ORDER Navkar, J:- 1. This is a petition under Article 227 read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of Madhya Pradesh Anusuchit Jan Jati Rini Sahayata Adhiniyam, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and in the matter of order dated 30.12.1976 for delivery of possession of land in favour of non-petitioner No.1 passed by the non-petitioner No.3 in file No. 125/76-77 and upheld by non-petitioner No.2 in file No. 5/76-77-a decision which was given in revision preferred against the order of non-petitioner No. l. 2. Non-petitioner No.1, by a registered sale-deed dated 18.8.1968, sold to the petitioner 1/3rd share in agricultural holding in all measuring 15.24 acres of land assessed to land revenue of Rs. 29.45 situated in village Dongarpur, Tahsil Datia. The sale-deed is Annexure P/1. Non-petitioner No1, on 6.8.1976 applied to non-petitioner No.3 vide Annexure-2 for getting back the possession of the land sold off with the following allegations: (a) The transaction was a mortgage with conditional sale and evidenced by other independent document. The agreement is for resale. It says that in case the purchaser pays price within four years as mentioned in the document, the property will be resold, to non-petitioner No.1. The petitioner is in possession of the property for the last so many years. It was submitted by non petitioner No.1 that by operation of law, the debt will be deemed to have been extinguished and, therefore, he is entitled for the possession of the property. All these allegations were denied by the petitioner is reply, after taking evidence, non- petitioner No.3 allowed the petition. Against that order, a revision was preferred, but, the order of non-petitioner No.3 was upheld. Aggrieved by it, this petition is filed. 3. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no relationship of creditor and debor existing between the petitioner and non-petitioner No. 1. Therefore, non petitioner No.3 had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The second submission made before us is that the transaction cannot be held to be a mortgage and it being out and out sale, the Court had no jurisdiction to hold that it is a mortgage, instead of sale. Therefore, non petitioner No.3 had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The second submission made before us is that the transaction cannot be held to be a mortgage and it being out and out sale, the Court had no jurisdiction to hold that it is a mortgage, instead of sale. The third submission made before us was that even though it is held to be a mortgage, then that Court (non-petitioner No.3) had no jurisdiction to order handing over back possession from the petitioner. At the most, if it came to the conclusion that the relation between the petitioner and non-petitioner No. 1 is that of a creditor and a debtor, then he could decide whether the debt existed on the date when the application was filed and how much debt was to be paid by non petitioner No. 1 to the petitioner, But the order of holding the transaction as a mortgage and the order of handing over possession back to non-petitioner No.1, the said Court had no jurisdiction under the Act to do. 4. The reply to these submissions made by the learned counsel for non-petitioner No.1 is that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application and as soon as the petitioner belongs to the Anusuchit Jan Jati and if he alleges in his petition relation that of a creditor and a debtor, then the Court gets jurisdiction to decide the matter. Regarding the second objection, it was submitted that the Court had jurisdiction to reopen the transaction, then, it can go to the root of the transaction and decide what was the idea in the mind of the two parties when they entered into the transaction The Court bas a right to see the mutual relationship between the parties when the transaction was entered and, therefore, the Court has a right to decide whether the transaction entered into is a mortgage or a sale. In the alternative, it was submitted that if the Court comes to the conclusion that the transfer of property which is termed as a sale, if the property transferred ill a collateral security for the amount mentioned in the transaction, then the Court has a right to decide the respective rights of the parties. In the alternative, it was submitted that if the Court comes to the conclusion that the transfer of property which is termed as a sale, if the property transferred ill a collateral security for the amount mentioned in the transaction, then the Court has a right to decide the respective rights of the parties. Regarding the order of giving back the possession the submission of the learned counsel is that if the Court comes to the conclusion that the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee has come to an end, then the Court has inherent power to order delivery of possession to the mortgager. He further submits that as soon as the mortgage comes to an end, the mortgagee has no right to keep the possession with him depriving the mortgagor thereof and, therefore, the order of handing over back the possession is legal and valid. 5. Before considering the different submissions made by the learned counsel, we will have to see the Act itself and the object behind passing the Act. The Act came into force with certain objects and reasons behind it and the objects and reasons for bringing this law into force is given under the, head: "Statement of Objects and Reasons". It is mentioned : "1. Due to the limited resources for earning their livelihood, the members of the Scheduled Tribes have to borrow money to meet their necessities of life. It is observed that taking advantage of the social and economic backwardness of the member of the Scheduled Tribes, the money-lenders lend money to them on exhorbitant rates of interest with the result that the Original debtor is unable to repay the loan in his life-time and the over-swelling amount of loan is passed on from generation keeping the families concerned in perpetual bondage of the creditors. 2. In order to emancipate the members of the Scheduled Tribes from this unfortunate state of affairs and to releve them of the heavy burden of their debts the Madhya Pradesh Scheduled Tribes Debt Relief Regulations, however, extend only to the Scheduled Areas in the State. As the number of the members of the Scheduled Tribes residing outside the Scheduled Areas is also very large, it is necessary to enact a measure which would afford the necessary relief to them both within and without the Scheduled Areas in the State. 3. As the number of the members of the Scheduled Tribes residing outside the Scheduled Areas is also very large, it is necessary to enact a measure which would afford the necessary relief to them both within and without the Scheduled Areas in the State. 3. Looking to the plight of the members of the Scheduled Tribes even outside the Scheduled Areas, it was considered necessary to enact a measure for the aforesaid purpose by promulgation of an Ordinance. The Madhya Pradesh Anusuchit Jan Jati Rini Sahayata Adhyadesh, 1966 (No 20 of 1966) was accordingly promulgated. It is now, proposed to replace the Ordinance by an Act of Legislature." While interpreting the welfare State laws, whether preamble can be considered is a point to be decided first, we may refer to 'Principles of Statutory interpretation' by G. P. Singh, Second Edition-page 90, in Which it is observed as under :- "The preamble of a statute like the long title is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to construction. Although not an enacting part, the preamble is expected to express the scope, object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the long title. It may recite the ground and cause of making the statute, the evils sought to be remedied or the doubts which may be intended to be setted. In the words of Sir John Nicholl : "It is to the preamble more specially that we are to look for the reason or spirit of every statute, rehearsing this, as it ordinarily does, the evils sought to be remedied, or the doubts purported to be removed by the Statute, and so evidencing, in the best and most satisfactory manner, the object or intention of the legislature in making or passing the statute itself." "As enunciated by Tindal, C. J, in delivering the opinion of the judges who advised the House of Lords in Sussex Peergge case: ''If any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble. which according to Chief Justice Dyer is a '"key to open the mind, of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intended to redress". which according to Chief Justice Dyer is a '"key to open the mind, of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intended to redress". The subject has been explained lucidly in a recent decision of the House of Lords. The decision establishes the following propositions : the preamble being a part of the statute can be read along with other portions of the Act to find out the meaning of words in the enacting provisions as also to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous, the preamble in itself is not an enacting provision and is not of the same weight as an aid to construction of a section of the Act as are other relevant enacting words to be found elsewhere In the Act, the utility of preamble diminishes on a conclusion as to clearity of enacting provisions " We may refer to M.C. Raipur v. State of M. P., 1970 JLJ 1 in which, while interpreting the provisions of Motor Transport workers Act, 1961, the Supreme Court held: "The Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, provides for welfare of motor transport workers and regulates the conditions of their work. Such beneficial Acts are not, as a rule, construed strictly." Therefore, when we consider such a law, strict interpretation should not be adhered to. We may refer to State of M. P. v. G. T. Vyapari Sangh, 1977 JLJ 439 in which it is laid down as under:- "Social Legislation interpretation of ......... The Act is s social piece of legislation and should have been liberally construed so as to advance the object of the Act and fulfil the aims to be achieved there by. The main purpose of the Act is to secure a scientific method of storage, sale distribution and marketing of agricultural produce and cut out as far as possible middleman's profit The Act, therefore, contains provisions of a beneficial nature preventing profiteering tendencies. It is not, however, the hardship that can be termed unreasonable so as to make a statute unconstitutional," This was so mentioned while interpreting the Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972. So, we have to see what is the object of the present Act. It is not, however, the hardship that can be termed unreasonable so as to make a statute unconstitutional," This was so mentioned while interpreting the Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972. So, we have to see what is the object of the present Act. The Act is promulgated only to "emancipate" the members of the Scheduled Tribes from this unfortunate state of affairs and to relieve them of the heavy burden of their debts the Madhya Pradesh Scheduled Tribes Debt Relief Regulations, 1962 were made by the Government..............." The meaning of 'emancipate' is, as given in the New National Dictionary, to set free from slavery or servitude; to set free from any restraint or restriction. According to Consise Oxord Dictionary, 'emancipate' means release (child, wife) from power of pater families; free from legal, social, political, intellectual, or moral restraint. Therefore, the meaning of the Act is to release the debtors of their burden of debts and free them from the clutches of the creditors and to restore to them the property belonging to them, if they are members of scheduled tribes and also to scale down the principal amount and the interest and to see that the property which the member of the Scheduled tribes has give n in exchange for the loan is restored to him. With this object in mind, we will have to consider the different provisions of the said Act. Before going further, we may also mention here that in Mukundlal v. Shan korlal, 1965 JLJ 1 how a statute is to be interpreted is mentioned in para 8 of the judgment as under:- "A certain amount of common sense must be applied in construing' a statute Consequently while construing a statute the object of its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and in order to carry out its purpose rather than defeat it." So also, before proceeding further, we will have to interpret the meaning of a 'transaction', This word came for interpretation before this Court in Ghanshyamdas v. Ghasilal, 1969 JLJ 426. The interpretation put on that word in the above judgement is as under:- "9. Under the principal part of the section, loans made before the Act came into force have been saved from the application of the provisions of sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. The interpretation put on that word in the above judgement is as under:- "9. Under the principal part of the section, loans made before the Act came into force have been saved from the application of the provisions of sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. These provisions do not apply to any 'loan' made before the Act came into force. But the proviso makes the provisions of the aforesaid sections applicable "if any fresh transaction in respect of a loan made before this Act comes into force is made after the Act comes into force." "This section makes a clear distinction between a 'loan' and a 'transaction'. "Transaction" is t he genus of which "making a loan" is a species. The word 'Transaction' is not defined in the Act. It is not a term of art, nor of extraordinary or technical meaning; and must be read in the ordinary sense of the term It is a general word of wide connotation. A literal interpretation must be given to it. It means an act doing, agreement, covenant, negotiation or dealing, etc. In Oxford Dictionary, amongst other meanings we find "an arrangement" an agreement, a covenant, an adjustment of a dispute, a compromise." In Brewin vs. Short (1865) 5 E and B 227 (235), the meaning of word 'transaction' was considered in these words: "Looking to the language of section 133, the word 'transaction' as here used has not any extraordinary or technical meaning but is used in its ordinary sense of act', 'doing', 'negotiation' or' dealing', as defined in common dictionaries" Again in Krebel Vs. The Great Central Gas Co. (1870) LR 5 Exch (289-294 -295), it was observed:- "Section 133 of the Bankruptcy, 1849, uses words 'contract', 'dealing' and 'transaction' ......... 'Transaction' is a general word and is thus defined in Webstor's Dictionary: 'Doing' or 'performing'; busiess that which is done; or an affair." So also in Bendir Vs. Anson (1936) 3 All ER 326 (330) Lord Fright M. R., while interpreting the words of R. S C. Order 16 rule 1. observed thus:- "The phrase "transaction or series of transactions" is not a term of art and I cannot find in the authorities any precise defintition of the exact scope of those words…......... Anson (1936) 3 All ER 326 (330) Lord Fright M. R., while interpreting the words of R. S C. Order 16 rule 1. observed thus:- "The phrase "transaction or series of transactions" is not a term of art and I cannot find in the authorities any precise defintition of the exact scope of those words…......... The word "transaction", I think, necessarily means an act, the effect of which extends beyond the agent to other persons." It is stated in 87 Corpus Juris Secundum 887:- "The word 'transaction' is derived from the Latin words "trans" and "'ago" meaning to carryon, or "agore" meaning to drive. It is not a legal and technical word, but rather it is common and colloquial; a general word of comprehensive import, broad and flexible in meaning .................. the word 'transaction' is frequently used to denote something done; something which has been transacted .............. "Transaction' is sometimes defined as meaning an act; an act of performing; an act of transacting or conducting business ...........................The word is applicable generally to business affairs and to doings, proceeings, and negotiations affecting property rights, contracts, agreements and the negotiations resulting in contracts and agreements and. in transfer of titles, or the obligations of one or both of the parties to do certain specified things, and it includes all that takes place in the conducting of any item of business or an affair." The objection that unless there is a debt, a debtor and a member of a scheduled tribe, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application if the allegation regarding debt is denied by the other party, cannot be accepted. I may refer to Central Batik of India v. Rajagopalan, AIR 1964 SC 743 . That was a case under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and an objection was taken that unless the other side admits that the applicant is a workman, the Court bas no jurisdiction. I may refer to Central Batik of India v. Rajagopalan, AIR 1964 SC 743 . That was a case under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and an objection was taken that unless the other side admits that the applicant is a workman, the Court bas no jurisdiction. Rejecting this contention, it was held as under: "When sub-section (2) of section 33-C refers to any workman entitled to receive from the employer any benefit there specified, it does not mean that he must be a workman whose right to receive the said benefit is not disputed by the employer Section 33-C (2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim ill based is disputed by their employers. The claim under section 33-C (2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the labour Court by sub section (2) AIR 1958 SC 207 and AIR 1961 SC 970 Referred to. Observations in AIR 1963 Bom 189 held obiter and not justified "For the purpose of making the necessary determination under section 33-C (2), it would, in appreciation cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests. When the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under section 33-C (2)." Therefore, to decide whether the Debt Relief Court had jurisdiction or not, the allegations in the application will have to be seen. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under section 33-C (2)." Therefore, to decide whether the Debt Relief Court had jurisdiction or not, the allegations in the application will have to be seen. If the applicant is the member of Scheduled tribes and if alleges in his application that he has taken, a loan from the other side and if he says that the transaction should be reopened and decided according to the Act, then the Court Will have jurisdiction to entertain the same. Only because the other side says that the transaction is not a loan, it cannot be held that jurisdiction of the Court will be ousted automatically. The Court can decide the matter regarding jurisdiction after taking into consideration the claim of the respective parties and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the said Act is not applicable to the transaction in dispute, then the Court can say that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed before it. Therefore, the first objection raised by the learned counsel that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under the Act cannot be accepted. The application is filed under section 8 of the Act to the Debt Relief Court. Section 11 says that the Code of Civil procedure will be applicable to the proceedings before the Debt Relief Court. Section 14 of the Act says that the Debt Relief Court shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment for the time being in force reopen all transactions made 34 years before the last transaction or before the 1st January, 1964, whichever is earlier and after re-opening the transaction, it will decide the amount of principal actually paid to the debtor and the date on which it was originally advanced and then certain other powers are given to decide the interest which can be recovered by the creditor. The important words in this section are that the Court has power to re-open the transaction. What is the meaning of 're-open', we will consider presently. It also says that not withstanding any thing contained in any other enactment. The meaning of such a clause which is called a 'Non-obstante clause' is considered on page 203 of 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation'. What is the meaning of 're-open', we will consider presently. It also says that not withstanding any thing contained in any other enactment. The meaning of such a clause which is called a 'Non-obstante clause' is considered on page 203 of 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation'. It is mentioned by the learned author that: "A Clause beginning with 'notwithstanding' anything contained in this Act or in some particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in force', is sometimes appended to a section in the beginning. with a view to give the enacting part of the section in case of conflict an overriding effect over the provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, It is equivalent to saying that inspite of the provision of Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, the enactment following it will have its full operation or that the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment. The phrase 'notwithstanding anything in......' is used in contradistinction to phrase 'subject to', the latter conveying the idea of a provisions to which it is made subject. Ordinarlly there is a close approximation between the non-obstante clause and the enacting part of the section and the non-obstante clause may throw some light as to the scope and ambit of the enacting part in case of its ambiguity, but when the enacting part is clear its scope cannot be cut down by resort to non-obstante clause." The meaning of this is that the provisions of other Act will not come in way' when giving effect to the rights and liabilities to be decided under section 14 of the Act The consequences of coming into force of the Act are mentioned under section 7 of the Act. Section 24 of the Act is regarding issuance of a discharge certificate. The discharge certificate is given by the Debt Relief Court after making such enquiry as it may deem fit and if it comes to the conclusion that the debt stood discharged or deemed to have been discharged under this Act. The meaning of re-open is to open again. In our opinion, the meaning of 're-open' is to consider the position of the respective parties and the nature of transaction when it was entered by the parties. The meaning of re-open is to open again. In our opinion, the meaning of 're-open' is to consider the position of the respective parties and the nature of transaction when it was entered by the parties. While deciding the nature of the transaction, the surrounding circumstances and the wordings of the documents are to be considered and if while considering this, the Court comes to the conclusion that the relation between the parties is that of a debtor and a creditor, then to give relief to the party under the Act to which it is entitled. Therefore, when an application under section 8 of the Act is moved before the Debt Relief Court, it had jurisdiction to re-open the transaction and consider the nature of the transaction entered by the parties. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted before us that the view taken by the Debt Relief Court and the Revenue Court that the transaction in question is a mortgage is not according to law. He referred us to Section 58C of the Transfer of Property Act and he submitted that when the condition or repurchase is not embodied under the sale-deed itself, then the authorities were not Justified in holding that the transaction is a mortgage and if it cannot be held to be a mortgage, then the relationship between the petitioner and non-petitioner No.1 is not that of creditor and debtor and that being the case, the Debt Relief Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and decide the matter. Even otherwise he submits, that the Debt Relief Court has not been given power under the Act to hold a sale with an agreement of re purchase to be a mortgage. Therefore, the order passed by the Courts below are without jurisdiction. In our opinion, we think that we are not willing to accept this proposition also. When the Debt Relief Court has power to see what is the nature of the transaction and if, after considering the relevant factors, it comes to the conclusion that it is a collateral security then the relation between the parties being that of a creditor and a debtor, the said Court is competent to decide the matter and give relief under the Act. How the documents are to be interpreted came for decision before the Supreme Court in Bhaskar v. Shrinarayan, 1967 JLJ 1032 and it was held therein as under :- "A transaction is not deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition referred to in clause (c) of section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act is embodied in the document which affects or purports to effect the sale. But it does not follow that if the condition is incorporated in the deed effecting or purporting to effect a sale a mortgage transaction must of necessity have been intended. The question whether by the incorporation of such a condition a transaction ostensibly of sale may be regarded as a mortgage is one of intention of the parties to be gathered from the language of the deed interpreted In the light of the surrounding circumstances. The circumstances that the condition is incorporated in the sale deed must undoubtedly he taken into account, but the value to be attached thereto must vary with the degree of formality attending upon the transaction. The definition of a mortgage by conditional sale postulates the creation by the transfer of a relation of mortgagor and the mortgagee, the price being charged on the property conveyed. In a sale coupled with an agreement to reconvey there is no relation of debtor and creditor nor is the price charge upon the property conveyed, but the sale is subject to an obligation to retransfer the property within the period specified. What distinguishes the two transactions is the relationship of debtor and creditor and the transfer being a security for the debt. The form in which the deed is clothed is not decisive. The definition of a mortgage by conditional sale itself contemplates an ostensible sale of the property. The question in each case is one of determination of the real character of the transaction to be ascertained from the provisions of the deed viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances. If the words are plain and unambiguous they must in the light of the evidence of surrounding circumstances be given their true legal effect. The question in each case is one of determination of the real character of the transaction to be ascertained from the provisions of the deed viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances. If the words are plain and unambiguous they must in the light of the evidence of surrounding circumstances be given their true legal effect. If there is ambiguity in the language employed, the intention may be ascertained from the contents of the deed with such extrinsic evidence as may by law be permitted to be adduced to show in what manner the language of the deed was related to existing facts Oral evidence of intention is not admissible in interpreting the convenants of the deed but evidence to explain or even to contradict the recitals as distinguished from the terms of the documents may of course be given. Evidence of contemporaneous conduct is always admissible as a surrounding circumstance but evidence as to subsequent conduct of the parties is Inadmissible." We may mention here that then said Judgment the document which was to be interpreted was a sale out and out with an other agreement to repurchase and the Court, after considering the surrounding circumstances and also the recitals in the document, came to the conclusion that the said transaction is a mortgage transaction. While deciding the matter, it has only said that the evidence as to the subsequent conduct of the parties to transaction is inadmissible to decide the nature of the transaction. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that there is nothing like a collateral security when the transaction is out and out sale and if the transaction in dispute does not amount to collateral security, then it will be sale and an agreement to repurchase. The rights and liabilites of the parties will be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, For that, he has no quarrel. He has further submitted that to hold it as a collateral security and also to hold that because it is a collateral security, the relationship of the parties is that of a creditor and debtor is not justified under any law. This propositions also, we are not in a position to accept. He has further submitted that to hold it as a collateral security and also to hold that because it is a collateral security, the relationship of the parties is that of a creditor and debtor is not justified under any law. This propositions also, we are not in a position to accept. This point came before this Court for consideration in Govind Prasad v. The Collector Durg and others, (1977) II MPWN 226 and it bas decided as under :- "Held: This Court has perused the orders of the Presiding Officer, Debt Relief Court, as also of the Additional Collector. Neither of them has recorded a finding as the leaned counsel of the petitioner wants this Court to read in them Neither the Presiding Officer of the Debt Relief Court has said that the parties never intended to act upon the transaction as a sale and it was a sham transaction or it was merely to serve as a collateral Security. Such a finding has not been given either by the Presiding Officer of the Debt Relief Court or the Revisional authority The Presiding Officer has treated the transaction as a mortgage. He has called it conditional salt. It is difficult to under stand what the Presiding Officer wanted to say. Appalently, at first the Presiding Officer called it a conditional sale and subsequently talked of forecloser i.e. treated it as a mortgage. To put it at the highest so as to give a meaning to his order what he wants to say is that the so called a conditional sale was a mortgage and, therefore, unless the mortgagee got the mortgage foreclosed, the loan was subsisting so that he could give the relief. It is nobody's case that in the sale-deed a condition as envisaged in section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act was embodied. On the contrary it is the case of both the parties that there were two separate documents, one purporting to be a sale deed and the other an agreement to reconvey executed by the vendee. It is nobody's case that in the sale-deed a condition as envisaged in section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act was embodied. On the contrary it is the case of both the parties that there were two separate documents, one purporting to be a sale deed and the other an agreement to reconvey executed by the vendee. The effect of the proviso to section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act is that it is not permissible to call a sale a mortgage merely because the mortgagor ostensibly sold the mortgaged property on a condition that all payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller, Turning now to the order of the learned Additional Collector, passed in revision, he has also not applied his mind at all to the legal position. He thought that he could not go into the question at all because at all because section 22 of the Act does not empower the revisional Court to go into the merits of the issues. The observation of the Additional Collector amounts to refusal to exercise the jurisdiction which he had. It was within the jurisdiction to see whether the legal position, which was the basis of the order passed by the Presiding Officer of the Debt Relief Court was correct. Accordingly, both the orders of the Presiding Officer of the Debt Relief Court and the revisional authority are quashed The case shall go back to the Presiding Officer of the Debt Relief Court to dispose of Sewak Ram's applications according to law" In the above judgment, it is held that a sale cannot be called a mortgage merely became of the existence of a condition to resale if money is paid in another document. But it goes to say that the Debt Relief Court should give a clear finding whet her the transaction was a sham transaction or it was merely to serve al a collateral security From this Judgement we can say that the said Court has jurisdiction to hold that the transaction in dispute was a collateral security. It can also go into the transaction and see whether the transaction was sham or not. It can also go into the transaction and see whether the transaction was sham or not. Therefore, relying on this Judgment and the Judgment of the Supreme Court, referred to above, we are of the opinion that the Court has power to look into the transaction and to say whether it is a collateral security and if it is a collateral security, then the relationship between the petitioner and the non-petitioner being that of a creditor and a debtor, it has jurisdiction to decide the same. 8. The next submission made before us is that the Debt Relief Court had no jurisdiction to order handing back of the possession even though it may hold that the debt is discharged. This proposition of law also we are not willing to accept. It is correct to say that there is no specific provision given in the Act itself that if the Court comes to a conclusion that the debt has been discharged, then it can give an order of handing back of the possession of the property mortgaged to the mortgagee. But there is a provision in the Act regarding movable property pledged with the creditor. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the loan secured is satisfied, then it can order return of the pawned article to the debtor. This is mentioned in section 14(8) of the Act. 9. We can see the matter from one more angle. The right to hold the property in possession or as a security is with the mortgagee as long as his money is not paid. As soon as money is paid, he loses the right to hold the property and also to hold the possession. The property reverts back to the mortgagor and he is entitled for the possession and usufruct thereof. In other words, it even after the satisfaction of the mortgage, the property remains with the mortgagee, then, his poisession is not justified under any law. Therefore, while giving an order of handing over possession back to the mortgagor, the Court is doing nothing illegal or anything against law, but is doing what is proper and legal. When a Court gives a declaration, then in our opinion, certainly it has power to say what will be the effect of the declaration. Therefore, while giving an order of handing over possession back to the mortgagor, the Court is doing nothing illegal or anything against law, but is doing what is proper and legal. When a Court gives a declaration, then in our opinion, certainly it has power to say what will be the effect of the declaration. Therefore, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the mortgage has come to an end, the effect will be that the mortgagor will be entitled for possession and if the Court says that as soon as the mortgage stands discharged, the mortgagor should get possession, we think, it is simply saying the effect of the declaration, it has to give under the Act. Therefore, the submission that the Court cannot give an order of handing back he possession to the mortgagor is not justified and we are not in a position to accept it. Therefore, this submission also we reject. 10. But, looking to the Judgment of the Courts below, we are of the opinion that it has not given any definite finding whether the transaction is a collateral security or not. That being the case, according to the Judgment mentioned above, we must set aside the order of the Debt Relief Court as well as that of the learned Collector. Datia and send the file back to them to decide the matter afresh and to decide after giving proper opportunity to the parties to amend the pleadings if they want so and after giving opportunity to produce them the evidence, to decide whether the alleged transaction is a collateral security or not and decide the matter according to law. 11. The result is that this petition is allowed, the orders of the Courts below are set aside and the case is sent back for disposal according to the observations made above, to the Debt Relief Court. There will be no older as to costs. Outstanding amount of security be refunded to the petitioner.