JUDGMENT : K.B. Panda, J. - The scope of this second appeal lies in a narrow compass and the facts may be briefly stated thus: 2. The two Plaintiffs are the Appellants in both the Courts. Plaintiff No. 2 is described as the adoptive sun of Plaintiff No. 1. The Plaintiff No. 1 is a pre 1937 Act widow, her husband Kangali having died in 1932. In this suit she sought for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and for an injunction against the several Defendants from interfering with her possession. Initially, Plaintiff No. 2 was not in the picture and has been subsequently added as a party after nearly one and half years of the filing of the suit. Defendants 1, 2 and 3 are admittedly the brothers of Plaintiff No. 1. Defendants 4 and 5 are the reversioners of Plaintiff's husband and are the sale contesting Defendants. The case of Defendants 4 and 5 is that earlier there was a suit in respect of schedule 'Kha' properties wherein it has been held that the alienation of those properties by the Plaintiff in favour of Defendants 2 and 3 was not for legal necessity and thus vested on the reversioners. Hence, they urged that the present suit is barred by the principles of resjudicata and that the Plaintiff is estopped from saying that the alienation in favour of Defendants 1, 2 and 3 is Benami. Both the Courts turned down the Plaintiffs claim. 3. It was contended by Mr. Mohapatra, the learned Counsel for the Appellants that: (1) the appellate Court has not taken into consideration the effect of the adoption of Plaintiff No. 2 in Margasir, 72. If it has done so then on the basis of the case law of AIR 1933 155 (Privy Council), it would have held that Plaintiff No. 2 was entitled to the properties left by his deceased adoptive father Kangali. Also replying on Govind Hanumantha Rao Desai Vs. Nagappa alias Narahari Laxman Rao Deshpande and Seven Ors. he contended that adoption of Plaintiff No. 2, as it dated back to the date of death of Kangali, Plaintiff No. 2 had a right to reopen the matter and the earlier suit referred to by Defendants 4 and 5 would not in any way adversely affect his share in the ancestral properties of the adoptive father. he contended that adoption of Plaintiff No. 2, as it dated back to the date of death of Kangali, Plaintiff No. 2 had a right to reopen the matter and the earlier suit referred to by Defendants 4 and 5 would not in any way adversely affect his share in the ancestral properties of the adoptive father. (2) His second point relying on Sawan Ram and Others Vs. Kala Wanti and Others and Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and Ors. v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (died) AIR 1977 S.C. 1944 is that since it has been decided in the earlier suit that: she shall remain in enjoyment of the properties of which she is in possession towards her maintenance till her death" and "the question as to which of the properties she is in possession will be determined at the time of execution of the partition decree. she acquires an absolute right over that property by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. (3) In view of the evidence of D.W. 1 that Plaintiff No. 1 was maintaining herself from the suit properties, it would be taken to be her absolute property. 4. Point Nos. 2 and 3: The learned appellate Court has quoted the relevant portion of the judgment from the earlier suit. In view of the admitted fact that the matter is under inquiry in the final execution proceeding of the partition suit, no clear cut finding can be given at this stage which had to wait till respective allotments of the parties are worked out. Hence, those two points are unacceptable and disposed of in favour of the Respondents. 5. Point No. 1: For a proper appreciation of this point, Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 need be quoted: 12. Effect of adoptions.-An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be served and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family: Provided that- (a) x x x (b) x x x (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. The question, therefore, for consideration is if the Plaintiff No. 2 could divest Defendants 4 and 5 of the property which had vested on them on the strength of his alleged adoption by Plaintiff No. 1. So long the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956 had not been passed, the considerations were different. Till then the case of Amarendra Man Singh Bhramarbar v. Sanatan Singh1 held the field. But after the passing of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 that Judge-made law can no longer prevail over proviso (c) to Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 quoted above. The case of Govind Hanumantha Rao Desai v. Nagappa alias Narahari Laxman Rao Deshpande and Ors. AIR 1972 S.C, relied on by Mr. Mohapatra is not the proper decision Inasmuch as that deals with a case of an adoption made prior to 1956 Act. The proper case is of Sawan Ram and Others Vs. Kala Wanti and Others wherein it is stated thus: It may however, be mentioned that the conclusion which we have arrived at does not indicate that the ultimate decision given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court was in any way incorrect. As we have mentioned earlier, the question is that case was whether E, after the adoption by D, the widow of B, could divest C of the rights which had already vested in C before the adoption. It is significant that by the year 1936. C as the sale male member of the Hindu joint family which owned the disputed property. B died in the year 1924 and A died in 1936. By that time, the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, had not been enacted and, consequently, C, as the sale male survivor of the family became fully owner of that property. In these circumstances, it was clear that after the adoption of E by D, E could not divest C of the rights already vested in him in view of the special provision contained in Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12 of the Act. It appears that by making such a provision, the Act has narrowed down the rights of an adopted child as compared with the rights of a child born posthumously. It appears that by making such a provision, the Act has narrowed down the rights of an adopted child as compared with the rights of a child born posthumously. Under the Shastric law, if a child was adopted by a widow he was treated as a natural-born child divest other members of the family or rights vested in them prior to his adoption. It was only with the limited object of avoiding any such consequence on the adoption of a child by Hindu widow that these provisions in Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12, and Section 13 of the Act were incorporated. In that respect, the Tights of the adopted child were restricted. It is to be noted that this restriction was placed on the rights of a child adopted by either a male Hindu or female Hindu and not merely in a case of adoption by a female Hindu. This restriction on the rights of the adopted could cannot, therefore, in our opinion, lead to any inference that a child adopted by a widow will not be deemed to be the adopted son of her deceased husband. In view of the above decision and the mandatory provision of the statute, it cannot be held that Plaintiff No. 2 who is admittedly adopted some time after the earlier suit had been decided, can reagitate the matter and claim a share in the schedule 'Kha' properties which had already vested on Defendants 4 and 5. Defendants 4 and 5 further dispute Plaintiff No. 2's adoption. That matter need not be gone into, for, even if it is accepted, the law as it now stands cannot alter the situation and divest Defendants 4 and 5 of the property already vested on them. All the three points raised on behalf of the Appellants having been negatived, the appeal must fail. Parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed