JUDGMENT 1. - This is a special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, from the order dated May 11, 1979, by which the learned single Judge dis- * Against judgment of single Judge of this Court in C. W. P. No 382 of 1979, D/- 11-5-1979. HW/IW/E206/79/GSN/SNV missed the appellant's writ petition summarily. 2. We have gone through the order and would like to observe that since the order, which the learned Judge has passed, is appealable, it would have been proper and desirable if the facts giving rise to the writ petition had been mentioned in the order under appeal. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at some length in order to appreciate the points arising out of the writ petition. 4. It appears that the petitioners, who was Medical Officer, posted as In charge Primary Health Centre, Sirsi, District Jaipur, allegedly made certain false entries pertaining to family planning, on account of which he along with one Miss Jacob was charge-sheeted and a joint inquiry was held against both, as a result of which the appellant was removed from service and it was directed that he would be paid the subsistence allowance during the period of suspension as already ordered. The order of dismissal as well as the whole proceedings of inquiry were challenged by the appellant and it was urged that the inquiry was bad for the following reasons: (1) that no order for joint inquiry was passed under Rule 18 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958; (2) that the petitioner had not been paid the subsistence allowance for part of the period of suspension and for the whole of the period of inquiry and consequently he was deprived of the right of defending himself properly and thereby principles of natural justice have been violated. (3) that the Public Service Commission had opined in favour of the appellant and yet the Government while passing the impugned order did not pay due attention to the opinion of the Public Service Commission; and lastly, (4) that the impugned order of removal is not a speaking order. 5. (3) that the Public Service Commission had opined in favour of the appellant and yet the Government while passing the impugned order did not pay due attention to the opinion of the Public Service Commission; and lastly, (4) that the impugned order of removal is not a speaking order. 5. It may be pointed out that the the appellant did not take any such objection in the course of inquiry that joint inquiry cannot be held in absence of an order under Rule 18 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. He participated in the inquiry throughout and took a chance. We are satisfied that the appellant has not been prejudiced in any way on account of the joint inquiry in the case. We, therefore, see no substance in this argument. 6. So far as the question of subsistence allowance is concerned, the learned single Judge has observed that if the subsistence allowance has not been paid for any period during which the petitioner has remained under suspension, he can approach the Government and there seems no reason why the Government would not pay the outstanding subsistence allowance. At this stage, we may also mention that the Additional Government Advocate Shri J.D. Agarwal, who has appeared on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, in response to the show cause notice issued to the State Government, has made a statement at the Bar that if any amount of subsistence allowance during the period of inquiry or during the period of suspension is found to be outstanding, the same will be paid. We are of the opinion that such an assurance on the part of the Government is sufficient to dispel the doubts of the appellant that he would 'not be paid the subsistence allowance of a certain period. 7. Learned counsel, in this connection, has also argued that on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance, there has been denial of sufficient opportunity to him to defend himself. In support of this contention, he1 has relied upon Ghansham Das Sri-vastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1971) 2 Serv LR 239 (SC) . We have gone through this ruling and, in our opinion, it is altogether distinguishable. That was a case in which the delinquent official was residing five hundred miles away from the place of inquiry. In support of this contention, he1 has relied upon Ghansham Das Sri-vastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1971) 2 Serv LR 239 (SC) . We have gone through this ruling and, in our opinion, it is altogether distinguishable. That was a case in which the delinquent official was residing five hundred miles away from the place of inquiry. He asked for payment of subsistence allowance but the same was not paid. On account of having not been paid subsistence allowance, he could not present himself before the Inquiry Officer and put up his defence. But ignoring this prayer, the Inquiry Officer hurriedly proceeded with the inquiry ex parte and passed a final order against him. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that it was a case of denial of proper i opportunity to the appellant. However, in the present case, admittedly, the appellant had received subsistence allowance up to January 2,1975, even though he was placed under suspension on November 10, 1972 and had continuously taken part in the proceedings. In our opinion, the rationale of that decision has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. As regards the opinion given by the Public Service Commission, it is not denied that the opinion of the Public Service Commission is not binding on the Government. The provisions regarding consultation with the Public Service Commission are only directory. In this view of the matter, it is not possible for us to hold that the impugned order of removal of the petitioner is vitiated on account of the Government having not followed the opinion given by the Public Service Commission. It is also urged that, at any rate, the Government was bound to give reasons for not following the opinion of the Public Service Com-mission. In our opinion, there is no warrant in law for such a proposition that if no reasons are given by the Government for not following the opinion of the Public Service Commission, the order is bad. 9. As to the objection that the impugned order of removal is not a speaking order, we may point out that no such objection was taken before the learned single Judge. 9. As to the objection that the impugned order of removal is not a speaking order, we may point out that no such objection was taken before the learned single Judge. But, apart from that, as we have already observed above, after discussing the evidence of the various witnesses examined in the course of inquiry as also the documents exhibited, the Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the charge against the appellant is proved. That inquiry report has been accepted by the Government while passing the impugned order. Moreover, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not in a position to say that the impugned order is arbitrary or illegal. Lastly, we may observe that we do not find any error in exercise of jurisdiction in the impugned order. 10. The result is that we do not see any force in this appeal and hereby dismiss it.Appeal dismissed. *******