JUDGMENT Nesargi, J.- This petition has come up before this Bench on reference made by Nagappa, J. The learned Judge has made the reference on the ground that important questions of law are involved and it is desirable that the matter is heard by a Division Bench of this Court. 2. The important questions of law which are enumerated in the order of reference are as follows: (a) that a reading of the complaint, Exhibit P-1, coupled with the evidence of the Drugs Inspector who is the complainant does not make out a case even for framing a case even for framing a charge against the accused; (b) that the accused had obtained necessary licences in Form No. 20-A and in Form No. 21-A issued by the competent authority which embraced the Drugs in question and charge against the accused: (c) that the authorities which issued the licences had no power to restrict the conditions of sale by incorporating a restriction under the head ‘N.B.‘ below the licence. Even otherwise, such an incorporation of restriction would not tantamount to the offence by the accused in view of the other recitals in the licence itself; (d) that the Courts below have not properly construed the statutory plea available to the accused under section 19 (3) of the Act which has resulted in injustice to the accused and, if the same was construed and applied to the facts of the case in proper perspective, the Courts ought to have acquitted the accused on this alone; (c) that the charge framed by the learned Magistrate is defective and the same has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice and the same has caused injustice to the accused. 3. The charge framed against the accused in C.C. No. 399 of 1974 on the file of the additional Civil Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandya District, Mandya, is as follows: “That you A-1to A-3 above named on or about 25th October, 1972 at M.T.M. No. 503/B2389, Bazar Street, Mandya, had stocked and exhibited for sale 60 dozens (60 } 12 } 10GM) of ointment of Pencillin I.P. 55, Batch No. L82-A. 1234 manufactured by M/s.Lyovak Laboratories, Bombay, without a valid licence as required under clause (c) of section 18 and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 27 (a) (ii) of the Drugs of Cosmetics Act, 1940, and within the cognizance of this Court”. 4. 4. The prosecution case as seen from the complaint and the evidence of the complainant was that on 25th October, 1972, he visited the shop premises of the respondents/accused (hereinafter referred to as the accused) and found the said quantity of Pencilin ointment in the shop and as the accused were not permitted by the licences possessed by them to sell this drug, he issued a prohibitory order as per Exhibit P-1 and that the prohibitory order was extended from time to time and lastly on 28th December, 1972, he took samples of that drug and seized the drug from accused. According to the prosecution the accused had two restricted licences one in Form No. 20-A and another Form No. 21-A enabling the them to sell certain drugs, but this drug is not covered by any of the said licences and as such they had committed the offence of ‘stocking or exhibiting for sale’ the said drug without a valid licence. It is on the basis of this case of the prosecution that the aforementioned charge was framed. 5. At this juncture we deem it appropriate to deal with the contention that the charge framed is defective and it has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice as the same has caused prejudice to the accused. The complaint was lodged in January, 1974 i.e., long prior to the commencement of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Therefore, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) would be applicable. section 537 of the Code reads as follows: “537. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error or omission in charge or other proceedings.- Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Chapter XXVII or on appeal or revision on account- (a) of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant proclamation, order, judgment, or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or (b) of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge, including any misjoinder or charges, or (c) of the omission to revive any list of jurors in accordance with section 324, or (d) of any misdirection in any charge to a jury unless such error, omission, irregularity or misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. Explanation.- In determining whether an error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. In regard to the explanation, the Supreme Court has held that omission to take objection of prejudice in the grounds of appeal is not) necessarily fatal; but the fact that the objection was not taken at an earlier stage, if it could and should have been taken, is a material circumstance weighing heavily against the accused, particularly when he is represented by Counsel throughout. Ordinarily it will be very difficult to sustain a plea of prejudice unless the Court is told just where the shoe pinches; vide decision reported in K.C. Mathew and others State of Travancore-Cochin1. The Supreme Court has in Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co., Limited and others K. Shreepathi Rao2 laid down that this explanation covers cases of omission, error or irregularity in the charges including misjoinder of charges providing in section 535 also of the Code. 6. The records show that no objection regarding charge especially on the ground that the charge was defective was raised by the accused at any stage during the trial. The charge reads, to show clearly, what the case of the prosecution was and what was the material that the prosecution intended to establish for proving the offence of ‘stocking for sale’ this particular drug without a valid licence. Sri V. C. Narasimha, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the accused, argued that the appropriate provision of law covering such a case would section 18(a)(vi) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), but not section 18(c) of the Act. This argument has to fail as it amounts to contending that a wrong provision of law is noted in the charge, assuming but not holding that the appropriate provision of law that would be applicable is section 18(a)(vi) of the Act. According to Sri Narasimha the prosecution had misled the accused in meeting the particular case. This contention is too general in nature and does not specifically show as to where the shoe pinches, as laid down by the Supreme Court. According to Sri Narasimha the prosecution had misled the accused in meeting the particular case. This contention is too general in nature and does not specifically show as to where the shoe pinches, as laid down by the Supreme Court. We are convinced that no prejudice has been caused and the accused had understood the prosecution case in particular the gravamen of the charge and the offence complained of, quite satisfactorily. 7. Licence in Form No. 21-A is at Exhibit P-27. Term-3 of the licence reads as follows: “Particulars of Schedules C and C (1) drugs to be sold……..4, 5 and 6-C(1) drugs and no schedule drugs”. The contention of Sri Narasimha is that the licensing authority had no power in law to restrict the licence by putting such conditions. Further on, according to the prosecution the accused were licenced to sell the following items as per Form No. 20-A licence: List of items permitted to sell under licence in Form 20-A: 1. Pain Relievers, Aspro, Anacin caffasprin, Codopyrin, Saridon Phensic. 2. Cough Syrups: Pertusin, Zephrol, Manners, Glycodin. 3. Ointments and Balms: Amrithanjan, Oriental Balm, Cibal, Iodex, Nopin Soloans - Liniment, Germex, Vicks Vaporub, Burnol. 4. Inhalers: Vicks, Amrithanjan. 5. Antiseptics: Dettal, Listerine, Iteal, Savlon. 6. Purgatives like: Purgolax, Trulax, Vaculax, Castophene, Milk of Magnesia. 7. Gripe water like; Balamrits, Wood-words, Dongre's, Manner. 8. Salts: Eno's Andrems, Health Salt, Kurshen's Epsum Salt. 9. Oils: Eucalyptus oil, Medicinal Castor, oil, Turpentine oil. This is Exhibit P-9.section 18 of the Act, provides that ‘stocking for sale or exhibiting for sale’ any drug except under and in accordance with a valid licence, is prohibited. section 33 of the Act vests the Central Government with the power to make Rules. Section 33(2)(e) of the Act empowers the Central Government to make Rules providing for forms of licences to be prescribed and for imposing certain conditions in licences. Rule 65 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) provides for licences, and reads as follows: “65. Condition of licences.— Licences is Forms 20, 20-A, 20-B, 21, 21-A and 21-B shall be subject to the conditions stated therein and to the following general conditions ……”. Rule 65 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) provides for licences, and reads as follows: “65. Condition of licences.— Licences is Forms 20, 20-A, 20-B, 21, 21-A and 21-B shall be subject to the conditions stated therein and to the following general conditions ……”. Rule 61(1) of the Rules provides for issue of licences to sell, stock of exhibit for sale, or distribute drugs other than those specified in Schedules C and C (1) by retail, on restricted licence or by wholesale in Form 20, 20-A or 20-B as the case may be. The proviso to rule 61(1) lays down that a licence shall be valid for such drugs as are specified in the licence. This provision makes it abundantly clear that the competent authority issuing the licence has the power to make the licence valid only for drugs as are specified in the licence. Rule 61 (2) of the Rules reads as follows: “A licence to sell, stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute drugs specified in Schedule C and C (1) by retail, on restricted licence or by wholesale shall be issued in Form 21, 21-A or 21-B, as the case may be: Provided that a licence in Form 21-A shall be valid for only such drugs as are specified in the licence”. Perusal of these Rules leaves no doubt in our mind that the licensing authority has the power to issue restricted licences and hence this argument has to fail. 8. Sri Narasimha argued that plea under section 19 (3) of the Act is available to the accused as it is not the case of the prosecution that the accused had secured this drug from manufacturers or dealers who are not duly licensed and that the drug was substandard. 8. Sri Narasimha argued that plea under section 19 (3) of the Act is available to the accused as it is not the case of the prosecution that the accused had secured this drug from manufacturers or dealers who are not duly licensed and that the drug was substandard. Section 19 (3) of the Act reads as follows: (3) A person, not being the manufacturer of a drug or cosmetic or his agent for the distribution thereof, shall not be liable for a contravention of section 18 if he proves— (a) that he acquired the drug or cosmetic from a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer thereof; (b) that he did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained that the drug or cosmetic in any way contravened the provisions of that section; and (c) that the drug or cosmetic, while in his possession, was properly stored and remained in the same state as when he acquired it”. If this argument of Sri Narasimha is held acceptable what follows is that so long as a person satisfies these conditions, it would not be in law necessary for him to secure a valid licence for stocking for sale or exhibiting for sale or selling any drug, under the Act. That apparently cannot be the intendment of this provision. section 19 deals mainly with misbranded drugs, sub-standard drugs and so on. Hence, this argument also has to fail. 9. We have shown what the prosecution case is on the basis of the allegation in the complaint and the evidence of the Drugs Inspector. We have also shown that according to Exhibits P-26 and P-27 the accused were licensed to sell the drugs mentioned therein. Item Nos. 4, 5 and 6 in Schedule C (1) appended to the Rules are: “(4) Fish Liver Oil and preparations containing Fish Liver Oil. (5) Vitamins and preparations containing any Vitamins not in a form to be administrative parenterally. (6) Liver extract and preparations containing liver extract not in a form to be administered parenterally”. The drug in question is not covered by items 4, 5 and 6. Therefore, it cannot be said that Exhibit P-27 is the valid licence under which the drug in question could have been stocked for sale by the accused. The drugs mentioned in Exhibit P-9 covered by Exhibit P-26 consist of 9 items. The drug in question is not covered by items 4, 5 and 6. Therefore, it cannot be said that Exhibit P-27 is the valid licence under which the drug in question could have been stocked for sale by the accused. The drugs mentioned in Exhibit P-9 covered by Exhibit P-26 consist of 9 items. It is again clear that the drug in question is not one of these items. Exhibit P-10 is another list of drugs which the accused were not licensed to stock for sale. Items Nos. 1 to 7 in Exhibit P-10 are not relevant for our purpose as it the contention of Sri Narasimha that item No. 8 includes this drug and therefore, the licence at Exhibit P-27 is a valid licence for stocking for sale of this drug by the accused. Item No. 8 in Exhibit P-10 reads as follows: ‘8. Any other preparations not in a form of injection”. It is to be remembered that the drugs mentioned in Exhibit P-10 are in regard to items 4, 5 and 6 of Schedule C(1) only. Therefore, item No. 8 of Exhibit P-10 must also be in regard to the items 4, 5 and 6 of Schedule C (1). We have also shown that items 4, 5 and 6 of Schedule C (1) do not cover the drug in question. Therefore, item No. 8 in Exhibit P-10 also does not cover the drug in question. Hence, there is no valid licence issued in favour of the accused to enable them to stock for sale the drug in question. 10. The next question that arises is whether there is irregularity or illegality in the findings recorded by the two Courts below in regard to the fact that the accused had stocked the drug in question for sale without a valid licence. 11. That the accused did not have valid licence, has been already shown. The question that remains to be considered is whether the material on record justifies the finding of the two Courts below. 12. Sri Narasimha, rightly pointed out that the trial Court has not gone into this aspect of the matter and has somehow come to the conclusion that the offence alleged had been committed. The question that remains to be considered is whether the material on record justifies the finding of the two Courts below. 12. Sri Narasimha, rightly pointed out that the trial Court has not gone into this aspect of the matter and has somehow come to the conclusion that the offence alleged had been committed. He nextly pointed out that according to the Sessions Judge the quantity of 60 dozens of drug viz., the tubes was sufficient to conclude that the accused had stocked the drug for sale, and urged that this conclusion of the Sessions Judge is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sk. Amir v. The State of Maharashtra1. He argued that the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Shabbir v. State of Maharashtra2 conflicts with the proposition of law laid down in Sk. Amir's case1. That also is a tentative opinion expressed by Nagappa, J., in his order of reference. The words ‘stock or exhibit for sale’ in section 18 (b) read with section 27 of the Act were interpreted in both these decisions. In Sk. Amir's case1, the Supreme Court has held that the word ‘stock’ was not used in any technical sense and its plain meaning was ‘to keep’ and therefore the injunction of law contained in the said provision meant no more than that no person shall keep for sale a misbranded drug or a drug in respect of which a valid licence was not held. It is therefore, clear that the Supreme Court has laid down in Sk. Amir's case1, that though the word ‘stock’ plainly meant ‘keep’ and what was necessary to be proved to bring home the offence was the ingredient ‘keeping for sale’. In other words, the Supreme Court held that merely keeping or stocking would not be sufficient but that such stocking or keeping should be for sale. That is exactly what has been held in Mohd. Shabbir's case2, after adverting to the commas used in framing the particular provision. Hence, we are of opinion that there is no conflict in the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sk. Amir's case1and Mohd. Shabbir's case2. 13. In Sk. That is exactly what has been held in Mohd. Shabbir's case2, after adverting to the commas used in framing the particular provision. Hence, we are of opinion that there is no conflict in the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sk. Amir's case1and Mohd. Shabbir's case2. 13. In Sk. Amir's case1, the facts were that the drug vis., 95,000 capsules of seco Barbital Sodium which is a sedative agent was found in a parcel which was in his possession when he was apprehended at the gate of the Malkapur Railway Station. The Supreme Court on taking this fact into consideration held as follows: “The large quantity of 95,000 capsules found in the possession of the appellant leaves no doubt that he had stocked or kept the drug for sale and it could not have been meant for his personal use”. Sri Narasimha pointed out that a similar contention was advanced in Mohd. Shabbir's case1and the same has been repelled by the Supreme Court in paragraph 4 of its judgment. The relevant portion reads as follows: “Mr. Khanna appearing for the State, however, contended that the word “stock” used in section is wide enough to include the possession of a person with the tablets and’ where such a person is in the possession of tablets of a very huge quantity, a presumption should be drawn that they were meant for sale or for distribution. In our opinion, the contention is wholly untenable and must be rejected. The interpretation sought to be placed by Shri Khanna does not flow from a true and proper interpretation of section 27. We, therefore, held that before a person can be liable for prosecution or conviction under section 27 (a) (i) (ii) read with section 18 (c) of the Act, it must be proved by the prosecution affirmatively that he was manufacturing the drugs for sale or was selling the same or had stocked them, or exhibited the articles for sale. The possession simpliciter of the article does not appear to be punishable under any of the provisions of the Act. If, therefore the essential ingredients of section 27 are not satisfied the plea of guilty cannot lead the Court to convict the appellant”. 14. The possession simpliciter of the article does not appear to be punishable under any of the provisions of the Act. If, therefore the essential ingredients of section 27 are not satisfied the plea of guilty cannot lead the Court to convict the appellant”. 14. The evidence of P.W. 1 has satisfactorily established that 60 dozens tubes of Pencilin ointement viz., the drug in question, were found in stock in the shop premises of the accused and it was in the said shop premises that the accused was licensed to sell drugs under the licences in Form No. 20-A viz., Exhibits P-26 and P-27. 60 dozen tubes of Pencilin ointment is, in our opinion, a considerable quantity. The accused had kept this stock of drug in his shop premises where he Was licensed to sell certain drugs. The only inference that follows, because of these proved facts, is the one that was drawn by the Supreme Court in Sk. Amir's case1, on the basis of the large quantity of drug only. There is an additional circumstance in the case on hand. Though this aspect of the matter has not been clearly dealt with by the Sessions Judge, we have no hesitation in holding that in view of these established facts and circumstances, the conclusive inference flowing therefrom is that that the accused had stocked this drug for sale. Hence, the funding of the learned Sessions Judge does not call for interference in this revision petition. Ordinarily the High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, does not interfere when two reasonable views are possible on facts. But, in this case, only one reasonable view is possible and that view is taken, by the Sessions Judge. 15. In view of the foregoing reasons, we see no substance in this revision petition and dismiss it. S.V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.