JUDGMENT Mulye, J. - 1. This appeal filed by the unsuccessful defendant tenant, is directed against the judgment & decree dated 3.3.1979 passed by the 1st Addl. District Judge, Mandsaur, in Civil First appeal No. 31-A of 1976, confirming the judgment and decree of ejectment and other reliefs passed by the trial Court. 2. The short facts giving rise to this appeal, which are no longer in dispute are as follows :- That an open plot of land belonging to the Municipality Mandsaur, was taken on rent by the defendant appellant, on a monthly tenancy for the purpose of constructing a shop thereon, the terms and conditions of which are incorporated in the lease-deed. As the plaintiff municipality needed the suit accommodation for the purpose of developing the motor-stand and widening the road, by a quit notice, the defendant's tenancy was terminated and a suit for ejectment was filed, which was resisted by the defendant-appellant on a number of grounds, but the trial Court decreed the plaintiff's claim for ejectment, which has also been maintained by the lower appellate Court. 3. According to the plaintiff municipality the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, so for as the suit accommodation is concerned, were not applicable, in view of the provisions of section 3(b) of the said Act, which is as follows :- "3. Act not to apply to certain accommodation. (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to- (a)……………………………………. (b) accommodation which is the property of a local authority used exclusively for non-residential purposes." 4. In this appeal the appellant has mainly challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit on the ground that the suit instituted by the respondent was barred by provisions of sections 2 and 15 of the M.P. Lok Parisar (Bedakhali), Adhiniyam 1974 (Act No. 46 of 1974) which received the assent of the President on 10th November, 1974, and was published in M.P. Gazette dated 26th November, 1974. Sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act provides that it shall be deemed to have come into force (i) in Mahakooshal region on the 12th September 1952; and (ii) in other regions of the State on the 1st January 1959, except sections 11, 19 and 20, which shall come into force atonce. Sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act provides that it shall be deemed to have come into force (i) in Mahakooshal region on the 12th September 1952; and (ii) in other regions of the State on the 1st January 1959, except sections 11, 19 and 20, which shall come into force atonce. The original Text of this Act, as passed by the State Legislature is in Hindi, of which as per Article 348(3) of the Constitution of India a translation of the same in the English language was also published under the authority of the Governor in the Madhya Pradesh Official Gazette. 5. In the English translation, the definition of "public premises" as defined in section 2(e) of the Act is as follows :- "Public premises" means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the State Government, and includes any premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of – (i) Any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act 1956 (No.1 of 1956) in which not less than 51% of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government; and (ii) Any Corporation (not being a Company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956) No.1 of 1956 or a local authority; The Hindi Text of section 2 (e) is as follows:- ¼„½ bl vf/kfu;e esa tc rd fd lUnHkZa esa vU;Fkk visf{kr u gks^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^¼M+½ yksd ifjlj ls vfHkizsr gS dksbZ Hkh ,sls ifjlj tks jkT; ljdkj ds gksa ;k jkT; ljdkj }kjk ;k mldh vksj ls iV~Vs ij fy;s x;s gksa ;k vf/kxzfgr fd;sa x;s gksa vkSj mlds vUrxZr dksbZ Hkh ,sls ifjlj vkrs gSa tks& ¼,d½ daiuh ,DV ƒ‹‡ˆ ¼dzaekd ƒ lu~ ƒ‹‡ˆ½ dh /kkjk … esa ;Fkk ifjHkkf”kr fdlh ,slh daiuh] ftlesa dh jkT; ljdkj leknl vW’kiwath dk de ls de ,D;kou izfr’kr /kkj.k djrh gks] ds gks] ;k ml daiuh }kjk ;k mldh vksj ls iV~Vs ij fy;s x;s gksa] ;k ¼nks½ fdlh ,sls fuxe ¼tks daiuh ,DV ƒ‹‡ˆ ¼dzaekd ƒ lu~ ƒ‹‡ˆ½ dh /kkjk … esa ;Fkk ifjHkkf”kr daiuh ;k Lfkkuh; izkf/kdkjh u gksa½ ( 5. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, a bare reading of the English translation of section 2 (e) 'public premises", means a local authority and the Mandsaur Municipality being admittedly a local authority this Act applies to the premises belonging to the local authority, and in view of the provisions of section 15 of the said Act, which is reproduced below, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. 6. Sec. 15. Bar of jurisdiction-No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under sub• section (1) of section 7, or the damages pay• able under sub-section (2) of that section or the costs awarded to the State Government or the Corporate under sub-section (5) of section 9 or any portion of such rent, damages or costs. 7. Therefore according to the learned Counsel for the appellant the only authority under the said Act which has jurisdiction to evict persons from these public premises is the competent authority to be appointed under section 3 of the said Act, which is as follows:- "3-Appointment of competent authority- The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,- (a) appoint any person and appoint such person being an officer, not below the rank of Deputy Collector who has held such office for a period of not less than five years, as competent authority for the purposes of this Act, and (b) define the local limits within which, or the categories of public premises in respect of which the competent authority shall exercise the powers conferred, and perform the duties imposed, on competent authority by or under this Act" 8. Further according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant is covered by definition of 'unauthorised occupation' as defined in section 2 (g) of the said Act.- (g) "unauthorised occupation" in relation to any public premises means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever". 9. 9. Further according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant is covered by the said definition of unauthorised occupation and in these circumstances, the learned lower Court by over-looking the provisions of Article 348 of the Constitution of India has committed an error by relying on the 'Hindi Text' of the said Act, thereby rejecting the authorised version that is, the English translation. Though the learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute that a plain reading of the 'Hindi Text' of the definition of 'Lok Parisar' (public premises), excludes, local authority from the applicability of the provisions of the said Act. 10. The short question involved in this appeal, therefore, is whether the English translation of 'public premises' as printed and published makes out a meaning, favourable to the appellant, as per his interpretation that 'public premises' as defined herein include 'local authority' ? 11. The word 'local authority' has not been defined, as such, in this Act but it is not in dispute that as defined, in different statutes including the General clauses Act, and the Municipalities Act, the municipality Mandsaur is a 'local authority'. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant relying upon the decision reported in 1957 JLJ 431=A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 16 M/s Govindram Ramprasad v. Assessing Authority (Sales Tax), urged that according to Article 348 of the Constitution of India, it is only the authoritative Text in English which can be taken into consideration for purposes of interpretation, and not the original statute passed in the regional language of the State. But he did not dispute that the State Legislature could validy introduce and pass a State legislation in the regional language of the State, in our Province, the, State language being Hindi. In my opinion, there is no constitutional bar for not looking into the original Hindi Text, as in this case, a bare reading of which makes it abundantly clear that the local authority is excluded from the definition of Lok-Parisar, (Public premises), as defined in section 2(e) of the M. P. Lok Parisar (Bedakhali) Adhiniyam 1974. In my opinion, there is no constitutional bar for not looking into the original Hindi Text, as in this case, a bare reading of which makes it abundantly clear that the local authority is excluded from the definition of Lok-Parisar, (Public premises), as defined in section 2(e) of the M. P. Lok Parisar (Bedakhali) Adhiniyam 1974. The learned counsel for the appellant, further urged that in sub-section (ii) (e) of section 2, after the word' Corporation' there is a bracket before the beginning of the word 'not' and this bracket is not there at the end of the word 'authority', though the words No.1 of 1956, are in a complete bracket after which there is a 'coma' and the word, or a local authority. Therefore, according to the learned counsel and the bracket proceeding the word 'not' having not been there after the last word authority, it only means that the word local authority is included in the definition of 'Corporation', and consequently local authority, which can also be said to be a 'Corporation', having been included in the definition of 'public premises', there is a clear bar of jurisdiction to the civil Courts, as contemplated by section 15 of the said Act. However, I am not pursuaded to agree with this submission, as merely because of the bracket is not complete after the word 'authority', it does not mean that the said clause is disjunctive. In my opinion, no significance should be attached to the absence of the second bracket after the word 'authority'. To construe Acts according to punctuation marks or according to the absence of punctuation marks, or incompletion of bracket, would be to constitute legislative enactment, not according to the intention of the legislature, but according to the intention of the statutory draftsmen. I conceive with what the legislature passes in its reading of the bills are sections and other provisions, it does not pass punctuation marks or brackets as part of its reading, excepting, in cases where as might happen on occasion while introducing amending provisions; punctuation marks or brackets are specifically adverted to in the amendments themselves. The great stress led on the coma, before the words or a local authority in order to interpret the same to be disjunctive cannot be expected to be the true construction put up by the learned counsel for the appellant on the language of this section. The great stress led on the coma, before the words or a local authority in order to interpret the same to be disjunctive cannot be expected to be the true construction put up by the learned counsel for the appellant on the language of this section. It is now well settled that punctuations or brackets could not be regarded as controlling factor and could not be allowed to control the plain meaning of a Text. In this connection the rule prepounded by Sutherland may be aptly reproduced and it is as follows :- "The better rule is that punctuation is a part of the Act and that it may be considered in the interpretation of the Act, but may not be used to creat doubt or to disturb or defeat the intention of the legislature. When the intent is uncertain punctuation, if it affords some indication of the intention, may be looked to as an aid. In such a case, the punctuation may be disregarded, transposed, or the Act may be re-punctuated if the Act as originally punctuated does not reflect the true legislative purpose. An Act should be read as punctuated; unless there is some reason to the contrary and this is specially true where statute has been repeatedly reenacted with the same punctuation. (See Statutory construction of Sutherland 3rd Edi. Vol. 2 Art. 4939 at page 447 and 448)" Thus it would be clear that technical constructions of sections leaving no room for reasonable elasticity should be avoided, if language is plain and unambiguous hardship or inconvenience cannot alter meaning, but if language is susceptible of more than one meaning to warrant consistent with the object of statute must be preferred. Approach to interpretation must be organic and not pendant i.e. and the construction must be harmoneous. It is no doubt true that where the language of provision is clear and explicit, it must be given effect to whatever be the consequences. Approach to interpretation must be organic and not pendant i.e. and the construction must be harmoneous. It is no doubt true that where the language of provision is clear and explicit, it must be given effect to whatever be the consequences. It is no doubt, true, that as a rule, a court of law is not authorised to supply a casus-omissus or to alter the language of statute for the purpose of supplying a meaning if the language used in statute is not capable to warrant, but where the meaning and purpose of the statute are clear, the Court need not feel helpless in giving effect to them merely because there is an error or omission here or there. It is also a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes, that a statute should not be so construed as to render, as far as possible, any part of it redundant or nugatory. 13. It may be noted that section 2 (b) of the said Act, which defines 'corporate authority' means any company or corporation referred to in clause (e) of this section. This definition has specifically excluded the words 'local authority'. Besides while defining 'public premises' under sub-section (e) of section 2 of the said Act, between the first clause and second clause there is a word "and", which further indicates that the legislature did not want to include the local authority in the definition of 'public-premises'. The words 'or a local authority' and the coma proceeding thereto clearly indicate that it is conjunctive, denoting thereby, that the local authorities are excluded from the word 'corporation', which finds place in the definition of public premises'. Thus, in my opinion, even if we read the printed English Text as it is, it cannot be interpreted to mean that local authority, namely the municipality in this case, is included in the said definition of 'public-premises' and consequently, I am not inclined to hold that according to section 15 of the said Act, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit for ejectment, and other reliefs. (Please see AIR 1976 Allahabad p. 420 M.B. Pandey v. Board of Revenue). 14. (Please see AIR 1976 Allahabad p. 420 M.B. Pandey v. Board of Revenue). 14. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that in this case the accommodation let to the defendant appellant was an open land and though admittedly it was given for a non-residential purpose, still, the provisions of section 3(1) (b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, are not attracted, as the immunity from the operation of the Act contained in section 3(1) (b) is in respect of the premises and is not with respect to the parties to the contract of tenancy. If the premises belonged to a local authority, the Act is not applicable in such premises, even if the person letting it out is a private person, and in support of this submission he placed reliance on a decision reported in 1977 JLJ p. 200 (Radheylal v. Ratansingh) which in turn has relied on the decision report in AIR 1953 SC p. 16(Bhatia Co op. Housing Society v. D.C. Patel). In my opinion, these authorities do not help the defendant in any way. The definition of the word accommodation as defined under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 1961, includes an open land. Admittedly, the land in question was let out for a non residential purpose and was also being actually used for a non-residential purpose. This has also been the finding of the lower Courts, as apparently this point as is being now tried to be argued was not put up before the lower Courts. The land in question undisputedly belongs to the municipality who is the lessor from whom the land in question was taken on lease by the defendant-appellant on the basis of a written lease deed, wherein also it is specifically incorporated that the land in question will only be used for a non-residential purpose and not for any other purposes. Besides, it has never been the case of the appellant-defendant that accommodation was used for a residential purpose or a construction put up thereon is of such a nature which is meant for only residential purpose. Therefore, this contention has also no force and has to be and is hereby rejected. 15. Besides, it has never been the case of the appellant-defendant that accommodation was used for a residential purpose or a construction put up thereon is of such a nature which is meant for only residential purpose. Therefore, this contention has also no force and has to be and is hereby rejected. 15. The decision of this appeal shall also govern the disposal of Second Civil Appeal No. 169 of 1979 (Govindram Bhugdamal v. Nagar Palika Mandsaur), and Second Civil Appeal No 200 of 1979 (Chabbaldas S/o Bansimal v. Nagar Palika Mandsaur), as these very same common questions of law are involved in these 2 appeals and material facts are also the similar. In both these cases the landlord is the municipality Mandsaur and the accommodation taken on rent by the tenants in these 2 cases is also open land, and that the same was taken for a non residential purpose only, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease• deed executed by these tenants in respect of the accommodation taken by them on lease. 16. For all these reasons I do not find any merit in these appeals, which are hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200, if certified.