ground or material or is based on a ground or material which is not germane to the issue, it would be an arbitrary decision. 12. To show the difference of language in Regulation 880 of Police Regulation I will refer to some other Service Rules dealing with suspension, Rule 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, provides, if, having regard to the circumstances in any case, and where articles of charge have been drawn up, the nature of the charges, the Government of a State or the Central Government of a State or the Central Government, as the case may be, is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension a member of the Service, against whom disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or are pending, that Government may a) if the member or the Service is serving under that Government, pass an order placing him under suspension, or b) if the member or the Service is serving under another Government, request that Government to place him under suspension pending the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings and the passing of the final order in the ease. 13.Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965' provides that an appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President by general' or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending, or aa) where in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself In activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State: or b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial; 14. Rule 1706 of the Conduct and Discipline Rules for Railway Servants provides that a railway servant may be placed under suspension – a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending: or b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. 15. Rule 1706 of the Conduct and Discipline Rules for Railway Servants provides that a railway servant may be placed under suspension – a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending: or b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. 15. Rule 7(1) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971 provides that the appointing authority or any authority to which it is sub-ordinate or any authority empowered by the Governor in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding .or departmental enquiry against him is contemplated or is pending; or (b) Where in the opinion of the authority aforesaid he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the Security of the of the State; or (c) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial; Provided that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made. 16. Police Regulation 858(2) provides that a Superintendent may suspend any Inspector subordinate to him pending inquiry into his conduct and may award to him the punishment mentioned in (a) (iv) an enter it at his discretion in the officer's service record, reporting every case to the Deputy Inspector General of the Range, giving details explanatory of the necessity for his action. Regulation 858(4) provides that an Assistant Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent, or Inspector has been empowered to suspend any Assistant Inspector, Head Constable, Naik or Constable, pending inquiry into his conduct*** Regulation 880(a) reads as follows: "Suspension is not to be considered a specific punishment and is only authorized in cases where the continuance in an office of an officer pending inquiry into his conduct is prejudicial to public interest. When the inquiries are completed, some definite order of acquittal or punishment shall be recorded." 17. The phraseology of Regulation 880 dealing with suspension is entirely different from other service Rules referred to hereinabove. It is to be noted that the Police Regulations were framed in 1943 and most of the service rules dealing with suspension have been framed after the Constitution came into force. The phraseology of Regulation 880 dealing with suspension is entirely different from other service Rules referred to hereinabove. It is to be noted that the Police Regulations were framed in 1943 and most of the service rules dealing with suspension have been framed after the Constitution came into force. The plain language of Regu1ation 880 is that, it authorises suspension only in cases where the continuance in an office of an officer pending inquiry into his conduct is "prejudicial to public interest". So the condition precedent for exercising powers under either Regulation 858(2) or (4) is that, save and except where the continuance of a delinquent officer in his office pending enquiry into his conduct is prejudicial to public interest. no order of suspension could be passed. The words "only authorized" expressed the Legislative intention in the clearest and precise manner. 18. In Gurupada Banerji v Stare of West Bengal 1972 (2) CLJ 35. this Court observed in a case of compulsory retirement of government servant under Rule 75 (aa) of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part-I. that the word, "public interest" has a well defined meaning The "'hole object of retiring government servant prematurely is that public money should not be wasted in retaining these officers who outlived their utility to the service, whose integrities are doubtful. who are physically incapable of doing any work, who have lost efficiency, and who are not mentally alert. These are some of the materials which arc germane to the issue that the public servant should retire compulsorily in "public interest", 19. It is not possible to give any uniform meaning of the expression "public interest". It takes different meaning in statute where it occurs and varies with the facts and circumstances of each case. Considerations of materials for compulsorily retiring a public servant "in public interest" cannot be similar to suspend a Police Officer pending inquiry into his conducting a departmental proceedings under Police Regulation 880. 20. Suspension order is generally issued when disciplinary proceedings against a particular employee arc contemplated or have started or charge-sheet is given. Sometimes this is regulated by the Service Rules. When the rules provided that a servant against whom the inquiries contemplated or proceedings have started, may be placed under suspension pending inquiry, then he can be suspended even when an inquiry as contemplated has not actually been initiated. Sometimes this is regulated by the Service Rules. When the rules provided that a servant against whom the inquiries contemplated or proceedings have started, may be placed under suspension pending inquiry, then he can be suspended even when an inquiry as contemplated has not actually been initiated. When power to suspend is expressly made subject to specific salutatory limitation, then the scope of the said power cannot be extended by assuming an implied power of suspension. 21. The object of suspension is to facilitate easy collection of evidence in the investigation or inquiry into the charges levelled against a delinquent officer. It would be prejudicial to the public interest when the authorities are satisfied that the witnesses may hesitate to depose against the delinquent officer 50 long as he continues to be in the office or that the delinquent officer should be prevented from tampering with the witnesses or records. Apart from this, if over a particular incidence there is a great public agitation against a particular police officer and the people of the locality wants immediate transfer of the said officer, in that case, the presence of the said officer in the office would be prejudicial to the public interest within the meaning of Regulation 880 and even before framing any charges or holding any preliminary inquiry against the conduct of the delinquent officer, the order of suspension could be passed by the competent authorities. The gravity of the charge, is also a relevant factor for which an order of suspension could be passed. When the charges against an officer is of moral turpitude, bribery, defalcation of public money, corruption or of any criminal charges, in that case, it is implicit that his continuance in the office would be prejudicial to the interest of the public. These are relevant facts to be taken into account while passing the order of suspension under Regulation 880. 22. Whenever an order of suspension is challenged on the ground that it was passed disregarding the relevant considerations, it is open to the Court or taking into account extraneous considerations, it is open to the Court to consider whether the considerations are relevant and germane to the issue viz, the continuance of the officer in the office would be prejudicial to the public interest. Sufficiency of the materials, however could not be gone into. 23. Sufficiency of the materials, however could not be gone into. 23. In the instant case, the entire records were produced before me. There is nothing on the records to show that why the presence of the delinquent petitioner in the office would prejudice the public interest. 24. Mr. Chatterjee, appearing for the respondents sought to argue that under Police Regulation 875 when an officer absents himself without leave, the delinquent mw be punished for mis-behaviour after drawing up proceedings and he is also liable to prosecution under S. 29 of the Police Act, 1851, It is contended by Mr. Chatterji that the Police constitutes the executive civil force of the State. It has an important roll to play. A probationary Assistant Sub-Inspector who was posted at Daspur Police Station for getting his practical training, left the police station when that area was seriously affected by flood. It was expected that as a member of a disciplinary force it was his duty to serve people in distress and to stretch his hands to save the life and properties of the people of the locality affected by the flood. On the other hand, being afraid and to save his own life he flied away from the affected area. It is argued that his very presence in Daspur Police Station might be detrimental to the public interest; as by his conduct he has brought down the image of Police before the public eye. According to Mr. Chatterjee, these are the materials for satisfaction of the competent authority to pass the impugned order. 25. In the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the Superintendent of Police, the deponent has not said that the presence of the delinquent petitioner would prejudicially affect the interest of the public inasmuch as his presence itself would be detrimental to the public interest. If there was any complaint or agitation by the people of the locality against the petitioner that they wanted transfer of that cowardly officer, in that case, order of suspension could have been justified. There is nothing on the records to show that the petitioner was trying to tamper the records or win over the witnesses. On the other hand it appears from the records that the officer-in-charge of the police station sought permission of the higher authorities to allot duties to the petitioner for relief works but such permission was not granted. 26. There is nothing on the records to show that the petitioner was trying to tamper the records or win over the witnesses. On the other hand it appears from the records that the officer-in-charge of the police station sought permission of the higher authorities to allot duties to the petitioner for relief works but such permission was not granted. 26. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 579 the Supreme Court observed that the administrative order is subject to judicial review on the ground that it is mala fide or that the reasons for making the order are extraneous or that they have no relevance to the interest of the general public or that they cannot possibly support the making of the order in the interest of the general public. 27. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, in my opinion, the condition precedent for exercising powers of suspension under Regulation 880 have not been fulfilled in the instant case inasmuch as the respondents failed to produce any materials to show that continuance of the petitioner in the office pending inquiry into his conduct would be prejudicial to public interest. Administrative order based on reasons of fact which do not in fact exist must be held to be infected with an abuse of power and such order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the impugned ardor of suspension is quashed. The Rule is made absolute. Let a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding the respondents not to give effect to the order of suspension. This order, however, shall not prevent the respondents to continue the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.