JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) has been directed against the order dated 17th October 1978 passed by the learned Additional District judge, Khurai, in Civil Suit No. 3 of 1978, ( 2. ) THE brief facts of the case are that the applicants by a written agreement dated 20-6-1970 contracted to sell their 14 41 acres of agricultural land, to the non-applicant for a consideration of Rs. 10,000 and also delivered possession of the land to the non-applicant. The non-applicant instituted the suit for specific performance of the said contract against the applicants which was compromised in pursuance of which a compromise decree was passed on 14-9-1977. The terms of the compromise decree were that the applicants shall make payment of Rs. 14,000 to the non-applicant by 20-6-1978 in which event the non-applicant would give up his claim for specific performance of the said contract in respect of the said land and shall deliver back the possession thereof to the applicants. It further provided that in the event of failure on the part of the applicants, to make the aforesaid payment by the date specified in the decree, the non-applicant would be entitled to obtain a sale deed in respect thereof from the applicants and on their failure to do so to get the same executed by the process of the Court. ( 3. ) THE applicants could not manage the payment of Rs. 14,000 to the non-applicant within the aforesaid specified date, on account of failure of crops and there being no other source of income to make the payment. The applicants therefore made an application under section 148 of the Code, for extension of time upto 15-6-1979 for payment of the said amount. ( 4. ) THE learned lower Court, besides other cases, relying on the case of Hukumcliand v. Bansilal, (AIR1968 SC86.) rejected the said application by the impugned order, holding that it had no jurisdiction to extend the time fixed in the decree. It is against this order that the applicants have come up in revision before this Court. ( 5. ( 4. ) THE learned lower Court, besides other cases, relying on the case of Hukumcliand v. Bansilal, (AIR1968 SC86.) rejected the said application by the impugned order, holding that it had no jurisdiction to extend the time fixed in the decree. It is against this order that the applicants have come up in revision before this Court. ( 5. ) THE only point for consideration in the revision petition is whether under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court has power to enlarge or extend the date for payment of a certain sum of money specified in the decree. ( 6. ) I have heard Shri N. S. Kale, learned counsel for the applicants. None appeared for the non-applicant, though S. P. C. was issued by the office. I have also perused the record. ( 7. ) I have examined the law laid down by their Lordships of the supreme Court, in Hukumchands case (supra) on which reliance was placed by the learned lower Court in rejecting the application for enlargement of time. In that case, their Lordships while construing various Rules of order 21 of the Code and the right of a judgment-debtor to deposit the decretal amount under a mortgage decree, before confirmation of sale, observed that section 148 of the Code would not apply and the executing court was right in holding that it could not extend time. There the extension of time was not deemed fit in view of the statutory provisions. ( 8. ) THE learned counsel for the applicants placing his reliance on nanjibhai v. Ramkishan, (1916 M PL J 650.) urged before me that the compromise decree in question was obtained in a suit for specific performance of a contract based on the agreement dated 20-6-1970 between the parties. The compromise decree therefore retained its character as a contract founded on the said agreement, as such it is subject to all incidents of a contract including section 74 of the Contract Act. He further urged that land in question is worth about Rs. 35000 and the same was not intended to be transferred for a meagre sum of Rs. The compromise decree therefore retained its character as a contract founded on the said agreement, as such it is subject to all incidents of a contract including section 74 of the Contract Act. He further urged that land in question is worth about Rs. 35000 and the same was not intended to be transferred for a meagre sum of Rs. 14,000 and the condition in the compromise decree for execution of a sale deed on failure of payment of said amount on the specified date was incorporated in terrorem, in order to compel the applicants to pay the said amount on the date fixed in the decree, which amounts to a penalty and as such cannot be enforced. 1 do not find any substance in the above said contention of the learned counsel for the simple reason that there is no material on record to suggest even prima facie that the land in question is worth more than Rs. 14000. On the contrary the record shows that the agreement was for sale of the land only for a consideration of Rs. 10,000. Under these circumstances the land could not be said to be worth more than rs. 14,000. In Nanjibhais case (supra) of this Court it was observed that there is a clear distinction between a provision in the nature of concession and one by way of penalty. In my opinion, therefore, the said condition was by way of concession and not as penalty, as such the provisions of section 74 of the Contract Act would not be attracted. The facts and circumstances of the case, in hand clearly indicate that the non-applicant had agreed to restore possession of the land to the applicants on payment of the said mutually agreed amount of Rs. 14,000 which was by way of a concession to the advantage of the applicants and for that reason he had given up his claim for specific performance of contract on the condition of such payment. It was, therefore, not a penalty, consequently it is not hit by the provisions of section 74 of the Contract Act. ( 9. ) I shall now proceed to examine the provisions of section 148 of the code to see if the Court has power to enlarge time specified in the decree for payment of the money. It was, therefore, not a penalty, consequently it is not hit by the provisions of section 74 of the Contract Act. ( 9. ) I shall now proceed to examine the provisions of section 148 of the code to see if the Court has power to enlarge time specified in the decree for payment of the money. But before I do so, I feel it necessary to reproduce section 148 of the Code hereunder with advantage : section 148: "where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. " ( 10. ) THERE are divergent views of the different High Courts, regarding the powers of the Courts under sections 148 and 151 of the Code, to enlarge time fixed or specified in orders and decrees. It is true that after passing the decree the Court becomes functus officio and retains no jurisdiction to enlarge the time for payment fixed by the decree because once a judgment or decree is signed by the judge, it ceases to have any power to alter or add to it, except of course, as provided by any provisions of the Code, such as under section 152 or under Order 47 of the Code. ( 11. ) BUT a distinction has to be drawn between cases in which a judgment or decree has attained finality and there remains nothing to be done and the cases where the judgment and decree specifying a particular date for certain payment, are not final and there is yet to be done something in order to attain the finality in the matter. In my opinion, in the former case the provisions of section 148 of the Code could not be pressed into service, as the Court becomes totally functus officio and retains no jurisdiction whatsoever to alter or add to the judgment and decree. In my opinion, in the former case the provisions of section 148 of the Code could not be pressed into service, as the Court becomes totally functus officio and retains no jurisdiction whatsoever to alter or add to the judgment and decree. But in the latter case, the court does retain the power and control over the same as the judgment or decree specifying the date were of the preliminary nature, not intending to be final and the Court is seized of the case as there is still something to be done in order to give finality to it, and therefore the provisions of section 148 of the Code may be pressed in service and the time specified in the decree could be enlarged by the Court. The question therefore that arises now is to see whether the decree in question is final or it is in the preliminary nature. ( 12. ) IN the present case before me, admittedly suit for specific performance of a contract on the agreement to sell the land was instituted in which the compromise decree was obtained of which the main terms were, that the applicants shall make the payment of Rs. 14,000 to the non-applicant on or before 20-6-1978, consequent upon which, the non-applicant will restore possession of land to the applicants and forego his claim of specific performance of said contract. But if the applicants failed to make the aforesaid payment on or before the date fixed, then in that event the non-applicant could be entitled to retain possession of land and the applicants shall execute a sale deed in respect of the said land in favour of the applicant and on their failure to do so, the non-applicant shall get the same executed by the Court. Thus, the aforesaid terms of the decree clearly indicated that it was in the nature of a preliminary decree and the Court is still seized of the case, having the power and control over it, to direct the applicants to execute the sale deed and in default thereof, to get the sale deed executed by the Court on behalf of the applicants. Thus, I find, that the Court has still to pass necessary orders in the case and it has not become functus officio and therefore it has power to enlarge the time for payment, fixed in the decree. Thus, I find, that the Court has still to pass necessary orders in the case and it has not become functus officio and therefore it has power to enlarge the time for payment, fixed in the decree. In this view of the matter I am supported by the decisions in M. and A. Associates v. Telerad Ltd. , ( AIR 1969 Bom 323 .), Lakshmi Bala v. Brijendra Nath, (AIR 197) Cal 243. ). Bisun Prasad v. Kamla Kant, ( AIR 1972 Pat. 322 .) and B. Ganpati v. Sheshrao Raja Ram, (1973 Mh. L J 1034=a I R 1974 Bom. 104.) ( 13. ) IN Mahanth Ramdas v. Gangadas, (AIR 1961 S C 882.) their Lordships had an occasion to consider the scope and effect of section 148 of the Code and powers of the court to extend the time. In the case of Mahanth Ramdas (Supra) three months time was granted by the Patna High Court to pay the deficit court fees with a condition that if it is not so paid within three months the appeal will stand dismissed. If the Court fee is paid within the time given, the appeal will be allowed with costs and the suit of the plaintiff will stand decreed. An application was filed for execution of this time for payment of court fee. This application was heard after the expiry of the period fixed for its payment. Their Lordships therefore observed that section 148 of the code, in terms, allowed the extension of time even if the original period has expired. It was further observed that that it empowers the Court to deal with such events that may arise subsequent to the passing of an order, for the purpose of enlarging time for payment. ( 14. ) AGAIN the same conclusions may be recorded if an approach to the case is made from a different angle. A perusal of the provisions of section 28 of the Specific Relief (Act No. XLVII of 1963) Act, 1963 will indicate that on a decree for specific performance of a contract of sale being passed, when the purchaser makes default in payment of the money as per directions of the Court, then a right accrues to the vendor to rescind the contract. He may do so either by applying to the Court in the same suit for specific performance of contract or by a separate suit. This makes the position further clear that the contract has not been determined and there is yet something to be done in future to comply with the terms of decree. The main part of section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, may be reproduced with advantage as under:-Section 28. (1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require. (2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the court- (a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 15. ) THE words and expression, "or such further period as the court may allow", are very much significant and clearly show that in a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale, power vests in the Court which had passed the decree, to enlarge the period. This power also extends to the Court in which an application under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act is moved. ( 16. ) FROM the above discussion, I find that in the special circumstances of this case, the Court is still seized of the case, the decree being in the preliminary nature as pointed out hereinbefore and therefore the Court retained its control and power over the same. As such the provisions of section 148 of the Code may be invoked to enlarge and extend the time. ( 17. ) AT this stage, now I do not feel it necessary to send the case back to the lower Court for holding an enquiry on the application of the applicants made for extension of time to deposit the money, specially when the period prayed for has already expired. Sending the case for enquiry would further add to delay already caused. In such circumstances, I deem it fit to set aside the impugned order and grant the applicants one and a half months time from today, for payment or deposit of the sum specified, in the compromise decree. Sending the case for enquiry would further add to delay already caused. In such circumstances, I deem it fit to set aside the impugned order and grant the applicants one and a half months time from today, for payment or deposit of the sum specified, in the compromise decree. It is expected that the applicants will comply the orders without further indulgence for any reasons whatsoever. ( 18. ) FOR the reasons stated above, the revision succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order is set aside with the observations and directions contained in paragraph No. 17 above. As this revision was heard exparte, there will be no order as to costs in this Court. Revision allowed.