JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition is directed against a judgment of the First Additional District Judge, Kanpur dated 7-9-1976 dismissing an appeal filed by the petitioners under section 18 of U. P. Act. XIII of 1972. 2. The dispute in this case is with regard to shop No. 83-A/57, Juhi Kanpur. This shop belongs to the petitioners. It had been released in their favour in 1962. 3. An application was made by Tara Singh respondent 3, in June 1975 for allotment of the said shop on the ground that the petitioners had previously illegally sublet the premises of the shop to a tenant and thereafter the shop was lying vacant for the last two years. Respondent 3 claimed that as the shop was lying vacant, it could be allotted to him. On the application filed by respondent 3 an Inspector was deputed for making a spot enquiry. On 5-6-1976, he visited the shop and found that the shop was closed. He happened to meet two persons living in the neighbourhood Pramod Kumar Bajpai and Arvind, who stated that the aforesaid shop was vacant. They also told the Inspector that the said shop had been previously let out by the petitioners to a person who was commonly known by the name of Nepali and he was running the shop in the name of 'Laxmi Pushtak Bhandar'. The further statement made by the aforesaid persons was that after the shop was vacated, possession of the same was handed over to the petitioners who kept it locked. After the report two notices were sent to the petitioners. The petitioners filed an objection disputing that the shop was vacant. The objection further was that they had been carrying on the business of selling books in the disputed shop, and that they had never let it out to Nepali. In support of their case, they also filed the affidavits of Pramod Kumar and Arvind. In these two affidavits they claimed that they did not make any statement before the Inspector, and that the shop really was in possession of the petitioners wherein business was being done by them. 4. In support of their case, they also filed the affidavits of Pramod Kumar and Arvind. In these two affidavits they claimed that they did not make any statement before the Inspector, and that the shop really was in possession of the petitioners wherein business was being done by them. 4. After considering the evidence of the parties, the Rent Control and Eviction officer found that the case of the petitioners was not reliable, and that the shop had been previously let out to Nepali and after it had been vacated by him, the same was lying vacant. Having found that the shop was actually vacant, the Rent Control and Eviction officer allotted the same to respondent 3. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Control and Eviction officer dated 17-12-1975, the petitioners preferred an appeal under section 18 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The appeal came up for hearing before the First Additional District Judge on 7-9-1976. By the time, the appeal came to be heard section 18 had been amended. As a result of the amendment, the appeal was required to be heard as a revision. However, the learned Additional District Judge did not find any merit in the appeal and dismissed the same on 7-9-1976. While dismissing the appeal, he referred to the evidence of the petitioners and found that the petitioners had not succeeded in establishing that the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer holding that a vacancy occurred, was erroneous. 6. Being aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present writ petition. 7. The main submission of Sri S. P. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, was that the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction officer as well as that of the First Additional District Judge did not give any reason as was required under the law, the same are vitiated and liable to be quashed. Particularly, he referred to the affidavits of Pramod Kumar and Arvind, which had been filed by the petitioners in support of their case. He took me through these affidavits and argued that as these two persons had claimed that none of them made any statement before the Inspector, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer either should have found these persons as liers and disbelieved them or he should have decided the application in favour of the petitioners. 8. He took me through these affidavits and argued that as these two persons had claimed that none of them made any statement before the Inspector, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer either should have found these persons as liers and disbelieved them or he should have decided the application in favour of the petitioners. 8. Before coming to the aforesaid argument of the petitioners' learned counsel, I wish to refer to the finding of the learned Additional District Judge wherein he found that the petitioner no. 2 was 85 years of age and the petitioner I was employed as a clerk in Omar Vaish Intermediate College. The learned Additional District Judge, amongst others, relied on the aforesaid circumstance and found that the case of the petitioners that the shop was not lying vacant was not worthy of belief. To me, it appears that the aforesaid finding given by the learned Additional District Judge concludes the matter against the petitioners. This shows that none of the petitioners was available for doing the business which was being claimed by them. Petitioner No. 2. Smt. Parvati Devi was over 85 years of age. The inference drawn by the learned Additional District Judge that she was not expected to do any business in the shop, cannot be said to be perverse. As Uma Shanker Shukla, petitioner 1, was employed in an institution, he was also rightly taken for holding that the shop was lying vacant. It appears that he concealed the fact of his service and falsely alleged that he was in the business. 9. I am also not prepared to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners about the affidavits which had been filed by Pramod Kumar Bajpai and Arvind. The learned Additional District Judge has referred to those affidavits, and although he has not given any finding thereon but reading the judgment as a whole it appears that he disbelieved those affidavits. He placed reliance on the report of the Inspector, who had clearly stated that the shop was lying vacant. 10. It may be stated here that Section 18 of U. P. Act. XIII of 1972 is in the same language as Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Section 115 Civil Procedure Code does not empower a court to interfere with the question of fact or that of law. 10. It may be stated here that Section 18 of U. P. Act. XIII of 1972 is in the same language as Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Section 115 Civil Procedure Code does not empower a court to interfere with the question of fact or that of law. In revision interference can be made where there is exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction. The expression "material irregularity" or "illegality" also refers to serious or unreasonable omission on the part of a court in following the procedure prescribed by law. The question that the two courts below did not draw a correct inference from the affidavits filed by the petitioners, is not one of jurisdiction. It could at the most give rise to an error of fact. 11. For all these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, I make no order as to costs. The stay order is discharged.