JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - This is a defendants appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20-9-1969 passed by Civil Judge, Ghazipur in Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1968. 2. A registered sale deed dated Sept. 6, 1963 purported to have been executed by Smt. Budhia in favour of the appellants in respect of some agricultural plots came into existence. In the year 1964 Smt. Budhia filed suit that she was an old, illiterate and blind woman, that she had not executed the said sale deed and that the sale deed was a result of misrepresentation and fraud played upon her by the appellants. She was actually taken to Ghazipur for getting a ration card prepared. In that connection her thumb impressions were taken on some blank papers. She claimed cancellation of the sale deed. She further claimed possession in case she was found out of possession. 3. The suit was contested by the appellants, who inter alia contended that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court. 4. Parties led oral evidence in the case. On an appraisal of the entire material on record the Munsif Saidpur at Ghazipur, who tried the suit found in favour of Smt. Budhia. The appellants names were entered in revenue records. Therefore, the munsif decreed the suit for cancellation of the sale deed as well as for possession. The appellants filed appeal which was dismissed by the Civil Judge. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants firstly urged that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court and that it was cognizable by the revenue court for two reasons: (1) The deceased plaintiff Smt. Budhia alleged that she received no consideration of the sale deed. Therefore the sale deed was void and not voidable, and (2) The deceased plaintiff claimed possession also in the suit. 6. Smt. Budhia could easily sue for possession by ejectment of the appellants in the revenue court and in that case she could prove that the sale deed was without consideration and as such a void document. The lower appellate court observed that the suit was essentially for the cancellation of the sale deed on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation and as such it was a voidable document. Therefore, the Civil Courts could take cognizance of the case. 7. The lower appellate court observed that the suit was essentially for the cancellation of the sale deed on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation and as such it was a voidable document. Therefore, the Civil Courts could take cognizance of the case. 7. The appellants counsel cited three cases in support of his contention; Rasool Ahmad v. Beni Prasad, 1965 Rev Dec (HC) 79; Baijnath v. Binda, 1978 Rev Dec (HC) 77; (AIR 1978 NOC 66) (All) and Amanatullah v. Mohd. 8 Fariyad, 1978 Rev Dec (HC) 262 : (1978 All LJ 661). In the first case of Rasool Ahmad the zamindars executed leases in favour of defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiff Rasool Ahmad alleged that in fact he was tenant of the land and defendants 1 and 2 were interfering with his possession. On the basis of these allegations Rasool Ahmad filed 8 suits in the revenue court for declaration that he was a hereditary tenant. Original suits were dismissed by the revenue court. Thereafter he filed writ petition in the High Court which was rejected. Then he filed another set of cases for declaration alleging that he was occupancy tenants. All his suits were dismissed by the revenue court. Thereafter he brought suits in the civil court with the same allegations, and sought cancellation of the lease deeds. It was held that the suits were not cognizable by the civil court. There is no dispute to the view taken in this case. It will be noticed that first of all Rasool Ahmad tried his luck in the revenue courts and when he was unsuccessful in the revenue courts, he filed suits in the civil court for the cancellation of the lease deeds executed by the zamindars. Rasool Ahmad did not seek cancellation of the lease deeds. On the ground of fraud or misrepresentation. Therefore, the facts of this case are entirely different from the facts of the present case. 8. In the second case of Baijnath, the Asstt. Consolidation Officer prepared records of the statements and then issued notices to the interested persons. The applicant filed objection on the ground of fraud. He was unsuccessful before the Assistant Consolidation Officer and also before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Then the applicant filed civil suit with the same allegation. 8. In the second case of Baijnath, the Asstt. Consolidation Officer prepared records of the statements and then issued notices to the interested persons. The applicant filed objection on the ground of fraud. He was unsuccessful before the Assistant Consolidation Officer and also before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Then the applicant filed civil suit with the same allegation. On the basis of the principle laid down in the case of Gorakhnath v. H. N. Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 , it was observed: "The effect of interpretation of law is that a void document can be considered and adjudicated by the consolidation courts but a document which is only voidable and needs a declaration or adjudication by a competent court, then the matter can be agitated only in the Civil Court and the jurisdiction of the consolidation courts shall be barred." 9. In this way the position is that if the document is void in law, the revenue court is the proper court for seeking redress, but if a document is voidable, the Civil Court can take cognizance of the case for avoiding it. 10. In the third case of Amanatullah (1978 All LJ 661) a compromise decree was sought to be set aside on the ground that the plaintiff was living outside, that he did not receive any summons nor had knowledge of the suit, that he did not sign the Vakalatnama and that he did not enter into the compromise. It was held that the allegations of the plaint establish that the plaintiff had set up a case that the compromise decree was void. Thereafter in view of the principle laid down in the case of Gorakhnath Dube v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1973 SC 2451 (cited above) it was held that the decree which was null and void could be ignored by the consolidation authorities and it was not necessary that the said decree be cancelled. Consequently application under Section 5 of the Consolidation Act was allowed. This case lays down the same principle which was laid down in the case of Baijnath v. Binda (cited above (1978 Rev. Dec (HC) 77 ; AIR 1978 NOC 66 (All)). 11. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the allegations of the plaint. In para. Consequently application under Section 5 of the Consolidation Act was allowed. This case lays down the same principle which was laid down in the case of Baijnath v. Binda (cited above (1978 Rev. Dec (HC) 77 ; AIR 1978 NOC 66 (All)). 11. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the allegations of the plaint. In para. 1 of the plaint it was alleged that plaintiff Smt. Budhia, Budhan father of defendants 1 to 3 and Nandan father of defendants 4 to 6 were co-tenants prior to Chakbandi, that there took place chakbandi in the village, that in chakbandi she was allotted a separate chak of the plots in suit, and that she was in possession of the said plots as sirdar. In Para. 2 of the plaint it was alleged that she was an illiterate, very old and blind woman, that her daughter Smt. Ganeshia and her sons were living with her, serving her and looking after her cultivation. In Para. 3 of the plaint it was alleged that in the month of Sawan 1963 her daughter had gone out on some urgent work, that taking advantage of this position Budhan and Nandan told her that ration cards were being prepared, that therefore, an application was to be given for the same, that her thumb mark was obtained at several places. In Para. 4 of the plaint it was alleged that when her daughter returned then she learnt that Budhan and Nandan had obtained a fictitious sale deed which was without consideration by playing fraud on her on 6-9-1963 in favour of their sons. In Para. 5 it was alleged that she had not executed sale deed knowingly in favour of the defendants, that she was not in need of any loan, that she had not taken Rupees 1,500/- from the defendants or their fathers, that the sale deed was fictitious and fraudulent and without consideration, that the defendants did not derive any right through the said sale deed, that the defendants did not come in possession of the plots in suit. In Paragraph 6 of the plaint it was alleged that on enquiry it was found that Budhan and Nandan deposited ten times of the revenue themselves and thereby obtained Bhumidhari in her name, that they gave a fictitious application before the Consolidation officer Chakbandi and obtained- permission for the sale deed, that then they got the sale deed for Rs. 1,500/- executed on the papers upon which her thumb marks had been obtained and that as such the sale deed was without consideration and fraudulent and that she was not bound by the sale deed. In Para. 7 of the plaint it was stated that when the plaintiff came to know of the forgery and fraud, she asked the defendants that they should not interfere in her possession and get the sale deed cancelled but they paid no heed. 12. The above allegations clearly show two things: (1) Smt. Budhia thumb-marked on some blank papers for obtaining ration card. She did not thumb mark on the papers which were meant for writing out sale deed. Thus he challenges the very character of the document. According to her it was a forgery committed by the fathers of the defendants, and (2) She had no necessity to take any loan. She was given no consideration of the sale deed. These allegations clearly indicate that according to the plaintiff the sale deed was in fact a void document. No doubt, there are allegations to the effect that she is an old, blind and illiterate woman but these allegations do not take away the effect of the entire allegations of the plaint which clearly show that according to her it was a forged and fictitious document without consideration. Therefore, in order to obtain possession or to obtain declaration of her status as sirdar she could easily sue in the revenue court. The lower appellate court was not justified that the suit was essentially for adjudging the sale deed void on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation. 13. In the case of Baijnath v. Binda (cited above) (1978 Rev Dec (HC) 77 : AIR 1978 NOC 66 (All)) the applicant alleged that the opposite party had obtained his thumb impressions on plain paper and on enquiry he learnt that his thumb impressions had been utilised on the compromise before the Asstt. Consolidation Officer. 13. In the case of Baijnath v. Binda (cited above) (1978 Rev Dec (HC) 77 : AIR 1978 NOC 66 (All)) the applicant alleged that the opposite party had obtained his thumb impressions on plain paper and on enquiry he learnt that his thumb impressions had been utilised on the compromise before the Asstt. Consolidation Officer. It was observed, "The applicant therefore, unmistakenly challenged the character of the document. The effect of inducement if found true was to render the document void. Such a claim could be and was in fact agitated before the consolidation courts. As the nature of the document itself was challenged the case was squarely covered by the principle laid down in Ningawwa v. Byrappa ( AIR 1968 SC 956 ). 13A. In the case of Ningawwa v. Byrappa, AIR 1968 SC 956 , it was held by the Supreme Court (at p. 958): "It is well established that a contract or other transaction induced or tainted by fraud is not void but only voidable at the option of the party defrauded............ The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulant misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to the character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the' character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof." 14. In the case of Baijnath (1978 Rev Dec (HC) 77: AIR 1978 NOC 66 (All) it was held that the Assistant Consolidation Officer, who went into the question of fraud alleged by the applicant, could decide that question. In the instant case the above observations are fully applicable. 15. The result is that the court below committed an error in holding that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. In fact the suit was not cognizable in the Civil Court on the allegations made in the plaint. 16. In view of what has been found above the decree passed by the courts below has to be set aside. The successor-in-interest of Smt. Budhia, if advised, may seek remedy in the appropriate revenue court. In this case it is not necessary to pass order for the return of the plaint because while filing a suit in the revenue court appropriate allegations and reliefs will have to be made. 17. The successor-in-interest of Smt. Budhia, if advised, may seek remedy in the appropriate revenue court. In this case it is not necessary to pass order for the return of the plaint because while filing a suit in the revenue court appropriate allegations and reliefs will have to be made. 17. Appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment and decree dated 20-9-69 passed by the Civil Judge in Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1968 and the judgment and decree dated 28-3-1968 passed by Munsif, Saidpur at Ghazipur in O. S. No. 160 of 1964 are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is ordered to be dismissed. The appellants shall get costs of all the courts from the assets of Smt. Budhia. The costs incurred in this Court shall be calculated on ex parte scale as no appearance was put in on behalf of the respondents.