JUDGMENT 1. - The impugned order Ex 1 dated May 5, 1971, by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer, in Jagir Appeal No. 10 of 1967, was challenged by two writ petitions filed in this court one by the State of Rajasthan, which was numbered as DB Civil Writ Petition No. 531 of 1972, and the other by the jagirdar Rao Takhat Singh by this petition, numbered as D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 991 of 1972. The writ petition No. 531 of 1972 filed by the State was decided by this Court on October 10, 1972 and this writ petition was allowed to remain lying. In our opinion, it would have been much better if both the writ petitions had been decided together as they arose out of the same order. May be, that this fact was not brought to the notice of the Bench which decided the writ petition No. 531 of 1972, other. wise, the Court would have directed that both the writ petitions be heard together. Be that as it may, the fact remains that on the contention raised by the State in writ petition No. 531 of 1972, State of Rajasthan v. Rao Takhat Singh-(reported in 1973 Rajasthan Law Weekly at page 23) , it was held that for the purposes of awarding compensation to the Jagirdar under Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (which will hereinafter be referred to as "the Act"), the provisions of the Act shall have to be given effect to notwithstanding section 16 of the Rajasthan Excise Act (Act No. 2 of 1950). It may be stated, here, that the contention of the State of Rajasthan before the Board of Revenue was that after introduction of the Excise Act, the Jagirdar was not entitled to get compensation for taking over the excise administration by the State irrespective of the provisions contained in the Act. That contention was overruled by the Board, whose view was confirmed by this Court also in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 531 of 1972. We are, therefore, no more concerned with this aspect of the case even though the learned Government Advocate tried to take us into that question. 2. The other point of dispute decided by the Board of Revenue is regarding the method of calculation of compensation. We are, therefore, no more concerned with this aspect of the case even though the learned Government Advocate tried to take us into that question. 2. The other point of dispute decided by the Board of Revenue is regarding the method of calculation of compensation. The Board of Revenue has held in agreement with the Jagir Commissioner that the petitioner is entitled to get compensation on the basis of the actual income received by him or on his behalf for the excise contracts given by him during the relevant period. The petitioner's Jagir was resumed on August 23, 1954. Paragraph 2(h) of the Second Schedule appended to the Act provides as follows, "2. Gross Income.- The gross income of a Jagirdar for the basic year shall be the total income from his jagir lands under the following heads, (a) to (g) ... ... ... (h) the amount of compensation paid in cash by the Government to the Jagirdar taking over the excise administration and the production or manufacture of excisable articles in jagir lands calculated on the basis of average income of three years, preceding the basic year. (i) ... ... ... Provided that where a jagidrar received or would have received fixed sum from any person in respect of any of the aforesaid heads of income or any part thereof, such fixed sum shall notwithstanding anything contained in clause (3) be substituted for the income from any such head or part thereof.""Basic year" has been defined in pars 1 of the Second Schedule as follows,- "1. Basic year.- The expression 'Basic year' means the agricultural year immediately preceding the agricultural year in which the date of resumption falls:- Provided that, as from the twentieth day of August, 1958 and in relation to jagir land resumed on or after that day, the expression 'basic year' means the agricultural year in which the date of resumption falls." "Agricultural year" has been defined in section 2(a) of the Act as under,- "(a) 'Agricultural year' means the year beginning on the first day of July and ending on the thirtieth day of June, next following;" The Jagir Commissioner as well as the Board of Revenue have worked out the average income of three years' preceding the 'basic year' as follows,- for the year 1950.51 ..... Rs. 19,793/. for the year 1951.52 ...... Rs. 40,025/- and for the year 1952.53 ....... Rs. Rs. 19,793/. for the year 1951.52 ...... Rs. 40,025/- and for the year 1952.53 ....... Rs. 7,169/44 While arriving at these figures, the learned Members of the Board have observed as follows, - "The first two figures are based on the actual income of the Jagirdar during the two years as verified by the Excise department. The third figure (Rs. 7,169.00) is manifestly based on the earlier decision of the Jagir Commissioner dated 27-12-1962, further confirmed in his order dated 30.7.1964. In the order dated 27.12.1962, the Jagir Commissioner referred to a Government letter No.F 1 (24) E&T/65 dated 10.1.1962 addressed to him. With this letter, there was a Government order of the same number, dated 1.10.1958, according to which some Excise compensation had been sanctioned to this Jagirdar, along with some other Jagirdars of the Shomat area of the Udaipur division. On the basis of the sanction, the Jagir Commissioner adopted in his decision dated 27.12.1962, the following figures:- (i) 18.7.1952 to 31.3.1953 Rs. 4,997.60 (ii) 1.4.1953 to 30.6.1953 Rs. 2,171.84 Rs. 7,169.44 Item No. (1) was the actual amount shown in the statement enclosed with the sanction, in respect of this Jagir, for the period 18-7-1952 to 31-3-1953. Item (ii) was one-fourth of the amount ( Rs. 8,627/6/-) shown therein for 1953-54. Although in his order dated 7.2.1969, the Jagir Commissioner has not given all these details, he has referred to the earlier order dated 27.12.1962 at the very commencement of the order, and there can be no doubt that he had taken the earlier orders into account." 3. For a correct appraisal of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it may be necessary to mention a few dates. Admittedly, the basic year in this case is July 1, 1953 to June 30,1954, as the agricultural year, in which the date of resumption falls, is 1954-55, as the date of resumption is August 23, 1954. Consequently, the three years preceding the basic years would be:- (i) July 1, 1952 to June 30, 1953, (ii) July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1952, and (iii) July 1, 1950 to June 30, 1951, 4. Consequently, the three years preceding the basic years would be:- (i) July 1, 1952 to June 30, 1953, (ii) July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1952, and (iii) July 1, 1950 to June 30, 1951, 4. At this stage, we might also state that the learned Government Advocate has raised a preliminary objection that even though the petitioner has challenged the order by the Jagir Commissioner dated February 7, 1969, he has not filed a copy of the same and consequently, his prayer for setting the order of the Jagir Commissioner dated February 7, 1969, cannot be entertained and that if that cannot be set aside, the relief for quashing the order of the Board would be meaningless. It may be pointed out that the Jagir Commissioner's order has merged in the order of the Board and therefore the petition cannot be thrown out on the ground that a copy of the Jagir Commissioner's order has not been filed. 5. There is no dispute regarding the years 1950-51 and 1951-52. The dispute relates to the year 1952-53. The contention of the petitioner is that since the contract for production and manufacture of liquor for the year 1952-53 was given by the Jagirdar for Rs. 40,025/-, the income for the year 195253 should have been counted as Rs. 40,025/- and not Rs. 7,169/44. In support of this argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the proviso to clause (h) of para 2 of the Second Schedule which says that where a jagirdar received or would have received a fixed sum from any person in respect of any of the heads of income, such fixed sums shall be substituted for the income from any such head. It is nowhere alleged in the petition that the fixed sum that the petitioner would have received on account of excise contract for the year 1952-53 was Rs. 40,025/- and he would have received that amount during that year. Since the order of the Jagir Commissioner has not been filed before us, we are not in a position to say that this point was taken before the Jagir Commissioner or not. 6. 40,025/- and he would have received that amount during that year. Since the order of the Jagir Commissioner has not been filed before us, we are not in a position to say that this point was taken before the Jagir Commissioner or not. 6. Coming to the order by the Board of Revenues, it appears that learned counsel for the Jagirdar contended before the Board that there was a contract between the Jagirdar on the ore hard and certain Kalals on the other for a period of three years commencing from October 1, 1951, regarding distillation and sale of liquor under which the contractors were to pay to the Jagirdar a sum of Rs. 40025/- annually and the Jagirdar would have received this fixed sum annually even after July 18, 1952, when the excise administration had not been taken over under the Excise Act. It appears by reading in between the lines the order by the Board and as also agreed by the learned counsel for the parties, that from, from July 18, 1952, the contract entered into by the Jagirdar was cancelled on account of the introduction of the Excise Act and the income of Rs. 7,169/44 has been shown as the income realised by the State during the relevant period on account of the excise administration by the State. The reply of the learned Government Advocate to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner is only entitled to get the proportionate income from the excise administration actually received by the State for the relevant period in as much as the contract entered into by the Jagirdar with the Kalals had come to an end on July 18, 1952, and for the period thereafter, the Jagirdar is entitled only to the amount of compensation paid in cash by the Government. In other words, it is submitted that for the period after July 18, 1952, the application of the proviso is excluded. 7. In other words, it is submitted that for the period after July 18, 1952, the application of the proviso is excluded. 7. It may be pointed out that previously also a writ petition had been filed by the petitioner Rao Takhat Singh in this court challenging the validity of the order dated December i6, 1967, passed by the Jagir Commissioner determining the compensation payable to the Jagirdar on account of the resumption of his Jagir under the Act without taking due note of certain excise revenue) which, according to the Jagirdar: accrued to him in the relevant basic year. This writ petition was registered as D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1743 of 1964. It was decided by a Division Bench of this Court on November 7, 1967. A copy of that judgment has not been placed on the record of this case by either party. However, a certified copy of that judgment is there in the file pertaining to D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 531 of 1972, which we have sent for our perusal. The question of interpretation of sub-clause(h) and the proviso was agitated before the learned judges in that writ petition and the court observed as follows, "In our view, sub clause (h) and the proviso provide for two alternative situations : In a case where the jagirdar was receiving the amount of compensation in cash for taking over of the excise administration by the Government, there could be no question of the Jagirdar having income under that head from any other person during the same period, but, in our view. the application of the proviso cannot be excluded for a period prior to the taking over the excise administration, if during the period preceding such taking over the Jagirdar was having income as is referred to in the proviso. We may mention that the proviso governs all the sub-clause (a) to (i)............" "Proviso to clause 2 enjoins that notwithstanding anything contained in clause 3, where a jagirdar received or would have received a fixed sum from any person in respect of any of the aforesaid heady of income or any part thereof, such fixed income has to be substituted for the income from any such head or part thereof. The proviso, in our view, emphasises that even where the jagirdar used to receive any fixed income from any person in respect of the income referred to under the various sub- clauses that had to be taken into account. This, in our view, leads to the inference that for the period prior to 18.7.1952, if the Jagirdar received any income under the head "Excise" from any ether person that had to be taken into consideration." In concluding part of its order, the Court observed as follows:- "On a plain reading of clause 2 of Second Schedule of the Act, we are satisfied that the Jagir Commissioner and the Revenue Board have not interpreted it properly and particularly they were in error in overlooking the proviso.........." "In the result, we hereby accept this writ petition and quash the orders of the Jagir Commissioner dated 27-12-62 (Annexure-A) and that of the Revenuer Board dated 18.3.64 (Annexure-B) ...... ......and direct the jagir Commissioner to deal with the matter afresh in the light of what we have observed above ....,," 8. After having carefully scrutinised the impugned judgment by the Board of Revenge, we have came to the conclusion that the method of calculation adopted by the Jagir Commissioner and confirmed by the Board, is in consonance with the directions (extracted above) in the judgment delivered by this court in D B Civil Writ Petition No 1743 of 1964. It is clear that for the period prior to July 18, 1952, the amount actually received by the Jagirdar by way of fixed sum as excise income under which excise contracts entered by the Jagirdar has been taken into account es envisaged in the proviso to clause 2 and for the period after July 18, 1952, the excise compensation as sanctioned and paid by the Government, has been taken into consideration for determination of the total amount of compensation payable under clause (h) of para 2 of the Second Schedule. It is sufficient to point out ghat the decision of this Court in DB Civil Writ Petition No. 1743 of 19)4 is inter parties and exactly on the point at issue before us. We are, therefore, of opinion that it is not open to the petitioner to take a stand contrary to the decision in the above mentioned writ petition. 9. We are, therefore, of opinion that it is not open to the petitioner to take a stand contrary to the decision in the above mentioned writ petition. 9. Before parting with the case, we may, however, observe that we also respectfully agree with the view taken by the Division Bench earlier with respect to interpretation of sub clause (h) and proviso to clause 2 of the Second Schedule. In our considered opinion, for the period posterior to July 18, 1952, the petitioner is not entitled to get compensation on the basis of the contract entered into by him as one contract was put an end to on July 18, 1952, and only compensation was paid in cash by the Government to the Jagirdar for the period thereafter. 10. In the result, this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but there will be no order as the costs. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner prays for certifying the case to be fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. We are, however of opinion, that no substantial question of law of general importance, which needs to be decreed by the Supreme Court, is involved in the case. The prayer is disallowed.Writ dismissed *******