JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - This is a defendants appeal against the judgment and decree dated 6-8-1966 passed by the Civil Judge, Agra in Civil Appeal No. 526 of 1965. 2. Facts giving rise to this appeal are these: The dispute relates to a Kothari ABCD shown in the plaint map 5/5 Ka which is a part of the trial courts decree in suit No. 373 of 1962. The plaintiff-respondents claimed permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking possession of the Kothari by any means. The respondents alleged that this Kothari was part of the house No. 4899/1-3 which fell to the lot of their vendor Bindeshwari Prasad and that they were in actual peaceful possession thereof since the date of the sale i. e. 20-2-1959 in their favour, that Rameshwari Prasad alias Rajjan Lal defendant No. 1 had agreed to sell house No. 4899 which had fallen to his lot in the partition in the year 1956, that later on he did not want to execute sale deed in respondents favour, that he had allowed Rajjan Lal defendant No. 2 appellant to live in house No. 4899, that the appellant used to cause harm to the respondents now and then, that the appellant tried to demolish a portion of the wall of the respondents house to forcibly open a door towards the Kothari in dispute, that the local police directed the appellant not to open any door and to fill up the demolished portion of the wall, that the local police also directed tire respondents to fill up the door between the portion B. N. 3. The suit was contested by defendant No. 2 appellant. Issues were struck in the case on 21-8-1963. The suit was fixed for final hearing on 2-4-1965. On 1-4-1965 the appellant moved for adjournment which was allowed. Then again on 18-5-65 the appellant moved application for adjournment which was allowed. Then on 22-7-65 the appellant again moved an application for adjournment which was allowed. Thereafter on 7-9-1965 the hearing of the case was adjourned to 13-10-1965 on the application of the appellant. On 13-10-1965 the appellant was absent. His counsel did not appear. The trial court proceeded under O. 17, R. 3 C. P. C. On behalf of the respondents one witness Ram Charan Das only was examined. Then 16-10-1965 was fixed for judgment. On 16-10-1965 the judgment was delivered decreeing the respondents stiff. On 13-10-1965 the appellant was absent. His counsel did not appear. The trial court proceeded under O. 17, R. 3 C. P. C. On behalf of the respondents one witness Ram Charan Das only was examined. Then 16-10-1965 was fixed for judgment. On 16-10-1965 the judgment was delivered decreeing the respondents stiff. Against this decree the appellant filed appeal which was heard by the Civil Judge. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that the trial court was in error in proceeding to decide the suit on merits under O. 17, R. 3 C. P. C. and that the trial court should have proceeded ex parte under O. 17, R. 2 C. P. C. It appears that this contention did not find favour with the Civil Judge. Therefore, the appellants counsel assailed the decree on merits. The Civil Judge, therefore, dealt with the merits of the case and came to the conclusion that the trial Court had rightly held that the Kothari in dispute belonged to the respondents. Consequently, he dismissed the appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the trial court as well as the lower appellate court were not correct in holding that O. 17, R. 3 C. P. C. was applicable. According to him, O. 17, R. 2 was applicable and as such the trial court could have decreed the suit ex parte. 5. Rules 2 and 3 of O. 17, C. P. C. have been amended from time to time in this State. In the year 1965, amended R. 3 of O. 17 read as follows : - "Where in a case to which R. 2 does not apply, any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the Court may, notwithstanding such default, proceed to decide the suit forthwith." 6. It will be seen from the above that Rule 3 will be applicable only where R. 2 would not apply. 7. It will be seen from the above that Rule 3 will be applicable only where R. 2 would not apply. 7. Amended R. 2 reads as follows: "Where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or airy of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by O. 9 or make such other order as it thinks fit." 8. The rest of the portion of R. 2 is not reproduced for it is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The amended Rule 2 clearly says that where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, any of the parties fails to appear, the Court can adopt two courses: (1) dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed under O. 9. It means that it can proceed ex parte, and (2) it can make such order as it thinks fit. It means that instead of disposing of the suit ex parte it can pass an appropriate order, say, an order adjourning the case. This provision does not entitle the Court to decide the suit on merits. 9. In the present case the appellant sought adjournment on four dates. No evidence of the parties had been recorded earlier than 13-10-65 on which date the appellant was absent and the trial court proceeded to dispose of the case. R. 2 does not indicate at whose instance the hearing of the suit is adjourned. The hearing of the suit can be adjourned by the Court on account of its own convenience or on account of an application/re-quest by any one of the parties to the suit. Therefore, in both the cases, if the Shearing of the suit is adjourned, R. 2 will be attracted. 10. The lower appellate court has placed reliance on the case of Laxmi Chand v. Ishwar Din 1958 All WR (HC) 406. This case no doubt lays down that in the case like the present one the Court can proceed under O. 17, R. 3 C. P. C. But this decision is no longer good law in view of the Full Bench decision in the case of M. S. Khalsa v. Chiranji Lal, 1976 All LJ 379 (FB). This case no doubt lays down that in the case like the present one the Court can proceed under O. 17, R. 3 C. P. C. But this decision is no longer good law in view of the Full Bench decision in the case of M. S. Khalsa v. Chiranji Lal, 1976 All LJ 379 (FB). In this case, Civil Revision No. 801 of 1968 F. A. F. O. No. 329 of 1970 and Civil Revision No. 356 of 1970 were under consideration. In Civil Revision No. 801 of 1968 following question was referred to the Full Bench: "Whether a case in which the defendant obtains an adjournment on the date of final hearing of the suit and fails to appear on the adjourned date is covered by Rule 2 of O. 17, C. P. C. and whether the Court has jurisdiction to pass an order under R. 3 of O. 17, C. P.C. The Full Bench answered the question in this way that O. 17, R. 2, C. P. C. was applicable and as such an application under O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. would lie. 11. The position that easily follows from the above is that in the instant case the courts below were in error in holding that O. 17, R. 3 was applicable. Correctly speaking O. 17, R. 2 was applicable and if the trial court wanted to dispose of the suit it should have disposed it of in accordance with the provisions of O. 9. It means that the trial court could dispose of the suit ex parte. 12. The appellants counsel then urged that the case should be remanded in order to enable the appellant to cross-examine the plaintiffs witnesses and to lead his evidence. He pointed out that the respondent had simply claimed relief of injunction and in case it was found that the respondents were not in possession they were not entitled to get the relief of injunction. The appellant can be allowed indulgence only if he is able to show any sufficient reason for his absence on 13-10-1965, the date on which the suit should have been proceeded with ex parte. But this thing cannot be gone into by this Court. The most which this Court can assume is that the decree passed by the trial Court is an ex parte one. But this thing cannot be gone into by this Court. The most which this Court can assume is that the decree passed by the trial Court is an ex parte one. Against this decree the appellant has two remedies: (1) to file an application for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. In that application the appellant could show the reasons for his absence, and (2) an appeal against the ex parte decree. In the instant case the appellant did not take recourse to the former remedy, despite the fact that in appeal before the lower appellate court the appellant urged that the trial court was not justified in deciding the case on merits under O. 17, Rule 3 C. P. C. and that it should have proceeded under Order 17 Rule 2, C. P. C. The appellant adopted the second remedy of filing an appeal against the ex parte decree. On merits the contention of the appellant before the lower appellate court was not found sustainable. Therefore the appeal was dismissed. In this appeal against the decree of the lower appellate court the appellant can only be heard on merits of the case. This Court cannot go into the question as to why the appellant had not appeared on the date of final hearing before the trial court. This is the scope of an application under O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. An appeal against a decree cannot take the place of miscellaneous application for setting aside an ex parte decree. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on three cases: - M. Hummi v. Aziz-ud-Din, AIR 1917 All 475 ; Mazhar Husain v. Rafiq Husain AIR 1925 Oudh 645; Ganesh Das Varma v. Hari Chand, AIR 1934 Oudh 131 (1). 14. In all these three cases it was laid down that where a decree was made in absence of the defendant it must be deemed to have been made ex parte and if the defendant complained that the decree should not have been made in his absence, his only remedy was to apply to have it set aside and the case restored but he was not entitled in an appeal against the decree to go into any question connected with his non-appearance at the hearing. 15. 15. In this connection it will be useful to reproduce the observation in the case of Sved Mazhar Husain cited above. That observation reads: "When a specific remedy with a particular limited period of limitation is granted, a party must avail himself of it and cannot make it a ground of appeal under the general provision granting him a right of appeal from an ex parte decree." 16. The position that follows is that in this appeal, this Court cannot see the reasons for the absence of the appellant on the date of the hearing of the suit by the trial court. The appellant can only show that on merits the decree was not justified. Therefore, despite the fact that the alleged prejudice is there, this Court cannot remand the case as urged by the appellants counsel. 17. The appellants counsel argued that as the trial court had expressly proceeded under (J. 17, R. 3 C.P.C. the appellant could not move an application under O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. In this connection he referred to the case of Badri Pandey v. Ram Chandra, 1976 All LJ 659. This case is simply an authority for the proposition that two remedies are open to an aggrieved party: (1) to move an application for setting aside the ex parte decree, and (2) to file an appeal. There is no dispute to this proposition. This case is also an authority for the view that an application for rehearing of the appeal under O. 41, R. 21 C. P. C. did not become in-fructuous on the filing of the Second Appeal. This case does not lay down that because the trial court had expressly proceeded under O. 17, R. 3 C. P. C., the appellant could not have moved an application under O. 9, R. 13 C. P. C. for setting. aside the ex parte decree. This case does not lay down that because the trial court had expressly proceeded under O. 17, R. 3 C. P. C., the appellant could not have moved an application under O. 9, R. 13 C. P. C. for setting. aside the ex parte decree. It will be; noticed that in the appeal before the lower appellate court the appellant clearly contended that O. 17, R. 3, C. P. C. was not applicable and that the trial court should have proceeded under O. 17, R. 2, C. P. C. It means that the appellant held the view that the trial court could proceed ex parte and as such the appellant should have moved an application for setting aside ex parte decree under O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. In this application he could easily allege that the trial Court was not justified in proceeding under O. 17, R. 3, C. P. C. and that the decree was in fact an ex parte one. In view of this the appellants counsel is not correct in saying that the appellant could not have moved an application for setting aside ex parte decree under O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. 18. On merits the appellants counsel pointed out that in partition deed dated 15-2-1956 lot No. 2 was of Bindeshwari Prasad, predecessor of the respondents and that this deed did not show that the disputed Kothari was given to him. On the other side the respondents counsel has with reference to the plaint map, the commissioners map and the map of the house No. 1899/1-3 attached to the partition deed, shown that the Kothari in dispute was allotted to Bindeshwari Prasad in the partition. The plaint map as well as the commissioners map show a latrine to the west of the Kothari in dispute. The partition map shows the same. Therefore, there appears force in the contention of the respondents counsel that the Kothari in dispute fell to the lot of Bindeshwari Prasad in the partition. 19. As regards possession there is statement on oath of Ram Saran (P. W. 1). In tins way on merits the trial court as well as the lower appellate court were justified in holding that the disputed Kothari belonged to the respondents and the respondents were in possession. thereof. 19. As regards possession there is statement on oath of Ram Saran (P. W. 1). In tins way on merits the trial court as well as the lower appellate court were justified in holding that the disputed Kothari belonged to the respondents and the respondents were in possession. thereof. Hence, the degree of injunction passed by the trial court and confirmed by the lower appellate court cannot be disturbed in this appeal. 20. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed. In the unusual circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs incurred in this Court.