ANKAIAH v. M. VEERABHADRAPPA — 1979 DIGILAW 35 (KAR)

( 1 ) IN this revision petition under S. 50 (1) of the Karnataka Rent Control act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 1961 Act), the petitioner who is also the petitioner in H. R. C. No. 2036 of 1975 has challenged the order dated 24-6-1978 of the IV Addl. Civil Judge, Bangalore City, permitting the learned counsel for the respondent to put certain questions. ( 2 ) IN H. R. C. No. 2036 of 1975 the petitioner has sought far eviction of the respondent under S. 21 (1) (a) and (f) of the 1961 Act. The case of the petitioner is that the respondent who is admittedly his brother has taken the petition schedule premises (hereinafter referred to as 'the premises') on lease and has defaulted in payment of rents and has sublet the premises. to] another person. Among others, the respondent resisted the petition on the ground that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. He has also asserted that the partition deed dated 20-8-1970 under which the petitioner claims to be the owner and landlord of the premises is a nominal deed. In the course of the cross-examination of the petitioner, the learner counsel for the respondent sought to put certain questions on the nominal na,ture of the partition deed dated 20-8-1970 pleaded by the respondent. At that stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner objected to those questions on the ground that a Court functioning under the 1961 Act can only examine the relationship of landlord and tenant as' a jurisdictional fact and cannot examine the validity of the partition deed on any of the grounds. On a consideration of the contentions urged by the learned counsel, the learned Civil Judge in an unduly lengthy order to the question that arose before him has passed an order over-ruling the objections raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the course of his order, the learned Civil Judge has held that it was open to the learned counsel for the respondent to elicit answers on the nominal nature of the partition deed pleaded by him. But in his order, the learned Civil Judge has not set out the questions that were put by the learned counsel for the respondent. But in his order, the learned Civil Judge has not set out the questions that were put by the learned counsel for the respondent. ( 3 ) SHRI S. Krishnaiah, learned, counsel for the petitioner, strenuosly contended that under the 1961 Act, it is not open to a Court functioning under the said Act to examine the validity of the partition deed on any of the grounds pleaded by the respondent and therefore the order passed by the learned Civil Judge holding that it was permissible for the learned counsel for the respondent to elicit answers on the nominal nature of the partition deed is erroneous. Shri S. V. Narasimhan, learned counsel for the respondent, urged that this revision petition under S. 50 of the 1961 Act is not maintainable. Shri Narasimhan maintained that the order passed by the learned Civil Judge is in the course of an examination of a witness and relates to the relevancy of a question and cannot therefore be construed as an order deciding any of the rights of the parties, to hold that it is an order revisable under Section 50 of the, 1961 Act. In support of his contention, Shri narasimhan strongly relied on a ruling of the Supreme Court in Central bank of India v. Gokulchand AIR 1967 SC. 799 ( 4 ) EARLIER I have noticed that the learned Civil Judge has passed. his order on the relevance of questions that were sought to be put by the learned counsel for the respondent and the objections raised thereto by the petitioner. Admittedly the learned Civil Judge has not fully recorded the evidence and has not passed, his final order in the case. In this view, the question that arises for determination is whether the order passed by the learned Civil Judge is an order within the meaning of S. 50 of the 1961 Act. ( 5 ) IN the Central Bank of India case (1) the facts were these. M/s. Central bank of India was the tenant of a certain premises situated in Delhi. Under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958) (hereinafter) referred to as the Delhi Act), Gokul Chand, the owner of the premises sought for eviction of the Central Bank. M/s. Central bank of India was the tenant of a certain premises situated in Delhi. Under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958) (hereinafter) referred to as the Delhi Act), Gokul Chand, the owner of the premises sought for eviction of the Central Bank. In that proceeding, Centra Banmade an application for the, appointment of a Commissioner to inspect premises and prepare, a plan of the premises and submit the same to the court which application was rejected by the trial court for certain reasons which are not necessary for purposes of this case. An appeal filed by the central Bank against the order of the trial court was dismissed by the a pellate authority and was affirmed by the High Court of Delhi. The Appellate tribunal in that case dismissed the appeal filed by the Central Bank under s. 38 (1) of the Delhi Act holding that it was an interlocutory order and was not an appealable order, which view was affirmed by the High Court. In an appeal filed by the Central Bank, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the true scope and ambit of S. 38 (1) of the Delhi Act, which reads thus: -"an appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made urder this Act to the Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) consisting of one person only to be appointed by the Central government by notification in the Official Gazette. "at this stage, it is relevant to read sub-section (1) of S. 50 of the 1961 act. S. 50 (1) of the 1961 Act reads thus: - "50. Revision -.- (I) The High Court may at any time call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the court of Civil judge under this Act or any order passed by the Controller under Sections 14, 15, 16, or 17 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. (2)---- (The rest of it is not necessary and omitted as unnecessary) an examination of S. 38 (1) of the Delhi Act and S. 50 of the 1961 Act would show that the language used in S. 50 is almost analogous to the language used in S. 38 (1) of the Delhi Act. (2)---- (The rest of it is not necessary and omitted as unnecessary) an examination of S. 38 (1) of the Delhi Act and S. 50 of the 1961 Act would show that the language used in S. 50 is almost analogous to the language used in S. 38 (1) of the Delhi Act. In the Delhi Act, the order is made appealable, while in the 1961 Act, the order is made revisable ,and except for this there is no other substantial difference in the provisions of the two Acts. In this view, the construction and interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on the true scope and ambit of S. 38 (l) of the Delhi Act and the principles enunciated therein would be applicable in the true scope and ambit of S. 50 of the 1961 Act. On the scope and ambit of S. 38 (l) of the Delhi Act, the Supreme Court observed thus: - (3) The object of Sec. 38 (1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved, by some order which affects his right or liability. In the context of Sec. 38 (1), the words "every order of the Controller made under this Act", though very wide, do not include, interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders under S. 36 and 37, such as orders regarding tthe submoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents issue of a, commission for examination of witnesseis,, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a, question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any 'party to set forth the error, defeat or irregulaarity, if any, in such an order as a ground of abjection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. The legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any 'party to set forth the error, defeat or irregulaarity, if any, in such an order as a ground of abjection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Bent Control Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under the Act, Even an interlocutory order passed under S. 37 (2) is an order passed under the Act and is subject to appeal under S. 38 (1) provided it affects some right or liability of any party. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal. " in the light of these principles, the order passed by the learned Civil judge being interlocutory and touching on the relevancy of questions, cannot be construed as an order within the meaning of that term occurring in s. 50 (1) of the 1961 Act and this revision petition is therefore not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. ( 6 ) SHRI Krishnaiab, strenuously contended that the, order finally decide the rights of the parties and therefore it is reyisable under S. 50 (1) of the 1961 Act as decided by the Supreme Court in the Central Bank of India case (1 ). As noticed earlier, the learned Civil Judge has not decided any of the rights of the parties finally and therefore there is no merit in this contention of Shri Krishnaiah. ( 7 ) SHRI Krishnaiah lastly contended that an interlocutory order is revisable under S. 50 of the 1961 Act as held by Nesargi J, in Rukamoddia v. Basawwa (1973) 2 Mys. ( 7 ) SHRI Krishnaiah lastly contended that an interlocutory order is revisable under S. 50 of the 1961 Act as held by Nesargi J, in Rukamoddia v. Basawwa (1973) 2 Mys. L. J. 206 Shri Krishnaiah, placed strong reliance on the following sentence occurring at page 210 of the report; - "if the Munsiff holds that it is not a complicated dispute and proceeds to decide it, it is on appeal open to the District Judge to consider that aspect and either agree or disagree with the view of the Munsiff relating to the dispute about title of the landlord, Finally it is open to the High Court acting under Section 50 of the Act to consider whether the approach of the two Courts below in regard to this aspect of the matter is acceptable or not. In my opinion, the sentence, on which Shri Krishnaiah placed strong reliance has to be read in the context of the case. In, that case this Court was called upon to decide the validity of final orders passed by the Courts below. In Rukamoddia Dastargirsab's case (2), Nesargi J was not called upon to decide the precise question that arises for determination in this case. I am therefore of the opinion that the sentence on which Shri Krishnaiah has placed strong eliance is of no assistance to him and I therefore reject the same, ( 8 ) AS I have held that this revision petition is not rnainiainable under s. 50 of the 1961 Act, it is not proper for me to examine the correctness of the order passed by the learned Civil Judge. I therefore decline to express any opinion on the correctness of the order challenged in this revision petition. But as observed by the Supreme Court in the Central Bank of India case (1), it is undoubtedly open to the petitioner to set forth the error ii any in the present order if an occasion arises for him to challenge the fin order that may be passed by the learned Civil Judge. ( 9 ) SHRI Krishnaiah submits that the application for eviction was presented in the year 1972 and for one reason or the other the same has not been disposed of by the Court below and therefore it is necessary to direct the learned Civil Judge tor dispose of the same expeditiously. ( 9 ) SHRI Krishnaiah submits that the application for eviction was presented in the year 1972 and for one reason or the other the same has not been disposed of by the Court below and therefore it is necessary to direct the learned Civil Judge tor dispose of the same expeditiously. In my opinion, there is force in the submission of Shri Krishnaiah. I therefore direct the learned IV Addl. Civil Judge to dispose of the H. R. C. No. 2036 of 1975 pending on his file on or before the Civil Courts close for long summer vacation. ( 10 ) CIVIL Revision Petition dismissed. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear the lowr costs. ( 12 ) LET a copy of this order be communicated to the learned Civil judge within 10 days from this day. --- *** --- .