JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for recovery of Rs. 1744.67 P. with pendente lite and future interest. 2. The plaintiff is a co-operative society. According to the plaint allegations, the defendant was employed as a sales-manager on 1st March, 1954 on the plaintiffs retail depot at Sikandra; the position of the defendant was that of an agent; that there was a fire in the night of 27th/ 28th May, 1958, whereafter it was discovered on enquiry set up by Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, that the defendant had made incorrect entries in the stock register, with the result that goods of the value of Rs. 1744.67 P. were not accounted for by the defendant in the accounts maintained by him. The report of the enquiry made by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, was dated 28th June, 1959 and the plaintiff came to know of the defendants misconduct from that report. The defendant was asked to make good the value of the goods not accounted for. He failed to do so. Hence, the suit for recovery of Rupees 1744.67 p. along with interest at the rate of 1 per cent per mensem amounting to Rs. 255/- up to the date of the suit. 3. The defendant denied the plaintiffs allegations. One of the pleas taken by him was of limitation. 4. By a judgment dated 21st March, 1964, the learned Munsif, who first tried the suit dismissed it as barred by time. He did not specify the article of the Indian Limitation Act under which he found the suit to be barred by time. He only observed that the plaintiff came to know of the defendants misconduct in the month of May, 1958, and the suit was filed on April 17, 1962 and that it was, therefore, clearly, filed after three years of the misconduct becoming known. He only observed that the plaintiff came to know of the defendants misconduct in the month of May, 1958, and the suit was filed on April 17, 1962 and that it was, therefore, clearly, filed after three years of the misconduct becoming known. The learned counsel for the parties have explained that the learned Munsif had Art. 90 of the Indian Limitation Act in view, and that is how it was understood by the court of learned Civil Judge, Aligarh, on first appeal, which by its judgment dated 14th Dec., 1964, set aside the judgment of the learned Munsif and remanded the suit for fresh hearing after giving parties an opportunity to lead fresh evidence and deciding afresh the question about the date when the defendants misconduct became known to the plaintiff. On remand, the learned Munsif held that the plaintiff came to know of the defendants misconduct from the letter dated 16th June, 1959, and the suit was, accordingly, not barred by limitation. The defendant appealed from this judgment. The appeal was heard by the court of Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge. Before it a point was made that the defendant had not admitted that he was an agent of the plaintiff and accordingly Art. 90 could not be applied for holding that the suit was within limitation. It was contended that the defendant was an employee of the plaintiff, and that if the defendant was not an agent of the same, the suit was clearly barred by time. The lower appellate court by its judgment dated 16th Sept., 1967 allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment of the trial court, remanded the suit for re-trial in the light of the observations made by it. The observations were that a material point for determination in the case was whether the defendant acted as an employee in the capacity of a sales manager by receiving salary from the plaintiff or whether he acted as an agent according to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act. The trial court again decreed the suit holding that the lower appellate court had vide its judgment dated 14th Dec., 1964, held that Art. 90 was applicable, and that misconduct of the defendant became known to the plaintiff from the letter dated 16th June, 1959. On the merits, the trial court found that the defendant had misappropriated cloth worth Rs. The trial court again decreed the suit holding that the lower appellate court had vide its judgment dated 14th Dec., 1964, held that Art. 90 was applicable, and that misconduct of the defendant became known to the plaintiff from the letter dated 16th June, 1959. On the merits, the trial court found that the defendant had misappropriated cloth worth Rs. 1744.67 p. and was entitled to recover that amount but was not entitled to recover interest thereon. On appeal from the said judgment of the trial court which is dated 4th March, 1968, the lower appellate court found that by the earlier judgment dated 16th Sept., 1967, the lower appellate court had directed the trial court to get a clarification of the pleadings from the parties and as a result of the same, the plaintiff had applied for amendment of the plaint showing the terms on which the defendant was employed as the sales-manager at its retail shop at Sikandra. and that the cause of action arose on June 16, 1959, which was the date of the letter received by the plaintiff from the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies Kanpur and when the plaintiff demanded the cost of price of cloth and other goods from the defendant and lastly on April 2, 1962, when the defendant refused to pay the same. It was contended before the lower appellate court by the defendant that the amendment should not have been allowed. The lower appellate court overruled that contention and held that the amendment was properly allowed as it was necessary for determination of the question in controversy between the parries. On the question of limitation, the lower appellate court found drat there was no direct evidence to prove that the defendant was not a mere servant but an agent of the plaintiff and that on whatever evidence was on record, it was not proved that the appointment of the defendant was as an agent, and the circumstances showed that the position of the defendant was that of a servant of the plaintiff and not that of an agent. Having come to this finding, the lower appellate court proceeded to observe that the defendant not being an agent Art. 89 or 90 could not apply and - "the suit should have been filed within 3 years from the date on which the cloth was entrusted to the defendant and was not accounted for"; and that the learned Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, who had heard and decided the appeal earlier, by his judgment dated 16th Sept., 1969, was of the opinion that if the defendant was not an agent of the plaintiff, the suit was clearly barred by time; and that he agreed with those observations. On these findings, the lower appellate court held the suit to be barred by lime. 5. A suit can be said to be barred by time only if it was not filed within the time prescribed by a specific article of the Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act and if there be no specific article applicable to the suit, if it was filed beyond six years of the date when the right to sue accrued, under Art. 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The lower appellate court has proceeded on the assumption that the period of three years from the date on which goods entrusted to the defendant were not accounted for, is limitation for a suit for recover)' of the price of those goods from an employee. Learned counsel contended that this assumption is correct, and in support thereof he referred to Arts. 64 and 115 of the said Act. On the premises, Art. 64 is wholly inapplicable, as the suit is not a suit "for money payable to the plaintiff for money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them." Art. 115 relates to a suit "for compensation for breach of any contract, express or implied". The suit was not a suit for compensation for breadi of contract, but was a suit for compensation for misfeasance ex-contract", and therefore, as held by the Bombay High Court in Govind v. Rangnath AIR 1930 Bom 572; neither Art. 36 nor Art. 115 could be said to be applicable to the case in hand. The suit was not a suit for compensation for breadi of contract, but was a suit for compensation for misfeasance ex-contract", and therefore, as held by the Bombay High Court in Govind v. Rangnath AIR 1930 Bom 572; neither Art. 36 nor Art. 115 could be said to be applicable to the case in hand. The result was that if the position of the parties was that of an employer and employee, period of limitation was six years from the date when the right to sue accrued under Art. 120 of the Indian Limitation Act 1906. 6 This is not to say that I agree with the finding of the lower appellate court that the position of the defendant was that of an employee and not of an agent. However, in view of my finding that even if the position of the defendant was that of an employee, the suit was not barred by time, it is not necessary for me to go into that question. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, urged that the matter should be remanded to the lower appellate court for a finding on the merits of the question whether the defendant was really liable to make good the price of the goods in question. The trial court had, by the judgment under appeal, held on issues Nos. 1,2 and 3 that the defendant had misappropriated cloth worth Rs. 1744.67 p. and was liable to pay the price thereof to the plaintiff and further that the suit was maintainable in the form in which it was brought, that is for recovery of an ascertained sum. According to the judgment of the lower appellate court, only two points were raised before it by the learned counsel for the defendant and they were that the suit was barred by limitation and that the defendant was not an agent of the plaintiff but was its servant. The findings of the trial court on the merits were not assailed, nevertheless the lower appellate court had held that it is proved from the evidence on record that the defendant did not account for the cloth worth Rs. 1744.67 p. and that the learned Munsif had given cogent reasons for arriving at that finding with which it agreed and accordingly it was not necessary for it to discuss the entire evidence in detail. 1744.67 p. and that the learned Munsif had given cogent reasons for arriving at that finding with which it agreed and accordingly it was not necessary for it to discuss the entire evidence in detail. The learned counsel was unable to point out any error of law in the said finding. 7. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The suit shall stand decreed for recovery of Rupees 1744.67 p. Xpendente lite and future interest at the rate of six per cent per annum and costs throughout.