JUDGMENT M.P.Saxena 1. Sarvasri J. P., Nath, S. I., N. N. Singh, A. N. Shukla, P. K. Singh, A. K. Sharma and A. P.: Srivastava have filed this revision application against the judgment and order dated 17.4.1976 passed by Shri Prem Narain Roy, Illrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this revision application are that in October 1975 revisionist No. 1 was posted as a S.I. at police station Mutthiganj while the remaining revisionists were posted as Sales Tax Officers at Allahabad. On 22.10.1973 the opposite party filed a complaint in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad under Sections 147, 323, 504/506 and 426 I.P.C, alleging that there is a Azad Furniture Mart at 623, Tilak Road, BahadurGanj, Allahabad, which is owned by Mohammad Javid. The opposite party was a mechanic and one Rahim used to polish the furnitures. On 20.10.1975 Mohd. Javid had gone to Pratapgarh to see his ailing wife. In that night the revisionists came there and enquired about the whereabouts of Mohammad Javid. When he gave out that he had gone to Pratapgarh they forced him to give himself out as owner of the Furniture Mart. On his refusal to do so they beat him with kicks, fists and dandas. They stayed up to 12 in the night and then went away. The opposite party and Rahim got their injuries examined at the Moti Lal Nehru Hospital. This occurrence was witnessed by Babu Khan, Paras Nath and Mohd. Yaqub. He went to lodge a report but it was not taken down. The complainant filed copies of the injury reports also. The learned Magistrate examined the complainant under Section 200 CrPC and then recorded evidence under Section 202 Cr. P. C. He came to the conclusion that no prima facie case was made out against the revisionists and he dismissed the complaint and discharged the revisionists under Section 203 Cr.P. C. 3. The opposite party filed a revision which was disposed of by the IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad, by the impugned order. He came to the conclusion that the enquiry under Section 202 Cr. P. C. does not contemplate a thorough probe into the matter. The court has simply to feel satisfied that a prima facie case is made out. He came to the conclusion that the enquiry under Section 202 Cr. P. C. does not contemplate a thorough probe into the matter. The court has simply to feel satisfied that a prima facie case is made out. He also held that if it was really correct that the revisionists had inflicted injuries to Mohd. Kalim and Rahim, the question would arise whether the revisionists had done so while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. This question could not be decided unless some evidence was recorded and up to the stage the evidence under section 202 CrPC was recorded there was no material to hold that the complaint was barred by Section 197 CrPC. Accordingly he set aside the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate and directed him to take cognizance of the case and proceed according to law hence this revision application. 4. The main question for consideration is whether in the circumstances of this case sanction for prosecution under Section 197 Cr. P. C. was necessary. The relevant portion of Section 197 of the Code lays down as follows :- ' (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction : (a) In the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government: (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government." The expression "acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" has been the subject matter of discussion in a number of cases. In Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 44 the test for determining it was laid down in the following words :- "The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. What the court must find out is whether the act and the official duty arose inter related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation." 5. It was further observed that the question of sanction may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial enquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial may establish the necessity for sanction. 6. The same view was taken in the cases of Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 309 ; Som Chand Sanghvi v. Bibhuti Bhusan Chakravarty, AIR 1965 SC 588 ; Baij Nath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 220 . In B. P. Srivastaw v. N. P. Misra, AIR 1970 SC 1661 the Supreme Court after a resume of all the aforesaid cases observed : "The object and purpose underlying this section is to afford protection to public servants against frivolous, vexatious or false prosecution for offences alleged to have been committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. The larger interest of efficiency of State administration demands that public servants should be free to perform their official duty fearlessly and undeterred by apprehension of their possible prosecution at the instance of private parties to whom annoyance or injury may have been caused by their official duty. This section is designed to facilitate effective and unhampered performance of their official duty by public servant by providing for scrutiny into the allegations of commission of offence by them by their superior authorities and prior sanction for their prosecution as a condition precedent to the cognizance of the cases against them by the Courts. It is neither to be too narrowly construed nor too widely. It is neither to be too narrowly construed nor too widely. The narrow and pedantic construction may render it otiose for it is not part of an official duty and never can be to commit an offence. In our view, it is not the "duty" which requires examination so much as the "act" because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. One must also guard against too wide a construction because in our constitutional set up the idea of legal equality or of universal subjection of all citizens to one law administered by the ordinary courts has been pushed to its utmost limits by enshrining equality before the law in our fundamental principles. Broadly speaking, with us no man, whatever his rank or condition, is above the law and every official, from the highest down to the lowest is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen. In construing section 197, Cr.P.C. therefore a line has to be drawn between the narrow inner circle of strict official duties and acts outside the scope of official duties." The Supreme Court, therefore, laid down that it is quality of the "act" that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Code will be attracted. 7. In N. K. Aher v. H. G. Vartak, A. I. R. 1970 Bombay 385, it has been held that the scope of Section 197 cannot be widened without bearing in mind the limits and restrictions imposed by the provisions of the Constitution. The right of a citizen to have his grievances adjudicated by a competent civil or criminal court is a part of the fundamental right of equality before law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. Any fetters or restrictions on these; rights shall have necessarily to be construed strictly and when a class of officers is sought to be protected in derogation of these rights, the restrictions; are required to stand the test of reasonably being connected with the object for which section 197 is intended and enacted. 8. Any fetters or restrictions on these; rights shall have necessarily to be construed strictly and when a class of officers is sought to be protected in derogation of these rights, the restrictions; are required to stand the test of reasonably being connected with the object for which section 197 is intended and enacted. 8. Keeping these observations in mind it will be obvious that protection of Section 197 CrPC cannot be granted simply because the accused happens to be public servant. It is further to be; established that the act done by him had reasonable or close connection with the official duty. Applying this test to the: instant case it would be evident that; the revisionists were no doubt within their rights to inspect the Furniture Mart and to examine the account books etc. but it was not part of their duty to beat anyone unless they were resisted or assaulted. The revisionists were discharged after recording some evidence under Section 202 Cr. P. C; obviously the entire evidence has not been recorded so far and it cannot be said what facts will ultimately emerge. From the material so far available on the record it cannot be said that there was any justification for the revisionists to use force. A question would also arise whether they had actually beaten Mohammad Kalim or Rahim. Therefore, there is nothing on the record to apply the bar of Section 197 Cr. P. C. at this stage. The learned lower revisional court was correct in directing the Magistrate to proceed with the case:. It may, however, be made clear that the question of sanction may apply at any stage of the proceedings. The facts subsequently coming to light in this course of evidence at the trial may establish the necessity for sanction. As held in the case of Kaji Zalil Abbazi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1978 ACrR. 434 it would be open to the revisionists to show that the injuries, if any, were inflicted by them in the exercise of their duties, whenever that material is produced before the trial court during the course of the trial it will be open to the court to dismiss the complaint for want of requisite sanction. At this stage it cannot be done on the basis of the material on the record. At this stage it cannot be done on the basis of the material on the record. The learned counsel for the revisionists has also contended that according to the complainant himself the revisionists had gone for inspection of the workshop. Therefore, the revisionists were members of a lawful assembly and if any of them beat the complainant he would be personally liable for it. As the complainant does not show as to who had inflicted injuries none of the revisionists can be held guilty and from this point of view it was not worthwhile to send the case to the trial court. It is true that the revisionists had gone for inspection which was a part of their duty and in that connection they cannot be said to be members of an unlawful assembly but the question would still arise as to who had inflicted injuries, if any. if all the revisionists are found to have done so they would all be liable if they had no justification for it. If only some of them are found to have caused the injuries and their identity cannot be established, all the revisionists would get the benefit. Therefore, at this stage it will not be proper to express any opinion on this question. It can be adequately decided only when the entire evidence is brought on the record. For all these reasons the revision application has no force and is rejected. Revision rejected.