ORDER H.G. Mishra, J.—This is a revision by the complainant against the order dated 31-1-77 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Vidisha, in Criminal Revision No. 17/76 whereby the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Vidisha, dated 19-1-76 rejecting the application of the non-applicant u/s 19, Criminal Procedure Code 1898, was set aside and the non-applicant had been discharged and the complaint against him was held to be incompetent without sanction of the State Government. 2. The facts essential for decision of this revision are as under: (a) On 27-12-1973, the revision-applicant filed a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Vidisha, under sections 392, 441 and 147, Indian Penal Code against the non-applicant R. C. Shivhare, Administrator, Municipal Council, Vidisha, and one Hukum Chand, Driver of the Municipal Council Vidisha, on the allegations that there were 3 shops situate in Bada Bazar, Kanthari line, Vidisha, about 16 to 17 ft. in width which belonged and were in possession of the complainant and his nephews Kailash Narayan, Shambhudayal, and Ashok Kumar. The Municipal Council Vidisha pulled down the aforesaid shops for taking 10 ft. wide and about 30 ft. long lane on which the 3 shops were standing. It was further averred in the complaint that the complainant applied to the Municipal Council for permission to construct shops on the remaining land out of the land on which the aforesaid shops were standing. The Municipal Council granted permission to the complainant on 20-4-1973 to construct the shops thereon. On the aforesaid land, the complainant had put a Takhat and permitted his nephews mentioned above to use this Takhat as shop until the shops were constructed on that place. (b) It is further averred in the complaint that on 13-12-1973 the the accused R. C. Shivhare and Hukum Chand (Driver) along with four constables came to the said shops in the absence of the complainant. Both the accused persons along with four constables began to remove goods placed on the land belonging to and in possession of the complainant. They did not refrain from doing so in spite of being asked not to do so by the nephews of the complainant and ultimately gave threats to beat them and pushed them aside. Both the accused persons along with four constables began to remove goods placed on the land belonging to and in possession of the complainant. They did not refrain from doing so in spite of being asked not to do so by the nephews of the complainant and ultimately gave threats to beat them and pushed them aside. The accused ultimately removed dishonestly, without his consent and in order to cause wrongful loss to the complainant four Takhats, two benches and one oil cloth, 18 Ballis 12 bags by loading in a tractor trolly. In spite of F. I. R. having been lodged with the Police they are not moving in the matter. Hence the complaint. 3. After recording the evidence, on 30-11-74, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vidisha, passed an order to the following effect: The oral evidence on record shows that there are sufficient grounds for proceedings u/s 447 and section 397, Indian Penal Code against the accused persons. Register case against the accused persons u/s 447 and section 397, Indian Penal Code. Copies of the complaint, list of PWs. and P. F. in 3 days. The accused persons be summoned to appear. 4. Thereafter on behalf of the non-applicant R. C. Shivhare, Administrator, Municipal Council, Vidisha, application dated 30-9-75 was moved u/s 197 (1), Criminal Procedure Code whereby an objection was raised to the effect that he is a 'public servant' who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government; and, that the acts alleged to have been done by him appear to have been done in discharge of official duty. Accordingly, cognizance of offence complained of cannot be taken by the Court without previous sanction of the State Government. 5. That on 2-1-1976 copies of 9 documents were filed on behalf of the accused. 6. After hearing arguments on the aforesaid application, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dismissed the objection by order dated 19-1-76. Aggrieved by this order, the accused-non-applicant preferred a revision which has been allowed by the impugned order by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and it has been held that the trial Court could not take cognizance of the offence in absence of previous sanction of the State Government. 7. The present revision is directed against this order. Aggrieved by this order, the accused-non-applicant preferred a revision which has been allowed by the impugned order by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and it has been held that the trial Court could not take cognizance of the offence in absence of previous sanction of the State Government. 7. The present revision is directed against this order. In this revision Shri J. M. Anand, learned counsel for the complainant, contended that the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction because at this stage only the facts alleged in the complaint have to be looked into and that on the facts alleged in the complaint previous sanction u/s 197 (1), Criminal Procedure Code cannot be regarded as a condition precedent for taking cognizance of the case. Reliance was placed on the ratio of the following cases : Satwantsingh v. State of Punjab A I R 1960 S C 226 , Dhannjay Ram Sharma Vs. M.S. Uppadaya and Others, , Khairati Ram and Others Vs. Firm Balak Ram Mehr Chand and Another, , B. P. Shrivastava v. N. P. Mishra A I R 1950 S C 1661 , Namdeo Kashinath Aher v. H. G. Vartak A I R 1970 Bom. 385 and Pukhraj Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, . It was also contended by Shri Anand that the learned Additional Sessions Judge could not look into the documents filed by the non-applicant herein. Shri R. K. Shinde, learned counsel for the accused non-applicant, submitted that none of the aforesaid contentions has any force and contended that (i) that documents produced by the accused non-applicant before the trial Magistrate as alleged by the revision-applicant will be deemed to have been taken on record and as such it was open to the learned Additional Sessions Judge to rely on them; (ii) that the complainant has described the non-applicant as 'Administrator of Municipal Council Vidisha', and that the acts alleged in the complaint appear to have been done or purported to have been done in discharge of official duty. As such, cognizance of the offence cannot be taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Vidisha without previous sanction of the State Government. Reliance was placed on the ratio of in Girdharilal and Others Vs. Lalchand and Others, . 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have reached the conclusion that the revision deserves to be allowed. 9. Reliance was placed on the ratio of in Girdharilal and Others Vs. Lalchand and Others, . 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have reached the conclusion that the revision deserves to be allowed. 9. According to section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which was in force on 27-12-1973, the date of the filing of the complaint, no Court could take cognizance of an offence which was alleged to have been committed by any public servant while acting or purported to act in discharge of his official duty without previous sanction of the State Government. Undisputedly, the accused was a public servant, but the mere fact that the accused happened to be a 'public servant' is not enough to attract the bar imposed by section 197 (1) of the Code of the power of the Court to take cognizance of the offences alleged to have been committed by him. If on facts alleged in the complaint, it can neither be said that what the accused non-applicant is alleged to have done, could be purported to be done in exercise of his duty, nor that they were done in exercise of any duty imposed on him by law or otherwise by virtue of his occuying the office, the cognizance is not barred. 10. In this case, when the accused-applicant raised the objection by his application dated 30-9-75, there was only complaint before the Court. What could be seen at such a stage was only the complaint and the defence the accused proposed to raise. This is what has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pukhraj Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, where in the law on the point has been laid down thus: We must also make it clear that this is not the end of the matter. As was pointed out in Sarjoo Prasad v. King Emperor 1945 F C R 227 , referring to the observations of Sulaiman J. in Horiram Singh's case (supra) the mere fact that the accused proposes to raise a defence of the act having purported to be done in execution of duty would not in itself be sufficient to justify the case being thrown out for want of sanction. At this stage we have only to see whether the acts alleged against the 2nd respondent can be said to be in purported execution of his duty. But facts subsequently coming to light during the course of judicial inquiry or during the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to depend from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case [see observations in Matajog Dobey Vs. H.C. Bhari, . In Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava Vs. N.P. Mishra, also it was pointed out that it would be open to the appellant (the 2nd respondent in this case) to place the material on record during the course of the trial for showing what his duty was and also that the facts complained of were so inter-related with his official duty so as to attract the protection afforded by section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. Accordingly, raising of aforesaid objections at the best can be understood to be an intimation by the accused that he intended to raise the defence that the acts alleged to have been performed by him were done in exercise of his duty. However, merely because the accused proposes to raise such a defence, the complaint cannot be thrown for want of sanction. 10. The principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court on the point in other cases relied on by Shri Anand are to the same effect. In Namdeo Kashinath Aher Vs. H.G. Vartak and Another, the scope of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (1898) has been expounded as under: Mr. Jethmalani lastly urged that the provisions of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code should not be so narrowly construed, ignoring the practical difficulties created by the present unhealthy political climate; and in that event the very object of the section will get frustrated. Mr. Jethmalani says that it will be easy for a few miscreants to drag any Minister or public servant in frivolous and vexatious cases in different parts of the State by so cleverly drafting their complaints that the protection available u/s 197, Criminal Procedure Code may ultimately be rendered as illusory. I do not find it possible to agree with this contention of the learned advocate. I do not find it possible to agree with this contention of the learned advocate. In the first instance, inconvenience and practical difficulties cannot be an answer to the natural, plain and obvious interpretation of any section. Secondly, the interests of democracy and orderly society can be better served, not by stifling such prosecution, even if they be frivolous and vexatious, but by allowing them to have their natural course. Thirdly, the scope of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code cannot be widened without bearing in mind the limits and restrictions imposed by the provisions of the Constitution. The right of a citizen to have his grievances adjudicated by a competent Civil or Criminal Court is a part of the fundamental right of equality before law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. Any fetters and restrictions on these rights shall have necessarily to be construed strictly, and when a class of officers is sought to be protected in derogation of these rights, the restrictions shall be required to stand the test of reasonably being connected with the object for which section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is intended and enacted. The scope of this section cannot be unduly widened, without invading this fundamental right of a citizen. The last contention of Mr. Jethmalani, the learned advocate, therefore, also fails. (Para. 19.) Acceptance of arguments advanced by Shri Shinde will involve unduly widening of the scope of the section, which is not permissible on any established principles of interpretation of statutes. 11. Accordingly, in view of the facts alleged in the complaint taking, of cognizance of the offence by the Chief Judicial Magistrate does not appear to be barred without previous sanction of the State Government. The acts complained of against the accused-non-applicant stated are such as appear to be entirely unconnected with his official duty. It appears that the accused non-applicant acted with undue haste in filing a revision and the learned Additional Sessions Judge appears to have been erroneously persuaded to accept his proposed defence. No foundation for acceptance of the proposed defence has yet been laid by the accused by placing material properly and fully before the Court. The accused could have established his proposed, defence by cross-examination of the complaint or other witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant and /or by producing defence evidence. No foundation for acceptance of the proposed defence has yet been laid by the accused by placing material properly and fully before the Court. The accused could have established his proposed, defence by cross-examination of the complaint or other witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant and /or by producing defence evidence. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pukhraj's case (supra) where sanction is necessary or not may have to depend from stage to stage. The approach of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is in line with the principles laid down in the case of Pukhraj (supra). 12. So far reliance by Mr. Shinde on the ratio of Girdharilal v. Lalchand goes, is not available in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In. Girdharilal's case it was not in dispute that the Rajasthan Municipalities Act casted duty on the accused persons to remove refuse. Accordingly, the complaint related to non-observance of that duty. It was held in view of the facts alleged in the complaint that the acts complained of appears to have have done or purported to have been done in discharge of official duty by the accused persons, in para. 8 of Girdharilal's case (supra) it has been observed that-- It is correct that there may be cases where in at initial stages such a question may not admit of a clear answer. It may be remembered that it is not merely the suggestion of the accused that is enough as pointed out by their Lordships. In my opinion, therefore, while it is open to an accused person to raise the plea of want of a sanction at any stage of the case but its decision would be dependent on the availability of adequate material on record enabling a Court to effectively adjudicate it. As stated above, in the present case there is no material properly and lawfully placed before the Court on the basis of which it may be regarded that what the complainant alleges in the complaint is not true and that the defence, the accused proposes to be take in correct. For the same reason, it was not open to look into the documents produced by the accused non-applicant, at this stage. Therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge acted contrary to law when he travelled beyond the allegations made in the complaint. 13. For the same reason, it was not open to look into the documents produced by the accused non-applicant, at this stage. Therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge acted contrary to law when he travelled beyond the allegations made in the complaint. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, refraining from expressing any opinion on the truth or falsity of allegations contained in the complaint, it is clear that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not justified in holding that the previous sanction of the State Government was necessary for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. The view taken by the learned trial Magistrate is proper and legally correct. 14. Accordingly, the revision succeeds. The impugned order is set aside and she order passed by the learned trial Magistrate on 19-1-1976 is restored. Needless to state that the accused will be free either by cross-examination of the complaint or his witnesses and/or by leading evidence, to establish that the case is, in fact and in reality, within the ambit of section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.