Judgment :- Ismail J. This is an appeal preferred against the order of Gokulakrishnan J. dated 19-8-1978, allowing W.P. No. 7257 of 1975 filed by the respondent herein. The matter lies in a very narrow compass. The respondentherein is a Sugar Mill having been established in or about the year 1956. It went into production of sugar for the first time in 1960. Sugar is a commodity coming under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and excise duty is leviable thereon under item 1 of the First Schedule to the Act. However, Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. enables the Government to exempt excisable Articles from the payment of duty either wholly or in part. In this case the Government of India issued a notification No. 146/74-C.E., dated 12-10-1974, which reads as follows :- "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby exempts sugar, described in column (2) of the Table below and falling under sub-items (1) of item No. 1 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944 (1 of 1944) from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon as is specified in the corresponding entry in columns (3) and (4) of the said Table. Explanation :-In this notification - (a) 'Average production' in relation to sugar produced in the period by a factory which had gone into production for the first time in 1967-68 or earlier, means the simple average production during the corresponding period of the preceding five sugar years; (b) 'free sugar sale' means sugar other than levy sugar; (c) 'levy sugar' means sugar required by the Central Government to be sold under an order made under clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (X of 1955);(d) 'sugar year' means the period of 12 months beginning with the 1st day of October and ending with the 30th day of September next following. 2.In computing the production of sugar during the periods mentioned in column (2) of the said Table- (a) in respect of a factory mentioned in the said Table - (i) the date, as furnished in form R.G. 1 prescribed in appendix I to the Central Excise Rules, 1944 or in such other record as the Collector may prescribe under Rule 53 or rule 173G of the said Rules shall be adopted, and (ii) any sugar obtained by refining sugar or khandsari sugar shall not be taken into account; (b) in respect of a factory mentioned in serial numbers 1 and 2 of the said Table - (i) any sugar obtained by reprocessing of sugar house products left over in process at the end of the base period or earlier shall be taken into account; and (ii) any sugar obtained by reprocessing of defective or damaged sugar or brown sugar, if the same has already been included in the quantity of sugar produced, shall not be taken into account. 3.In the case of a factory which had gone to production for the first time after 19-7-1968, the first two years of production shall not be taken into account while computing average production of the preceding five sugar years. Where production in one or more sugar years among five sugar years was nil, the production in such sugar year or sugar years shall be ignored and the average production shall be the average of the production of the corresponding period of the remaining sugar years. 4.Nothing contained in this notification shall apply to a factory which has been producing sugar only for three years or less. 2. Subsequently, the Government of India issued a corrigendum to this notification on 14-7-1975. The purpose of the corrigendum was to take away the second sentence in paragraph 3 of the said notification and read it as a separate paragraph, namely, paragraph 4 and renumber the existing paragraph 4 as paragraph 5.The respondent's production of sugar for five years, viz., 1969-70 to 1973-74, was as follow 3.With reference to this production as well as the notification of the Government of India, the respondent submitted its claim for refund of excise duty to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Pondicherry. While so doing, the respondent worked out the average production as 42360 quintals divided by 5, as equal to 8472 quintals. While so doing, the respondent worked out the average production as 42360 quintals divided by 5, as equal to 8472 quintals. However, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Pondicherry, questioned the correctness of this calculation and took the view that the production of 42360 quintals had to be divided by 2 and not by 5, because the production of sugar during October-November 1969, October-November 1970 and October-November 1971, was nil, and therefore, those three years must be excluded. The respondent put forward the contention that the calculation of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Pondicherry, was erroneous and, on the terms of the notification referred to above, its calculation alone was correct. We may point out in this behalf that according to the calculation of the respondent herein, it was entitled to a rebate of Rs. 6, 59, 104 while, according to the calculation of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, the respondent was entitled to a rebate of only Rs. 1, 12, 660. It is against this background of controversy between the respondent herein and the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Pondicherry, the respondent herein filed the writ petition in question, viz. W P. No. 7257 of 1975 praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ or direction of a like nature directing the respondents therein, namely, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Pondicherry and the Union of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue and Insurance), New Delhi, to grant the respondent herein its claim for rebate of Rs. 6, 59, 104 under the terms of the Notification No. 146/74-C.E., dated 12-10-1974. We may mention straightaway that there is no controversy before the court that if the calculation of the respondent is correct it is entitled to a rebate of Rs. 6, 59, 104 and if, on the other hand, the calculation of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Pondicherry, is correct, the respondent would be entitled only to Rs. 1, 12, 660 by way of rebate. 4.An elaborate counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellant herein before the learned Judge, putting forward the contention that the production of the total quantity of 42, 360 quintals of sugar has to be divided only by 2 and should not be divided by 5. 1, 12, 660 by way of rebate. 4.An elaborate counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellant herein before the learned Judge, putting forward the contention that the production of the total quantity of 42, 360 quintals of sugar has to be divided only by 2 and should not be divided by 5. The writ petition came to be disposed of by Gokulakrishnan J. The learned Judge allowed the writ petition by issuing a writ of mandamus as prayed for. It is against this judgment and order, the writ appeal has been filed. 5.We shall now refer to the case put forward by the appellant before the learned Judge. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants herein, it was contended- Para 4 of the Explanation to the Notification No. 156/74 (a mistake for 146/74) says that where production in one or more sugar years among five sugar years was nil, the production in such sugar year or sugar years shall be ignored and the average of the production shall be the average of the production of the corresponding period of the remaining sugar years.' Para 4 of the Explanation is applicable to all sugar factories irrespective of whether the factories commenced production in or prior to 1967-68 or after 1968-69'. The counter affidavit further proceeded to state-" * As the petitioner's calculation for his claim for rebate was not in accordance with the explanation 4 to the notification, the Assistant Collector, Pondicherry, instructed the factory to revise the claim. "6.However, as the learned Judge points out in his judgment, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants herein argued before the learned Judge that clause (4) of the explanation carried out by the corrigendum will not govern clause (I)(a) of the notification. The learned Judge has referred to this argument in more than one place. After referring to this argument, the learned Judge draw the inference that clause 3 and clause 4 of the Explanation go together as applying only to sugar mills which started production in 1967-68 and subsequent years, and those two clauses remain untouched by the Explanation; if so, on the basis of para 1(a) of the Explanation, the respondent herein rightly divided the total production by 5 and claimed rebate on that basis.7.Mr. U.N.R. Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants contends before us that paragraph 4 will govern paragraph 1 just like any other paragraph and therefore we have to consider the controversy on the application of paragraph 4 to paragraph 1 also. In other words, we have to take paragraphs 1 and 4 together and decide the controversy before us. 8.We are of the opinion that even if it is assumed that paragraph 4 applies to sugar factories which started production prior to 1967-68 also, still the language in that paragraph will not apply to the respondent's case. We have already referred to the fact that the respondent mill was established in 1956 and it commenced production of sugar in 1960, and therefore, the respondent is a factory which commenced production prior to 1967-68. Paragraph 4 of the Explanation which we have already extracted states-" * Where production in one or more sugar years among five sugar years was nil; the production in such sugar year or sugar years shall be ignored and the average production shall be the average of the production of the corresponding period of the remaining sugar years. "9.We have already given the particulars of production in the respondent factory. That shows that during the years 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72, though the production of sugar during the months of October-November was nil, yet the production cannot be said to be nil during the sugar year as such. Consequently, paragraph 4 on its own terms, will not apply to the respondent. However, as soon as we put this position to the learned Counsel for the appellants, Mr. U.N.R. Rao, he wanted us to read paragraph 4 as if, after the word 'production' in the commencement of the paragraph, the words 'during the relevant months or corresponding period' were present and not to read the word 'production' as indicating production during the whole of the sugar year. We are unable to accede to this request. The expression 'sugar year' has been defined in Explanation 1(d) and it takes in the twelve months period from the 1st October to the 30th September. Therefore, when paragraph 4 uses the expression 'sugar year', we have to understand that expression only as defined in paragraph 1(d) of the Explanation and not otherwise. However, what Mr. The expression 'sugar year' has been defined in Explanation 1(d) and it takes in the twelve months period from the 1st October to the 30th September. Therefore, when paragraph 4 uses the expression 'sugar year', we have to understand that expression only as defined in paragraph 1(d) of the Explanation and not otherwise. However, what Mr. Rao wants us to do is to introduce certain words in paragraph 4, which are not there, to qualify the expression 'production' occurring in the opening of that paragraph. As the paragraph now reads, it refers to production in one or more sugar years. But, how Mr. Rao wants us to read that paragraph is, as though it refers to production not in one or more sugar years, but in the relevant periods, that is, October-November, or December-September, as the case may be, in one or more sugar years. If the language is deficient to bring out the real intention of the authors who issued the notification, it is not for this court to supply the deficiency. In view of this, we hold that paragraph 4 not being applicable to the respondent herein, it is paragraph 1(a) that applies to the respondent and there is no dispute that if paragraph 1(a) applies, to the respondent, the calculation made by the respondent is correct. In view of this, we agree with the final conclusion of the learned Judge that the respondent herein was entitled to a rebate of Rs. 6, 59, 104.10.One other contention that would appear to have been advanced before the learned Judge was based on Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, as amended by the Forty-second Amendment. That provision stated-" * No petition for the redress of any injury referred to in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall be entertained if anv other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force." 11.In the context of that provision, it would appear that on behalf of the appellant herein reliance was placed on Section 33 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, putting forward the contention that the respondent herein had an alternative remedy. The learned Judge, after referring to Sections 33 and 35 of the Act, held that the respondent herein did not have an alternative remedy by way of an appeal or revision and consequently, the respondent was entitled to approach this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Just now, Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India as amended by the Forty-second Amendment is no logger in force. Independent of this, the matter in controversy in the writ petition did not involve any investigation into controverted questions of fact, and merely involved an interpretation of the statutory notification of the Government of India referred to above. In such a context, we are of the opinion that the respondent was justified in approaching this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the fact that the respondent should have filed a suit is no bar to this court granting relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In these circumstances, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 12.After we dictated the above judgment, Mr. U.N.R. Rao, learned counsel for the appellants, orally applies for the grant of a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution of India for preferring an appeal to the Supreme Court of India. We are not satisfied that the matter involved a substantial question of law of general importance which in our opinion needs to be decided by the Supreme Court so as to justify the grant of a certificate and consequently we reject the request.