JUDGMENT 1. - The only question, which arises in this revision petition is, whether the learned Magistrate could have taken cognizance against the accused-petitioners for an offence u/s 323 and 447, IPC, after the expiry of one year from the commission of the offence. 2. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 14.8.75, and the F.l.R. was lodged in P.S. Patan on 15 8.75. The F.l.R. 39/75 was registered in the police station, and a charge sheet was filed against the accused-petitioners in the Court of learned Magistrate for offence u/ss, 147, 447 and 323, IPC. on 8.7.77. The learned Magistrate thereafter took cognizance of the offence against the accused-petitioners. An application was filed on behalf of the accused-petitioners before the learned Magistrate that in view of S. 468, Cr.P.C. (1973), the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance against the accused-petitioners so far as the offence u/s 447 and 323, IPC is concerned. The learned Magistrate under the impugned order was of the opinion that cognizance could be taken and as such he dismissed the application filed on behalf of the accused-petitioners. 3. The submission of the learned Advocate for the accused-petitioners is that an offence u/s 447, IPC is only punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to three months, or with fine, which may extend to Rs. 1,000/-, or with both. An offence u/s 323. IPC is punishable with imprisonment of either description, which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000/-, or both. He, therefore, submits that so far as these offences are concerned, u/s 468, Cr P.C. cognizance can only be taken by the learned Magistrate within one year of the' offence He, therefore, submits that cognizance of these offences should have been taken by the learned Magistrate only upto 14.8.76 and not thereafter. Under S. 468, Cr.P.C., as it stood prior to the amendment by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment Act 1978), which came into force with effect from 18. 12. 78, cognizance for an offence punishable with fine only could be taken within six month's and for an offence punishable for a term not exceeding one year the cognizance could be taken within one year. 12. 78, cognizance for an offence punishable with fine only could be taken within six month's and for an offence punishable for a term not exceeding one year the cognizance could be taken within one year. Therefore, it can be said that when the charge sheet was filed before the learned Magistrate, he could not have taken cognizance so far as the offences under SS 447 and 323. TPC are concerned. But, so far as S. 141 IPC is concerned, he was competent to take cognizance. By the (Amendment) Act, 1978, sub-section (3) was inserted after sub-section (2), and the same is to the following effects:- "468 (3)-For the purpose of this section the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with more severe punishment or as the case may be, the most severe punishment." Therefore, after the amendment, in a case in which the accused is charged for more than one offence, which may be tried together, the period of limitation will be applicable in relation to such an offence in which most severe punishment is prescribed. Therefore, if sub-section (3) of S. 468, Cr.P.C. would have been applicable, there can be no dispute that as the accused is also alleged to have committed an offence u/s 147 IPC cognizance can be taken against them within a period of three years. But, the question is. as to whether the amendment by inserting sub-section (3) to S. 468, Cr. P. C, is retrospective. 4. Statutes to limitation are regarded procedural and the law of limitation, which applies to a suit is the law in force at the date of the institution of the suit irrespective of the date of accrual of cause of action. In Maxwell, on the interpretation of Statutes (13th Edn.) (page 22) dealing with procedural Act, it said, "the presumption against retrospective construction has no application to enactments, which affect only the procedure and practice of the Courts. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure, but only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being, by or for the court, in which he sues, and if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he can only proceed according to the altered mode. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure, but only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being, by or for the court, in which he sues, and if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he can only proceed according to the altered mode. Alterations in the from of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be." The author, G. P. Singh, in his book principles of Statutory Interpretation 2nd Edn, 1975 dealing with the Statutes of Limitation has said, "the object of Statute of Limitation is not to create any right to prescribe periods within which legal proceedings were instituted for enforcing of rights which exist under the substantive law. But after expiry of a period of limitation, the right of suit comes to an end, and, therefore, if a particular right of action had become barred under an earlier Limitation Act, the right is not revived by a later limitation, even if it provides a larger period of limitation than that provided by the earlier Act. 5. The same author at page 279, expresses himself in these words, "Statutes of Limitation are thus retrospective, in so far as they apply to all legal proceedings brought after their Operation for enforcing cause of action accrued earlier, but they are prospective in the sense that they neither have the effect of reviving a right of action which is already barred on the date of their coming into operation, nor do they have the effect of extinguishing a right of act on subsisting on that date, but a Statute may expressly or impliedly by retrospectively extending limitation revive a barred claim". A Full Bench of this Court in Government of Rajasthan and another v. Sangram Singh and Others, after reviewing the entire case law laid down the following law in para 12:- "On a survey of authorities, referred to above, am of the view that it is not always true to say that the law of limitation is only a law of Procedure and does not bar the remedy altogether so as to destroy the right. It is well settled proposition of law that the new law of limitation would not revive a barred right. It is well settled proposition of law that the new law of limitation would not revive a barred right. Similarly, it may be taken to be equally well settled that the new Law of Limitation cannot be construed retrospectively so as to destroy altogether the remedy of the litigation to enforce his right in the Court of Law." The following passage in Corpus Juris quoted in the "Interpretation of Statutes" by Bindra-1961 - (3rd Edn.) (Page 586) was quoted with approval. "While it has been said that statutes relating to remedies or procedure may be given a retrospective operation, a more accurate statement of the principle intended is that, unless expressly prohibited by statute, and in the absence of directions to the contrary, or unless in doing so, some contract obligation is violated or some vested right diverted, statutes merely affecting the remedy or law of procedure apply to actions thereafter, whether the right of action accused before or after change the law. The Legislature has full control over the mode, time and manner of prosecuting suits, and whenever, upon consideration of entire statute relating to those matters, it appears to have been the legislative intent to make it retrospective, it will be given this effect". 6. It can, therefore, be said that by and large the law of Limitation being procedural is retrospective and will apply to all legal proceedings either instituted after the coming into force of the act or pending when the Act came into force, but at the same time, it can be said that it will not affect a vested right and it will not revive a right of action which is already barred on the date when the Act comes into force and to that extent it will be perspective in the sense. 7. In the instant case, the cause of action or the incident is alleged to have taken place on 14.8 75, and when the learned Magistrate took cognizance also for offences under sections 447 and 323, IPC, S. 468 Cr. P. C , as it stood prior to the amendment by the (Amendment) Act, 1978 was in force, and, therefore, the Court could not have taken cognizanoe of these offences. Therefore, when sub - sec. (3) was inserted to S. 468, Cr. P. C , as it stood prior to the amendment by the (Amendment) Act, 1978 was in force, and, therefore, the Court could not have taken cognizanoe of these offences. Therefore, when sub - sec. (3) was inserted to S. 468, Cr. P. C. by the (Amendment) Act, 1978, which came into force with effect from 18.12.78, it could not have effected the right of the accused-petitioners, which they had acquired, so far as the offences under sections 447 and 323, IPC are concerned by the lapse of time. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has erred when he dismissed the application of the accused-petitioners and perhaps held u/s 468 (3) Cr.P.C. that the limitation for an offence u/s 147, IPC being three years, cognizance can also be taken for Offences under sections 323 and 447 IPC. 8. In the result, the application partly succeeds and the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance after expiry of one year for an offence u/s 147 and 323, IPC is set aside. But, it is clarified that his order taking cognizanoe for an offence u/s 147 IPC stands. *******