JUDGMENT Bajpai, J. 1. The principle of lis pendens as contemplated by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act owes its origin to the maxim of Roman Law "rem de que controversia prohib mur in acrum decicare." This means that where the subject in dispute owing to contest in between parties passes into the custody of the Court, parties are under an obligation not to withdraw it from the protection of the Court and that is why it was provided that the property involved in a suit cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein. The consequence, thus, was that a transferee pendente lite remains bound by the ultimate decision of the lis, But these provisions were not meant for enabling a party who had no right, title or interest to snatch away the property from the hands of a purchaser pendente lite on the basis of an admission made by the codefendant-transferor subsequent to the date of transfer stating that he had no right title or interest and that the plaintiff was the owner. The reason is that it would be in equitable to allow a person who has parted with his interest in the property in favour of the other to divest the right of the other claiming under him by any statement which he may choose to make subsequently. The claim of the plaintiff-appellant in the present case to secure a decree on the basis of the admission made by defendant No.1 in an application for compromise has been rejected and his suit claiming declaration of his ownership and permanent injunction has been further dismissed because he failed to establish any such right, title or interest. 2. Before this Court also, the plaintiff-appellant claimed a decree not only on merits of his claim but also on the basis of a compromise admitting his claim entered by defendant No.1 after he had already sold the suit land to defendant No.2. 3. The case of the appellant-plaintiff on merits was that prior to abloom of the Jagirdari or Zamindari rights in the local area which took place in 1951, he had acquired those rights and had been in actual possession of the suit land as a tenant. 3. The case of the appellant-plaintiff on merits was that prior to abloom of the Jagirdari or Zamindari rights in the local area which took place in 1951, he had acquired those rights and had been in actual possession of the suit land as a tenant. It was further asserted that he had been in possession throughout upto the date of suit and defendant-respondent No. 1 Jalima or his father Haria had no right, title or interest in the suit land, nor they had been in possession at any time. However, at the stage of evidence the plaintiff himself had to admit that he happened to occupy the suit land as an encroacher and was not inducted as a tenant by the Zamindar. As regards evidence the fact of continuous actual physical possession since 1951 and onwards, the plaintiff relied on his self-serving testimony and similar oral testimony of a few villagers. It would be significant to mention that there is no mention of even the possession of the present appellant-plaintiff on the suit holding or any part thereof in the annual papers either prior to 1951 or afterwards. Throughout for the last more then 15 or 16 years upto the date of suit the suit land has been recorded initial1y in the name of Haria, the father of respondent defendant No. 1 Jalima as a tenant, and after the death of Haria, the same has been mutated and recorded in the name of Jalima, his son. Haria and Jalima have been thus shown as tenants and holders in actual possession of the suit land. The Courts below have, therefore, accepted the version of respondent-defendant No.2 and his witnesses because the same found support from the statutory revenue records which were prepared and maintained long before the present dispute came into existence. Thus, the finding by the Courts below that the plaintiff was not in actual physical possession of the suit land at any time since the abolition of Zamindari rights upto the date of suit is a finding on a pure question of fact and cannot be said to be perverse or arbitrary in any manner. It is based on sufficient material on record and has been arrived after proper appreciation of the evidence on record. 4. It is based on sufficient material on record and has been arrived after proper appreciation of the evidence on record. 4. Shri M. M. Kaushik, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the reasons given by the lower appellate Court for rejecting the oral, testimony of the witnesses examined by the plaintiff to prove the fad of actual possession were not proper. It was pointed out that the lower appellate Court had stated that the witnesses could not give the survey number and the actual area pertaining to each number. It was also pointed out that the lower appellate Court had also observed that the witnesses could not state as to in which year which crop was sown by defendant No.1. It is true that the lower appellate Court had given the aforesaid reasons which may not be so strong while affirming the judgment of the trial Court, but it is also equally true that the trial Court in its judgment which has been affirmed by the lower appellate Court, had given further reasons for rejecting the oral testimony of the witnesses examined by the plaintiff and accepting that of the witnesses examined by the defendant No.2. The trial Court had stated in its judgment that since the oral version of the witnesses of defendant No. 2. finds support from the statutory revenue records, the same was liable to be preferred as against the mere oral say of the plaintiff and his witnesses which does not find corroboration in any other manner. The plaintiff had admitted that he never paid any land revenue in respect of the suit land. The revenue records also disclose that the suit land formed part of the holding of Haria and after his death of his son Jalima, and was mutated and assessed accordingly in his favour. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that as admitted by the respondent No 2 also before this Court, the appellant was in actual possession of the suit land and that is why the other side had been restrained by this Court from interfering with his possession during the pendency of this second appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that as admitted by the respondent No 2 also before this Court, the appellant was in actual possession of the suit land and that is why the other side had been restrained by this Court from interfering with his possession during the pendency of this second appeal. Shri N. K. Jain, learned counsel for respondent No.2, met this contention by pointing out that in the order sheet dated 31-4-1975 recorded by this Court, it had been clearly mentioned that according to respondent No. 2 the appellant had wrongfully taken the possession of the property in suit after 14-2-1974 by taking advantage of the ex-parte order made on 14-2-1974. Shri Jain thus stated that there was no question of admission. I have gone through the order sheet and I find that the position stated by Shri Jain is correct This Court had specifically recorded both the conflicting versions and made the order on the consideration that in any case on the aforesaid date, i.e., 21-4-1975, the appellant was in possession. This does not improve the case of the appellant so far as the finding of fact recorded by the Courts below regarding the fact of his possession from 1951 and onwards upto the date of suit is concerned. In the opinion of this Court the scope of interference with such a finding of fact is little at this stage in second appeal and the same bonding on the parties Thus, it is apparent that the plaintiff could neither establish his title nor possession over the suit land. His claim for declaration of his rights as owner of the suit land or permanent injunction was, therefore, rightly dismissed on merits. 5. Being faced with this situation, an effort was made to assail the judgment and decree by raising certain technical objection to the validity of tile proceedings in the suit. The objection raised was that since prior to the addition of the present defendant-respondent No. 2 Hardayal as a party to the suit in pursuance of the transfer of the suit-holding pendente lite. the respondent defendant No. 1 Jalima, the vendor of respondent No.2, had already filed an application for compromise of the suit wherein he had admitted that the plaintiff was the actual owner and occupant of the suit land and that he (Jalima, defendant No. 1) had no right. the respondent defendant No. 1 Jalima, the vendor of respondent No.2, had already filed an application for compromise of the suit wherein he had admitted that the plaintiff was the actual owner and occupant of the suit land and that he (Jalima, defendant No. 1) had no right. title or interest at any time in the suit land. The suit was liable to be decreed on the basis of the aforesaid admission in the compromise and the trial Court should not have proceeded with the suit by joining defendant No.2, the purchaser of the suit land, as a party under O. 22, R. 10 CPC. The argument was that since the application for compromise was already filed before the defendant No.2 applied or was joined as a party to the suit, he was bound by the same due to the specific provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. Shri N. K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 while replying to the aforesaid technical objections contended that since the admission contained in the application for compromise was subsequent to the date of transfer of the suit holding by Jalima, defendant No. 1, in favour of defendant No.2, it was not relevant and admissible in evidence for being used and relied as evidence for any purpose against defendant No.2 It was also pointed out that on the date when the defendant No.2, was impleaded, the suit had not come to an end and no decree on the basis of the compromise was passed. It was, however, not disputed that prior to the addition of defendant No.2 as a party to the suit an application for compromise as referred above, had already been filed and the Presiding Officer of the trial Court had verified the contents of the same by examining Jalima and the plaintiff. After doing that much, the suit was adjourned for suitable necessary orders. In the mean while, defendant No.2 came with an application for being joined as a party to the suit saying that since he had already purchased the suit land from defendant No. 1 on 6-5-1968 he was entitled for leave to contest the suit in accordance with the provisions of O. 22, R. 10 CPC. In the mean while, defendant No.2 came with an application for being joined as a party to the suit saying that since he had already purchased the suit land from defendant No. 1 on 6-5-1968 he was entitled for leave to contest the suit in accordance with the provisions of O. 22, R. 10 CPC. According to the pleadings raised, the issue which arose was whether the compromise entered in between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 Jalima on 18-6-1968 was binding on defendant No.2, the purchaser also, and, if so. whether his rights were affected by the aforesaid compromise and the suit was liable to be decreed, irrespective of the fact that the plaintiff could not establish his case on merits. 7. It was not disputed that the application for compromise containing the admission of defendant No. 1 that he had no right, title or interest in the suit land was subsequent to the date of transfer of the suit land in favour of defendant No.2. The application for compromise was moved on 18-6-1968 whereas the defendant No.1 had already transferred the suit land on 6-5-1968 by a deed of sale duly executed and registered on the same date. It was also not disputed that a party who is added in accordance with the provisions of R. 10 of O 22 CPC is bound by the proceedings which had already taken place and is simply entitled to continue the suit. It was also not disputed that if the purchaser pendente lite does not come up with a prayer for being joined as a party he remains bound by the decision in the suit. 8. But it is also equally true that a purchaser after having been added as a defendant to the suit remains bound by the result of the litigation which has been openly in his presence tried and decided upon. Once he comes in the array of parties t hen what could have been shown by way of compromise or adjustment in between his predecessor-in-interest and the opponent when he was not before the Court will not be allowed to interfere with his claim for a fair trial and decision of the lis on merits. In the present case the suit has not been decreed on the basis of the compromise on the date when the defendant No. 2 was impleaded. In the present case the suit has not been decreed on the basis of the compromise on the date when the defendant No. 2 was impleaded. The application for compromise did exist on record. But since the suit had not been decreed, the application for compromise was in the shape of a document containing certain admissions by the predecessor-in-interest of defendant No.2 subsequent to the date of sale. The question will be whether such admissions will be binding on the purchaser and relevant for deciding the dispute in a suit to which he also is a party. In my opinion, the answer will be in negative, the reason being that the said admission had been made subsequent to the execution of the deed of sale. On the date when defendant No.1 made the above referred admission, he had already ceased to have any interest in the suit property. Actually speaking the principles of section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act will apply by analogy also. Admissions in order to be relevant must be made during the continuance of the interest of the person making them The reason for this is that it would be against all the principles of equity and fairness to allow a person who has parted with his interest in the property to divest the right of another claiming under him by any statement which he chose to make subsequently. The statement of admission by a person from whom another person has derived interest is admissible only when the admission is of a date prior to the date of the transfer The purchaser, in the present case, is, therefore. not bound by the admission of his vendor, i.e., defendant No.1 Jalima. 9. Thus, in the present case, the trial Court was fully justified in proceeding with the trial of the suit, of course, with the specific issue whether the admission contained in the application for compromise was binding on defendant No.2 or not. The issue has been rightly decided by the Courts below in negative. 10. Shri Kaushik, learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant thereafter, contended that once the application for compromise had already been received, the trial Court should not have allowed the application made by defendant No.2 under O 22, R. 10 CPC and he should not have been impleaded. The issue has been rightly decided by the Courts below in negative. 10. Shri Kaushik, learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant thereafter, contended that once the application for compromise had already been received, the trial Court should not have allowed the application made by defendant No.2 under O 22, R. 10 CPC and he should not have been impleaded. The argument was that the suit should have been decreed on the basis of the compromise which should have been binding on the purchaser also as it was a case of transfer pendente lite In my opinion, the defendant No.2 was entitled to oppose the compromise, as it was intended to defeat his rights. It is true had the suit been already decreed on the basis of the compromise before defendant No.2 was impleaded, the only course left open to the defendant would have been to get rid of the decree by filing a separate suit and establishing that the same was either an outcome of collusion, fraud or coercion and that it was in any case not binding on him because defendant No. 1 Jalima admitted the rights and interest of the plaintiff on the suit property on a date when he had already parted with all his interests therein. In the present case, since there was no order passed on the terms of the compromise and the suit had not been decreed on the basis of the compromise and, in the meantime, defendant No.2 was already impleaded as party to the suit, he had every right to oppose the request of the plaintiff for a decree being passed on the basis of the compromise. According to the observations in AIR 1924 Cal. 188, it is apparent that until there is actually a decree made in a suit, the litigation does not terminate. In the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had gone even to the extent of observing that the suit did not become dead so long as the decree was not actually drawn up and signed, However, for the present in this case, it is not necessary to deal further with this aspect. It would suffice to hold that so long as there is no tined order or judgment decreeing the suit on the terms of the compromise, the suit remained alive. It would suffice to hold that so long as there is no tined order or judgment decreeing the suit on the terms of the compromise, the suit remained alive. In the present case, there was no such judgment or order directing that a decree be drawn up. The request of defendant No. 1 for continuing the suit in accordance with the provisions of O.22, R. 10 CPC was therefore fully tenable and was rightly allowed. Thus, defendant No 2 had entered the field when the litigation was pending and once he had become a party he had every right to claim a fair trial of the dispute and to protect his interests. The suit had, therefore, been rightly tried and on finding that the plaintiff failed to establish his rights on merits the suit was rightly not decreed on the basis of the compromise because the same did not affect the rights of the purchaser, defendant No. 2 apparently, for the reason that the same was entered in between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 after the latter had already sold the suit property in favour of defendant No.2. The Courts below have placed reliance on a decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1963 A.P. 646. Shri Kaushik however pointed out that in the aforesaid case the compromise itself was filed after the transferee pendente lite had already become a party to the suit The argument was that in view of this distinguishing feature the ratio of the aforesaid decision was not applicable to the present case, It is not possible to accept this contention, for the reason that the compromise admitting the claim of the plaintiff was made subsequent to the date of transfer in favor of respondent-defendant No.2 and, as such, was not binding on him and did not affect the right which he had acquired under the deed of sale executed by defendant No. 1. If it was not binding at all then it makes not difference whether the application was moved prior to the addition of defendant No. 2 as a party to the suit of afterwards. 11. Lastly, Shri Kaushik contended that the Courts below have gone beyond the scope of pleadings in observing that the compromise was collusive in between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 to defeat the interests of the purchaser, the defendant No.2. 11. Lastly, Shri Kaushik contended that the Courts below have gone beyond the scope of pleadings in observing that the compromise was collusive in between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 to defeat the interests of the purchaser, the defendant No.2. The arguments were based on the circumstance that there was no such specific pleading raised in the written statement by defendant No.2 or defendant No. 1. The only case put up in this respect, according to the learned counsel, was that the compromise arrived in between the plaintiff and defendant No 1 was not binding on the defendant-purchaser I have gone through the record and I find that despite the application for compromise having been filed and the statement of defendant No.1 having been recorded, the defendant No.2 did not take any such plea specifically that it was collusive. It was pointed out by Shri N. K. Jain that defendant No.1 had already moved an application that his thumb impressions on the application for the alleged compromise were obtained by fraud. Shri Kaushik however, met this situation by saying that defendant No.1 despite having filed the aforesaid application did not pursue the same. He also pointed out that defendant No.1 had not raised any such specific plea that the compromise was obtained by fraud. In my opinion, it is not necessary to further deal with this aspect of the case for the reason that in any Case the compromise in between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 entered subsequent to the date of transfer of the suit property could not bind defendant No.2, the purchaser because the admission by the defendant No. 1 about the rights and interests of the plaintiff on the suit property was not during the continuance of his interest. Eyen otherwise, it is collusive apparently on its face. The plaintiff who had been unsuccessful in establishing his right, title or interest in the suit property or even the fact of possession, made an attempt to secure a decree and to claim that the same was binding on the purchaser because the transfer was pendente lite by persuading defendant No. 1 to take a different stand that he had no right, title or interest in the suit property and that the plaintiff himself was the sole owner and occupant of the same. It would also be significant to mention that immediately after the filing of the suit the defendant No. 1 himself had filed a written statement denying all the claims of the plaintiff. It is only after he had sold the suit-land to defendant No.2 that he found it convenient to file an application for compromise wherein he admitted the entire claim of the plaintiff. But, as discussed above, the compromise irrespective of being collusive or not, was not binding on defendant No.2 and, therefore, the circumstance that there were no specific pleadings about the compromise being collusive does not affect the validity of the judgment and decree made by the Courts below. 12. No other point was pressed. 13. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee according to schedule if certified.