JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - Petitioner is the Managing Committee of the Orissa Police High School, Cuttack, which is an aided educational Institution as defined in Section 3-B of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Act') and the Petitioner in this writ petition is represented by its Secretary. The Petitioner by this writ petition prays for the quashing of the order dated 21-8-1978 (Annexure I) by the State Education Tribunal, opposite party No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') to reinstate opposite party No. 1 forthwith in service in the school with all consequential benefits. 2. The facts relevant for consideration of the points raised in the writ petition may be shortly stated as follows: Opposite party No. 1 was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Orissa Police High School, Cuttack (hereinafter referred to as the 'school') as per the appointment order dated 14-5-1969 issued in his favour. He joined his service in the school on 3-7-1969. On 5-4-1977 the Managing Committee of the school passed a resolution that the services of opposite party No. 1 would terminate with effect from 1-6-1977. The Secretary of the school passed an office order on 16-4-1977 to the effect that the services of opposite party No. 1 would terminate on 31-5-1977 and he would make over charge on 1-6-1977 forenoon. Opposite patty No. 1 made a representation against the said decision of the Managing Committee, but the Managing Committee never passed any order on that representation. The Headmaster of the school informed opposite party No. 1 that there was no reason to revise the decision of the Managing Committee. 3. The Petitioner's case in the writ petition is as follows: Opposite party No. 1 was appointed as a temporary teacher in the school on ad hoc basis on fixed salary as distinct from the scale of pay for the approved teachers, and he was there over and above the approved cadre strength of teachers in the school. As the service of opposite party No. 1 was purely on ad hoc and contractual basis, he was paid his salary out of the private funds of the Managing Committee and not from the funds received by the school from the Government. As the service of opposite party No. 1 was purely on ad hoc and contractual basis, he was paid his salary out of the private funds of the Managing Committee and not from the funds received by the school from the Government. On the report of the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school that opposite party No. 1 did not have the requisite qualification to serve as a teacher in the school and for reducing the expenses of the school, the Managing Committee in its meeting dated 5-4-1977 resolved to terminate the services of opposite party No. 1 in the school with effect from 1-6-1977. The Secretary of the school by his letter dated 16-4-1977 informed opposite-party No. 1 that his services would terminate with effect from 31-5-1977 and be should hand over charge on the afternoon of 1-6-1977. The power of management of the school vested in the Managing Committee of the school, and this Committee therefore had the power to appoint, discharge, dismiss or otherwise terminate and regulate the services of the teachers. As the appointment of opposite party No. 1 was an ex cadre ad hoc appointment, the Petitioner did not obtain any approval in writing of the Inspector of Schools (opp. party No. 3) as required u/s 10-A of the Act, nor was such approval necessary under the said section. That being so, the order of termination of the temporary services of opposite party No. 1 by the Managing Committee is perfectly legal and valid, and the finding of the Tribunal, that the order of termination of the services of opposite party No. 1, having been made without making any reference to the Inspector of Schools for approval, is void and illegal, is bad in law and liable to be quashed. It is further urged that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal preferred before it by opposite party No. 1, and even if the appeal was competent, it was barred by limitation and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay nor has it condoned the said delay. 4. It is further urged that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal preferred before it by opposite party No. 1, and even if the appeal was competent, it was barred by limitation and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay nor has it condoned the said delay. 4. The case put forward on' behalf of opposite party No. 1, in short, is as follows: Section 10-A of the Act and the beneficial provisions for teachers in the Orissa Education Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') ate not limited in their operation only to the so called approved members of the staff, but the same are applicable to all teachers including the temporary appointees also. It is not correct to say that the appointment; of opposite party No. 1 was purely temporary and on ad hoc basis and against the cadre strength of the teachers in the school. The services of opposite party No. 1, whether permanent or temporary, could not be terminated without obtaining the prior approval in writing of the Inspector of Schools (opp. party No. 3). No order actually terminating the services of opposite party No. 1 was passed on 5-4-1977. The office order dated 16-4-1977 of the Secretary of the school as contained in Annexure 2 is not an order of termination but was merely an intimation of the fact that the services of opposite party No. 1 would terminate in future, i.e. on 31-5-1977. The Petitioner's averments, that the services of opposite party No. 1 were terminated due to his lack of qualification and for relieving the financial burden on the school, are false and incorrect. The representation of opposite party No. 1 to the Managing Committee of the school was never considered, and no orders thereon were ever communicated to him. It is further asserted that no effective and legal order terminating his services was ever passed or served on him, but as he was not allowed to resume his duties in the school on its reopening on 26-6-1977 after the summer vacation and opposite party No. 4 was appointed as a teacher in the school in place of opposite party No. 1, opposite party No. 1, being all grieved by the same, preferred an appeal before the Tribunal against the said action of the Petitioner. The action of the Petitioner in not allowing him to work in the school without a proper and legal order of termination of his services is mala fide and illegal, and the order passed by the Tribunal is perfectly legal and justified as the service of opposite party No. 1 was illegally terminated without obtaining the prior approval in writing of the Inspector of Schools (opp. party No. 3). The Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal filed by opposite party No. 1; the appeal was not barred by time; and if there was any delay in filing the appeal there were sufficient reasons to condone the same, and the Tribunal in effect has condoned the same. 5. Mr. Mohanty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, at first urged that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the aforesaid appeal of the Petitioner, as, according to him, the provision for appeal in Sub-section (3) of Section 10-A of the Act applies only to orders passed by the Director of Public Instruction or the Circle Inspector of Schools, as the case may be either approving or disapproving orders terminating the services of a teacher, but not simply to orders passed only by the institution. There is no merit in the above contention. Section 10-A of the Act, so far as relevant, is quoted below: 10-A. Services of teachers of aided institutions not to be terminated without approval- (1) The services of a teacher of an aided educational institution shall not be terminated without obtaining the prior approval in writing of the- (a) Director of Public Instruction (Higher Education), in the case of a teacher of a college; and (b) Circle Inspector of Schools having jurisdiction, in the case of a teacher of a school. (2) xx (3) Any person aggrieved by an order passed under Sub-section (1) may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal within one month from the date of receipt of the order. From the wordings in Section 10-A it is quite clear that the order of termination has to be passed by the appropriate authority in the aided educational institution. But on the passing of the said order the services of the teacher shall not be terminated until the said order gets written approval of the director of Public Instruction or the Circle Inspector of Schools, as the case may be. But on the passing of the said order the services of the teacher shall not be terminated until the said order gets written approval of the director of Public Instruction or the Circle Inspector of Schools, as the case may be. Therefore, in order to make the said order of termination effective in law it has to get the approval of one of the aforesaid two officers as mentioned in Sub-section (1) of that section. So, at first the order of termination is to be passed and thereafter only it can be sent for approval to a particular officer. It may so happen that on passing the order of termination the authority controlling the affairs of the school may not permit the teacher to work in the school, may not ask for the written approval of the prescribed officer, or the said officer may not deal with that matter for a long time. In that case the teacher would certainly be aggrieved by that order of termination itself. So, if It is said that the words "an order" in Sub-section (3) of Section 10-A are confined only to the order of approval or disapproval of the concerned officer, as submitted by Mr. Mohanty, then the teachers who are affected and have reasons to be aggrieved by such orders of termination, as in the present case, shall be left without any remedy. Invoking the discretionary and extraordinary writ- jurisdiction of the High Court in such a case by a teacher of a private school, apart from being of doubtful proposition, is not a remedy as of right. On the above considerations we hold that an appeal u/s 10-A(3) can be preferred against an order passed by the Managing Committee terminating the service of a teacher of an aided school if the said teacher is any way aggrieved by the said order. In the present case opposite party No. 1 has been thrown out of his employment in the school only in consequence of the order passed by the Managing Committee of the school, and thus being aggrieved by the said order his appeal before the Tribunal was legally maintainable. 6. Mr. In the present case opposite party No. 1 has been thrown out of his employment in the school only in consequence of the order passed by the Managing Committee of the school, and thus being aggrieved by the said order his appeal before the Tribunal was legally maintainable. 6. Mr. Mohanty contends that as the provisions for appeal contained m Article 287 (28) of the Orissa Education Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') are still in force under the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 27 of the Act, opposite party No. 1 should have preferred an appeal under the said provision in the Code and not u/s 10-A (3) at the Act. Sub-section (4) at Section 27 of the Act states that until rules are made under this section, the rules contained in the Orissa Education Code which were In force Immediately prior to the corning into force of this. Act shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the Constitution, be deemed to be rules made under this Act. Therefore, any provision in the Code which is Inconsistent with any provision in the Act or the Constitution cannot hold good. We have held above that a teacher of an aided school aggrieved by an order of termination of his services in the school can prefer an appeal under Sub-section (3) of Section 10-A. As such a teacher has a statutory right to appeal under the Act, the provisions of Article 287(28) of the Code cannot apply to his case. Therefore, opposite party No. 1 aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Managing Committee could not have preferred any appeal against the said order under Article 287(28) of the Code. 7. Mr. Mohanty's contention that the provisions of Section 10-A of the Act apply only to teachers working within the approved cadre strength of the school is without any substance. The provisions of Section 10-A apply to "a teacher of an aided educational institution", and there is nothing in that section to restrict its application only to the teachers working within the cadre strength of that school. 8. Opposite party No. 1 filed the appeal before the Orissa State Education Tribunal on 2-9-1977 along with a petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, if any, in filing the said appeal. 8. Opposite party No. 1 filed the appeal before the Orissa State Education Tribunal on 2-9-1977 along with a petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, if any, in filing the said appeal. That petition was dealt with by the Tribunal and it found that "this appeal is not barred by limitation in view of the fact that be (opposite party No. 1) has preferred this appeal within 30 days from the date of order appointing Respondent-3 (opp. party No. 4) as a teacher in Orissa Police High School and that this date of appointment of Respondent-3 as a teacher was the date when the Appellant (opp. party No. 1) was aware of the fact that the Managing Committee really intended to terminate his services." 9. Mr. Mohanty submits that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain that petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. According to him, petitions u/s 5 of the Limitation Act are maintainable only in respect of matters pending before the 'courts', and such petitions are not maintainable before the Tribunal. He further contends that the Tribunal has no power or authority to condone the delay in filing any appeal as there is no provision in the Act for condoning such delay. In support of his above submission, Mr. Mohanty cited the decision reported in Nityananda, M. Joshi and Others Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others, in paragraph 3 whereof it has been .observed as follows: .... Again u/s 5 it is only a Court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if the Court is satisfied that the application had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. It seems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to Courts, and that the Labour Court is not a Court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. In that case the point for consideration was whether the applications filed u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act prior to its amendment by Central Act XXXVI of 1964 were governed by the period of limitation laid down in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, and it was decided in that case that as the Labour court is not a Court within the limitation Act, that Article was not applicable to such a proceeding. The observation therein in respect of Section 5 of the Limitation Act was made per incurram and without taking into consideration the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act of 1963 which reads as follows: Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law Therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply allunde to all appeals or applications under any special or local law, of course if the application of the said section is not expressly excluded by the particular special or local law in question. Under the Limitation Act of 1908 there was no such provision, and so the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were not applicable to appeal or applications under any special or local law, but under the Limitation Act of 1963 that section is made applicable u/s 29(2) to all such appeals or applications, unless the provisions thereof are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. So though under the Act there is no provision authorising the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing an appeal before it, it can condone such delay under the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, application of which is not expressly excluded by anything in the Act. In the case of Town Municipal, Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others etc. cited by Mr. Mohanty, the question for consideration was whether Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applied to applications u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sections 5 and 29 (2) of the Limitation Act were not referred to and/or considered in the said decision. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others etc. cited by Mr. Mohanty, the question for consideration was whether Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applied to applications u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sections 5 and 29 (2) of the Limitation Act were not referred to and/or considered in the said decision. In the case of Raghunath Agarwall v. State of Orissa 1975 TLR 2075, questions regarding the applicability of the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application made to the Sales Tax Tribunal u/s 34(1) of the Sales Tax Act and the jurisdiction of the said Tribunal to condone limitation u/s 5 of the Limitation Act were directly raised for decision, and a Division Bench of this Court, on elaborate consideration of the matter and examination of several authorities of the point, held that In view of these authorities and considerable amount of consensus of judicial opinion, we are prepared to hold that by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. 1963, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 thereof shall apply to proceedings under the Orissa Sales Tax Act to the extent they are not inconsistent with any specific provision in the Taxing Act. The decisions reported in Nityananda, M. Joshi and Others Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others and Town Municipal, Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others etc. were of course not referred to in this decision, but these two Supreme Court decisions were expressly referred to and considered in the later Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Gandharba Misra v. State of Orissa 1976 (1) C.W.R. 17. Therein it has been held that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act refers in terms to a Court and that section in express terms is not applicable to the appeals or applications under special or local law, but on account of the language of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provision of Section 5 is applicable to such appeals or applications. As the point in question was not expressly raised for decision in the above mentioned two Supreme Court cases; in those cases the attention of their Lordships was not drawn to the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act we have in the field two Division Bench decisions of this Court directly deciding the point in question, in one of which both the Supreme Court decisions were referred to and considered, and we see no reason to differ from the view expressed by our Court on this point, we feel bound by the said decision of this Court. There is nothing in the Act which expressly excludes the application of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals u/s 10-A (3) of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to appeals under the said section, So, the petition u/s 5 of the limitation Act filed by opposite party No. 1 was maintainable before the Tribunal, and it had the jurisdiction to deal with that matter. 10. The appeal was admitted on 17-9-1977 after hearing the said petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. So it can be said that this petition at that stage was allowed ex parte without of course giving the Respondents an opportunity to have their say in this matter. That being so, the Respondents were entitled to agitate, and in fact they actually agitated, that question for fresh decision after their appearance in the said appeal. The Tribunal expressly considered that matter in extense in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the impugned judgment, and It held that this appeal was not barred by limitation. So, though on 17-9-1977 the petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act was allowed ex parte the mischief of that irregularity was cured by allowing the party to reagitate that matter and by passing a well reasoned order on that question after hearing both the parties on that point. 11. Mr. Mohanty contends that the Tribunal has not yet disposed of the said petition u/s 5 as it has not recorded in express terms an order condoning the delay in filing the said appeal. 11. Mr. Mohanty contends that the Tribunal has not yet disposed of the said petition u/s 5 as it has not recorded in express terms an order condoning the delay in filing the said appeal. The grounds on which the Tribunal has arrived at the finding that there was no delay in filing the appeal are good grounds and reasons for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. So, though the Tribunal has expressed its finding on this question in that language and manner, it has in effect allowed that petition and has condoned the delay in filing the said appeal. 12. The impugned order could not be successfully assailed on any other ground. 13. We do not find any merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. There would be no order for costs. J.K. Mohanty, J. I agree. Petition dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed