ORDER J. S. Verma, J.- l. Petitioner Nos. 2 to 14 are employees 2 of the Inspectorate of Armaments, Khamaria, at Jabalpur. They are working in different capaeities as Assistant Foreman, Chargeman Grade I, Chargeman Grade II, Supervisor Grade II and Supervisor Grade III. An advertisement (Annexure A) dated 20-2-1977 has been issued by the Inspectorate of Armaments. Khamaria, Jabalpur, for filling the vacancies specified therein of Foreman, Assistant Foreman, Chargeman Grade I and II etc. by direct recruitment. The petitioners are aggrieved by the proposal to fill all these vacancies by direct recruitment and accordingly this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed substantially for the relief of quashing of this advertisement. 2. The petitioners case in substance is that the vacancies have to be filled by selection from two different sources, namely, direct recruitment and promotion in the ratio of 1/3rd and 2/3rd respectively, as provided in the rules applicable for this purpose. Their grievance is that filling of these vacancies only by direct recruitment is contrary to the rules applicable for this purpose. Several arguments detailed hereafter have been advanced in support of the petitioners' case. 3. It is common ground before us that the statutory rules applicable to the case, framed in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution by the President, are called the Department of Defence production (Directorate General of Inspection) Class III Non-gazetted (Technical, Scientific and other Non-ministerial) Posts Recruitment Rules, 1964'. The method of recruitment to the aforesaid posts, as laid down in these rules notified in S. R. O. 109 and amended by S. R. O. 320. reads as under:- "33/1-2% vacancies by direct recruitment failing which by promotion and 66/2-3% vacancies by promotion failing which by direct recruitment. " It is indeed the interpretation of the above extract from the rules laying down the method of recruitment from the two Sources which is the real question for decision in this petition. 4. The existing vacancies advertised for being filled in accordance with the advertisement (Annexure A), are detailed in Annexure B to the petition, as they existed in January 1978. These are all vacancies which were required to be filled by direct recruitment in accordance with the quota fixed in the rules for direct recruits. 4. The existing vacancies advertised for being filled in accordance with the advertisement (Annexure A), are detailed in Annexure B to the petition, as they existed in January 1978. These are all vacancies which were required to be filled by direct recruitment in accordance with the quota fixed in the rules for direct recruits. It is common ground that these vacancies remained unfilled and for the purpose of administrative convenience ad hoc appointments were made to them by promotion and some of the petitioners have been working by virtue of these ad hoc appointments. The petitioners rightly did not claim any right to the posts by virtue of ad hoc appointments by promotion. However, the main contention of the petitioners is that in accordance with the above requirements in the rules fixing the quota for filling the vacancies from two different sources. Namely, direct recruitment and promotion any vacancy which remained unfilled by direct recruitment for a period of one year became automatically available for being filled by promotion and it ceased to he a vacancy available for being filled by direct recruitmen1. The petitioners also contend that it is of no consequence that such vacancies still remained unfilled for want of any substantive appointment by promotion to these posts They claim that all such vacancies should now be filled only by promotion to which source the petitioners belong, and not by direct recruitment, even though they are vacancies which, according to the quota fixed by the rules, were required to be filled by direct recruitment. There is no dispute that the quota fixed by the rules for promotion has been made available to them and these vacancies pertain to the quota relating to direct recruits. The main question, therefore, is whether a deviation from the quota fixed by the rules can be made as claimed by the petitioners in order to fill all these vacancies now by promotion only, denying the same to the direct recruits to whose quota the vacancies belonged. 5. The main question, therefore, is whether a deviation from the quota fixed by the rules can be made as claimed by the petitioners in order to fill all these vacancies now by promotion only, denying the same to the direct recruits to whose quota the vacancies belonged. 5. In support of the petition, Shri Gulab Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, had advanced the following arguments: (1) the expression 'failing which ...' in the above extract from the rules means that if a vacancy relating to the quota of direct recruits cannot be filled by direct recruitment for any reason whatsoever at the end of the year in which the vacancy occurs, it gets released from the quota meant for direct recruits alone and becomes available for being filled only by a promotee; (2) in the alternative, there being no provision to carry forward any unfilled vacancy relating to the quota for direct recruits, all vacancies remaining unfilled at the end of the year get released with the result that all available vacancies at any time are required to be filled according to the 1/3rd and 2/3rd proportion provided in the rules and not only by direct recruits to whose quota they belong and (3) giving of seniority to direct recruits from the date of availability of vacancies and not from the dates of actual appointments in such cases, where appointments are made much later, would result in placing them above the promotees who have been given promotion earlier, in spite of the promotees having a longer period of continuous officiation. 6. The last contention of Shri Gupta can be disposed of at the very outset for the short reason that this question does not really arise in the present petition. No. such direct recruit, to whom such a benefit may have already been given as against the earlier promotees in substantive capacity is impleaded in this petition. Shri Gupta contends that this being the policy of the respondents, a decision on the point can be given in this very petition to ensure compliance subsequently when the occassion arises. In our opinion, it is not at all necessary to do so when such a grievance has not yet arisen. Shri Gupta contends that this being the policy of the respondents, a decision on the point can be given in this very petition to ensure compliance subsequently when the occassion arises. In our opinion, it is not at all necessary to do so when such a grievance has not yet arisen. This argument is based anticipating the possibility in future of giving the persons directly recruited in response to the advertisment (Annexure A) seniority from dates to which according to the petitioners, they would not be entitled. It is sufficient to say for the present that this situation can arise only subsequent to the selection made in pursuance of the impugned advertisement (Annexure A) and that selection has yet to be made. If the petitioners have any such grievance subsequently, the occuson would arise then to make such a challenge but that hypothetical situation cannot be visualised in this petition and for that reason there is no occasion to give any decision thereon. We accordingly express no opinion on the merits of the last contention raised by Shri Gupta, since that contention does not arise for decision in this petition. 7. The first contention of Shri Gupta is really the main contention in this petition, the second contention being merely an alternative argument. We shall, therefore, consider the first contention at this stage. This contention of Shri Gupta is based mainly on the decision in N K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat AIR 1977 SC 251 . It would, therefore, be appropriate to state the facts of N. K. Chauhan's case and the decision therein, before we proceed to examine the correctness of Shri Gupta's contention. 8. In N. K. Chauhan's case (supra), the dispute related to seniority inter se of Deputy Collectors appointed by direct recruitment in 1963 and those promoted as Deputy Collectors from the posts of Mamlatdars prior to them during the years 1960 to 1963 in excess of the quota fixed by the rules for the promotees. These promotee Deputy Collectors from 1960 to 1963 were appointed to substantive posts of Deputy Collectors prior to the appointment of the direct recruits in 1963. These were the two different sources for appointment of Deputy Collectors, namely, by direct recruitment and promotion. These promotee Deputy Collectors from 1960 to 1963 were appointed to substantive posts of Deputy Collectors prior to the appointment of the direct recruits in 1963. These were the two different sources for appointment of Deputy Collectors, namely, by direct recruitment and promotion. According to the rules applicable for the purpose, which provide for these two sources of appointment to the posts of Deputy Collectors either by direct recruitment or by promotion of suitable Mamlatdars, the ratio of appointment by direct recruitment and by promotion was 50: 50, 'as far as practicable'. These rules fixed the quota providing for half the vacancies to be filled by c1irect recruitment and the other half by promotion 'as far as practicable'. Significantly the rules did not provide for rotational or roster system, namely, that alternative vacancies were to go to the two different sources. The claim of seniority made by the later direct recruits over the earlier promotees appointed to substantive vacancies in excess of the quota meant for promotees was required to be decided on the basis of these rules. In that case such a deviation from the quota fixed by the rules had been made after the State Government had taken steps for filling the vacancies within the quota of direct recruits by direct recruitment but it failed in that attempt and, therefore, instead of resorting to the mode of making purely ad hoc promotions to carryon the work, the promo tees had been appointed to these unfilled vacancies in the quota meant for direct recruits by making substantive appointments of the available promo tees in excess of the quota meant for the promotees. It may also be mentioned that these rules were sub-sequantly amended in 1966 and the saving provision 'as far as practicable' was deleted with the consequence that deviation from the quota was no longer permissible thereafter and the quota was required to be adhered to rigidly. However, the claim of the direct requites of seniority over the earlier promotees appointed substantively in excess of the quota meant for promo tees were required to be decided according to the rules as they existed prior to the amendment in 1966. However, the claim of the direct requites of seniority over the earlier promotees appointed substantively in excess of the quota meant for promo tees were required to be decided according to the rules as they existed prior to the amendment in 1966. The claim of the direct recruits was rejected taking the view that the words 'as far as practicable' existing in the rules prior to the amendment in 1966 permitted the deviation when the attempt to fill the vacancies meant for direct recruits by direct recruitment had failed. The effect of the amendment made in 1965 was also considered for adjusting the seniority of Deputy Collectors who were governed by the amended rules from 1966. While deciding the case, certain principles were laid down by the Supreme Court which are summarised hereafter. 9. The main principles culled out from the decision in N.K. Chauhan's case are as under:- (1) while laying down quota when filling up vacancies in a cadre from more than one source, it is open to the Government to choose a year or other period of the vacancy by vacancy basis to work out the quota among the sources. (2) The 'quota' is not necessarily inter-locked with 'rota' so that where the former is expressly prescribed, the latter is implidly inscribed. The quota methodology may itself take many forms of which rota is only one but no the only mode and not an inevitable consequence of quota in earch case where quota is prescribed. (3) The quota rule does not inevitably involve the application of the rota rule. where rota does not apply even though quota has 10 be adhered to, later direct recruits appointed against their quota cannot claim 'deemed' dates of appointment for seniority in service with effect from time, according to rota or turn, the direct recruits' vacancy arose, to get seniority above earlier promotees appointed substantively to deficient vacancies This is because seniority, ordinarily, depends on the length of continuous officiating service and cannot be upset by late arrivals from open market save to the extent any excess promotee bas to be pushed down when permissible. (4) Where the requirement was to adher to the quota 'as far as practicable', a deviation from the quota was permissible where despite honest and serious effort it had become impracticable or not feasible to adhere to the quota. (4) Where the requirement was to adher to the quota 'as far as practicable', a deviation from the quota was permissible where despite honest and serious effort it had become impracticable or not feasible to adhere to the quota. (5) Where a deviation from the quota had become permissible in the above manner, it was permissible to either make ad hoc appointments from the other source till the vacancies could be filled from the source to which they belonged or make substantive appointments from the other available source without suffering the seats to lie indefinitely vacant, depending on the exigencies of administration. (6) A case for deviation from the quota having been made out and permitted by rules which contained the words 'as far as practicable', substantive appointments from the other available source, namely, promotees, was justified and, therefore, the later direct recruits could not claim seniority over the earlier promotees appointed substantively in this manner in excess of the quota meant for promotees. Quota without rota being prescribed by rules. (7) The absence of expression 'as far as practicable' or any similar expression indicates that a deviation from the quota is not permissible and the quota is required to be strictly adhered to. (8) Strict adherence to the quota requires that where substantive appointments from the other source have been made in excess of the quota meant for that source, the excess promotees have to be pushed down as against the later direct recruits who had been regularly appointed within their quota and to that extent appointment of these excess promotees is to be treated as temporarily invalid till the vacancies for their substantive appointment in their quota became available subsequently. (9) Where inextricable interlinking between 'quota' and 'rota' springs from the specific provision rather than by way of any general proposition the relative seniority between direct recruits and promotees should be determined according to the rotation of vacancies between the different sources. (10) The 'carry forward' rule has no relevance to a situation where two sources of recruitment are designated in a certain proportion and shortfalls occur in the one or the other category. In such a case, what is needed is conformity to the prescription of the proportion and no question of carrying anything forward strictly arises 10. (10) The 'carry forward' rule has no relevance to a situation where two sources of recruitment are designated in a certain proportion and shortfalls occur in the one or the other category. In such a case, what is needed is conformity to the prescription of the proportion and no question of carrying anything forward strictly arises 10. In the present case, we do not find that the petitioner can get any• assistance from the decision in N. K. Chauhan's case. The rule in the present case fixes the quota as 1/3rd for direct recruits and 2/3rd for promotees. No doubt, the rule permits a departure from the quota but that departure can be made only to the extent permitted therein. The words 'failing which' in the above quoted extract from the rules laying down the quota, show that the rules permit a departure from the quota and enable filling of the vacancies from the other sources only when attempt to fill the vacancies from the source for which they are meant, has failed. It is obvious that there can be no such failure to fill the vacancies from the source for which they are meant, unless a candid attempt has been made which has not been fruitful. In our opinion, the words 'failing which' require a more rigid adherence to the quota than the words 'as far as practicable' which came up for construction in N. K. Chauhan's case. The words 'failing which' necessarily imply at least an honest and serious attempt which remains unsuccessful. The making of an honest and serious effort, which does not succeed, was held to be a condition precedent even in Chauhan's case to permit a departure from the quota where the words 'as far as practicable' had been used in the rules. At any rate, the words 'failing which' used in the present case do not indicate that a more liberal departure from the quota has been contemplated so as to satisfy the condition precedent permitting a departure from the quota even without making an honest and serious effort which remains unsuccessful. It must, therefore, be held that the rules in the present case permit a departure only after an honest and serious effort has been made to fill the vacancies from the source for which they are meant and that attempt has ultimately failed. 11. It must, therefore, be held that the rules in the present case permit a departure only after an honest and serious effort has been made to fill the vacancies from the source for which they are meant and that attempt has ultimately failed. 11. In the present case, there is nothing to show that an honest and serious effort to fill the vacancies meant for the quota of direct recruits had been made and the same had failed. No such facts have been alleged or shown by the petitioners. On the other hand, it has been stated in the return that these vacancies meant for the quota of direct recruits had remained unfilled for certain technical reasons. Obviously this happened without any honest and serious attempt being made to fill the vacancies by direct recruitment. It is common ground that only ad hoc promotions had been made according to the exigencies of the administration to carryon the work and no substantive appointment by appointment of the promotees has yet been made to fill these vacancies meant for the direct recruits. It is, therefore, not even a case where substantive appointment of promotees in excess of their quota has already been made and filling of these vacancies now by direct recruits would have the effect of pushing down the promotees who have been substantively appointed. The question really is whether these unfilled vacancies belonging to the quota of direct recruits should be made available to the promotees alone and a departure should now be made for this purpose as claimed by the petitioners' no such departure from the quota having been made as yet. In short, the petitioner's claim is that these vacancies belonging to the quota of direct recruits having remained unfilled so far there being no attempt made to fill them by direct recruitments, they should now be released from I he quota meant for direct recruits and made available to the promotees alone. We do not find anything in the rules to justify such a course. 12. Shri Gupta strenuously urged that a year should be taken as the basis for working out the quota and no unfilled vacancy available in the quota should remain available in that quota for more than the year in which it occurs. We do not find anything in the rules to justify such a course. 12. Shri Gupta strenuously urged that a year should be taken as the basis for working out the quota and no unfilled vacancy available in the quota should remain available in that quota for more than the year in which it occurs. In the first place, there is no such requirement in the rules and then the question in the present case is that there being nothing to indicate that direct recruits are not available, is there any occasion to shut out the direct recruits from entry to the vacancies meant for that source and convert these available vacancies for being filled only by the promotees, when no substantive appointment of any promo tee against these vacancies has been made as yet? We do not think so. The return shows that the respondents have adopted the vacancy, by vacancy basis for working out the quota against which there is no prohibition in the rules and as held in N. K. Chauhan's case (supra), that is a permissible basis. It appears that the first attempt to fill these vacancies by direct recruitment, the source for which they are meant, has been made only by issuance of the impugned advertisement (Annexure A). That being so there is no reason to restrain the respondents from making this first serious attempt to fill the vacancies from the source for which they are meant in the quota rules. We do not find anything in Chauhan's case which requires adoption of the course suggested by the petitioners and, therefore, the first contention of Shri Gupta must be rejected. 13. The second contention of Shri Gupta, in the alternative, also has no force. This is really not a case of applying the 'carry forward' rule as suggested by Shri Gupta. Shri Gupta has placed reliance on T. Devadasan v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 179 , and State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas AIR 1976 SC 490 . Both these cases have been referred and distinguished in N. K. Chauhan's case (supra). It has been pointed out that apart from the fact that it is doubtful whether Devadasan's case survives the subsequent decision in N. M. Thomas's case, the rule of carry forward has no relevance to a situation where the whole cadre of a particular service is divided into two parts. It has been pointed out that apart from the fact that it is doubtful whether Devadasan's case survives the subsequent decision in N. M. Thomas's case, the rule of carry forward has no relevance to a situation where the whole cadre of a particular service is divided into two parts. It has also been pointed out that there is no application of the carry forward rule at all in situations where two sources of recruitments are designated in a certain proportion and short falls occur in one or the other category. In such a case what IS needed is conformity to the prescription of the proportion and no question of carrying anything forward strictly arises. This not being a case to which the 'carry forward' rule applies or in which the same has been adopted, this argument advanced by Shri Gupta does not really arise. The alternative contention of Shri Gupta is also, therefore, rejected. 14. We have earlier dealt with the last contention of Shri Gupta regarding fixation of seniority and pointed out that the same does not arise in the present petition. We may, however, add that as pointed out in N K. Chauhan's case (supra), the quota system does not necessitate the adoption of the rotational rule in practical application since quota can exist even without rota. In the rules applicable to the present case, quota has undoubtedly been prescribed but there is no indication that rota is inter-locked with it or that it is an inevitable consequence of the quota rule. In our opinion, the principle of rota cannot, therefore, be attracted in the present case and it is only the prescribed quota which has to be adhered to in the manner already pointed out by us. We are clarifying this position because this would become relevant in fixing the seniority of the direct recruits appointed hereafter. We have no doubt that this principle would be borne in mind by the respondents while fixing the seniority of the later direct recruits in relation to the earlier promotees appointed against substantive posts and not on ad hoc basis. In this connection, the settled rule reiterated in N K Chauhan's case that seniority normally is measured by the length of continuous officiating service has to be borne in mind. In this connection, the settled rule reiterated in N K Chauhan's case that seniority normally is measured by the length of continuous officiating service has to be borne in mind. Since no occasion has asisen to test the correctness of fixation of seniority with reference to any specific case, the appointments by direct recruitment being yet to be made, this matter need not detain us further. 15. Consequently the petition fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioners.