Judgment :- 1. This revision by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 201/78 is against the order of the trial court in I.A. No. 293/79, an application filed under Order XI R.12 CPC. 2. The suit was for permanent injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 from trespassing into two separate one-acre plots in R. S. No.1/IA. The plaintiff's father had obtained 27 acres of land in the survey number (plaint A schedule) under a partition deed of 1942 and he was in direct possession from 1953. Out of the above 12.02 acres were to be surrendered as excess under Act I of 1964. The father was desirous of giving the remaining 14.98 acres (plaint B schedule) to his four sons, including the plaintiff, and land revenue was accordingly being paid in the sons' names. But the father died in 1977 and the property devolved on his widow and six children. The defendants had requested the father during his life time to give them some part of land instead of surrendering the same as excess, but that request had been turned down. They were ever thereafter trying to get at the land, and on 15-10-78 when the plaintiff went to the property with labourers, the defendants unsuccessfully obstructed. They however threatended that renewed efforts would be made to trespass upon the land. The defendants had therefore to be restrained from entering on the two acres of land described in the C schedule, forming part of the B schedule. 3. Apart from denying the plaint allegations the defendants, in their written statement, contended that the C schedule property could not be identified at all by the descriptions therein, and it was therefore proper that the plaintiff be directed to take out a commission for the purpose. After such identification, the defendants would file an additional written statement. The plaintiffs' father had put them in possession of the two acres in 1958 and it was the defendants who were paying revenue thereafter. They had no need to trespass on two acres, and they had never attempted to do so. 4. It appears that the plaint was thereafter amended so as to seek recovery on the strength of title, and the defendants filed an additional written statement reiterating the plea that the identity of C schedule had first to be established. They had no need to trespass on two acres, and they had never attempted to do so. 4. It appears that the plaint was thereafter amended so as to seek recovery on the strength of title, and the defendants filed an additional written statement reiterating the plea that the identity of C schedule had first to be established. The defendants also pointed out that the plaintiff's refusal/ failure to take out a commission for the purpose was indicative of an attempt to fish out a case for which there was no factual basis. 5. The plaintiff then filed the I. A. for an order directing the defendants to make discovery on oath of the documents in their possession, alleging that they were deliberately suppressing information about the documents under which they had obtained the two acres, in order to bide time for creating false documents. The defendants filed a counter objecting to the discovery again on the ground that the suit property had not been identified, and pointing out that the plaintiff had extensive properties in the area and in the same survey number. They would produce documents in their possession once the identity of the property was fixed up. 6. The learned Munsiff held that in the nature of the objections raised and in view of the fact that a specific issue had been framed "regarding the identity of the property, the measurements and boundaries", it was not necessary to direct the defendants "to produce the documents at this time". The court was not disposed to accept the argument of counsel for the plaintiff that discovery would be a better method for identifying the property than issue of a commission. The defendants had undertaken to produce the documents before the commissioner and the court therefore "closed" the application with the observation that it would be sufficient if the defendants produced the documents before the commissioner at the time of inspection. 7. Mr Madhavan Nambiar's submission on behalf of the petitioner that the court below has confused discovery under R.12 with production of documents under R.14 seems to be technically at least right; and he is also right in urging that production of the documents before the commissioner, as directed by the court, is no substitute for an affidavit to be filed under R.13. However it is not difficult to construe the order as one rejecting the prayer for discovery at "this stage", and the question is whether in that view, there are grounds for interfering with it. 8. Under Order XI R.12, the court can direct any party to a suit to make discovery of documents "relating to any matter in question therein". The expression 'matter in question" means a question or issue in dispute in the action and not the thing about which such dispute arises. See Halsbury, 3rd Edn. Vol. 12, page 26; thus in a suit for recovery of land it means the plaintiff's alleged title, and not the land. And in a suit for injunction to restrain a defendant from entering upon plaintiff's land, it means the latter's possession. At any rate, the matter in question is not the land and all rights relating thereto. In a recent decision Kesava Bhat v. Subraya Bhat 1979 KLT. 766 by a bench of five judges, this Court observed: "Unaided by authorities we think that in suits for injunction, we are concerned only with the question of possession the nature and character of the possession is immaterial. If the plaintiff does not make out his possession, there is no need at all to consider whether the defendant is in possession, and if so, in what character or capacity, and if the plaintiff makes out his case of possession, the question of defendant's tenancy again would not fall for consideration" No doubt, the question there was whether a reference under S.125 (3) to the Land Tribunal was mandatory in a suit for injunction where tenancy was claimed by the defendant. But the principle cannot be different here also. The plaintiff wants the court to injunct the defendants against entering upon two one-acre plots in a survey number which contains at least 27 acres of land; and the plaintiff's possession of the two plots is the 'matter in question's Which are these plots? It seems to me that without identifying them, no court could fix up what the matter in question is, and on that basis, direct the other side to discover documents relating to it. It seems to me that without identifying them, no court could fix up what the matter in question is, and on that basis, direct the other side to discover documents relating to it. What the court below has done, in substance, is to direct the plaintiff to first identify the C schedule property, and thereby the 'matter in question', before claiming an order for discovery, and not to use discovery as a means to show what the matter in question is. Understood in this manner. I think, the order does not call for any interference. 9. Counsel submitted, with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur (AIR. 1972 SC. 2379), that the scope of discovery under Order XI R.12 could not be unduly restricted. The decision shows that it is not necessary for the applicant to specify in detail the documents sought to be discovered when they are in the hands of the other side. A defendant may claim a document to be privileged, but that claim can be considered only after discovery, when the stage of production is reached; privilege also therefore is not a relevant consideration under Order XI R.12. Even if the documents are not admissible in evidence, they may contain information which may enable the applicant to advance his case or damage the adversary's case; thus inadmissibility too is not a defence against discovery. But these observations were made by the court in the context of an application by a defendant in a suit, instituted in forma pauperis, calling upon the plaintiff to discover documents relating to his bank accounts (i. e. pass books, cheque books etc.) and also the documents in respect of the properties held by him and the personal account maintained by him. The pauperism of the plaintiff was the matter in question, and on that, there was no doubt or dispute; and as the documents were obviously related thereto, discovery had to be made, leaving admissibility, privilege and like questions to the appropriate stage. Even the failure of the applicant to specify the documents was not fatal. The decision, however, has no application to the facts of the present case where the matter in issue remained shrowded in mystery. 10. Rajkishore Prasad v. State (AIR. 1979 Ori. 96) was a case where the plaintiffs sued the State of Orissa and others for injunction. Even the failure of the applicant to specify the documents was not fatal. The decision, however, has no application to the facts of the present case where the matter in issue remained shrowded in mystery. 10. Rajkishore Prasad v. State (AIR. 1979 Ori. 96) was a case where the plaintiffs sued the State of Orissa and others for injunction. According to the plaintiffs, they were lessees of a plot of land belonging to the Jagannath Road Fund Trust. During the emergency, on 30 - 6 75, officers of the State and the Municipality forcibly entered the same and demolished a building therein. Buildings in other similar plots were also demolished on the same day. When the occupants filed writ petitions in the High Court against further trespass and demolition, the respondents raised a false plea that the demolitions were done under the provisions of the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act. As a matter of fact, no proceedings under the Act had been initiated and no notice served on them; the plaintiffs continued to be in possession after the incidents of 30-6-75. The defendants pleaded that encroachment cases had been duly registered against the plaintiffs under the Act and in such proceedings notices had been served by 'personal contact' and proclamations through loudspeaker. The application under Order XI R.12 was filed by the plaintiffs calling upon the defendants to discover records relating to the alleged proceedings under the Act, not only in respect of the plaint property, but also other properties of the Trust where similar demolitions were mads on 30-6-75. A contention was raised before the High Court that the plaintiffs had not specified the documents with reasonable clarity; and that was repelled, by referring to the Supreme Court's observations in Sethi's case (AIR. 1972 SC. 2379) that a plaintiff may not always be able to do so. As to the contention that documents relating to demolition of buildings in other items of lands belonging to the Trust were irrelevant, the High Court said: "It would be seen that the plaintiffs' stand from the very start of filing of the plaint is that not only the house of the plaintiffs, but also other structures standing on that land were forcibly demolished and documents have been manufactured about proceedings under the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act and the plaintiffs have been consistently pressing the matter. It is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that those documents will throw light on the fact that records were manufactured for a bunch of cases, including that of the plaintiffs under the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act and there was no service of notice in fact and all the service returns have been manufactured. Relevancy is not the question for consideration at this stage. Those documents will throw light on the matter in controversy and in favour of the plaintiffs or may contain information which will directly or indirectly enable the plaintiffs to advance their case or damage the stand of the opposite parties. This will result in avoiding a trail of enquiry in the matter for consideration." Here again, the matter in question was never in doubt; it was the possession of a plot of land belonging to the Trust and over which demolition operations had admittedly been carried on in June, 1975, followed by prior litigations in the High Court. 11. The decision in Damodaran v. Samuel Aaron (1959 KLT.1186) had arisen from an application under Order XI Rules.12, 14 and 15 for permission to inspect documents produced in court by the defendant. The plaintiff and the defendant were partners in a saw mill business. The firm was dissolved under a deed of 1953 and accounts settled, with the plaintiff receiving Rs. 25,000 from the defendant as estimated value of the goodwill. In pursuance of certain income tax proceedings regarding periods prior to dissolution, the plaintiff subsequently came to learn that the defendant, who was actually in management of the business all the time, had perpetrated fraud in connection with the settlement of accounts. He therefore brought a suit for reopening of accounts, and filed an application under Order XI R.14,15 and 18 for production and inspection of all the books of accounts The court directed the defendant to produce the books, but ordered that inspection could be allowed only after the plaintiff furnished further details of the fraud alleged. The plaint was thereafter amended to incorporate such further particulars; and another application was again moved for inspection. The trial court allowed inspection of the accounts relating to some period, observing that if fraud in some items were proved, the question of reopening the accounts for the entire period could be considered at the time of passing the preliminary decree. The plaint was thereafter amended to incorporate such further particulars; and another application was again moved for inspection. The trial court allowed inspection of the accounts relating to some period, observing that if fraud in some items were proved, the question of reopening the accounts for the entire period could be considered at the time of passing the preliminary decree. The plaintiff moved the High Court against limiting inspection to a specified period, and the defendant challenged the grant of permission for that period. Vaidialingam J. (as he then was) held that the mere inability of a party to particularise the items of misconduct was no reason to deny inspection. When the information required was necessarily within the opponent's knowledge, and when the attempt was not to fish out a case, discovery could even precede particulars where the object was to reopen settled accounts. But the decision is no authority for holding, as counsel suggests, that in all cases except those excluded by the proviso to R.12, discovery should be allowed as a matter of course. As I read the rule, the court has to be satisfied, before directing discovery, that the documents relate to a matter in question in the suit. Even if the relationship is clear, there is a discretion in the court to decide whether discovery should be allowed or not at a given stage. 12. There is thus no merit in the CRP. and I dismiss the same, but subject to the direction that if the plaintiff takes out a commission, identifies C schedule property and still considers that discovery should be sought for, nothing stated herein, or by the court below in its order under challenge, shall prevent it from dealing with a fresh motion to that effect in accordance with law. Parties will bear their own costs.