Judgment Birendra Prasad Singh, J. 1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In this application a prayer has been made for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 20-11-1978 contained in Annexure 2. This is an order passed by the Election Tribunal rejecting the election petition on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. 2. The election of Kewati Gram Panchayat in the district of Monghyr was held on 1-6-1978, in which respondent No.2 was declared elected as Mukhia. The petitioner was also a contesting candidate for the post of Mukhia. He filed an election petition challenging the election of respondent No.2 before the Election Tribunal respondent No.1 on 1-7-1978. The election case was registered and numbered as Election Case No.15 of 1978. When the matter came up for hearing the petition on the question of admission, the learned tribunal found that the petition has been filed after 30 days, the time fixed for filing an election petition. Accordingly, the learned Tribunal rejected the selection petition on 20-11-1978. 3. Mr. Bindeshwari Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the respondent Tribunal has wrongly exercised its jurisdiction and dismissed the election petition. According to learned counsel 1-6-1978 the date on which the result was declared should have been excluded and counting it from 2-6-1978, the election petition was filed within 30 days on 1-7-1978. The learned counsel may bo correct, but it is not possible for me to interfere in this case in the exercise of my powers under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Mr. S. B. N. Singh, learned counsel for respondent No.2 has contended that an appeal has been provided against the judgment of the Election Tribunal to the District Judge under rule 70 of the Bihar Panchayat Rules, 1959. His submission, therefore, is that this court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of any inferior court if an appeal or revision is provided against the judgment of the trial court. Mr. Chaudhary then contended that the impugned order contained in Annexure 1 cannot be said to be a judgment and is merely an interlocutory order against which no appeal has been provided. It is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel. Mr. Chaudhary then contended that the impugned order contained in Annexure 1 cannot be said to be a judgment and is merely an interlocutory order against which no appeal has been provided. It is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel. A judgment has been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure which means the statement given by a judge on the grounds of a decree or an order. 5. If an order finally terminates the proceeding of a court that is a judgment. By the impugned order the Tribunal has ultimately dismissed the election petition and that, in my opinion, will amount to a judgment and is subject to an appeal the petitioner could file an appeal against that order before the District Judge. However, erroneous it may be, that in view of the alternative remedy available to the petitioner, it is not possible for me to interfere with the said order in a writ petition. 6. This application, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There shall however, be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.