JUDGMENT 1. - Appellants are the defendants in a suit filed by the respondent Bhanwarlal for recovery of Rs. 3050/- in the Court of Additional Civil judge, jodhpur. The suit was dismissed by the learned Additional Civil Judge. In appeal filed by the plaintiff-respondents that judgment was set aside and the suit of the plaintiff for an amount of Rs. 3050/- was decreed. 2. Dissatisfied by that judgment and decree the appellants have filed this appeal in this Court. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case relevant for the disposal of this appeal are that Bhanwarlal respondent was appointed as a teacher on temporary basis on 1-9-54 and remained posted at Chadikhas and Sawara. On 2-10-59 his services were transferred to Panchayat Samiti, Bap by the Education Department and thereafter he served as a permanent teacher at the village Chokhu. On account of some domestic trouble he submitted his resignation from service on 9-2-1961. On 25-2-1961 he withdrew his resignation Despite that withdrawal Panchayat Samiti, Bap accepted his resignation on 7-3-1961 the plaintiff made representations against the order accepting his resignation but without any fruit. Subsequently Panchayat Samiti realised its mistake and reinstated the plaintiff by passing a resolution to that effect on 10-4-1963. While reinstating the plaintiff the Panchayat Samiti ordered that the period between 7-3-1961 and 21-6-1963 should be treated as leave without pay. By filing the suit the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order of the Panchayat Samiti treating the period as leave without pay was illegal and without jurisdiction. He prayed for payment of Rs. 3050/- being the salary for that period. 4. The appellant-defendants Panchayat Samiti, Bap and its Vikash Adhikari contested the suit. In their joint written statements they admitted the transfer of services of the plaintiff to the Panchayat Samiti, Bap. The fact of his submitting the resignation and subsequently withdrawing it was also admitted but it was contended that the application for withdrawal of the resignation was rejected and the resignation accepted. That on the representation of the plaintiff, Panchal at Samiti reappointed him and that order cannot be said to be for reinstatement. 5. Learned Additional Civil Judge struck out three issues. Plaintiff alone appeared in the witness-box. No witness was examined by the defendants. 6. That on the representation of the plaintiff, Panchal at Samiti reappointed him and that order cannot be said to be for reinstatement. 5. Learned Additional Civil Judge struck out three issues. Plaintiff alone appeared in the witness-box. No witness was examined by the defendants. 6. Learned Additional Civil Judge held that the plaintiff has based his case on the ground that the order dated 21-6-1963 was illegal and therefore there was no ground for his claiming the money through the suit. The learned trial Judge held that order as that of re-appointment and not reinstatement. As a result of those findings the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed with costs. 7. The learned District Judge while deciding the appeal filed by the plaintiff referred to the contents of the resolution, copy of which on record is Ex. A/2 and held that the Panchayat Samiti has wrongly accepted the resignation when the plaintiff had already applied for its withdrawal. It was also held by the first appellate Court that the statement of the plaintiff remains uncontroverted and when he was not allowed to work, he was entitled to pay for the period between 7-3-1961 to 21-6-1963 i.e., from the date of the acceptance of his resignation to the date of his reinstatement. The appeal of the plaintiff was allowed with costs. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the findings of the learned District Judge on the ground that the order Ex. 2 was for reappointment and the learned District Judge has legally erred in considering it to be an order of reinstatement. It has also been stressed by the learned counsel that acceptance of resignation having not been challenged the learned District judge was not called upon to declare it illegal and thus the order remaining unchallenged became final which could not be made a basis for recovery of the amount due. 9. It has also been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned District Judge has arrived at a wrong conclusion that the suit was only for getting a particular part of the order set aside when the prayer in the plaint was definite, that the order dated 21-6-1963 may be declared illegal. 10. 9. It has also been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned District Judge has arrived at a wrong conclusion that the suit was only for getting a particular part of the order set aside when the prayer in the plaint was definite, that the order dated 21-6-1963 may be declared illegal. 10. Meeting out these arguments the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 Bhanwarlal submitted that he intention of the order was to reinstate the plaintiff and when his remaining absent from service was not on account of his fault, he has every right to recover the salary for that period. It has been contended that the plaintiff sought the declaration only for the part of the order and the plaint should be read as a whole and some mistake in the prayer, should not debar the plaintiff from the relief he is entitled to. 11. Ex. 2 has been passed in pursuance of the resolution of the Panchayat Samiti dated 10.4.1963 the copy of that resolution on the file is Ex. A/2. From that resolution it is evident that it was resolved that Bhanwarlal teacher may be considered as a permanent employee because he was in service since 1953. In Ex. 2 it is clearly mentioned that his services have been considered as continued from the date of his appointment. From Ex. A/2 it is also evident that the resolution was passed in view of the fact that within one month of the filing of the resignation, Bhanwarlal had filed an application for withdrawal of resignation hence illegality about acceptance of resignation is apparent. In Ex. 2 it has been specifically mentioned that on consideration of his case it was found that he was a permanent teacher and a transferred candidate of the Education Department&was unnecessarily getting the loss of his service. The contents of Ex. 2 to the effect that he will get his arrears and increments as he was entitled before the termination of his services will be considered as continued from the date of his appointment clearly indicates that the intention was to reinstate him and the plea taken that he was only re-appointed is not at all appealing. The contents of Ex. 2 to the effect that he will get his arrears and increments as he was entitled before the termination of his services will be considered as continued from the date of his appointment clearly indicates that the intention was to reinstate him and the plea taken that he was only re-appointed is not at all appealing. A careful reading of the plaint as a whole makes it clear that the plaintiff was dissatisfied only by a part of the order dated 21-6-1963 and not be the whole of it. In this view of the matter the learned District. Judge has correctly arrived at a conclusion that the absence from duty was not on account of the fault of the employee and therefore, he was entitled to the arrears of pay. 12. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned District Judge has allowed the plaintiff more than what he was actually entitled to, because during the period in between the acceptance of his resignation and the order dated 21-6-1963 he was temporarily appointed as a teacher and was paid accordingly. This argument also does not help the appellants because the learned District Judge has given specific finding on this point that there is no evidence on rebuttal from the side of the respondents and the plaintiff has stated on oath the amount he was entitled to recover. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants addressed the Court on the question of limitation. Though the objection of, the maintainability of the suit as being time barred was not raised in the trial court yet the learned counsel for the respondent Bhanwarlal fairly agreed that because the question of limitation goes to the root of the matter it can be raised even at this stage. 14. The maintainability of the suit has been challenged in view of the provisions of Section 75 of the Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishad Act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act). The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that this section is attracted only when the act is done or purported to be done under this Act. 15. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that this section is attracted only when the act is done or purported to be done under this Act. 15. Relevant provision of section 75 reads as under:- "75(1) No suit or other civil proceedings against a Panchayat Samiti or a Zila Parishad or against' any member, officer or servant thereof or against any person acting under the direction of the Panchayat Samiti or the Zila Parishad or any member officer or servant thereof for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act in its or his official capacity- (a) ......................... (b) shall be instituted, unless it is a suit for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the alleged cause of action. (2) ..................................................... 16. In order to see whether the provisions of this section are attracted in the present case, it is to be seen whether the act of reinstatement and granting extra ordinary leave without pay was passed by the Panchayat Samiti under this Act or it purported to be so done under this Act and the Vikas Adhikari passed the order under this Act in his official capacity. There is no such provisions in the Act that a person may be reinstated and the period of his absence from duty may be treated as leave without pay. Mr. Singhvi learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to rule 8 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti (Administrative Powers) Rules, 1960. Rule 8 of which authorises the Vikas Adhikari to grant all kinds of leave to any member of the Service except special disability leave and leave for going outside India. 17. The point for decision before me is not the authority of the Vikas Adhikari to grant leave but as to whether in the circumstances when the resignation was illegally accepted, the period of remaining out of permanent service could be treated as leave without pay. 18. Mr. Singhvi trying to bring the order dated 21.6.1963 under the Act referred to the provisions of Section 88 of the Act which empowers the District Establishment Committee to regulate the mode of and recommend persons for temporary appointments under the second proviso to subsection (8) of Section 86 and appointments by promotion or transfer under subsection (9) of that section. 19. 19. Pertinent it is to note that the case of respondent does not fall in the category of a temporary appointment by the Panchayat Samiti and therefore, provisions of this section do not bring the order of reinstatement under the definition of an act done or purported to be done under the Act. 20. Another provision referred in this connection is Rule 19-A of the Rajasthan Panchayat and Zila Parishad Servics Rules, 1959. This rule is also not of any help in the present case to the appellants because he was not temporarily appointed by the Panchayat Samiti rather he was appointed by the Education Department, Government of Rajasthan and his services were transferred to the Panchayat Samiti, Bap. 21. The provisions of Section 75 of the Act are therefore, not attracted and the suit cannot be said to be barred by limitation. 22. Mr. Singhvi then raised an argument that the learned District Judge has erred in allowing the arrears of salary for a period beyond three years of the filing of the suit in view of the specific provision of Article 102 of the old Limitation Act and Article 7 of the new Limitation Act. 23. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that because the plaintiff was forced to remain out of service, he could not have filed the suit for the arrears of salary prior to his reinstatement. The provisions of Article 102 have been incorporated in Article 7 of the new Limitation Act. Under the old as well as the new Art. period of three years has been allowed for filing the suit for wages when the wages 'accrue due'. Both the learned counsel advanced arguments on the point as to when the wages 'accrue due'? Mr Joshi has placed reliance on Dilbag Rai v. Union of India, 1974 (1) SLR (S.C.) 1 . In that case the question of limitation under section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act (4 of 1936) was under consideration. While discussing the distinction between the terms 'deductions of wages' 'delay in payment of wages' appearing in Section 15, sub-secs (2) and (3) of that Act it was observed that from a reading of Section 15, it is clear that the legislature has deliberately used, first, in sub. sec. (2) and then in sub-sec. While discussing the distinction between the terms 'deductions of wages' 'delay in payment of wages' appearing in Section 15, sub-secs (2) and (3) of that Act it was observed that from a reading of Section 15, it is clear that the legislature has deliberately used, first, in sub. sec. (2) and then in sub-sec. (3), the expressions "deduction of wages" and "delay in payment of wages' as two distinct concepts. Terminusa quo (1) in the proviso expressly relates to the deduction of wages, while (ii) is referable to the delayed wages. If both these termini were always relatable to the same point of time, then there would be no point in mentioning terminus quo (i) and the Legislature could have simply said that limitation for a claim under Section 15(2) would always start from the date on which the wages "fall due" or "accrue" as has been done under Art 102 of the Limitation Act which applies only to suits for recovery of wages. In view of these observations Mr. Joshi agreed that the subject matter for decision in that case was altogether different. 24. In Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1962 S.C. 8 their Lord- ships were pleased to hold that a suit for arrears of salary of a Government servant is covered b) Article 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 25. In Jai Chand Sawhney v. Union of India, 1969 (3) SCC 642 , while deciding the claim of arrears of salary of a public servant and discussing the provisions of Article 102 of the Limitation Act (old), their Lordships were pleased to observe that the period of limitation commences to run when the wages "accrue due" and the wages accrue when in law the servant becomes entitled to wages. It was held that the High Court was right in holding that the plaintiffs claim was governed by Article 102 of the Limitation Act, that the remuneration payable to him accrue due month after month and that his claim for salary beyond the period provided by the third column of Article 102 was barred by the Jaw of limitation. 26. Similar question arose before this Court in State of Rajasthan and Another v. Ratanlal Sogani, AIR 1971 Raj. 26. Similar question arose before this Court in State of Rajasthan and Another v. Ratanlal Sogani, AIR 1971 Raj. 142 in which it was held that in a suit for recovery of arrears of salary cause of action arises on a date when the salary of a particular period becomes due under terms of employment and not when order of dismissal is set aside. Art 102 of the Limitation Act was held to be applicable in such cases. 27. This being the settled position of law the period of limitation allowed in such cases is three years from the date the salary becomes due under the terms of the employment. This is not in dispute that Bhanwarlal was entitled to recover the pay every month, hence his salary fell due every month. In this view of the matter he was only entitled to the arrears of salary for a for a period of three years preceding the date of the filing of the suit. The suit was filed on 23-9-1965. He was not entitled to recover the salary prior to 23.9-1962.. He has claimed the salary from 7-3-1961 to 21-61963. In his statement the total amount of the claim is given and therefore in order to calculate the amount due from the period 23-9-1962 to 21-6-1963 help will have to be taken from the chart filed by him in the first appellate Court. The amount according to that chart comes to Rs. 265/-. Hence the respondent is held entitled to recover only that amount. 28. Mr.Joshi submitted that though the prayer is for the salary only up to 21.6.1963, the difference of the salary subsequent to that in view of the increment he would have got should be allowed. The decree beyond the claim cannot be passed but Mr. Singhvi learned counsel for the appellants submits that the arrears of salary according to increments and emoluments of service after 21-6-1963 will be considered by the Panchayat Samiti at the time of fixation of the plaintiff-respondent. 29. Consequently the appeal is partly accepted and the decree passed by the first appellate court is modified in the way that the plaintiff Bhanwarlal will be entitled to Rs. 265/- only with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of the institution of the suit till realisation. The modified decree may be drawn accordingly.Appeal partly accepted. *******