JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - Brij Mohan Lal Ayurvedic Sanskrit Dharmarth Trust is a public charitable trust situated in Mohalla Beharipur, Bareilly. This trust had been created by Smt. Ganga Devi and Smt. Sharma Devi, widows of Lala Brij Mohan Lal, under a document executed in the year 1929. By the said trust-deed, besides certain zamindari properties, two houses including house No. W.D. 7/133A, situated in Mohalla Beharipur, Bareilly, were dedicated for the trust. The object of the trust, appearing from the trust-deed, is running of the Vidyalaya, a dispensary and a hospital. It is common ground that the Vidyalaya had been running in the lower storey of the first house, earmarked by Lala Brij Mohan Lal himself, while the principal lived in the upper storey. The disputed house is the other house dedicated under the trust-deed. It consisted of a big room 24 x 11, four small rooms 10 x 10, averandah and a Sahan. One of these rooms is being used as a dispensary while the rest of it had been let out to Pooran Chand, the petitioner, on a. monthly rent of Rs. 27. On 18-2-1971, the trust moved an application for permission under Section 3 of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 to evict the petitioner on the allegations that the disputed house had been let out to earn some income in the beginning when the number of students was meagre and there were few boarders, but as the trust had been needing the house for use as a boarding-house for the purpose of the Vidyalaya and had been making efforts since 1957. The claim of the trust was that the premises, in occupation of the petitioner, was required for providing an indoor hospital facilities and for maintaining a boarding house. The trust claimed that the boarding-house was in a rented accommodation and for the proper functioning it was essential that the boarding-house was lodged in the disputed premises. 2. The application was contested by the petitioner on the grounds inter alia that the need of the trust was not bona fide. He claimed that its requirement for providing a boarding-house to the students of the Ayurvedic school simultaneously for accommodating patients of the Ayurvedic Avashdhalaya itself suggested that the need was not bona fide. 2. The application was contested by the petitioner on the grounds inter alia that the need of the trust was not bona fide. He claimed that its requirement for providing a boarding-house to the students of the Ayurvedic school simultaneously for accommodating patients of the Ayurvedic Avashdhalaya itself suggested that the need was not bona fide. On 16-6-1971 the application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the finding that the need of the trust was not bona fide. Against the said order, the trust filed a revision in July 1971. 3. On the enforcement of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the revision was transferred to the District Judge. On 8-1-1874 the District Judge allowed the revision holding that the trust needed the disputed house for providing better boarding-house facility and also with the object of providing an indoor hospital. The order of the District Judge became final. 4. On 25-1-1974 the trust filed an application under Section 21 read with Section 43 (2) (rr) for the enforcement of the said order obtained under Section 3 of the old Act. Through this application, a prayer was made by the trust for getting the possession of the premises by the ejectment of the petitioner. The trust claimed that under Section 43 (2) (rr) it was entitled to get the order passed under Section 3 of the old Act implemented. The application was contested by the petitioner. On 20-1-1976 the application was rejected on the finding that as the application filed under Section 43 (2) (rr) did not mention the grounds on which the application under Section 3 was allowed, the application filed under Section 43 (2) (rr) was not maintainable. This led to the filing of the second application by the trust on 24-3-1976. In this application, the trust gave the grounds on which the application under Section 3 had been accepted. It asserted that the house was dedicated to the trust for the boarding of the college students and was set for charitable Avashdhalaya. Due to non-availability of the boarding facilities, the students were facing great difficulties. The petitioner again contested this application and filed a written statement challenging that the need of the trust was bona fide. It asserted that the house was dedicated to the trust for the boarding of the college students and was set for charitable Avashdhalaya. Due to non-availability of the boarding facilities, the students were facing great difficulties. The petitioner again contested this application and filed a written statement challenging that the need of the trust was bona fide. On 26-8-1976 the prescribed authority allowed the application on the finding that the order passed under Section 3 of the old Act having become final, the trust was entitled to an order of eviction of the petitioner under Section 43 (2) (rr). Against this order, the petitioner filed an appeal. The appeal was dismissed on 26-5-1977, hence the writ. 5. The first thing that is to be noted is that the order of the prescribed authority accepting the application of the trust made on 26-8-1976 was not appeal-able under Section 22 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, hence the appeal filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. The petitioner should have directly filed a writ petition against the order of the Prescribed Authority, if he was aggrieved by that order. He had no justification for preferring an appeal against the same and wasting his time in prosecuting it. 6. However, I would not like to dismiss the writ petition on this ground. In my opinion the time spent in prosecuting the appeal is not liable to be excluded. 7. Reverting to the merits, the first submission made by the learned counsel was that the application made by the public charitable trust was not maintainable inasmuch as the public trust being a registered society, the property belonging to it was outside the purview of the Act. Counsel referred to Section 2 of the Act No. XIII of 1972 and pointed out that under Cl. (f) of Section 2, the building built and held by a registered society under the Societies Registration Act was exempt from operation of the Act. According to his submission as the property was exempt, the application ought to have been rejected. This is admittedly a new ground taken by the petitioner's learned counsel in this writ petition. The ground whether it was society registered under the Societies Registration Act ought to have been taken earlier. Even on merits, I find no substance. According to his submission as the property was exempt, the application ought to have been rejected. This is admittedly a new ground taken by the petitioner's learned counsel in this writ petition. The ground whether it was society registered under the Societies Registration Act ought to have been taken earlier. Even on merits, I find no substance. Under Section 2 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, an application can be filed for release of a premises by a landlord. Clause (a) contemplates that an application under the aforesaid provision for release can be made also by a public charitable trust. The trust admittedly was a public charitable trust. In fact, as I would show while dealing with the second point, counsel appearing for the petitioner himself contended that it was a public charitable trust. As the property belonged to public charitable trust, the trust could file the application under Section 21 read with Section 43 (2) (rr). 8. Section 43 (2) (rr) had been added by U. P. Act No. XXXVII of 1972. By this section a landlord was made entitled to get an eviction order of the tenant where a permission had been granted under Section 3 of the old Act. Under Section 3 of the old Act a landlord was required to institute a suit for ejectment if he had obtained the necessary permission. Since the old Act had been repealed and the requirement of filing the suit was not carried forward in this Act, the legislature made a provision under clause (rr) of sub-section (2) of Section 43 for providing the same right to a person who had obtained the permission under the old Act, which was available to a landlord under the new Act. Under Sec. 43 (2) (rr) a landlord is only required to establish that the permission had been obtained under Section 3 on any ground specified in sub-section (1) of Section 21. From a reading of Section 21 read with Section 43 (2) (rr), it is clear that an application of a public charitable trust is maintainable. 9. Before proceeding to discard the second point, it appears appropriate to point out that the counsel appearing for the petitioner conceded that the landlord was a public charitable trust, 10. From a reading of Section 21 read with Section 43 (2) (rr), it is clear that an application of a public charitable trust is maintainable. 9. Before proceeding to discard the second point, it appears appropriate to point out that the counsel appearing for the petitioner conceded that the landlord was a public charitable trust, 10. The second submission of the learned counsel was that as constructing a hospital or Avashdhalaya as well as a boarding-house were not the objects of the trust, the application filed under Section 43 (2) (rr) was liable to be rejected. I have already noted above that an application under Section 21 (1) (a) can be filed by public charitable trust for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of the need of the building for the objects of a trust. The objects of the trust undoubtedly were to be found from the deed itself. A copy of the deed has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. The deed had been executed for the purpose of running an Avashdhalaya and for imparting education to the students in medicine. At the time when it had been executed, the portion in dispute had been let out. But as the trustees were finding difficult to continue with the portion left in their possession, an application had been filed by the trust for getting possession to enable it to open a dispensary and a boarding house. These purposes fall within the objects of the trust for which it had been created. What is required to be seen in such a matter is whether the need, for which the premises is required, is to effectuate the central intent of the dedicator and if it is meant for that purpose, the same would be considered to be one filed for the object of the trust. The object of the trust appearing from the deed is running of the Vidyalaya, a dispensary and a hospital, making provision for a boarding-house which will enable a more efficient running of the Vidyalaya and similarly providing for a hospital is a need directly covered by the deed. The object of the trust appearing from the deed is running of the Vidyalaya, a dispensary and a hospital, making provision for a boarding-house which will enable a more efficient running of the Vidyalaya and similarly providing for a hospital is a need directly covered by the deed. That being so, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as the application had not been filed under Section 3 of the Act for the object of the trust, the application made under Section 43 (2) (rr) was liable to be rejected, cannot be accepted. 11. The third submission made by the learned counsel was that proviso-(3) to sub-section (1) of Section 21 laid down that no application under clause-(a) shall be entertained "for the purposes of a charitable trust, the objects-of which provide for discrimination in-respect of its beneficiaries on the ground of religion, caste or place of birth. Counsel admitted that although there Was nothing in the deed itself indicating that discrimination, which was prohibited by proviso (i) (sic), was provided for in the deed but since in the actual user the discrimination had been practised, the application was not maintainable. I am unable to accept the submission. For applying the proviso (i) (sic) it was necessary to establish that the object should have provided for discrimination. If the objects do not provide for discrimination, in respect of its beneficiaries on the ground of religion, caste or place of birth, this proviso will not be attracted. 12. The fourth submission made was-that on the application under Section-43 (2) (rr), the court had jurisdiction to compare the need of the landlord with-that of the tenant and as while granting the application made by the landlord under Section 43 (2) (rr), the need" of the petitioner was not compared with that of the landlord, the application was liable to be rejected. It is no doubt true that under Section 21 (1) (a), it is essential to consider the likely hardship which might be caused to the tenant from the acceptance of the-application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application but the question is whether such an exercise is required to be done while deciding an application-under Section 43 (2) (rr), as well. 13. In my view, the submission made has no substance. 13. In my view, the submission made has no substance. Under clause (rr) of sub-section (2) of Section 43 a court is required only to find whether the permission had been granted under Section 3 of the old Act on any ground specified in sub-section (1) (a) of Section 21. If the ground of permission is covered by the aforesaid section, the landlord would be entitled to get a release order in his favour. At this stage the court is not called upon to consider the comparative hardship inasmuch as Section 43 (2) (rr) does not confer jurisdiction to consider either the bona fides of the requirement or the hardship again which had already been done at the stage of Section 3 of the old Act. In fact, the true nature of the proceedings, under Rule (rr) of sub-section (2) of Section 43, is executory. Under this provision, instead of filing a suit a landlord is entitled to file an application and to get the release made in his favour. Just as in a suit filed under Section 3 of the old Act, the validity of the permission could not be gone into, the validity of the said order cannot be investigated in the proceedings under Section 43 (2) (rr) as well. 14. There is yet another reason to take that view, the same is that even under Section 3 of the old Act, the court was required to compare the comparative hardship and permission could be granted to the landlord only if the need of the landlord was found to be greater. That being so, the irresistible conclusion is that the court dealing with an application under Section 43 (2) (rr) is not required to compare the need of the landlord with that of the tenant again. 15. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on a decision of this Court reported in Smt. Sarju Devi v. Prescribed Authority 1976 All LR 704: (1977 All LJ 251) in support of the above submission. There is nothing in this case which is of any assistance to the petitioners counsel for advancing his argument. In that case the Court was considering the proposition that while dealing with an application under Section 43 (2) (rr) the Court could grant release in respect of a part of the disputed house. I am not seized with the said controversy. In that case the Court was considering the proposition that while dealing with an application under Section 43 (2) (rr) the Court could grant release in respect of a part of the disputed house. I am not seized with the said controversy. I am unable to find anything in this case which could help the petitioner. 16. The last submission was that the-earlier application made under Section 43 (2) (rr) having been dismissed, the second application was barred and was not maintainable. This submission is devoid of substance. The earlier application had not been rejected on merits. It was dismissed as the trust had not disclosed the grounds on which the permission had been granted to it under Section 3 of the old Act. It is settled law that a decision given on merits will operate as res judicata but where, as here, no decision had been given on merit. The maintainability of the second application could not be doubted. 17. The writ petition fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances I grant three months to the petitioner to vacate the premises. There shall be no order as to costs.