Judgment Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. 1. The plaintiff petitioner filed a suit for money on the allegation that the defendant, as karta of his joint family, had taken a loan of Rs.2190 from him on the basis of a promissory note. The defendant denied the liability and also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 7 (5) of the Bihar money Lenders Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Both the Courts have examined the evicence led in the case and have concurrently held that the plaintiffs claim on merits is correct and the defendant is liable for the amount mentioned in the promissory note with interest at Re.1 per centum per mensem. They have, however, accepted the defence that the suit is hit by the provisions of Sec.7 (5) of the Act, and since the relevant extract from a register enjoined by the Act to be maintained has not been produced in the suit, the claim cannot be decreed. The suit has been accordingly dismissed. Since the total claim in the suit is less than rs.3,000, a second appeal is barred under sec.102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the plaintiff has, therefore, filed the present application in revision challenging the decision of the courts below. 2. Mr. Kailash Roy, appearing in support of this application, has contended that since the suit was filed in the year 1973, that is, before the enactment of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974 , and the provisions of the Act are not retrospective in operation, Sec.7 (5) of the act has no application to the present suit whatsoever. It is, therefore, suggested that in view of the concurrent findings of fact in favour of the plaintiff, which is binding on the High Court, the suit is fit to be decreed. 3. The defendant has not appeared in this case but Mr. Parmeshwar Prasad sinha, learned Advocate through whom the defendant in a similar suit has filed a second appeal which has been numbered as S. A.52 of 1979 has intervened and has assisted the Court by his argument presenting the opposite point of view. 4. The only question which arises for decision in this case is as to whether the provisions of Sec.7 (5) of the act are applicable to a suit filed earlier than the coming in force of the Act. 4. The only question which arises for decision in this case is as to whether the provisions of Sec.7 (5) of the act are applicable to a suit filed earlier than the coming in force of the Act. 5. It is a fully established rule that statutes should be, as far as it may be possible, interpreted so as to respect the vestedrights. For the purpose of affecting such rights, the language of the statute must be in express and unambiguous term to that effect. (Sec Craies on Statute law, 7th edition, 398 ). The supreme Court in Eapen Chacko V/s. The Provident Investment Company (p) Ltd. (1977)1 SCR 1026 , while recognising this rule observed that for the purpose of interpreting a subsequent law, former state of law is to be construed as also the legislative changes contemplated by the statute and where the effect could be to alter a transaction, already entered into, prima facie construction of the Act is that it is not to be retrospective. The decisions in Moon V/s. Durden (1948) 2 exth 22 ; Gardner V/s. Lucas (1978) 3 appeal Cases 582 ; and Smithies V/s. National union of Operative Plasters (1909) 1 kb 310 were followed. In Moon V/s. Durden, a question arose as to whether sec.18 of the Gaming Act, 1845 providing that no suit should be brought or maintained for recovering any sum of money alleged to have been won upon a wager, applied to a suit instituted earlier. The observations of Parke, J while deciding the point in the negative, have been quoted by the Supreme court with approval. In Smithies V/s. National union oj Operative plasters. (supra) the plaintiff had commenced an action before the passing of the Trade Disputes act, 1906 for damages against a trade union for procuring a continuing breach of contract by the workmen, by sanctioning a strike by them and giving them strike pay. The Sec.4 of the 1906 Act raised a bar to such actions and the argument was that since the enactment was not retrospective in express terms, it could not affect the pending action. Sec.4 like Sec.7 (5) of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974 , relevant in the present case, had used the word shall and shall not. The Sec.4 of the 1906 Act raised a bar to such actions and the argument was that since the enactment was not retrospective in express terms, it could not affect the pending action. Sec.4 like Sec.7 (5) of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974 , relevant in the present case, had used the word shall and shall not. Vaughan Williams, LJ, with whom the other learned Judges were in agreement, observed as follows : "it is a proposition founded in common sense that, where vested rights have already accrued, and legislation is passed which uses words expressive of futurity, such as shall or shall not, which prime facie would appear to be meant to be applicable to future cases, it is not to be construed retrospectively so as to affect those vested rights, unless terms are used which clearly compel the Court to give it that construction. This is only to impute common sense to the legislature, any reasonable person would say that clear terms ought to be used, if it is intended to divest a vested right". It was held that the action was not hit by the subsequent legislation. The decision in Knight V/s. Indre (1893, 1 Queens Bench division, 41) and Henshall V/s. Porter; (1923) 2 Kings Bench 193, followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Maharaja G. P. Sahi V/s. State of Bihar (ILR 30 Patna, 735) go further and hold that if plaintiffs cause of action arose earlier, it is not defeated by a subsequent legislation in absence of express language to that effect. However, i am not concerned in this is case as to what would be the position in a suit filed after enactment of the new Money lenders Act where the cause of action had arisen earlier than the passing of the Act. 6. Following the principl. laid down in P. Venkateshwarlu V/s. Motor and general Traders ( AIR 1975 SC 1409 ), mr. Justice Iyer in Rameshwar V/s. Jot Ram (AIR 1975 SC 49) declared that it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding, and this is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted. Proceeding further, it was observed that the later developments cannot defeat his right because had the Court found his facts to be true the day he sued, he would have got his decree. The Courts procedural delays cannot deprive him-of legal justice or rights crystalised in the initial cause of action. It is essential therefore, that for an act to be retrospective in its operation so as to affect the vested rights, the language to that effect must be in express terms. 7. I would, however, like to state here that the rule of interpretation discussed above confines only to such cases where the rights may be affected and has no application where enactments merely affect the procedure. If the legislature lays down a new procedure to be followed, a litigant cannot insist that he must be permitted to proceed In accordance with the old procedure, for as has been said, no one can have a vested right in a particular form of, much less an older form of, procedure. The distinction was clearly enunciated for the first time in Wright V/s. Hale (1860) 30 LJ Ex.40, where Pollock, CB observed that there is a considerable difference between laws which affect vested rights and those laws which merely affect the proceedings of courts and this distinction has been recognised by Courts in India throughout 8. The main question, therefore, to decide in the present case is as to whether by incorporating the provisions of Sec.7 (5) of the Act, has the legislature introduced any change in the procedure only or whether rights are sought to be affected. But before I proceed to consider this aspect with reference to the present Act, I would refer to the case in Bank of Athens Society Anonyme V/s. Royal Exchange Assurance (1938)1 KB 771, mentioned at the bar. In 1933, the plaintiffs made a claim against the defendants on the basis of certain insurance policy and issued a writ, and in 1934 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)Act, 1934 came into force and section 3 (1) thereof provided that "in any proceedings tried in any court of record for the recovery of any debt or damages, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that there shall be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest at such rate as it thinks fit". It was held that the section was applicable. It was held that the section was applicable. This case does not run counter to the principle and the decisions discused in the earlier paragraphs of my judgment, as the question of grant of interest was not bestowed on the plaintiffs as a matter of right it was merely a question or discretion with the Court by way of ancillary relief dependant on the main relief to which the plaintiffs were entitled from before. 9. Under the earlier Money lenders laws also, a money-lender was enjoined to maintain a register of transactions and provisions were made in the Act for the enforcement of the same and for action against him. if he failed to do so. But failure on the part of the plaintiff money-lender to maintain such a register or to produce the same in a suit filed by him for recovery of loan, however, did not lead to the dismission of the action. As a result, suits in which such registers were not decreed, if the claims were found on merits to be correct. The only provision in the old Act which could defeat the suit was Sec.4 (Act 7 of 1939)providing that no Court should entertain a suit (subject to certain exceptions) by a money-lender not registered under bihar Act 3 of 1938. There was no such provision relating to the produccion of the register. The new Act 22 of 1975 which came into force in March, 1975, besides requiring the money-lender to maintain a register as before, further provided in Sec.7 (5) as follows : " (5) A money-lender shall in a suit for recovery of money advanced by him as loan file a copy of the relevant extracts from his register of accounts relating to the said loan and he shall not be entitled to maintain any claim beyond the entries made in the register of accounts. " 10. The suit out of which the case before me arises had been filed in 1973, but was taken up. for hearing in 1977 and it was urged on behalf of the defendants that since the petitioner had failed to file a copy of the relevant extract from the register of accounts relating to the loan, he was not entitled to maintain the claim and the suit was, therefore, bound to be dismissed. It has been suggested by Mr. for hearing in 1977 and it was urged on behalf of the defendants that since the petitioner had failed to file a copy of the relevant extract from the register of accounts relating to the loan, he was not entitled to maintain the claim and the suit was, therefore, bound to be dismissed. It has been suggested by Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Sinha that sec.7 (5) of the Act merely deals with the procedure in regard to production of evidence in the case and enjoins the plaintiff in peremptory terms to file a copy of the register on pain of dismissal of his claim. The learned counsel has emphasised on the aspect that the requirement of maintenance of a register referred to in Sec.7 (5) of the Act has been coming from before and, therefore, it is not offensive to equity and justice that a copy of the register is now being peremptorily directed by law to be filed in the suit the question, therefore, to be resolved is whether the provision is purely procedural in nature or affects rights, for, if, in fact, it affects vested rights, it can not be held to be retrospective so as to be applicable in pending actions. 11. On the plain language of the sub-section, it appears that it is depriving the plaintiff of his rightful claim which was bound to be decreed, if the court below had been in a position to dispose of the suit before March, 1975. By merely keeping the suit pending for about 2 years, for no fault on the part of the plaintiff, he is now being refused a decree, which he was otherwise perfectly entitled to. The effect of Sec.7 (5) of the Act is clearly to refuse to enforce a lawful claim and it is, therefore, not possible to hold it as being merely procedural in nature. The conclusion is that the sub-section affects rights and cannot be applied to pending suits. A consideration of certain cases dealing with law of limitation may be helpful. 12. Rules of limitation are, prima facie, rules of procedure and, therefore, no one can be said to have a vested right in a particular period of limitation for a suit. In fact, limitation merely bars the remedy without destroying the right. A consideration of certain cases dealing with law of limitation may be helpful. 12. Rules of limitation are, prima facie, rules of procedure and, therefore, no one can be said to have a vested right in a particular period of limitation for a suit. In fact, limitation merely bars the remedy without destroying the right. But there have been cases where a new law of limitation has been introduced which bars a claim otherwise maintainable, without giving any reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff to file such suits within a certain prescribed period. If such an Act comes into force at once, which in effect defeats the right of the plaintiff, it has the effect of defeating vested rights and has been held not to apply to pending suits. 13. Reference may be made to the case of manjhori Bibi and others V/s. Akel Mahumed and others (17 Calcutta weekly Notes.889 ). The suit in that case was filed on the 25th August, 1908 on the allegation that the plaintiffs had been dispossessed towards the end of 1898. The courts below dismissed the suit as being barred by special rule of two years limitation prescribed by the third article in the third Schedule to the Bengal tenancy Act, 1885, as amended by sec.61 clause (3) of the Eastern Bengal and, assam Tenancy (Amendment)Act, ly08, which came into force on the 10th june, 1908, The amending Act was held not to be retrospective, as it would have defeated the lawful rights of the plaintiffs causing hardship and injustice. The principle that a new law affecting procedure must be held to apply retrospectively was not applied, although the amending Act was merely regulating the limitation. This decision has stood the test of time and has been followed in innumerable decisions by many High courts of the country including our own High Court. Gokaran Prasad Singh v. Malik Waris Ali (AIR 1924 Patna 183)a question as to the retrospective application of Sec.45 of the Bihar orrissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 arose. This decision has stood the test of time and has been followed in innumerable decisions by many High courts of the country including our own High Court. Gokaran Prasad Singh v. Malik Waris Ali (AIR 1924 Patna 183)a question as to the retrospective application of Sec.45 of the Bihar orrissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 arose. For a similar consideration, while holding that the limitatiqn prescribed under the Public Demands Recovery Act could not apply retrospectively, it was observed as follows : it was pointed out that there were two positions; where, in accordance with its provisions, a suit could be brought after the passing of the amendment, it may be that the amendment would apply, but where it could not, then the amendment would have no application. This second position had previously been laid down in the case of manjhoori Bibi V/s. Akd Mahumed. " 14. Commenting in a converse position, a Division Bench of this Court in Lakhmir Singh V/s. Commissioner of income Tax (AIR 1957 Patna 538) held that although limitation is a matter of procedural law and although it is open to the legislature to extend the period of limitation, the amending law cannot be applied to a case where the right is already barred by the previous law of limitation. It was further held that the presumption against retrospective operation of a statute as regards vested rights applies not merely to substantive rights but applies equity to remedial rights, like rights of action including rights of appeal another Division Bench in Shiva Janki thakurain V/s. Kirtanand Singh Bahadur (AIR 1936 Patna 173) held that when the legislature alters the rights of the parties by taking away or confirming any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. 15. The decision of the Privy Council in delhi Cloth and General Mills co. V/s. Income Tax Commissioner (AIR 1927 Privy Council 242) wherein the principle enunciated by the Privy council in the Colonial Sugar Refining Company ltd. V/s. Irving (1905 Appeal Cases 369)was followed, is also helpful. The colonial Sugar Refinining Companys case came from Australia and the question was whether the appeal to the Privy council was maintainable after the passing of the Judiciary Act, 1903, which by its Sec.38 made the judgment of the High court final in certain matters. V/s. Irving (1905 Appeal Cases 369)was followed, is also helpful. The colonial Sugar Refinining Companys case came from Australia and the question was whether the appeal to the Privy council was maintainable after the passing of the Judiciary Act, 1903, which by its Sec.38 made the judgment of the High court final in certain matters. The Judiciary act was not made retrospective in express terms and the question was whether it would apply to the suit. The privy Council observed : "it seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt to deprive a suitor in a pending action of ad appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. " 16. In the present case, the plaintiff will be deprived of his right to realise his just dues, if Sec.7 (5) of the new Money lenders Act is held to be retrospectively applicable, and this cannot be characterised as a mere interference in the form of procedure. I, therefore, hold that the sub-section does not apply to suits which were already pending from before. 17. In the result, this revision application is allowed, the decision of the courts below is set aside and the suit is decreed with costs of the two courts below. There will be no order as to costs of this Court. Revision allowed.