JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been referred to us by a learned single Judge of this Court on account of conflict of opinion amongst various High Courts on the question whether a Government employee can be punished in departmental proceedings even though he may have been honourably acquitted by a Criminal Court on the same Charge. 2. The material facts giving rise to this writ petition lie within a narrow compass. Petitioner Mandal Dutt was employed as a driver by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Corporation") On August 7, 1975, at about 6.30 a.m. bus No. RSM-1967, which was being driven by the petitioner from Jodhpur to Phalidi, struck against the railway Gate No. 11 Soorsagar, Jodhpur, as a result of which, the bus was damaged the Regional Mechanical Engineer of the Corporation suspended the petitioner by his order dated October 25, 1975, for driving the bus negligently and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. During the pendency of the departmental proceeding, the petitioner was prosecuted by the Police under Section 279 I.P.C. The learned Additional Judicial Magistrate No. 4 Jodhpur, who tried the case, acquitted the petitioner of the charge by his Judgment dated Marcy 29, 1976 (Ex. 3). On the basis of the Judgment or acquittal passed in his favour by the Criminal Court, the petitioner Frayed before the disciplinary authority that the departmental proceedings should be dropped as he had been honourably acquitted of the same charge by a Criminal Court. However, the Regional Mechanical Engineer (respondent No. 2) by his order dated June 23, 1976 (Ex. 4) held that it was established in course of the inquiry that the petitioner was guilty of driving the bus negligently, as a result of which the bus belonging to the Corporation was damaged and there- by the Corporation had been put to a loss of Rs. 1,000/- Consequently, he directed that an amount of Rs. 1,000/- may be recovered from the petitioner's salary by deducting Rs. 50/- from his each month's salary. 1,000/- Consequently, he directed that an amount of Rs. 1,000/- may be recovered from the petitioner's salary by deducting Rs. 50/- from his each month's salary. It was also directed that the petitioner's salary for the period of suspension, except the subsistence allowance paid during that period, be forfeited under Clause 30(5) of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and workshop Standing Orders the petitioner has challenged the validity of the order dated August 4, 1976, on the ground that a since he had been honourably acquitted by Criminal Court on the same charge, the Department had no jurisdiction to punish him in disciplinary proceedings. 3. He petition has been opposed on behalf of the respondents. They have also filed a written reply to the writ petition and the principal contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that despite the order of acquittal by the Criminal Court, the disciplinary authority was competent to give its own finding independently and punish the petitioner in case he was found to be guilty of driving the vehicle negligently. Thus the short point arising for our decision is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the disciplinary authority was competent to punish the petitioner in departmental Inquiry even though be was acquitted of the offence under Section 279 I. P. C.by the learned Magistrate ? 4. It in urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been honourably acquitted by the Criminal Court and therefore he cannot be punished In disciplinary proceedings. In support of his argument, he has relied upon R.P. Kapur v. Union of India and another A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 787 . State of Assam V. Raghava Rajgopalchari, 1972 S.L.R. 44 . Workmen U.P. State Electricity Board v. Upper Ganges valley Electricity Supply Co. and others, 1966 (12) I.F. and L.T. 231 . Bombay Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. and others v. Khem Chand Raj Kumar and others, 1969 (9) I.F and L.R. 1 . Bhagwat Charanv. State of U.P., 1973 (2) S.L.R. 238 . Rajendra Kumar Paul v.Union of India, 1976 (2) S.L.R.295 . Shri Kundan Lal v. Delhi Administration, Delhi, 1976 (1) S.L.R. 133 . Hari Narain Duby v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 1976 (1) S.L.R. (M.P.) 585 . S. Prahlad Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1965 J. and K. 91 . Rajendra Kumar Paul v.Union of India, 1976 (2) S.L.R.295 . Shri Kundan Lal v. Delhi Administration, Delhi, 1976 (1) S.L.R. 133 . Hari Narain Duby v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 1976 (1) S.L.R. (M.P.) 585 . S. Prahlad Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1965 J. and K. 91 . State of Orissa v. Sailabehari, A.I.R. 1963 Orissa 73 . Himmat Giri Mohan Giri v. Shri Paveri K. S. etc. 1977 S.L.R.623 . Banta Singh v.National Coal Development Corporation, A.I.R. 1968 Patna 300 . Noor Chand Sheikh V. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1914 S.C. 2120 . Dorai Kunnu v. Parry's Confectionary Ltd. Nellikuppam and another, 1976(3) I.F. and L.R. 294 and Shri Rama v. Superintendent of Police and another, 1967 (14) I.F. and L.R. 36 . 5. On the other hand, it is strenuously contended by Shri Raj Narain learned counsel for the respondents, that acquittal by a Criminal Court cannot operate as a bar against. Departmental Inquiry on the same charge and the findings recorded by the Criminal Court are not binding on the disciplinary authority. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on Bhaurao v. State of Maharashtra, 1972 S.L.R. 862 . Moti singh Chhagsingh Vaghela v. S.D. Mehta, A.I.R. 1966 Gujarat 33 . Suresh Chandra v. Himangshu kumar Roy and others, A.I.R. 1953 Calcutta 316 . Kishan Chand Koru Mal v. Shri Imdad Ali I.G. Police, I.L.R. 1966 Gujarat 1030 . Spadigam v. State of Kerala, 1970 (1)L.L.J. 718 . Varkey Joseph v. Mechanical Superintendent, Chochin Port Trust and others, 19/1 (4) L and I.C. 1466 . B.K. Agarwal v. Regional Transport Authority, Kumaon, 1962 A.L.J. 116 . State of Andhra Pradesh v. K.H. Khan, 1967 (2) A.P.L. W.R. 121 . Factory Manager C.I.M.M. Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Rehman and others, 1971 J.L.J. 337 . Madhujit Dev Barma v. Union Territory of Tripura and others, A.I.R. 1959 Tripura 51 . Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Khushal Bhan, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 806 . State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Raman Rao, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1723 . 6. We shall first take up the cases decided by the Supreme Court. Madhujit Dev Barma v. Union Territory of Tripura and others, A.I.R. 1959 Tripura 51 . Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Khushal Bhan, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 806 . State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Raman Rao, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1723 . 6. We shall first take up the cases decided by the Supreme Court. In 'Delhi Cloth and General Mills', case (Supra) the Supreme Court observed that though very often employers stay enquiries into the misconduct of the employees pending the decision of the criminal trial Courts calling with the same facts and that is fair, it cannot be said that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision, at least of the criminal trial Court, before taking action against an employees. However, if the case is of a grave nature or Involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial Court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. 7. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao (Supra), Shah J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed as follows:- "The inquiry officer appears to have stated that the judgment of the Magistrate holding a criminal trial against a public servant could not always be regarded as binding in a departmental inquiry against that public servant. In so stating the inquiry officer did not commit any error". It was also observed that there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him. The rule followed in criminal trial that an offence is not established unless proved beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied. 8. In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 325 . The rule followed in criminal trial that an offence is not established unless proved beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied. 8. In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 325 . It was held that the language of Article 20 of the Constitution of India and the words actually used in it afford a clear indication that the proceedings in connection with the prosecution and punishing a person must be in the nature of criminal proceedings before a Court of law or judicial tribunal and not before a tribunal which entertains a departmental or administrative inquiry even though set up by a statute but which is not required by law to stay a matters judicially and on legal evidence. In that case, the proceedings had been taken under the Sea Customs Act before a customs authority who ordered investigation of the case. Such proceedings, it was held, were not prosecution nor the order of confiscation, a punishment within the meaning of Article 20(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as the customs authority was not a Court or a judicial tribunal but it merely exercised administrative powers vested in aim for revenue purposes. 9. In Workmen U.P. State Electricity Board v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Co. (Supra) the Supreme Court agreed with the finding of the Tribunal that after the employees acquittal, there was no valid reason for not re-employing him.In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India and another (Supra), an officer of the rank of I.C.S. was suspended by the Governor of Punjab on the ground that a criminal case was pending against him. The officer filed a writ petition in the Punjab High Court challenging the order of suspension. Wanchoo J , as he then was, observed as follows :... ".........Such suspension also, in our opinion. Is clearly related to disciplinary matters. If the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted, even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable." 10. ".........Such suspension also, in our opinion. Is clearly related to disciplinary matters. If the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted, even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable." 10. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Syed Quamar Ali, 1967(1) S.L.R.228 , the contention raised on behalf of the police officer was that the order dismissing him was contrary to para 241 of the Central Berar Police Regulation inasmuch as he could not be punished departmentally for the offence for which he was tried and acquitted constituted the sole ground of punishment on the basis of earlier decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Babu Ram Upadhya, A.I.R.1961 S.C. 751, their Lordships held that the obvious object of the rule-making authority was that the police officer in holding the departmental inquiry, should not sit in review over a considered decision of the criminal Court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, this decision turned upon the provisions of rule 241 of the Police Regulations, which provided that when a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal Court, then he must, as a rule, be reinstated and may not be punished departmentally when the offence for which he was tried, constituted the sole ground for punishment. 11. In Bombay Steel Rolling Mills Ltd., and others v. Khem Chand Raj Kumar and another , (supra). The Court observed that even apart from steel men, there would be a good claim for the workmen's claim to the reinstatement as soon as they bad been acquitted, but since the workmen preferred to remain away and did not ask for work, it was held that it was neither fair not reasonable to ask the Management to comply for demand of reinstatement for months and months after such acquittal. 12. In State of Assam and another v. Raghava Rajgopalachari (Supra), writ was sought against the State of Assam for directing the latter to pass order for payment of full pay and allowances to the petitioner admissible under the Rule for the whole period of forced absence from duty, as, the petitioner had been acquitted by the Supreme Courts. 12. In State of Assam and another v. Raghava Rajgopalachari (Supra), writ was sought against the State of Assam for directing the latter to pass order for payment of full pay and allowances to the petitioner admissible under the Rule for the whole period of forced absence from duty, as, the petitioner had been acquitted by the Supreme Courts. The contention raised on behalf of the state was that the petitioner was not honourably acquitted, but the Supreme Court held that the Government servant had not been fully exonerated of the charge. 13. In Adl. Pherozshah Gandhi v. H. M. Seerval Advocate General of Maharashtra, Bombay, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 385 . It was observed than in disciplinary proceedings, the advocate was not estopped from questioning the charge that he was guilty of corrupt practice, and that in civil proceedings, the decision of the criminal Court is not res judicata. 14. From the above resume or the Supreme Court cases, it would be clear that there is no direct authority on the point but there are general observations contained in them, which has been referred to in some of the Judgments of the High Courts. 15. Let us now turn to the cases decided by the various High Courts on the point. 16. In B.K. Aggarwal v. Regional Transport Authority Kumaon , (Supra)where the Regional Transport Authority had cancelled the petitioner's private carrier permit, one of the grounds taken for quashing the order of cancellation was that since the petitioner had been prosecuted under Section 123 of the Motor Vehicles Act and had been acquitted by the Magistrate. The Regional Transport authority could not enquire into the same charge again under Section 60 and impose the penalty of revoking the permit. The Court observed that two independent Tribunal with different findings in relation to the purpose of Inquiry before them. In coming to this view, the learned Judges did not accept the principle laid down by the Madras High Court in J.D. Silva v. Regional Transport Authority, A.I.R. 1952 Madras 853 . However, we may mention that from the facts contained in the judgment. It appears that the charges, which were enquired into by the criminal Court and the Regional Transport Authority, were found not to be identical. However, we may mention that from the facts contained in the judgment. It appears that the charges, which were enquired into by the criminal Court and the Regional Transport Authority, were found not to be identical. In a subsequent single Bench decision of the same Court in Bhagwat Charan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (Supra) a different view was taken.The petitioner was a confirmed Collector Admin in that case. A departmental inquiry was held against him and he was dismissed from service, but by the time the case came to be finally decided in appeal, the petitioner was acquitted by the criminal Court on the same charges, Relying upon the observations in R.P. Kapur v. Union of India (Supra). K.Rengarajan v. State of Madras, 1968 (1) Land I.C. 63 and J.D. Silva v. Regional Transport Authority (Supra), the learned Judge held that since the petitioner had been honourably acquitted, no departmental proceedings could be taken against him on those very charges, it appears that the earlier Division Bench decision of the Court as not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. 17. In Suresh Chandra v. Himangshu Kumar Roy and others, (Supra)though the learned judge quashed the order of dismissal of the petitioner on other grounds, yet he repelled the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that since the petitioner had been acquitted of the charge in the criminal proceedings, the departmental proceedings in respect of identical charges were without jurisdiction and were not warranted by law as being in violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. It was observed that the word "prosecution" in Article 20(2) means judicial proceedings before a Court or a legal tribunal. It cannot have reference to departmental or disciplinary proceedings taken for inflicting departmental penalty or punishment on an officer belonging to the department for any misconduct. In another decision of that Court in Rajendra Kumar Paul v. Union of India, (Supra), it was held that since the charge sheet issued against the petitioner initiating a disciplinary proceeding rested on the same allegations and charges as were the subject matter of the criminal trial in which the petitioner had been honourably acquitted the disciplinary proceeding could not be initiated nor any punishment could be awarded on the basis of the same charges. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge relied upon Bhagwat Charan v. State of U.P. (Supra). In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge relied upon Bhagwat Charan v. State of U.P. (Supra). It is noteworthy that the earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Suresh Chandra v. Himangshu Kumar Roy (Supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. 18. In C.I.M.M. Co. Ltd. v. Rehman (Supra), a Division bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that it is not permissible to hold a departmental inquiry into the misconduct of a Government servant with a view to the departmental action against him where he has been honourably acquitted of such misconduct by a criminal Court on the principle res judicata and issue escope. The learned Judges observed that the question of a tribunal being precluded on the principle of res judicata from coming to a finding inconsistent with that of a criminal Court in an identical matter can however arise only where the parties are the same. It was observed that in cases relating to Government Servants, departmental action is taken by the State which is also a party to the criminal proceedings and thus in the criminal Court as well as the departmental proceedings the parties are the same. In another case of that Court, namely. Harinarayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Supra), the point raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the petitioner, an employee of the police Department, having been acquitted in criminal case for an offence under Section 302, I.P.C. could not have been proceeded against departmentally in respect of the same charge. The learned judges held that in case acquittal is by the criminal Court on technical grounds or the inquiry is hold on a different charge though on the same facts or the acquittal is on the ground of benefit of doubt or the punishment is imposed for grave dereliction of duty though on the same facts, but for some lesser charge, departmental inquiry can be held. However, it was further observed that where the acquittal is substantially on merits on identical facts and charges, it will not be proper for a disciplinary tribunal to record a finding of guilt and to punish an employee thereon. 19. In J.D. Silva v. Regional Transport Authority , (Supra) the driver of the lorry was under Section 185, Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. 19. In J.D. Silva v. Regional Transport Authority , (Supra) the driver of the lorry was under Section 185, Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. After a full inquiry, the Magistrate discharged the accused driver holding that the accusation was groundless. Meanwhile, the Regional Transport Officer also called upon the owner of the lorry holding a public carrier permit to show cause why his permit should not be cancelled. Thereupon, the petitioner filed the writ petition praying for quashing the proceedings before the Regional Transport Officer. In these circumstances, Rajamanner C.J. observed as follows:- "4. We have no hesitation in making it clear that a quasi judicial tribunal like the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate tribunal therefrom cannot ignore the findings and orders of competent criminal Courts in respect of an offence when the Tribunal proceeds to take any action on the basis of the commission of that offence... ... ... ... "5. The position then would be this. If there is a conviction by a competent criminal Court, that would furnish conclusive ground for any penal action by the Transport Authorities. Equally, if the criminal prosecution ended in a discharge or acquittal of the accused and that event happened before the order of any Road Transport Tribunal, then such Tribunal would not have the power to go behind the final order of competent criminal Court. if at the time the Road Transport Tribunal disposes of any application or before such Tribunal passes an order no prosecution has been launched, then of course, It is not incumbent on the tribunal to await a criminal prosecution. But if a prosecution has actually commenced and that prosecution is in respect of the same offence by reason of which the Transport Authority proposes to take drastic action against the accused in the criminal case, then it is desirable that the Transport Authority should await the decision of the criminal Court. This procedure would avoid the spectacle of two departments of the Government proceeding on contradictory lines to the annoyance and hardship of the citizen". 20. In Sheik Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Offices, A.I.R. 1965 Madras 502 . The earlier decision of the Madras High Court in J.D.Silva v. Regional Transport Authority (Supra) was followed. This procedure would avoid the spectacle of two departments of the Government proceeding on contradictory lines to the annoyance and hardship of the citizen". 20. In Sheik Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Offices, A.I.R. 1965 Madras 502 . The earlier decision of the Madras High Court in J.D.Silva v. Regional Transport Authority (Supra) was followed. The same view was taken in Dorai Kannu v. Parry's Confectionary Ltd., Nallikappem and another (Supra), wherein it was observed that whore on an identical charge and evidence in a criminal prosecution as an employee a person has been found not guilty on merit and therefore has been acquitted, no departmental inquiry can be undertaken on the identical charge and the finding of guilt given on a like or Identical evidence Ignoring the finding of competent Court for acquittal on merits. Reliance was placed on the earlier decision of the Court in J.D. Silva v. Regional Transport Authority (Supra). 21. In Kundan Lal v. Delhi Administration Delhi (Supra) the Delhi High Court observed that there is a preponderance for the middle visor which is that when there is a substantial acquittal of the accused on a criminal charge, there should not be a departmental proceeding against him in respect of the same charge on the same facts unless there are present conditions like the acquittal befog on a technical ground or establishing conduct which would make it unworthy of the said officer continue in office etc. 22. In State of Orissa v. Sailabehari (Supra), it was held that where a criminal Court has acquitted a public servant honourably a subsequent inquiry in respect of the same allegations may offend the rules of natural justice and may have to be quashed, but there the acquittal is not honourable but it is based on benefit of doubt, further departmental inquiry in respect of the some subject matter is not excluded, especially as the standard of proof required in such an inquiry against a delinquent public servant is not the same as that required against an accused in a criminal case. 23. In Kishaschand Korumal v. Shri Imdadali and others (Supra), it was held that Article 20 of the constitution can apply only when a person's prosecuted and punished by a Court of law or a judicial tribunal and the said Article does not apply to a departmental enquiry. 24. 23. In Kishaschand Korumal v. Shri Imdadali and others (Supra), it was held that Article 20 of the constitution can apply only when a person's prosecuted and punished by a Court of law or a judicial tribunal and the said Article does not apply to a departmental enquiry. 24. In Himmat Giri Mohan Giri v. Shri Paveri K.S. etc. (Supra), it was observed that it is well settled that there is no constitutional bar to a departmental inquiry being held on the termination of a criminal proceeding in favour of a delinquent. There is also no statutory or legal bar against such proceedings. However, the case turned upon the guiding principles laid down by the State Government in initiating departmental proceedings against Government servants who had been acquitted on a criminal trial on the same charge 25. In Bhaurao v. State of Maharashtra (Supra), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dissented from the view of Tare J. in Qamarali v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 M.P. 46 , and it was hold that departmental proceedings did not amount to a prosecution within the meaning of Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (old)and as such there is no legal bar. 26. In Banta Singh v. National Coal Development, Corporation (Supra) it was observed by a single Judge that when there is a criminal case on an Identical charge and it ends in acquittal of the accused, a departmental inquiry on the identical charge is not justified. 27. In Sri Ram v. Superintendent of Police and another (Supra), it was observed that what constitutes an impediment to a disciplinary proceedings is an acquittal in a prosecutions in respect of the same charge. If there be no such acquittal and even if a criminal prosecution has commenced and is continuing, a disciplinary proceeding in respect of an accusation which forms the subject matter of the charge in the criminal Court is not forbidden and can be commenced and concluded so long as the prosecution has not ended in an acquittal. The same view was followed in a subsequent Division Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in Rama v. Superintendent of Police, A.I.R. 1967 Mysore 220 . 28. In Spadigam v. State of Kerala (Supra) Mr. The same view was followed in a subsequent Division Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in Rama v. Superintendent of Police, A.I.R. 1967 Mysore 220 . 28. In Spadigam v. State of Kerala (Supra) Mr. Justice K.K. Mathur as he then was, held that the doctrine of issue estoppel is concerned with the admissibility of evidence designed to upset a finding recorded by a competent Court in a previous trial in a subsequent criminal trial. It has never been applied in the case of an enquiry before a tribunal conducting disciplinary proceedings although the proceedings are quasi criminal. It was further held that the judgment of a case would not bar disciplinary proceedings against him on the basis of the same facts, not the judgment would operate as conclusive evidence in the disciplinary proceedings because a criminal Court required a high standard of proof for convicting the accused whereas such a standard of proof is not required for finding a person guilty in a disciplinary proceeding. As regards the observations in J.D. Silva v. Regional Transport Authority (Supra) that when a criminal Court and a disciplinary authority can come to different conclusion on idential charges the spectacle is rather unedifying, the learned Judge observed that it is inherent in our system and that we see the same thing when a civil Court arrives at a different finding than a criminal Court in respect of the same matter. V.P. Gopalan Nambiyar J., as he then was, took the same view in Varkey Joseph v. Cochin Port Trust and Bothers (Supra). 29. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bhaurao v. State of Maharashtra (Supra) held that Rule 445 of Chapter XIII of the Bombay Police Manual, Volume I, is not invalid or violative of any constitutional or legal provision and under this rule, the competent dismissing disciplinary authority is entitled to hold inquiry and consider the evidence taken afresh for deciding as to whether such servant mould to retained in service or not. The order of acquittal on the finding recorded by the criminal Court in such a case cannot be conclusive of the allegations made against such person. In coming to this conclusion the learned Judges disagreed with the view taken by the Madras and the Mysore High Court. 30. The order of acquittal on the finding recorded by the criminal Court in such a case cannot be conclusive of the allegations made against such person. In coming to this conclusion the learned Judges disagreed with the view taken by the Madras and the Mysore High Court. 30. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. K.H. Khan (Supra), it was observed that it is firmly settled that even though an order of acquittal he recorded by a criminal Court, there is no legal or constitutional bar to the departmental enquiry being held on the termination of criminal proceedings in favour of the delinquent, as a departmental proceeding is not a prosecution within the meaning of Section 401, Code of Criminal Procedure nor can it fall within the ambit of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India. 31. The above survey of the Judicial opinion seems to point to the view that Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India and Section 403, Code of Criminal Procedure, do not bar a departmental inquiry against a Government servant on account of his acquittal on the same charge by a criminal Court in other words, there is no constitutional, or legal bar against holding such an inquiry even thongs the man has been acquitted. Even those learned Judges who have held that much inquiry is barred, seem to have taken this view on the principle of natural justice that such a procedure may result in two departments of the Government proceeding on contradictory lines to the annoyance and hardship of a citizen. In support of this view, reliance has been placed on the following expression by Hon'ble Wanchoo, J , as he then was in R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India (Supra). "Even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable". It will be noticed that this point was not at all in issue in that case nor it was decided. The learned Judge has not dealt with the question as to what is "honourable acquittal". Only a general observation has been made that in cases other than honourable acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow. It is well established that general observations in cases should be confined to the facts of those cases. A case is an authority for what is decided therein and not what may be deduced therefrom. 32. Only a general observation has been made that in cases other than honourable acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow. It is well established that general observations in cases should be confined to the facts of those cases. A case is an authority for what is decided therein and not what may be deduced therefrom. 32. In Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor, 1934 (61) I.L.R. Calcutta 168 . Lord Williams J., made the following observations with regard to the words "honourably acquitted". "The expression 'honourably acquitted' is unknown to Courts of justice. Apparently, it is a form of order used in Court Martial and other extra judicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the Government Authorities and by the Magistrate .............. Further we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for aim to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what Government authorities term honourably acquitted". 33. We may state that there is consensus of judicial opinion that departmental proceedings and imposition of punishment herein are not absolutely barred on account of acquittal of a Government servant.Emphasis seems to have been said on the word honourable acquittal. 34. Now, in the present case, the Magistrate found that the petitioner was not driving the bus at the relevant time rashly and/or negligently but according to the learned Magistrate, a piece of stone got stuck up in the steering as a result of which the steering ceased to move and the bus swerved and struck against the gate of the railway crossing. On these premises, the offence under Section 279, I.P.C., was held to be not proved against the accused. The Inquiry Officer, however, came to the conclusion, as is clear from the inquiry report Ex. R.4, that the plea of the accused that the steering got jammed on account of a stone having got into it, is not convincing. He has further found that this plea wag an after-thought and that it is not borne out from the report of the Mechanical Transport Officer, which was prepared soon after the accident. R.4, that the plea of the accused that the steering got jammed on account of a stone having got into it, is not convincing. He has further found that this plea wag an after-thought and that it is not borne out from the report of the Mechanical Transport Officer, which was prepared soon after the accident. According to the Inquiry Officer, the accident was caused on account of the carelessness of the petitioner in not driving the bus attentively but getting absorbed in that with the other occupants of the bus at the time of negotiating the railway crossing. It is significant that the Corporation was not a party to the criminal case and as such it had no opportunity to adduce evidence and show that the plea taken by the accused was an after-thought and was not correct. The petitioner, it may be noticed, was charged for an offence under Section 279, Indian Penal Code which reads as under:- "279 Rash driving or riding on a public way; Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both". The important Ingredient of the offence is that the driving must be rash or negligent as to endanger human life or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any person. This the prosecution may have failed to prove in the criminal case, but so far as the departmental inquiry is concerned the petitioner has been called upon to pay compensation to the department for the lose caused to the vehicle by his carelessness.Thus the Department seems to have punished the petitioner far a lesser charge which may not amount to criminal offence though it may be based on the same facts. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the departmental action taken by the Corporation against the petitioner was not barred even though the petitioner had been acquitted of the offence under Section 279, Indian Penal Code, by the criminal Court 35. The result is that this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The result is that this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******