S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision application is filed by the plaintiffs of Regular Civil Suit No. 36 of 1965 against defendants for recovery of the suit premises on the ground of sub-letting and arrears of rent. The suit of the plaintiffs having been dismissed by both the Courts below they have preferred the present revision application under sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act. ( 2 ) THE case of the plaintiffs is that they had let the suit premises to defendant No. 1 who is since deceased on a monthly rent of Rs. 60/for the ground floor and Rs. 20/for the upper floor in addition to the municipal tax and other taxes. That defendant No. 1 was in possession of the suit premises as a statutory tenant. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant did not pay rent regularly and was in arrears from 1 March 1965; that defendant No. 1 had sublet part of the premises to defendant No. 2 without the consent of the plaintiffs; that the plaintiffs by a notice dated and January 1966 demanded arrears of rent and taxes and terminated tenancy of defendant No. 1 and claimed possession of the suit premises. On the aforesaid grounds the said suit was filed by the plaintiffs in the Court of the Civil Judge (J D.) Kalol Dist. Mehsana. ( 3 ) ORIGINAL defendant No. 1 contested the suit by written statement Ex. 30 and contended that he was the tenant of the entire building consisting of three parts and the rent of three parts was Rs. 125/per month; that it was reduced to Rs. 121/at a later stage; that from 1-8-49 the rent of the entire building; was Rs. 30 and contended that he was the tenant of the entire building consisting of three parts and the rent of three parts was Rs. 125/per month; that it was reduced to Rs. 121/at a later stage; that from 1-8-49 the rent of the entire building; was Rs. 141 P. M. that he was ready and willing to pay the rent that the agreed rent was not the Standard rent and hence the standard rent was required to be fixed that the 2nd defendant was sublet part of the premises since prior to 21st May 1959 and hence his possession was protected and defendant No. 1 was not liable to be evicted on the ground of subletting that defendant No. 1 also resisted the plaintiffs claim of possession on the ground of arrears ofrent and contended that he was a tenant ready and willing to pay the rent and he was not liable to be evicted on that ground. Defendant No. 2 also contended that subletting in his favour was protected as he was a sub-tenant since 1943. ( 4 ) THE learned trial Judge after framing issues and recording evidence came to the conclusion that defendant No 1 was a tenant in are are for more than 6 months on the date of the suit but was ready and willing to pay the rent and hence he was not liable to be evicted under sec. 1 2 (3) (b) of the Act. It was further found that defendant No. 1 had not unlawfully sublet the suit premises and that defendant No. 1 had a right to create sub-lease. that the standard rent of the suit premises was fixed at Rs. 60/per month and on these findings the learned trial Judge was pleased to dismiss the plaintiffs suit for possession against the heirs of defendant No. 1 (who had died pending the suit) as well as against diffident No. 2 by his judgment and decree dated 9-12-1974. ( 5 ) THE petitioners challenged the said decree by filing Regular Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1975 before the District Court Mehsana. Pending the said appeal the petitioners filed an application for amendment of the plaint Ex. 11 on the record. By the said application the petitioners wanted to introduce averments regarding some subsequent event which had happened pending the suit. Pending the said appeal the petitioners filed an application for amendment of the plaint Ex. 11 on the record. By the said application the petitioners wanted to introduce averments regarding some subsequent event which had happened pending the suit. It was contended by the petitioners by the proposed amendment that pending the suit defendant No. 1 had tried to induct new sub-tenants who were sought to be joined as defendants 3 and 4 and it was requested that the plaintiff be permitted to put forward this new ground of alleged subletting by defendant No. 1 pending the suit in favour of the proposed defendants 3 and 4. That application came to be rejected by the. Learned appellate Judge on the ground that it rested on a new cause of action and hence it could not be granted. It was also held by the learned appellate Judge that the proposed amendment was belated and on that ground also it was liable to be rejected. Thereafter the appeal was heard on merits and the learned Joint Judge Mehsana came to dismiss the appeal having agreed with the findings of the learned trial Judge regarding subletting by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 as well as on the ground of arrears of rent. It was also found by the learned appellate Judge that the standard rent of the suit premises was Rs. 69/per month. thus agreeing with all the findings of the learned trial Judge the learned appellate Judge was pleased to dismiss the appeal. It is this appellate decree which is challenged by the plaintiffs by way of this revision application. ( 6 ) MISS V. P. Shah learned advocate appearing for the plaintiffs has raised the following submissions in support of her revision application. (1) that the learned appellate Judge had committed patent error of law in not passing the decree for possession on the ground of subletting by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2; (2) that in any case defendant No. 1 was liable to be evicted on the ground of arrears of rent and he could not be held to be a tenant ready and willing to payment; (3) that the lower appellate Court committed an error of law in confirming tae findings on the learned trial Judge regarding standard rent and that the standard rent should have been fixed at Rs. 80/per month. (4) that the lower appellate Court was in error in rejecting the amendment application given by the petitioners-plaintiffs at Ex. II and that it ought to have been granted and the matter ought to have been remanded. ( 7 ) MR. C. B. Nayak the learned advocate appeared for defendant No. 1 while Mr. G. P. Vyas learned Advocate appeared for defendant No. 2 and they have supported the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. I shall deal with the submissions of the plaintiffs in the same sequence in which they wore raised before me. ( 8 ) SO far as the first submission of Miss Shah is concerned it was contended that defendant No. 1 had illegally sublet the suit premises to defendant No. 2 and hence the decree for possession ought to have been passed in favour of the plaintiffs on that ground. It is difficult to accept his submission of Miss Shah It has been clearly established on record that the original lease was created by the plaintiffs in favour of defendant No. 1 by rent note Ex 86 and the rent was payable with effect from 1 It was a lease for 3 period of 12 months and before the lease came to expire by efflux of time defendant No. 1 sublet part of the premises viz. pan shop and some portion over it to defendant No. 2 under the lease deed Ex. 211 dated 8-2-43. It would be obvious that at the relevant time there was no bar against sub-letting as we find in the Act. Thus sub-tenancy with effect from 1-2-43 could not be found fault with by the petitioners. Even otherwise such a sub-lease in favour of the 2nd defendant by defendant No. 1 could be clearly protected by the Ordinance of 1959. It was a sublease in favour of 2nd defendant since 1943 and it was clearly prior to the amendment-Ordinance of 1959 and hence such subletting was deemed not to have bad any effect and hence plaintiffs were not entitled to recover possession of the premises on the ground of unlawful subletting by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2. It was clearly protected by the said Ordinance and consequently the plaintiffs were not entitled to any decree for possession on the ground of alleged subletting and the plaintiffs suit on that ground was rightly dismissed by both the Court below. ( 9 ) MISS Shahs second submission was that in any case the petitioners would be entitled to possession on the ground of arrears of rent. Now it transpires from the record that the 1st defendant was in arrears of rent much prior to the time when suit notice Ex. 861 was served upon defendant No. 1. Thus the main ingredient of sec. 12 (3) (a) was satisfied viz. that at the time of service of notice defendant No. 1 was in arrears of rent for more than six months. However the said provision cannot he pressed in service by the plaintiffs for the simple reason that the plaintiffs demanded municipal taxes in the said notice. Admittedly municipal tax was not payable by month and hence the case as taken out of who operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act as held by this Court in the case of MEHESHWARI MILLS (MOHANLAL V. MAHESHWARI MILLS LTD) 3 G. L. R. 574 which has been later approved by the Division Bench of this Court consisting of A. D. Desai and M C. Trivedi JJ. in C. R. A. No. 459/70 decided on 2 Miss Shah thereafter submitted that in any case defendant No. I was liable to be evicted under sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. But the said submission is also liable to be rejected as it has been clearly established on the record that the dispute as to the standard rent as resolved by the learned trial Judge for the first time in the judgment when issue No. 5 was decided and Rs. 60/per month was fixed as the standard rent. The tenant went on depositing various amounts in the trial Court and by the time the judgment was delivered by the trial Court the tenant had deposited an amount of Rs. 9484. Now calculating the amount of rent at the rate of Rs. 60/p. M. as fixed by the learned trial Judge the amount of Rs. 6060/was due by way of arrears of rent till the date of the trial Courts judgment while the deposited amount came to Rs. 9484. 00. 9484. Now calculating the amount of rent at the rate of Rs. 60/p. M. as fixed by the learned trial Judge the amount of Rs. 6060/was due by way of arrears of rent till the date of the trial Courts judgment while the deposited amount came to Rs. 9484. 00. The said amount was sufficient not only to Cover arrears of rent till 9 but even till the date of the appellate Court decree i. e. 20-6-77 as the appellate Court decided the appeal on 1-7-77. The total claim made by the plaintiffs worked out to Rs. 8794/while the tenant had deposited in the Court ar amount of Rs. 9434/which was far in excess of the rent which would fall due in future and the said deposit would cover by way of advance deposit the amount of rent which was to fall due even during the pendency of the appeal. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that defendant No. 1 had not complied with the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. Faced with this difficulty Miss Shah submitted that in any case there was short payment at the date of the framing of the issues which was the date of the first hearing and therefore sec. 12 (3) (b) was not complied with. Now this submission of Miss Shah cannot be countenanced for the simple reason that the issue of standard rent was not taken up as a preliminary issue. No interim rent was fixed in the trial Court and the trial Court for the first time resolved the dispute of the standard rent in its judgment and hence following the ratio in the case of NANJI PANCHA V. DAULAL 11 G. L. R. 285 it would be obvious that the tenant could not be said to be not complying with the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act and it cannot be said that the tenant had forfeited its protection. In that view of the matter no decree can be passed against defendant No. 1 for possession on the ground of arrears of rent and hence it must be held that the plaintiffs suit for possession has been rightly dismissed by both the Courts below on the ground of arrears of rent. In that view of the matter no decree can be passed against defendant No. 1 for possession on the ground of arrears of rent and hence it must be held that the plaintiffs suit for possession has been rightly dismissed by both the Courts below on the ground of arrears of rent. ( 10 ) THE next submission of Miss Shah was that in any case both the Courts below had committed a patent error of law in fixing the standard rent of the suit premises at Rs. 60/per month. The submission of Miss Shah in this regard was that by a rent note Ex. 86 dated 26-1-43 the suit premises were let to defendant No. 1 at the rate of Rs. 121/per month. Admittedly the suit premises were business premises. At the relevant time in 1943 the premises were situated in the territory forming part of Ex-Baroda State. The rent of Rs. 121/was fixed for three properties described in the suit rent note inclusive of the suit premises; that for the remaining two properties separate litigation was taken out by the landlord wherein the standard rent was fixed by the Court at Rs. 61/per month. The rent of all the three properties was raised from Rs. 121 to Rs. 141/p. M. The learned appellate Judge has noted that the said increase was made with effect from 1-8-49. This finding of the learned appellate Judge has been strongly assailed by Miss Shah. [his Lordship after discussing the contention about the standard rent further observed. ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 11 ) THE learned appellate Judge has found from the evidence on record that the rent was increased from Rs. 121 to Rs. 141 p. m. only from 1 In this context it is necessary to refer to the relevant evidence on record. So far as the plaintiff is concerned she has not examined herself but one Chandubhai Ex. 13 who was managing the affairs of the plaintiff property has been examined. He had no personal knowledge about the period when the rent was increased from Rs. 121 to Rs. 141. So far as the plaintiff is concerned she has not examined herself but one Chandubhai Ex. 13 who was managing the affairs of the plaintiff property has been examined. He had no personal knowledge about the period when the rent was increased from Rs. 121 to Rs. 141. In para 18 of his deposition he had clearly stated that he had no personal knowledge about what had taken place prior to the time when he came into management and that he actually came into management since 1953. On his own admission he had no information or knowledge about what passed between the plaintiff and the defendant prior to 1953 the plaintiff herself had not stepped in the witness box. In that view of the matter it is clear that so far as the plaintiff is concerned there is total absence of evidence to show as to when the rent was increased from Rs. 121 to Rs. 141 p. m. It cannot be forgotten that the rent of shop premises as it was charged on 1-1-44 would be the standard rent as per the provisions of sec. 10a of the Act as applicable to the merged State of Baroda. Miss Shah wanted to place reliance on the proviso to sec. 10a. It is necessary to reproduce the said provision in its entirety to appreciate the submission of Miss Shah. "application of the Act to the Merged States. By virtue of sec 3 of the Bombay Merged States (Laws) Ordinance VI of 1949 which came into force on 1-1-1950and the Bombay Act IV of 1950 the Bombay Rent Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act LVII of 1947 has been extended to and is in force in the merged States and has been amended in its application to the State of Baroda in the manner setforth as hereunder :-Enactment Name of State the Bombay Rents Hotel baroda and Baroda Lodging house Rates Control Act 1947- bombay Act LVII of 1947 amendments- amendment of Sec. 5: For clause (10 of sec 5 the following shall be substituted.- " (10) "specified date" means (a) in case of any premises let for the purpose of residence the first day of January 1943 and (b) in case of any premises let for nonresidential purpose the first day of January 1944. (10a) standard rent in relation to any premises let for the purpose of residence or for non-residential purpose means (a) where the standard rent is fixed by the House Rent Control Order 1947 made by the Baroda Government such standard rent or (b) where the standard rent is not so fixed subject to the provisions of sec. 11 (i) the rent at which the premises were let on the specified date or (ii) where they were not let on the specified date the rent at which they were last let before that date or (iii) where they were first let after the specified date the rent act which they were first let or (iv) in any of these cases specified in sec. 11 the rent fixed by the Court. PROVIDED that an increase in rent made in operation immediately before the 30th day of July 1949 in accordance with the provision of the said House Rent Control Order 1947 shall be deemed to be included in the standard rent. Amendment to secs. 7 11 and 18. In sec. 7 11 and 18 of the said Act for the words and figures the first day of September 1940 wherever they occur the words the specified date shall be substituted. "thus the Bombay Rent Act as applied to the territories of the Ex-Baroda State stood amended and the amendments were in respect of sec. 5 (10) wherein the specified date was amended for Ex-Baroda State territory and sec. 5 (10a) was also inserted as reproduced above. ( 12 ) MISS Shah relied on the proviso to sec. 5 (10a) which stated that an increase in rent made ill operation immediately before the 30th day of July 1949 in accordance with the Provisions of the said House Rent Control Order 1947 should be deemed to be included in the standard rent. Miss Shahs contention was that whatever may be the standard rent of the business premises as on 1-1-44 or as per the provisions of sec. 5 the landlord was entitled to make increase in the rent as per the provisions of the House Rent Control Order 1947 hereinafter referred to as the control order. Both the sides have referred me to the Baroda House Rent Control Order 1947 which by clause 2 (4) and sub-clause (25 did provide for permissible increase of the standard rent by the landlord. Both the sides have referred me to the Baroda House Rent Control Order 1947 which by clause 2 (4) and sub-clause (25 did provide for permissible increase of the standard rent by the landlord. For the sake of convenience said clause (4) and sub-clause (25) are reproduced as under:-" (4) specified date means- (a) In a case of the house let for the purpose of residence the first day of January 1943. (b) In the case of a house let for non-residential purposes the first day of January 1944"" (25) Increase of rent for houses let for business or factories:- Where a house is let for the purpose of a business profession or shop or for the purpose of a factory as defined in the Factories Act 1943 an increase of rent for such house by the landlord shall not be deemed to be an increase for the purpose of clause 3 if the amount of the increase does not exceed fifty percent of the standard rent. PROVIDED that nothing in this clause shall apply to a house let to a public trust or a charitable institutions. "the clause 4 was further amended by amendment Act No. 1 of 1949 which was published in the Baroda Gazette on 17th March 1949. By virtue of this amendment clause 4 stood as under:-"where any premises are let before or on the specified date for the purpose of a business profession or shop or for the purposes of a factory as defined in the Factory Act 1940 an increase of rent for such house by the landlord after a written notice of two months shall not be deemed to be an increase for the purpose of Clause 3 of the amount of the increase does not exceed fifty percent of the standard rent. . . . "it was the contention of Miss Shah that the landlord was entitled to an increase of 50% and hence increase from Rs. 121 to 141 per month was within the permissible limit of clause 4 and that was according to the provisions of the Control Order and therefore proviso to sec. 5 (10a) squarely applied to the facts of the present case. Now sec. 5 (10) shows what would be the standard rent. As per sec. 121 to 141 per month was within the permissible limit of clause 4 and that was according to the provisions of the Control Order and therefore proviso to sec. 5 (10a) squarely applied to the facts of the present case. Now sec. 5 (10) shows what would be the standard rent. As per sec. 5 (10a) (ii) the specified date was 1-1-44 for the business premises and as the present premises were let on 1-2-43 as per rent note Ex. 86 prior to that date i. e. 1 at the rate of Rs. 121/per month prima facie that would be the standard rent. If Miss Shah wanted to establish her case of 50% increase being within the permissible limit as per clause (10a)) the burden would be surely on the landlord to put forward all the material for attracting the said proviso. As stated above the plaintiff had led no positive evidence to show as to when the rent was increased from Rs. 121 to Rs. 14/per month. A mere glance at the aforesaid proviso to sec. 5 (10a) will show that before rent can be increased upto 50% it must be established that the increase in the rent was made before 30-7-49 and it must be in operation immediately before that date. In the present case as stated above the lower appellate Court on the facts has found that the increase from Rs. 121 to Rs. 141 was made on 1-8-49 and not prior thereto. It is a pure finding of fact as I have reproduced the evidence of the plaintiff there is no indication so far as this relevant fact is concerned as to when the rent was increased from Rs. 121 to Rs. 141/p. m. Instead the defendant at Ex. 178 in para 3 of his examination in chief has clearly stated that from 1-8-49 the rent was increased to Rs. 141 for the three houses and Chandulal Chaturbhai was collecting rent at that-time. There was no effective cross-examination to the said averment of defendant No. 1. That statement on oath of defendant remained uncontroverted. Miss Shah as only attempt was to spell put clear-cut admission on the part of defendant No. 1 in the written statement Ex. 13 which 4as no relevance in the present case. Hence Miss Shah could not avail of the so called clear cut and categorical admission of defendant No. 1. That statement on oath of defendant remained uncontroverted. Miss Shah as only attempt was to spell put clear-cut admission on the part of defendant No. 1 in the written statement Ex. 13 which 4as no relevance in the present case. Hence Miss Shah could not avail of the so called clear cut and categorical admission of defendant No. 1. It is also shown that there is no such clear cut admission on the part of defendant in Ex. 13 as tried to be suggested by Miss Shah. Under the circumstances if the oral evidence of defendant No. 1 is believed by the learned appellate Judge and the learned trial Judge as Courts of facts and if they come to the conclusion that the evidence on record established that the rent was increased to Rs. 141 with effect from 1-8-49 the said finding of fact cannot be taken exception to by Miss Shah at this revisional stage. In any case it is not possible for me to reverse such a pure finding of fact which is fully established on the evidence on record. Once it is found that the increase was made from Rs. 121 to Rs. 141 from 1-8-1949 the proviso to sec. 5 (10a) goes out of picture because according to the proviso the increase must have been made before 3u-7-1949. It is true that the lower Court has held that the increase was not made according to the provisions of the Baroda Order. The said finding is not totally accurate. The increase which is permissible by the Baroda Order as per clause 4 did not require sanction of the competent authority and that the landlord-tenant could themselves enter into such an agreement within the permissible limits of clause 4. Mr. Nayak the learned Advocate appearing for the defendant went to the other extreme by submitting that under the proviso to sec. 5 (10a) the increase must have been made immediately before 30-7-1949 and any increase made in past even assuming that it is made in 1946 would be meaningless. This extreme contention of Mr. Nayak cannot be countenanced. The proviso to sec. 5 (10a) requires that whenever the increase may have been made such increase must be in operation before 30-7-1949. Mr. Nayaks contention that the increase should be made immediately before 30-7-1949 cannot be accepted. Mr. This extreme contention of Mr. Nayak cannot be countenanced. The proviso to sec. 5 (10a) requires that whenever the increase may have been made such increase must be in operation before 30-7-1949. Mr. Nayaks contention that the increase should be made immediately before 30-7-1949 cannot be accepted. Mr. Nayak tried to submit that the permissible increase of 50% of rent could be made according to the provisions of the Baroda Order immediately before 30-7-1949 and by that time the provisions of clause 4 of the said Baroda Order had stood amended by the amendment No. 1 of 1949 referred to above which was brought into force on 17th March 1949 and as per the said amendment a further fetter was imposed on the landlords right to increase rent and it was provided that before increasing the rent notice of two months was required to be served on the tenant and as this procedure was admittedly not carried out by the landlord the increase cannot be said to be as per the provisions of the Baroda Order. It is difficult to accept this submission. On an assumption that the increase was made in 1946 when the Baroda Order of 1947 was brought on the statute book the said increase was there and at that time clause 4 was in an unamended form. As per this unamended clause 4 increase would be squarely covered as permissible increase and there was nothing in the later amendment of 1949 to show any retrospective effect. If the increase was proper-ly made as per clause 4 of Baroda Order at the relevant time it would not become illegal because of the later amendment of clause 4 by which on 17-3-1949 other procedure was provided and a condition was imposed that two months notice was required to be given by the landlord to the tenant before such increase could be made as per the permissible increase limit of clause 4 of the said Baroda Order. It is not that the increase should also be made immediately before 30-7-1949. If that contention was accepted any increase made according to the Baroda Order of 1947 say on 28 would not be covered by that proviso because it can be urged that it is not immediately before 30-7-49 as 29th had intervened. Such an extreme contention of Mr. Nayak cannot be accepted. If that contention was accepted any increase made according to the Baroda Order of 1947 say on 28 would not be covered by that proviso because it can be urged that it is not immediately before 30-7-49 as 29th had intervened. Such an extreme contention of Mr. Nayak cannot be accepted. On a reasonable construction of the proviso to sec. 5 (10a) it can be said that what the proviso contemplated was that the increase should be made as per the existing provisions of the Baroda Order 1947 and such an increase must be in force immediately before 30-7-1949 meaning thereby that such an increase should not have been withdrawn on that day. But this discussion will be of no avail to the plaintiff for the simple reason that there is a pure finding of fact reached by the appellate Court and which is consistent with the evidence on record that the increase was made on 1-8-49. It was neither before 30-7-49 nor was it in operation on that day and hence the contention of Miss Shah that the landlord was entitled to an increase of rent from Rs. 121 to 141 per month as per the provisions of sec. 5 (10a) proviso cannot be sustained. Consequently the rent would remain as Rs. 121 per month as the standard rent for all the three properties covered by the rent note. For the other two properties the standard rent was already fixed at Rs. 61 per month and thereafter the standard rent of the suit premises would be Rs. 60/p. m. and that is how both the courts below fixed the standard rent and I see no reason to differ from the said finding of both the Courts below especially when the petitioner-landlady has failed to make out a case for getting the benefit of sec. 5 (10a) of the Act as applicable to the Baroda State territory as discussed by me above. Consequently the third contention of Miss Shah fails and is therefore rejected. ( 13 ) THAT takes me to the last contention of Miss Shah namely that the lower appellate court had apparently erred in rejecting her amendment application. Miss Shah submitted that certain events had happened during the pendency of the suit in the trial Court and they were required to be pleaded as additional grounds for obtaining relief of possession by the plaintiff. Miss Shah submitted that certain events had happened during the pendency of the suit in the trial Court and they were required to be pleaded as additional grounds for obtaining relief of possession by the plaintiff. That application to amend the plaint was given at Ex. 11 in C. A No. 9 of 1975. The said application was presented to the Court in appeal much before the date of hearing. By this application Ex. 11 in appeal the plaintiff-petitioners wanted to introduce certain averments in the plaint alleging that defendant No. 1 had entered into fresh subletting in favour of defendants 3 and 4 who were sought to be joined as parties and that this act of defendant No. 1 was found out pending the suit and these events which had come into existence pending the suit entitled the plaintiffs to urge this additional ground for the relief of possession. The said amendment application was resisted by the defendants and the learned District Judge by his order dated 28-1-77 was pleased to dismiss the said amendment application. Miss Shah has contended that the dismissal of this amendment application involved patent error of law on the part of the appellate Court. A glance at the order of the learned District Judge below Ex. 11 shows that the appellate Court mainly relied on two grounds for rejecting the said amendment application. One was that even though the alleged events had taken place pending the suit the plaintiffs did not think it proper to make an amendment application in the trial Court itself; that the alleged sub-letting had taken place on 11-3-69 while the suit was disposed of by the trial Court on 9 That for a period of 5 years the suit was pending on the file of the learned trial Judge and the plaintiff did not think it proper to seek an amendment before the trial Court and hence amendment application as filed in the appellate Court was grossly belated. The second ground put forward by the learned appellate Judge for rejecting the amendment application was that it introduced a new cause of action which was required to be processed by way of a separate suit and could not be joined in the present suit. The second ground put forward by the learned appellate Judge for rejecting the amendment application was that it introduced a new cause of action which was required to be processed by way of a separate suit and could not be joined in the present suit. I have heard the learned Advocates on this aspect and I find that both the grounds advanced by the learned District Judge for rejecting amendment application are not tenable in law. It is pertinent to note that even though the alleged sub-lettings in favour of the proposed defts. 3 and 4 were said to have taken place in 1969 the evidence which was permitted to be led in the trial court clearly allowed that the plaintiff was permitted to lead evidence also on these subsequent events of fresh sub-letting as alleged by her. The learned trial Judge could have prevented the plaintiff from leading that evidence on the ground that there was no pleading in which eventuality the plaintiff would have certainly been required to apply for amendment. But the learned trial Judge himself permitted the plaintiff to lead all evidence regarding the sub-letting in 1969 by deft. No. 1. Once the trial court permits a party to lead evidence regarding subletting based on a subsequent event a reasonable impression would be caused in the mind of the party that whatever be the state of pleadings the Court is going to decide this question and hence the party would not be called upon to apply for amendment. If the trial court had not permitted such irrelevant evidence the plaintiff could have certainly applied for amendment in trial Court. Thus inaction on the part of the trial court cannot be pressed in service against the plaintiffs for rejecting the proposed amendment especially when the trial court itself has permitted the plaintiff to lead evidence on the ground of subsequent sublettings and it is this which appears to have misdirected the plaintiff. It is only at the of waiting judgment that the learned trial judge observed in para of his judgment that the record was unnecessarily burdened by producing evidence by the plaintiff to the effect that the premises were also sublet to Mysore Cafe. Thus it is only when the Judgment was delivered that it became known to the plaintiff that this evidence has not been considered in the absence of proper pleadings. Thus it is only when the Judgment was delivered that it became known to the plaintiff that this evidence has not been considered in the absence of proper pleadings. It is pertinent to note that when the evidence was led in the trial court about alleged subletting subsequent to the suit no objection was raised by defendant No. 1 regarding the introduction of such evidence in the absence of pleading. Thus every one seemed to be under a bona fide misimpression and every one seemed to have thought that such evidence could go in and it is only at the stage of judgment when the learned trial Judge observed that this evidence was irrelevant and could not be considered that it became necessary to apply for amendment. That exactly the plaintiff seems to have done. She filed an appeal and at the earliest opportunity filed an amendment application Ex. 11 before the appellate Court. This delay in the background of the facts as stated cannot be considered to be fatal to the plaintiffs case. Even otherwise it is well settled that mere delay is no ground for rejecting amendment application Under Order 6 Rule 17 of the C. P. C. amendment can be granted provided it does not cause any prejudice to the other side and such amendment can be granted even in second appeal. Consequently the finding of the learned trial Judge that the amendment should be rejected on the ground of delay cannot be sustained. ( 14 ) THE second ground put forward by the learned appellate Judge for rejecting the amendment application is that it introduces a new cause of action. With respect to the learned appellate Judge it is not so. In a suit for possession between a landlord and a tenant the cause of action arises on service of notice terminating the tenancy. The rest are all grounds for possession as required by sec. 12 or 13 of the Act. Adding one more ground to the same cause of action cannot be said to be a change of cause of action. It is now well settled that pending the suit between a landlord and tenant for possession after the notice terminating tenancy any number of grounds can be added if they are based on subsequent events which had occurred after the filing of the suit. In ZAINAB BAI V. NAVYUG CHITRAPAT CO. LTD. It is now well settled that pending the suit between a landlord and tenant for possession after the notice terminating tenancy any number of grounds can be added if they are based on subsequent events which had occurred after the filing of the suit. In ZAINAB BAI V. NAVYUG CHITRAPAT CO. LTD. A. I. R. 1969 BOMBAY 194 lawsuits Nain has clearly held that in a suit for ejectment of tenant filed on certain grounds subsequent addition of fresh ground in the plaint does not change the nature of suit and therefore amendment of plaint by adding fresh ground was permissible. The learned Judge has further observed placing reliance on a Privy Council judgment in I. L. R. 16 Cal. 98 and a Bombay Judgment in A. I. R. 1954 Bom. 91 that the cause of action for a suit for eviction of a tenant was the termination of his tenancy. It was not necessary for a landlord to set out any of the conditions in sec. 13 termed as grounds of ejectment in the notice to quit as they were not a part of the cause of action of the landlord. The landlord sets out these grounds in the plaint not because they constitute his cause of action but in anticipation of the tenant claiming the protection provided in sec. 12 to show that conditions have arisen which have taken away the protection of the tenant and removed the impediment in the way of the landlord recovering possession. I am in complete agreement with the aforesaid view expressed by the learned Judge. In fact this Court has also consistently taken this view. There is an unreported judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Bhagwati (as he then was) in C. R. A. 451 of 1960 decided on 22th September 1960 wherein the learned Judge took the view that in a suit for possession by a landlord against the tenant on the ground of arrears of rent if it is found that pending the suit the conduct of the tenant bad caused nuisance such ground can be added in the plaint by an amendment and it does not alter the cause of action. Thus it is clear that the learned appellate Judge was in error in rejecting the amendment application on the ground that it sought to change the cause of action. In fact the cause of action remains the same. Thus it is clear that the learned appellate Judge was in error in rejecting the amendment application on the ground that it sought to change the cause of action. In fact the cause of action remains the same. Fresh ground of subletting was sought to be added in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Such an amendment ought to have been granted. ( 15 ) MR. Nayak for defendant No. 1 submitted that the plaintiff has already filed Regular Civil unit No. 129 of 1977 in the Court of the Civil Judge (J. D) Kalol and has put forward the ground which she wanted to introduce by way of an amendment as per application Ex. 11 and now that the suit has already been filed it would not be proper to allow such an amendment which would be a sheer duplication. Miss Shah submitted that she undertakes on behalf of her client to withdraw the aforesaid suit if the amendment application Ex. 11 was Granted by this Court. Thus the apprehension of Mr. Nayak that there would be multiplicity of proceedings and confusion arising for defendant No. 1 will no longer survive I therefore set aside the order of the learned District Judge Mehsana dated 28 below Ex. 11 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1975 and allow the proposed amendment as per Ex. 11. Consequently the decrees of both the Courts will be set aside and the suit will have to be remanded to the trial Court with a direction to the learned trial Judge to restore it to fie in its original number and to decide the suit tn the light of the attended plaint and the controversy arising therefrom. Miss Shah has already undertaken to withdraw the R. C. S. No. 129 of 1977 as the controversy that has been raised therein will be decided on remand by the learned trial Judge. The plaintiff therefore shall accordingly withdraw R. C. S. No. 129/77. It is further directed that the plaintiff shall carry out the proposed amendment as per Ex. 11 pursuant to this order within a fortnight from the receipt of the writ by the trial Court and its intimation to the plaintiff. The plaintiff therefore shall accordingly withdraw R. C. S. No. 129/77. It is further directed that the plaintiff shall carry out the proposed amendment as per Ex. 11 pursuant to this order within a fortnight from the receipt of the writ by the trial Court and its intimation to the plaintiff. Thereafter defendant No. 1 and 2 will be permitted to file their additional written statement in the light of the amended plaint of the plaintiff of course limited to the averments which are introduced by the plaintiff by way of amendment as per Ex. 11 and the newly added defendants will be entitled to file their written statements and thereafter the learned trial Judge after framing proper additional issues that way arise consequent to this amendment shall proceed to decide these additional issues only in the light of the evidence that may be led by the parties on those newly framed issues. Thus the learned trial Judge shall decide the remanded suit only on the newly added issues. It is needless to say that the findings of both the Courts on the existing issues have been maintained in their entirety and shall not he reopened. ( 16 ) IN the result this revision application is accordingly allowed and the. rule is made absolute to this limited extent with no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case. Orders accordingly. Application allowed. .