JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the order and decree dated May 24, 1972 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division Confirming the order and decree dated January 7, 1970 passed by the Assistant Collector First Class, Kanpur in a case under Section 176 UPZA and LR Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Hiralal since deceased and substituted by his son Ramadhin, respondent No. 1, had filed a suit for division of holding claiming half share in a joint holding alongwith defendant-appellant Maika. His case was that both of them were the sons of Badili. Maika contested the suit claiming that Hiralal was not the son of Badli but was the son of one Maduwa. Both the courts below have decreed the suit. 4. The first ground taken in the second appeal is that the plaintiff was not recorded as tenure-holder of the disputed land. The declaration of co-Sirdari rights, when the right and title of the plaintiff was denied, converted the suit for partition into one for declaration as well. This declaration could not given in the absence of the State Government which becomes a necessary party. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Rameshwar v. Chhotey Lal 1972 RD 76 in which a learned Member Sri P.P. Bhatnagar has observed as follows : "Where all the parties are recorded as tenure-holders, there is no question of declaration of rights of anybody; the only thing to be determined is the respective share of each. Where any of them is not a recorded tenure-holder and his rights are challenged, the suit becomes one for declaration of his rights as well as for division. A suit for declaration is covered by Sec. 220-B, ZA and LR Act in which the State Government is a necessary party. The present suit being of such a nature, the impleadment of the State Government was mandatory and the learned Additional Commissioner was right in remanding it for retrial after the impleadment of the State Government." 5. I am in agreement with this view. Section 229-B of the UPZA and LR Act clearly provides that both the State Government and the Gaon Sabha shall be impleaded as defendants in a suit for declaration of Sirdari or Bhumidhari rights. 6. I am in agreement with this view. Section 229-B of the UPZA and LR Act clearly provides that both the State Government and the Gaon Sabha shall be impleaded as defendants in a suit for declaration of Sirdari or Bhumidhari rights. 6. The second ground taken in the appeal is that the plaintiff as well as the trial court relied upon a previous compromise in deciding the title of the plaintiff, but the trial court wrongly did not accept the shares arrived at in the compromise. The compromise has to be taken as a whole or it has to be rejected out-right. "In Ramcharan v. Girja Nandini AIR 1966 SC 323 a learned Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the compromise entered into by the parties to the previous suit and embodied in a decree was in substance a family arrangement and, therefore, binding on all the parties to it." This view has been followed in Ram Murat v. Hargendu 1971 RD 431. A learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court has also taken the same view in Smt. Chandrawati v. Smt. Ramrani 1977 RD 196. 7. To my mind, this is indeed the correct view. A copy of the compromise entered into by the parties on August 22, 1959 in a previously instituted suit under Sec. 229-B is on record, and the courts below have erred in law in varying the terms of the compromise. 8. The judgments of the courts below are erroneous in law. I hereby allow the appeal ans set aside the impugned orders of the courts below. The case is remanded to the trial court for retrial in accordance with law after impleading the State Government as a party.