JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - In this appeal by Anand Singh, defendant No. 2, Ch. the learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the judgment and decree dated 19-10-1968 passed by 1st Additional Civil Judge in Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1967 confirming the judgment and decree dated 31-10-1966 passed by the Munsif City Kanpur in Original Suit No. 208 of 1963 on two grounds: (1) Contract of sale and purchase of cloth between the parties was void in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the U. P. Controlled Cotton Cloth and Yarn Dealers Licensing Order, 1957, hereinafter called, the Control Order, and as such unenforceable in law. (2) During the period in question the appellant was not a partner of registered firm M/s. Anand Singh Ravi Shanker. 2. The above points arise in this manner. Phool Chand, plaintiff-respondent No. 1 is sole proprietor of- a firm styled 'Phool Chand Dalai carrying on cloth business. The appellant, Ravi Shanker respondent No. 3 and Amrit Lal respondent No. 4 were undisputedly parties of a registered firm styled M/s. Anand Singh Ravi Shanker which was also dealing in cloth. Respondent No. 1 had sold cloth to the said firm during the period 30th April, 1959 to 13th July, 1961. In this period the firm of the respondents and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and appellant had made some payments. After having deducted the amounts paid, the respondent No. 1 brought suit for recovery of the balance amount. 3. The learned Munsif found that the appellant was a partner of the firm and was liable to pay the amount claimed by the respondent No. 1. On this finding, the suit of the respondent No. 1 was decreed against all the defendants in the case. Before the trial court it was not pleaded that the transaction of sale and purchase of cloth between the parties was void in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the Control Order. In the appeal by the present appellant, the First Additional Civil Judge confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the appellant was also liable to pay the amount in question to the respondent No. 1. Before the Additional Civil Judge, the appellant contended that the transactions were void because of the provisions of Section 4 of the Control Order. The Additional Civil Judge did not accept the contention. Before the Additional Civil Judge, the appellant contended that the transactions were void because of the provisions of Section 4 of the Control Order. The Additional Civil Judge did not accept the contention. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. 4. With regard to the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, reference may be made to the relevant provisions of the Contract Act and the Control Order in question. 5. Section 23 of the Contract Act lays down that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or it is opposed to public policy. Thereafter Section 24 lays down that if any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or any one or any part of any one of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the agreement is void. 6. The effect of both these sections is that if the object of an agreement is forbidden by law or it would defeat the provisions of any law or it is opposed to public policy, the agreement is void. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to cases mentioned hereinafter which were decided on the basis of this principle: Liladhar Dariyana v. Chimman Ram Curwa Ram, AIR 1955 Vin Pra 31; V. Basavayya v. N. Kottayya, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 145; T. Rama Rao v. Durga Suryanarayana, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 256; T. G. Lakshmi Narayana Chetty v. K. V. Nanjaiah Chetty, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 136; Babulal Agarwala v. Vijaya Stores, Firm, AIR 1955 Orissa 49; M. H. Gowder v. Naga Maistry, AIR 1957 Mad 620 ; Commr. of Income-tax, Mysore v. Union Tobacco Co., Ernakulam, AIR 1960 Ker 276 ; K. V. Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga and Co., AIR 1969 SC 504 . 7. It may be added here that the facts of all these cases are not parallel to the facts of the present case. By way of instance, facts of the case of Liladhar Dariyana v. Chimman Ram Curwa Ram, AIR 1955 Vin Pra 31 may be indicated. There was statutory provision prohibiting sub-letting. In the teeth of this prohibition, a tenant sub-let the premises to the defendant. The tenant-in-chief brought action against the sub-tenant. By way of instance, facts of the case of Liladhar Dariyana v. Chimman Ram Curwa Ram, AIR 1955 Vin Pra 31 may be indicated. There was statutory provision prohibiting sub-letting. In the teeth of this prohibition, a tenant sub-let the premises to the defendant. The tenant-in-chief brought action against the sub-tenant. It was held that as the contract of subletting was against the statutory prohibition, it could not be enforced. 8. Section 4 of the Control Order lays down that no person shall obtain or store for sale or distribute controlled cotton cloth or yarn except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence. This section prohibits a person who does not hold a licence to obtain purchase or store cotton cloth for the purpose of sale. If any person contravenes this prohibition he is liable to be punished under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Vide Section 22 of the Control Order). 9. In the present case, the evidence is that Ravi Shanker and Anand Singh both applied to have licence, but the licensing authority issued licence in the name of Ravi Shanker only. It will be noticed that Section 4 does not lay down that a person holding a licence cannot sell cloth to a person, who does not hold licence. In view of Section 4 of the Control Order it can easily be imagined that the respondent No. 1 must be having a licence to sell the cloth. Therefore, the respondent No. 1 could sell cloth to any person and not necessarily to a licence holder. Assuming for a moment that there was no licence either with Anand Singh or Ravi Shanker, the respondent No. 1 could maintain a suit for the recovery of the price of the cloth sold by him to them or any of them. Section 4 of the Control Order would not have come as a bar in his suit 10. It is evident that Section 4 of the Control Order does not prohibit sale by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 to the appellant and his partner Ravi Shanker. It was not pleaded by the appellant or any other defendant in the case that Phool Chand had no licence to sell the cloth. 11. It is evident that Section 4 of the Control Order does not prohibit sale by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 to the appellant and his partner Ravi Shanker. It was not pleaded by the appellant or any other defendant in the case that Phool Chand had no licence to sell the cloth. 11. For what has been stated above, it is clear that plaintiff-respondent No. 1 could legally maintain a suit for the recovery of the cloth sold by him to the. appellant and the other respondents. As Section 4 did not prohibit any sale by the' plaintiff-respondent to the appellant and his partners, Section 23 of the Contract Act did not come into operation. 12. There is no dispute to the contention of the appellants counsel that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 must be aware of the provisions of Section 4 of the Control Order, but this fact does not affect the sale by the respondent No. 1 to persons who did not hold a licence. Under the Control Order, therefore, this fact does not improve the position of the appellant in any way. 13. For what has been discussed above, there is no merit in the first contention. 14. With regard to the second contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to refer to any document through which the appellant indicated his intention not to remain a partner of the registered firm. There is nothing on record to indicate that the appellant gave any public notice regarding his retirement from the partnership. There is also nothing on record to indicate that the appellant informed the Registrar that he had retired from the partnership. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, referred to two pieces of evidence: (1) On 21-10-1953 Ravi Shanker wrote a letter to Anand Singh that he would not be in any manner responsible for the payment of the debts of the partnership firm; and (2) Ravi Shanker stated that the appellant was not used to sit on the shop from the year 1953 and was looking after his separate business under the style Lal Tel Pharmacy. These two pieces of evidence hardly go to show that the appellant became separate from the partnership firm or retired from the firm. The Partnership Act prescribes mode in which a partner can retire from the firm. That mode was not adopted by the appellant. These two pieces of evidence hardly go to show that the appellant became separate from the partnership firm or retired from the firm. The Partnership Act prescribes mode in which a partner can retire from the firm. That mode was not adopted by the appellant. In the result, the second contention also is without force. 16. No other point was urged on behalf of the appellant. For the findings arrived at above, there is no merit in this appeal. 17. The appeal is dismissed with costs.