JUDGMENT N. D. Ojha and Murlidhar, JJ. - The petitioner is a registered partnership concern and controls Vishambher Palace, Moti Mahal and Rupbani cinemas. Three applications were made by J. S. P. Pandey, an Inspector appointed under the Minimum Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Authority under the Act one each in respect of the three cinema houses aforesaid. The case set up in the said applications was that the management of the aforesaid cinema houses had not paid to their workmen minimum wages prescribed by the relevant notification and consequently they may be directed to make the said payment under Section 20 (3) of the Act along with ten times penalty. Notices were issued on these applications to the' management by the Authority under the Act and after hearing the parties the Authority came to the conclusion that the management was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 2724.90 as wages in respect of Vishambhar Palace, a sum of Rs. 2139.00 in respect of Moti Mahal and a sum of Rs. 1996.00 in respect of Rupbani. The Authority also directed the management to pay a sum representing ten times the aforesaid amount as penalty in respect of each of the three cinema houses. It is these orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged (1) that Shri J. S. P. Pandey, who filed the applications before the Authority, had not been validly appointed as an Inspector under the Act and as such no action could be taken on the basis of those applications; and (2) in view of an earlier award dated 11th March, 1972, which was to remain operative for ten years according to the direction contained therein the applications were not maintainable in view of S. 3 (2-A) of the Act. 3. These two pleas had been raised by this very petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1931 of 1974 in respect of a fourth cinema house and were repelled by this Court on 10th Jan. 1979 for the reasons contained therein: we find no substance in these two pleas. 4. It was then urged that the award of ten times compensation which was the maximum under Section 20 (3) of the Act was arbitrary. 1979 for the reasons contained therein: we find no substance in these two pleas. 4. It was then urged that the award of ten times compensation which was the maximum under Section 20 (3) of the Act was arbitrary. This plea does not appear to have been raised before respondent No. 1 nor had any ground been taken even in the grounds of the writ petition at the initial stage. However, an application has been made for amendment of the writ petition which was listed for orders along with the writ petition and we have permitted this plea being urged by the petitioner. This plea too was raised in Writ Petition No. 1931 of 1974 (supra) and was repelled even on merits. The ground on which ten times compensation was awarded by the Authority in the instant case was the same as the ground for awarding a similar compensation in the order which was sought to be quashed in Writ Petition No. 1931 of 1974. The reasons given in the judgment of this Court in that writ petition consequently hold good for repelling the said plea in the instant case also and for the sake of brevity we find it unnecessary to reiterate them here. We may, however, point out that when Section 20 (3) of the Act itself provides that compensation up to ten times of the unpaid amount may be awarded it can legitimately be presumed that the legislature had in contemplation some case in which that much compensation could be awarded. Consequently whether no compensation should at all be awarded or the maximum compensation should be awarded or any sum in between may be determined as amount of compensation will necessarily depend on the facts of each case. As seen above the plea does not appear to have been raised before respondent No. l. No circumstances were, therefore, apparently brought to the notice of the said respondent justifying the award of a lesser compensation than what respondent No. 1 in the circumstances of the case and for the reasons recorded by it thought fit to award. The, question as to what compensation should, be awarded is obviously not a pure question of law and requires investigation into questions of fact. The, question as to what compensation should, be awarded is obviously not a pure question of law and requires investigation into questions of fact. It is particularly in this background that we are of opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned orders on this point in exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 5. By the aforesaid application for amendment another ground which has been sought to be urged is that cinema operators and booking clerks did not. fall within the four categories of workers specified in the relevant notification and were as such not entitled to the minimum wages fixed by the said notification. This plea again does not appear to have been raised before respondent No. 1. It is a plea which requires evidence for its decision inasmuch as the question as to under what category a particular workman falls can be decided only on the basis of the actual duties which he performs and not by the label given to him. Had the plea been raised before respondent no. 1 evidence could have been led by the workmen to prove the necessary facts. This plea cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. 6. Another plea, which though not raised either before respondent No. 1 or even in the writ petition, was pressed at the time of arguments and was to the effect that respondent No. 1, viz. the-Deputy Labour Commissioner even though he had been appointed Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act could not have been appointed as an Authority under the Act in view of the amendment made in sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act by the Minimum Wages (Amendment) Act, 1957 (Act No. 30 of 1957). In order to appreciate this submission it would be necessary to quote Section 20 (1) of the Act. The said sub-section as it now stands reads as follows:- "20. In order to appreciate this submission it would be necessary to quote Section 20 (1) of the Act. The said sub-section as it now stands reads as follows:- "20. Claims.-(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under cl. (b) or cl. (c) of subsection (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under Section 14, to -employees employed or paid in that area. ........................" By Section 12 of the said Amending Act inter alia the words "any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any" were substituted for the words "any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or". What was urged by counsel for the petitioner was that after the aforesaid amendment any officer of the State Government below the rank of Labour Commissioner could not be appointed as an authority under Section 20 and since respondent No. 1 was only a Deputy Labour Commissioner the impugned orders passed by him were without jurisdiction. In substance the submission is that the words "any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner" should be read as a proviso, viz., if the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation appointed under the Workmen's 'Compensation Act was to be appointed as an Authority under Section 20 of the Act and if such person was an officer of the Central Government he should be an officer exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, and if he was an officer of the State Government he should not be below the rank of Labour Commissioner. We find it difficult to accept this submission for a variety of reasons. If that was the intention of the legislature there was no difficulty in adding a proviso to Section 20 (1) in the terms as urged by counsel for the petitioner. The legislature would in that event not have added (i) any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region; and (ii) any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner, after using the word "or" before each of them. The manner in which the amendment has been brought in and the plain language used in doing so particularly the use of the word "or" as aforesaid leaves to doubt in our mind that it was a case where by the amendment the legislature wanted to add these two sets of officers to be included in Section 20 (1) for being appointed as an Authority under the said section by the appropriate Government by issuing a notification straightway even if they had not been appointed Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by any earlier notification. In this connection it would be seen that the mere fact that a person may have been appointed as a Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act does not ipso facto become an Authority under Section 20 (1) of the Act. A separate notification has to be issued making a Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation as an Authority under the Act. Consequently if a person has not already been appointed as a Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and he did not fall under any other category of officers mentioned in Section 20 (1) of the Act he could not be appointed an Authority under S. 20 (1) by the appropriate government. An officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner and an officer of the State Government not below' the rank of Labour Commissioner which for all practical purposes means the Labour Commissioner did not find place in Section 29 (1) of the Act prior to the aforesaid amendment. Consequently unless they may have already been appointed Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act they could not be appointed as an Authority under Section 20 (1) of the Act even if the appropriate Government wanted to do so. Consequently unless they may have already been appointed Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act they could not be appointed as an Authority under Section 20 (1) of the Act even if the appropriate Government wanted to do so. At this place it would be relevant to note that the power to appoint a Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation under Section 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act has been conferred on the State Govt, whereas the power to appoint an authority under S. 20 (1) of the Act has been conferred on the appropriate Government. The term "appropriate Government" according to its definition contained in S. 2 (b) of the Act means:- "(i) in relation to any scheduled employment carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or a railway administration, or in relation to a mine, oilfield or major port or any corporation established by a Central Act, the Central Government, and (ii) in relation to any other scheduled employment, the State Government." According to S. 2 (g) of the Act "scheduled employment" means "an employment specified in the Schedule, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment." The appointment of an Authority under S. 20 (1) of the Act has thus to be made in some cases by the Central Government and in others by the State Government. Section 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act at the time when the amending Act No. 30 of 1957 aforesaid was passed contemplated appointment by the State Government of a Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation "for such local area as may be specified in the notification." The word "local" was however subsequently omitted by Act No. 64 of 1962. Consequently when Amending Act 30 of 1957 was passed the State Government could appoint a Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation for a local area only. The term "local area" could apparently not include any area outside the territory of the State, since S. 20 of the Act contemplates appointment of an Authority not only by the State Government but also by the Central Govern-men' and that too not for a "local area" but any specified area". Some difficulty may have been felt whereby a person appointed as a Commr. Some difficulty may have been felt whereby a person appointed as a Commr. for Workmen's Compensation u/s. 20 of the Workmen's Compensation Act may not have been found competent to act as an Authority under S. 20 of the Act in respect of "any specified area" and the amendment in S. 20 (1) may have been made to meet such difficulty. 7. Relying on Sanghvi Jeevraj v. M. C. G. & K. M. W. Union ( AIR 1969 SC 530 ) it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that while construing a provision introduced by amendment the mischief or defect sought to be removed is a relevant consideration and the words "not below the rank of Labour Commissioner" would be deemed to have been used in public interest as held by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore ( AIR 1964 SC 221 ) while construing S. 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. According to counsel the intention of the legislature in introducing the aforesaid amendment was that no officer of the Central Government who was not exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region or no officer of the State Government below the rank of Labour Commissioner was to be appointed an Authority under S. 20 of the Act. We do not agree. Had this been the intention the words "any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation" could very well have been deleted. The legislature, however, did not do so and retained those words. In Braham Sarup v. State of Haryana (AIR 1971 Punj & Har 102) the question of Interpretation of S. 15 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act came up for consideration. Had this been the intention the words "any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation" could very well have been deleted. The legislature, however, did not do so and retained those words. In Braham Sarup v. State of Haryana (AIR 1971 Punj & Har 102) the question of Interpretation of S. 15 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act came up for consideration. The said sub-section reads:- "15 (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Presiding Officer of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of Industrial Disputes in force in the State or any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other Officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages, of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters incidental to such claims. Provided.............. (2) .................. Provided.............." In that case Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer had been appointed as an Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and it was urged that the said appointment was not valid. The argument was that S. 15 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act should be construed in such a manner as to make judicial experience an inflexible qualification for persons who are to be appointed as an Authority under the said Act. The argument further was that the clause "other officers with experience of a Judge of a Civil Court or of a stipendiary Magistrate" in S. 15 (1) should not be read disjunctively but as an overriding qualification prescribed for all appointees who are to act as an Authority under the Act. The word "or" used in S. 15 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act was sought to be read as "and". While repelling the argument it was held "There can be no dispute with the general proposition that in exceptional circumstances it may be, legitimate to read the conjunctive and disjunctive words "and" "or" one for the other where the literal interpretation would defeat the intention of the legislature and the very object of the Act. While repelling the argument it was held "There can be no dispute with the general proposition that in exceptional circumstances it may be, legitimate to read the conjunctive and disjunctive words "and" "or" one for the other where the literal interpretation would defeat the intention of the legislature and the very object of the Act. However in construing the provisions of S. 15 (1) none of those exceptional circumstances for reading the word "or" and "and" can even remotely be suggested. Mr. Chawla is wholly unable to show that the plain meaning of S. 15 (1) was not obviously intended by the legislature when explicit language to that effect has been used. Nor in this context does a grammatical construction leading to any absurdity which may have to be avoided by reading the word "or" as "and" in this statute. There is nothing in the context of the above said provision to show that a contrary meaning was intended for the word "or". It is, therefore, that none of the pre-requisites which have been mentioned in the above said authorities exist in the present case and do not therefore see my way as to how and why the plain word "or" in S. 15 (1) should be construed as "and". This contention of Mr. Chawla therefore, must fail." The interpretation which I am inclined to take of S. 15 (1) of the Act is further fortified by a reference to legislative history. Section 15 as originally enacted in 1936 (apart from the Adaptation Order made in 1960) is in the following terms:- "15 (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other Officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages of persons employed or paid in that area." Obviously the above provision is considerably prior to the Industrial Disputes Act which was enacted in 1947. It is, therefore, that the reference to S. 7-A (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act on which Mr. Chawla wanted to rely is inappropriate because the provisions of a subsequent enactment could not control the earlier enactment viz., the Payment of 'Wages Act, 1936. It is, therefore, that the reference to S. 7-A (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act on which Mr. Chawla wanted to rely is inappropriate because the provisions of a subsequent enactment could not control the earlier enactment viz., the Payment of 'Wages Act, 1936. Consequently even as originally enacted, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation was one of the persons who could be appointed as an authority under the Act. It was only with effect from the 1st of February, 1965, that by an amendment the Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts under the Industrial Disputes Act or the corresponding State legislation were also made eligible to act as an authority. It is thus patent that the subsequent prescription of qualifications for the appointment to the Office of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court vide S. 7-A (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot have any bearing in construing S. 15(1) of the Act. Lastly there is weight in the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that if judicial experience was to be a prerequisite for appointment as an authority, the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act exercises even more important and vital judicial functions under that statute. Under S. 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act all questions as to the liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the amount or duration of compensation, in default of agreement, have to be adjudicated upon and decided by the Commissioner and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is barred therefrom. Similarly under S. 23 thereof, the Commissioner is empowered with all the powers of a Civil Court under the Civil P. C., for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of the documents and is deemed to be a Civil Court for all purposes under S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Vide S. 30 thereof appeals against the orders of the Commissioner lie direct to the High Court. It is unnecessary to refer to other provisions as it cannot be disputed that the Commr. under the above said Act indeed exercises a wide amplitude of judicial functions. Vide S. 30 thereof appeals against the orders of the Commissioner lie direct to the High Court. It is unnecessary to refer to other provisions as it cannot be disputed that the Commr. under the above said Act indeed exercises a wide amplitude of judicial functions. It was in this context that the legislature in its wisdom held it appropriate that the Commissioner, who already stood clothed with wide judicial powers under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, may also be empowered and appointed to exercise the closely analogous judicial functions of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. It is undeniable that the two statutes above said are integral part of the Industrial Legislation within the country. In the end, reference may well be made lo the gnawing fear voiced by Mr. Chawla That the State Government who is the appointing authority may be tempted to abuse the power of appointment vested in it. A reference was made to S. 20 of The Workmen's Compensation Act which does not prescribe any qualifications for the post of the Commissioner and lays down that the Government may appoint any person to be a Commissioner for the Workmen's Compensation for the relative area. From this provision it was sought to be argued that the State Government may first appoint a wholly unqualified person unworthy to hold judicial office as Commissioner and then empower him as an authority under the Payment of Wages Act also. This argument is indeed hypothetical and tends to assume mala fides on the part of the State. It is elementary that all powers vested in any authority is capable both of use and abuse. One cannot proceed on the assumption that the State will necessarily abuse such a power and make such an assumption a basis for denuding it of the express power given to it under the statute. Indeed the presumption is to the contrary, namely, that the State would use the power vested in it bona fide for advancing the purposes of the enactment. The observations of Willes, J. in Earl of Derby v. Bury Improvement Commrs., (1869) 4 Ex 222 are apt on the point - "In the absence of any proof to the contrary, credit ought to be given to public officers, who have acted prima facie within the limits of their authority, for having done so with honesty and discretion." 8. The observations of Willes, J. in Earl of Derby v. Bury Improvement Commrs., (1869) 4 Ex 222 are apt on the point - "In the absence of any proof to the contrary, credit ought to be given to public officers, who have acted prima facie within the limits of their authority, for having done so with honesty and discretion." 8. Section 15 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act is almost in pari materia to S. 20 (1) of the Act and the reasons given in Braham Sarup's case (supra) can be applied in the instant case too. 9. Further the established rules of interpretation too do not permit the acceptance of the submission made by counsel for the petitioner. When certain words or phrases are used one after the other it is either on the rule of ejusdem generis or the rule of noscitur a sociis (the meaning of word is to be ascertained by reference to the meaning of the other words associated with it) that a different or restricted meaning is given to a particular word or phrase. The rule of ejusdem generis as is well-known applies only to general words following words which are less general. Since the words "any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation" in S. 20 (1) do not follow but precedes the words "any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner" the rule of ejusdem generis will not apply. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes. Twelfth Edition, states the proposition thus:- "The rule applies only to general words following words which are less general. "I know of no authority", said Lord Cave L. C., "for applying that rule to A case where, to begin with, the whole clause is governed by the initial general words. "60 So the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the circumstances that the general words in S. 35 (13) of the Canadian Transport Act, 1938," on any application under this section, the Board of Transport Commissioners shall have regard to all considerations which appear to it to be relevant," are followed by a specific direction to the Board to have regard in particular to two matters did not in any way detract from the generality of the Board's discretion. 61." (60) Ambatielos v. Anton Jurgens Margarine Works (1923) AC 175, at p. 183. (61) Canadian National Railways v. Canadian Steamship Lines, Ltd. (1945) AC 204. 10. The rule of noscitur a sociis can also not be applied in the instant case. In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha ( AIR 1960 SC 610 ) it was held that noscitur a sociis js merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the Legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that the above rule of construction can be usefully applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the words of wider import is doubtful; but, where the object of the Legislature in using wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot be pressed into service. A similar view was taken in Nagpur Corporation v. Its Employees ( AIR 1960 SC 675 ). 11. In view of what we have stated above it is not a case where there is any doubt in regard to the meaning of any word of wider import while construing S. 20 (1) of the Act. The words used in the said sub-section are clear and free from ambiguity and the rule for interpreting such words is the one as laid down in Mahadeolal v. Administrator-General of West Bengal ( AIR 1960 SC 936 ), viz., " the intention of the Legislature has always to be gathered from the words used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning." 12. It is for these reasons that we are unable to accept the submission that respondent No. 1 could not be appointed as an Authority under S. 20 (1) of the Act. 13. The last submission which has been made by counsel for the petitioner is that there is an error of calculation of the amount of wages which had not been paid to the workmen of the three cinema houses aforesaid. The necessary facts and the grounds in this regard were introduced in the writ petition by an amendment application allowed on 23rd Sept., 1977. The necessary facts and the grounds in this regard were introduced in the writ petition by an amendment application allowed on 23rd Sept., 1977. In that application it has been stated that the correct figure of unpaid wages in respect of Vishambhar Palace was Rs. 1,585.27 and not Rupees 2,724.90, in respect of Moti Mahal it was Rs. 1,276.80 and not Rs. 2,139.00, and in respect of Rupbani it was Rs. 1,287.36 and not Rs. 1,996.50. The said application also states that the corresponding figures of ten times compensation also deserve to be reduced from Rupees 27,249.00 to Rupees 15,852.70 in respect of Vishambhar Palace, from Rupees 21,390.00 to Rupees 12,768.30 in respect of Moti Mahal and from Rs. 1,994.00 to Rs. 12,873.60 in respect of Rupbani. In respect of this submission Shri K. P. Agarwal, appearing for the workmen concerned, made a statement that the matter was already old and in order to avoid further delay he was accepting the figures given by the petitioner in the aforesaid amendment application and consequently no further investigation of this matter is needed. In view of this statement we are of opinion that it has become unnecessary to require the respondent No. 1 to go into the question as to what was the correct amount of wages and a direction can be issued to the effect that the impugned orders may be enforced only in respect of those amounts as have been stated by the petitioner in his application for amendment aforesaid in place of the amount mentioned in the impugned orders. 14. In the result we find no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed except for the relief specified hereinafter. In view of the statement made by counsel for the workmen a direction is issued that the impugned orders will be enforced against the petitioner only in respect of the amounts mentioned in the impugned orders so far as unpaid wages and compensation are concerned; Unpaid wages Compensation 1. Vishambhar Palace Rs. 1,585.27 Rs. 15,852.70 2. Moti Mahal Rs. 1,276.80 Rs. 12,768.30 3. Rupbani Rs. 1,287.36 Rs. 12,873.60 15. The respondents will be entitled to their costs.