Judgment Banerjee, J. This appeal is against the judgment and order passed by the Sub-ordinate Judge, Maida, in a proceeding initiated under section 14 of the Arbitration Act. It appears that the respondent entered into an agreement bearing No. 8/66-67 between the Union of India and the Plaintiff-Corporation, namely, M/s. Construction & Trading Corporation having its office at 105, Park Street for the construction of Left Guide Bundh and Afflux Bundh of Farakka Barrage at Khejuriaghat. The letter of intent was issued on 30th March, 1966 and initial date of completion of work was fixed on 30th June, 1968 but the time for completion of work was extended from time to time upto 30th June, 1972. Payment was made by the Government to the respondent according to the agreed rates. The respondent Corporation made representation to the Union of India for enhancement of rates alleging increase of expediture caused by the non-availability of the entire land at a time, non-supply of machinery per agreement, delay in re-imbursement of toll charge, acute shortage of food grains in the locality and other incidental matters leading disruption of the entire planning and programme of work. In view of this representation, disputes and differences arose between the parties over revision of the agreed rates and the enhancement thereof and in terms of clause 23 of the Contract, the matter was referred to the arbitration of Sri A.K. Mitra as the sole arbitrator but as Mr. Mitra could not and did not arbitrate for administrative reasons. Mr. G.K. Dutta, Superintending Engineer, Planning and Designing Circle, was appointed at the sole arbitrator and the parties file before the sole arbitrator their claims and counterclaims. The claim of the plaintiff was based on the 67 Running Account Bills for Rs.72,55,422/-, being 50% of Rs.1,45,10,344/-. The Government denied the same and submitted that the increased payment as claimed was not tenable. The sole arbitrator finally made his award on 19th June, 1973 and allowed the claim of the respondent for Rs.35,14000/-. Thereafter the arbitrator fled the award to the Court Notices of the filing of the award were issued to the Parties. The appellants filed in the objection to the award on 23rd August, 1973 for setting aside the award, filed in the Court on 31st July, 1973 by the Arbitrator. Thereafter the arbitrator fled the award to the Court Notices of the filing of the award were issued to the Parties. The appellants filed in the objection to the award on 23rd August, 1973 for setting aside the award, filed in the Court on 31st July, 1973 by the Arbitrator. This application was verified and the verification is in the following terms :- I solemnly affirm that the statements made above are true to my knowledge and I put my signature to-day on it at my office. To this application for setting aside a award, a petition objection was filed by M/s. Construction & Trading Corporation on 8th November, 1973 stating therein, inter alia, some facts as to why the award should not be set aside. Against the said objection again a reply was filed on 23rd April, 1974 and in the matter of a petition for setting aside the award filed in Court on 31st July, 1973 by the Appellant, Union of India and to that against the reply was given by the Corporation on 25th July, 1974. On the basis of this objection filed, three issued were framed by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge whether the case has been made out for setting aside the award. The issued on the question as to as framed were as follows:- (1) Is any of the petitions of the defendant Government for setting aside of the award barred by limitation? (2) Is the award liable to set aside ? (3) Is the plaintiff-Corporation entitled to get a decree in accordance with the award? and (4) Should the interest be decreed on the award? It was held, inter alia, on the issued No. 1 that the Government's petition dated 23rd August, 1973 is within time but the second petition for setting aside the award filed on 23rd April, 1974 is barred by limitation and cannot be taken any notice of in the proceeding. On the first point, therefore, the learned Sub-ordinate Judge had that the first petition filed by the Government is within time. The application which was filed on 23rd April, 1974 is barred by limitation and therefore the said application cannot be taken notice of in the proceeding. In the view that we take, it is not necessary for us to discuss the other-facts in this appeal. The application which was filed on 23rd April, 1974 is barred by limitation and therefore the said application cannot be taken notice of in the proceeding. In the view that we take, it is not necessary for us to discuss the other-facts in this appeal. We must make it clear that we have not decided in this case the validity of the award for the reasons hereinafter stated. We are of the opinion that the learned Sub-ordinate Judge was wholly wrong in holding that the alleged petition filed on 23rd April, 1974 is barred by limitation as we are of the opinion that it is only a reply to the objection filed by the respondent to the initial objection for letting aside the award filed by the Union of India which wall admittedly within time. 2. Mr. B. Das and Mr. T.K. Basu, however, argued the learned petition is not an independent one but it is only a continuation of the proceeding for setting aside the award. The Union of India filed that application within time for setting aside the award setting, the grounds made therein. The second petition dated 23rd April, 1974 was a rejoinder to the objection filed by the respondent and certain facts were stated therein to controvert the allegation made in the re-joinder by the Corporation and also to give facts on which the grounds stated in the first petition dated 23rd August, 1973 are based. 3. Mr. R.C. Deb appearing for the respondent contended that the petition dated 23rd August, 1973 and the petition dated 23rd April, 1974 are independent petitions, and therefore the petition filed on 23rd April, 1974 is beyond 30 days and therefore is barred by limitation. Mr. Deb argued that the first petition filed by the appellant mist be rejected as no averment of fact is to be found in the first petition and therefore it is argued that the second petition filed on 23rd April, 1974 is barred by limitation under section 30 of the Arbitration Act. It is argued that the first petition has not been filed on affidavit and moreover it is argued that there is no fact which has been alleged in the first petition. 4. Mr. It is argued that the first petition has not been filed on affidavit and moreover it is argued that there is no fact which has been alleged in the first petition. 4. Mr. Deb relied upon the case reported in (1) A.I.R. 1951 Cal., 230, (2) A.I.R. 1956 Cal., 321 and contended, inter alia, that the additional ground cannot be permitted to be taken after the period of limitation. This proposition of law is well settled and the Supreme Court has also affirmed the same in the case reported in (3) A.I.R. 1967 S.C., 1233 (Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal) and (4) A.I.R. 1971 S.C., 1646 (Union of India v. Kalinga Construction Co.). 5. In the case reported in A.I.R. 1951 Cal., 230 (Ebrahim Kassam v. N.I. Oil Industries) it has been held by the Hon'ble Single Judge at paragraph 20 that the affidavit filed stating new ground in an application made thereon must be treated as a new application which was clearly barred by time. The case reported in (2) A.I.R. 1956 Cal., 321 (Saha & Co. v. Ishar Singh) does not answer the question raised in this proceeding. It appears, however, that the judgment of the majority of the Judges was that the expression 'set aside' has been used in the Arbitration Act in a wider sense and required that whenever an award is found fit to be removed it must be set aside. In our opinion, the case reported in (2) A.I.R. 1956 Cal., 321 (Saha & Co. v. Ishar Singh) is of no held to us. In the case reported in (3) A.I.R. 1967 S.C., 1233 (Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal) the Supreme Court considered the written statement filed as a valid application for setting aside the award. The case reported in (4) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1646 (Union of India v. Kalinga Construction Co.) is a case under the Arbitration Act wherein their Lordships help that in a judgment over arbitration award the Appellate Court cannot sit in appeal over the conclusion of the arbitrator. There cannot be any dispute about the proposition of law and the only point which is considered for the purpose of consideration of this case is whether the reply to the rejoinder after the application is made for letting aside the award is to be treated as new ground or continuation of the ground already indicated. There cannot be any dispute about the proposition of law and the only point which is considered for the purpose of consideration of this case is whether the reply to the rejoinder after the application is made for letting aside the award is to be treated as new ground or continuation of the ground already indicated. In our opinion, the subsequent application is not one of new ground but only an elucidation of some facts in support of the around already existed. In the case reported in (3) A.I.R. 1967 S.C., 1233 (Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal) it has been held by the Supreme Court that there is no special form prescribed for making such an application under section 30 of the Arbitration Act and in an appropriate case an objection to an award in the nature of a written statement may be treated as such an application if it is filed within the period of limitation. In the case before the Supreme Court, the objection was filed by way of written statement which was however filed more than 30 days after the notice and as such it was held that the written statement though may be treated as an application for setting aside the award as it was filed beyond 30 days, it is barred by limitation. 6. In so far as the proceeding under the Arbitration Act, 1940 is concerned, it is treated as Misc. Judicial Case under Civil Rules and Order framed by the High Court. Under Part II, Chapter XV, Item No. 9 Rules regarding Arbitration Act, 1940 are framed. In rule 314 sub-rule (3) it has been provided that every application made to a Court shall be verified in a manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure unless Court directs that it should be by affidavit. It is nobody's case that the Court directed to file an affidavit and hence the verification as made is quite valid. In the facts of the case, therefore, the argument of Mr. Deb that there is no averment and that the averment which are not supported by an affidavit cannot succeed and must fail. It is however true that in the first petition only grounds have been stated without giving the facts upon which the grounds can be supported when an objection was raised to the facts stated in the first petition. Deb that there is no averment and that the averment which are not supported by an affidavit cannot succeed and must fail. It is however true that in the first petition only grounds have been stated without giving the facts upon which the grounds can be supported when an objection was raised to the facts stated in the first petition. In the rejoinder all the facts in support of the first petition were stated. In our opinion, the application filed for letting aside the award and the objection filed by the Corporation and the rejoinder or rejoinders are continuous process. If the first application was filed within time, the averment made subsequent to the first application not raisins any new ground cannot be said to be barred by limitation. In our opinion, the first application and the rejoinder which stated some particular facts cannot be said to be a new around for setting aside the award. It is only a continuation of a proceeding on the grounds already stated and filed within the time allowed under the law. Mr. Deb as also Mr. Basu appearing for the parties strongly relied upon the case reported in (5) A.I.R. 1974 Cal., 345 (Union of India v. Ramesh Kumar). It appears in the facts of the said case that the application was filed for setting aside the award and therefore under the law there was no fact before the Court upon which the award may be set aside. The statements in the application have been verified as based on information from records. The Division Bench, however, hold that when the grounds were filed within the time and the facts have been averred subsequently but beyond the time it cannot be said that the said application under section 30 must be thrown out as barred by limitation. It appears, though for the purpose of limitation, the learned Judge held that the allegations of facts and the ground made for the first time in the defendant-Government's application dated 27th April, 1974 are barred by limitation, still in deciding the issue no. It appears, though for the purpose of limitation, the learned Judge held that the allegations of facts and the ground made for the first time in the defendant-Government's application dated 27th April, 1974 are barred by limitation, still in deciding the issue no. 2, the learned Judge relied upon the second petition of the Government to hold that the statement made in the first petition and in the rejoinder by the Corporation support the Corporation case or in the other words, for the purpose of limitation, the case of the Government was not considered, but finding on that issue no. 2 was made against the Government on the statements made in the said petition. In the circumstances, therefore, in our opinion, the judgment on award cannot be substained and must be quashed. We direct the learned Sub-ordinate Judie, Maida, to re-hear the matter in order to consider whether the award is liable to be set aside under section 30 of the Arbitration Act. We must make it clear that we have not considered the merits and de-merits of the a ward and all the questions, in so far as the validity of the award is concerned, are to be decided by the learned Subordinate Judge who would hear the matter. Our decision however is that the first petition alleging the grounds filed on 23rd August, 1973 is within time and the rejoinder not adding any new ground cannot be thrown away as barred by limitation. In our opinion, the rejoinder dated 23rd April, 1974 does not in any way add any new ground to the grounds already taken on 23rd August, 1973. It only states some facts upon which the Union of India wants to challenge the award as made by the arbitrator. 7. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The matter is remitted back to the Court below for re-hearing the same and for disposing of the same in accordance with law. 8. There will be no order as to costs. The oral prayer of Mr. Chakraborty for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused. As Mr. 7. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The matter is remitted back to the Court below for re-hearing the same and for disposing of the same in accordance with law. 8. There will be no order as to costs. The oral prayer of Mr. Chakraborty for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused. As Mr. Chakraborty prays for stay of the operation of this order remitting the case to the Court below in view of the fact that his client intends to prefer an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, we stay the operation of this order till six weeks after the long vacation. The certified copy, if applied for, be given as soon as practicable. Ray, J.: I agree.