JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) ONE Modi Bai obtained a decree for possession in respect of khasra No. 200/2 of village Gahiranawagaon, tahsil Balod, district Durg, against certain persons in Civil Suit No. 16-A of 1970 of the Court of Civil judge, Class II, Balod. She put this decree into execution. One Janki Bai also figured as a defendant in that suit. The decree was also passed against her. Non-applicant, Nagraj obtained a sale-deed, dated 28-5-1968, from this janki Bai prior to the institution of that suit. Non-applicant, Nagraj claimed that in the process of execution of that decree he was wrongfully dispossessed of Khasra No. 200 j2. He, therefore, filed an objection on 9-11-1973 before the executing Court, complaining of this wrongful dispossession. This objection was filed under Order 21, Rule 100, Code of Civil Procedure, as it stood prior to the amendment of the Code by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976, which came into force on 1st of February, 1977. After due investigation, the executing Court decided this objection by its order, dated 7-9-1978 and held that the non-applicant, Nagraj was in possession of the property on his own account and allowing the objection, directed that the non-applicant be put in possession of the property. The decree-holder, Modi Bai appealed. The lower appellate Court held that the decree-holder obtained possession of the property from the non-applicant, Nagraj, in execution of the decree. It was held that the non-applicant was then in possession of the land in his own right on the basis of the sale-deed from Janki Bai and, therefore, was wrongly dispossessed in execution of the decree in that suit. The lower appellate Court, thus, upheld the finding of the executing Court in this behalf. It appears that before the lower appeal Court, it was urged that while the objection by non-applicant was pending adjudication before the executing Court, the Civil procedure Code was amended by the Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976 and drastic changes were made in Order 21 of the Code. It was urged that the right of suit consequent upon an order passed on an objection complaining of wrongful dispossession in execution of a decree was taken away by the amending Act and that the executing Court should have investigated into the title of the parties relating to the land in question. It was urged that the right of suit consequent upon an order passed on an objection complaining of wrongful dispossession in execution of a decree was taken away by the amending Act and that the executing Court should have investigated into the title of the parties relating to the land in question. As that was not done, it appears to have been urged before the lower appellate Court, the matter be remanded for due investigation. It appears that the lower appellate Court instead of remanding the matter has attempted to decide the title of the respective parties on the basis of the available records, and has held that the non-applicant has acquired good title to the land which remained unaffected despite the decree in Civil Suit No. 16-A of 1970. The contention that no appeal lay before him and that the remedy was only a suit under the provisions of the Code as they stood prior to the amending Act No. 104 of 1976, was repelled by the lower appellate Court. The appeal was held tenable. For all these reasons, the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal. ( 2. ) SHRI D. M. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the applicant (decree-holder), urged that the matter would be governed by Order 21 as it stands amended by the Amending Act 104 of 1976 and, therefore, in terms of rule 101 of Order 21, it was imperative for the executing Court to enquire and decide as to the title of the decree-holder vis-a-vis the non-applicant before it passed any order upon the objection filed by the non-applicant. He, therefore, prayed for remand of the matter. As against this, Shri Ravish agarwal, learned counsel for the non-applicant, urged that the matter shall be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure as it stood prior to the amendment for the reason that the objection was filed before the amendment came into force on 1-2-1977. He, therefore, submitted that even the appeal before the lower appellate Court was not competent. ( 3. ) THE scheme relating to adjudication of claims or objections to attachment of property and resistence or obstruction to possession of immoveable property during the course of execution has been drastically amended by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976. He, therefore, submitted that even the appeal before the lower appellate Court was not competent. ( 3. ) THE scheme relating to adjudication of claims or objections to attachment of property and resistence or obstruction to possession of immoveable property during the course of execution has been drastically amended by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976. Before this amendment, the enquiry relating to claim or objection to attachment was within a very narrow compass and the party aggrieved by an, order of the executing Court upon any such claim or objection had a right to file a Civil suit under Rule 63 of Order 21, Civil Procedure Code to get his title adjudicated. The Order was subject to such a result of that suit. Similarly, a party who complained of dispossession from any immoveable property in the course of execution of any decree, could -institute a suit to establish the right which he claimed to the present possession of property and order of dispossession was subject to the result of such suit, if any. Section 72 of the amending Act 104 of 1976 incorporates the changes made by that Act in order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By clause XXXIV of section 72 of the Amending Act, new Rules 99, 100 and 101 have been inserted in place of rules 100, 101, 102 and 103 of the Code, as it stood prior to this amendment. The new Rule 101 of Order 21 is as under:- "all questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an appli-cation under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. " The Rule 103 as amended, provides for an appeal against the order passed upon and adjudication made under Rule 98 or Rule 100 and enacts that the order shall have the same force and shall be subject to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. " The Rule 103 as amended, provides for an appeal against the order passed upon and adjudication made under Rule 98 or Rule 100 and enacts that the order shall have the same force and shall be subject to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. The other important section to be noticed is section 97 of the amending Act, which deals with repeal and savings. For the purpose of this case, clause (q) of sub-section (2) of section 97 is relevant and is, therefore, reproduced below:- "97 ** ** ** (q) the provisions of rules 31, 32, 48a, 57 to 59, 90 and 97 to 103 of order XXI of the First Schedule as amended or, as the case may be, substituted or inserted by section 72 of this Act shall not apply to or affect- (i) any attachment subsisting immediately before the commencement of the said section 72, or (ii) any suit instituted before such commencement under rule 68 aforesaid to establish right to attached property or under rule 103 aforesaid to establish possession, or (iii) any proceedings to set aside the sale of any immoveable property, and every such attachment suit or proceeding shall be continued as if the said section 72 had not come into force;" Another important provision is sub-section (3) of section 97 which runs as under:- "save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), the provisions of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall apply to every suit, proceedings, appeal or application, pending at the commencement of this Act or instituted or filed after such commencement, notwithstanding the fact that the right, or cause of action, in pursuance of which such suit, proceeding, appeal or application, is instituted or filed, had been acquired or had accrued before such commencement. " ( 4. ) COMPARISON of the old and the amended provisions regarding investigation of claim to attachment or to complaint regarding dispossession in course of execution shows that on such application being filed, the executing Court is required to decide all questions, including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property. The Court dealing with that application shall decide those questions. The amended rule 101 specifically provides that the question relating to right, title or interest in the property shall be decided by the Court dealing with that application and not by a separate suit. The Court dealing with that application shall decide those questions. The amended rule 101 specifically provides that the question relating to right, title or interest in the property shall be decided by the Court dealing with that application and not by a separate suit. Precisely for this reason the order passed under rule 98 or rule 100, as amended, has been made appealable as if it were a decree. The apparent object for this change appears to be to avoid delay in execution of the decrees and multiplicity of proceedings. On a person objecting to attachment or complaining of dispossession, all the rights of the parties, including title thereto, relating to the property in question, are to be inquired into and determined once for all in the same manner as is done in a suit ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant is right when he says that his application was pending before the executing Court complaining of wrongful dispossession in execution of a decree, and as rule 101, as amended, had then came into force, the executing Court should have disposed of that application in accordance with this amended rule 101. It is common ground that the application was pending before the executing Court when the relevant rules in Order 21 were amended and the Amending Act came into force on 1-2-1977. It is also not disputed that the objection was filed on 19-11-1973, i. e. , prior to this amendment. Question is whether this amended provision shall also apply to the applications made before the amendment came into force. The rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operations unless such a construction appears very clearly in terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication, is now firmly established. Similarly, a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. Maxwell on the "interpretation of Statutes" (11th Edn.), at page 204, says that it is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Maxwell on the "interpretation of Statutes" (11th Edn.), at page 204, says that it is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. At page 206 of the same, Volume, the law relating to retrospective operations as regards vested rights is stated as under:- "it is chiefly where the enactment would prejudicially affect vested rights, or the legality of past transactions, or impair contracts, that the rule in question prevails. Every statute, it has been said, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or impose a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past, must be presumed, out of respect to the Legislature, to be intended not to have a retrospective operation. " Relating to pending actions, the learned author, at page 212, stated the law as follows:- "in general, when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. " From this, it can safely be inferred that whenever the intention of Legislature is clear that the Act should be retrospective in operation, it must unquestionably be so construed even though the consequences may appear unjust or hard. Then, at page 216 of the same Volume, dealing with the retrospective operation of statute as regards procedure, it is observed that a law which merely alters the procedure may, with perfect propriety, be made applicable to past as well as future transactions. It is said that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being. If an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. The remedy in such cases does not take away any vested right. In Craxfords (Ramsgate) Ltd. v. William and steer Manufacturing Co. Ltd. , (1954) 3 All ER 17. If an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. The remedy in such cases does not take away any vested right. In Craxfords (Ramsgate) Ltd. v. William and steer Manufacturing Co. Ltd. , (1954) 3 All ER 17. it has been held that the repeal of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, section 4, as to the need for a note or memorandum in writing, deprived a defendant of the defence of the absence of such a note, notwithstanding that the writ was issued and the defence delivered before the repeal. When the Legislature gives a new remedy for enforcing the rights, it shall extend to rights which have accrued before the new remedy was provided. The general principle deduced from decided cases has been stated by the learned author to be that the alterations in procedure are retrospective, unless there be some good reason against it. Of course, an appeal to a superior tribunal, a right which belongs to every suitor, is different from merely regulating procedure. It is a vested right. In Chuluram v. Bhagat-ram, Misc. (Second) Appeal No. 55 of 1978, decided on 2-8-1979. a Division Bench of this Court observed that an appeal is a right of entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress an error of the Court below and, though procedure does surround an appeal, the central idea is a right. In has been held therein that although the right of appeal is exercised after the decree or order against which appeal is preferred is passed, it accrues and vests in the suitor at the time of institution of the proceeding in which the Decree or Order is passed. Such a right, said the Division Bench, is not impaired by a change in law relating to appeals. ( 6. ) WHEN a claim is preferred or any objection is made to the attachment of any property attached in execution of a decree under Order 21, rule 58, Civil Procedure Code, or when a complaint is made of wrongful dispossession from immoveable property under a decree, the persons so claiming or objecting are entitled to the adjudication to the claim so laid. Before the amendment, the procedure was to decide them at two stages-first before the executing Court and other by a suit. Before the amendment, the procedure was to decide them at two stages-first before the executing Court and other by a suit. The order passed by the executing court was made subject to decision of a suit by the party adversely affected. After the amendment, it is the executing Court which has been given jurisdiction to inquire into the right, title and interest of the person so laying the claim or objection to the property attached in execution of a decree or dispossessed in during the course of execution of a decree. Thus, the change is only as regards the procedure of investigation into the rights of the person objecting to the attachment or complaining of dispossession. This right of investigation of a claim or objection to attachment or into the complaint of dispossession, cannot be said to be a vested right in a suitor like the right of appeal. The amendment in this behalf bringing a change in procedure only thus does not affect any vested right and, therefore, can well be held to be retrospective and, therefore, applicable to the case pending investigation on the date when the amendment was brought into force. In the present case, therefore, the executing Court should have inquired into the right, title and interest of the respondent, Nagraj into the property in question when he made a grievance that he was wrongfully dispossessed of it during the execution of a decree held by the applicant against others. The lower appellate court should have, therefore, remanded the case to the trial Court for that purpose. ( 7. ) SHRI Ravish Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent strongly relied upon a decision of Delhi High Court in Syndicate Bank, New Delhi v. M\s Rallies India Ltd. New Delhi and others, AIR 1979 Delhi 40. and urged that the right to file a suit is a vested right. It cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation unless by express provisions or necessary intendment that right is taken away. That was a case relating to objection to attachment of some property under order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code. The objection petition was filed in the Court before the amending Act came into force on 1st February, 1977. Against the decision on the objection, an appeal was preferred in terms of rules as amended. That was a case relating to objection to attachment of some property under order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code. The objection petition was filed in the Court before the amending Act came into force on 1st February, 1977. Against the decision on the objection, an appeal was preferred in terms of rules as amended. This was objected to on the ground that since the objection was preferred before the amending Act came into force, although decided later, the objector had a vested right of a suit under Rule 63 (as it stood prior to its amendment ). It has, therefore, been held that a suit and not an appeal was the proper remedy and the amending Act did not take away either expressly or by necessary intendment the right to file the suit. In paragraph 18 of the report, as a matter of law, it has been held that unless the provisions of the new enactment clearly say so or it can be found out as a matter of necessary intendment, the new provisions cannot affect accrued rights and the right to file a suit or an appeal is just as much a vested right as any other. I have also indicated above that this proposition of law is quite firmly established. In Lalji Raja and Sons v. Firm Hansraj Nathuram, AIR 1971 SC 974 . it has been observed that a mere right, existing at the date of repealing statute to take advantage of the provisions of the statute repealed is not a "right accrued" within the meaning of usual saving clause. For this proposition of law, the Supreme Court relied upon the decision in G. Ogden Industries pvt. Ltd. v. Lucas, (1969) 1 All ER 121. It may be seen here that by virtue of clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 97, Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of Rules 57 to 59, 90 and 97 to 103 of Order 21 of the first Schedule as amended or as the case may be, substituted or inserted by section 72 of that Act, do not apply or affect any suit instituted before such amendment under Rule 63 to establish right to attached property or under Rule 103 to establish possession. This should only mean that the amended provisions shall not apply to a suit which has been instituted under Rule 63 or Rule 103 (as it stood prior to the amendment) before the amending Act came into force. This sub-section makes it clear that instead of taking away the right of suit, the Legislature has specifically saved the pending suits. And by Rule 58 (2) of section 1. 01, as they stand after the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the right, title and interest in the property affected are required to be investigated by the executing Court. It is the executing Court which is now required to decide all questions, including questions relating to rights, title or interest in the pro-property by adducing oral as well as documentary evidence and any decision could only be taken after this opportunity was afforded to them. As that has not been done, the matter must go back to the executing Court, which shall give the parties adequate opportunity of making proper pleadings and adducing evidence to support their rival claims to the property in question and thereupon to reach a conclusion one way or the other. ( 8. ) THE revision application is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Courts below are set aside and the case is sent back to the executing court for disposal according to law in the right of observations made above. The costs shall abide the ultimate result. Hearing fee Rs. 100/-, if certified. Revision application allowed.