ORDER Mahavir Singh, J. - This is a revision by the plaintiff against the order of the learned Additional District Judge, Kheri dismissing his revision against the order of the learned Civil Judge, Kheri dismissing his application to sue in forma pauperis. 2. The plaintiff had sued for recovery of Rs. 15,000/- from the defendant respondents. A Court fee of Rs. 1532.50 was payable. However, the plaintiff-applicant moved an application that he was not possessing sufficient means to pay court-fee. He gave a list of property which he had in his possession. They were said to be worth only Rs. 280/-. 3. The application was opposed by the State. It was alleged that the applicant was a permanent employee of the Animal Husbandry Department as a Poultry Inspector getting Rs. 453.60 p. m. as salary and so it was not expected that he had no means to pay this court-fee. It was also alleged that the applicant had much amount to his credit in the General Provident Fund and had also certain security with the*State Government. 4. The learned Civil Judge held that the amount from the provident fund and the security was not with-drawable and so not a realisable asset in his hand. However, he held that being a permanent employee he could raise loan to pay the court-fee. He also observed that it is difficult to believe that he had no asset at all. Accordingly he dismissed the application. 5. On revision the learned Additional District Judge held that the jurisdiction exercised by the trial court could not be said to have been done illegally or with material irregularity and it was only a question to believe or disbelieve the evidence of the applicant. He also observed that in any case the plaintiff applicant could withdraw the amount from the General Provident Fund and also security with the Government and if he did not do, then he himself was to blame. Accordingly he dismissed the revision. 6. The plaintiff has now come to this court and contends that the view taken by both the courts below was wholly wrong and that they failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them and in any case they acted with material irregularity or illegality in deciding his application. 7. The contention raised by the applicant has a force. 6. The plaintiff has now come to this court and contends that the view taken by both the courts below was wholly wrong and that they failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them and in any case they acted with material irregularity or illegality in deciding his application. 7. The contention raised by the applicant has a force. Coming to the point taken by the learned lower revisional court, it may be mentioned that he has clearly misread the evidence. It was observed that the applicant had Rs. 4200/-to his credit in G. P. F. and Rs. 1000/-as security with the Government and there was no bar for withdrawal or taking loan from these funds. This clearly is wrong. G. P. F. does not allow loan for such purposes. The plaintiff-applicant had also stated that he had moved an application for withdrawal of the amount from these funds but this was rejected. The learned lower court had also observed that this amount could be utilised for any such purpose. It is, therefore, not clear as to how the learned lower court had observed that the plaintiff-applicant had himself not exercised the option for taking loan from the G. P. F. and the security amount. 8. The learned trial court had rejected the application of the plaintiff-applicant on' two grounds : - (1) It was difficult to believe that the applicant who was a permanent employee getting Rs. 300/- as nett amount was not in a position to pay Rs. 1530/- as court-fee. (2) That he could raise loan on the status as State Government employee. 9. As regards the first point that was clearly based on surmise. There was nothing on record to show that the plaintiff applicant could not be believed. The plaintiff applicant had definitely given the list of the property which he had in his possession. No evidence was given from the other side to show anything more in his possession. Then how it could be observed that it could not be believed that he had only that much property with him. This observation was thus based not on evidence on record but on surmise. The learned lower revisional court had also misread this observation as a case of pure belief or disbelief of evidence on record and had thus acted with material irregularity in basing his decision on this point. 10. This observation was thus based not on evidence on record but on surmise. The learned lower revisional court had also misread this observation as a case of pure belief or disbelief of evidence on record and had thus acted with material irregularity in basing his decision on this point. 10. On the second point also the Reamed trial court had taken entirely a wrong view of the law. The word "means" used in O. 33, R. 1 C. P. C. no doubt,i does not mean in the strict sense possession of some property. As held in Bai want v. Jagdish (AIR 1966 Punj 86) the petitioners capacity to raise money was the real test and not mere possession of some property. But it does not mean that without possession of property a person can be said to have means. The idea behind the above dictum was, as held in Rani Ammal v. Rathnasabapathi Mudaliar ( AIR 1967 Mad 424 ), that he must have such assets on the basis of which cash can be realised. This is why where the property in possession of a person is such that it is not normally saleable, he could not be said to have means within the meaning of this rule. In Rani Ammal v. Rathnasabapathi Mudaliar (supra) it was, therefore, held that even if persons are prepared to advance loan on the basis of non-saleable property, that would not amount to his having sufficient means. In this case the applicant had no property whatsoever. He was only a permanent Government employee drawing Rs. 366/-as net salary. The right to enjoy this salary is not normally a saleable interest and so even if a person may offer to advance loan on that basis, that would not amount to the applicant having means within the meaning of O. 33, R. 1 C. P. C. 11. It may be mentioned that even when a person owes some debt to a plaintiff, that merely amounts to his having some claim and not means, vide Sri Pal Singh v. U. P. Cinetone Ltd. (AIR 1944 Oudh 248). So was the view in Chanda Begum v. Maqsood Husain Khan (AIR 1942 All 319) a Division Bench ruling of this court. The present case is worse than that. He has no claim at all against any one. 12. So was the view in Chanda Begum v. Maqsood Husain Khan (AIR 1942 All 319) a Division Bench ruling of this court. The present case is worse than that. He has no claim at all against any one. 12. The learned lower revisional court by not considering this objection at all can be said to have acted with material irregularity on this point also. 13. It was lastly contended that in any case no revision lay against such an order. However, in Chanda Begum v. Maqsood Husain Khan (supra) also it was held that an order rejecting the application to sue in forma pauperis is revisable under Section 115 C. P. C. 14. So the revision succeeds and is allowed with costs. The orders passed by the courts below are set aside. The application of the applicant to sue in forma pauperis is allowed.