Judgment :- 1. This is a petition to revise the order of the learned District Munsif, Kumbakonam in E.A. No. 223 of 1978 in R.C.O.P. No. 10 of 1973, which was an application filed by the respondent herein under S. 47. C.P.C. for directing the petitioner to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 2690-69 with subsequent interest and costs. The question of maintainability of the application under S, 47, C.P.C. had been considered as a preliminary point and against the adjudication on that question, the present civil revision petition has been filed. 2. Admittedly, the respondent is the owner of the building bearing door No. 24. Kasi Viswanatnar Koil St., Kumbakonam. The petitioner was a tenant of that building on a monthly rental of Rs. 50 payable by first week of every Tamil month. The respondent purchased the property on 14th September, 1972 from the previous owner and the petitioner continued to remain in possession of the property as a tenant even after the purchase by the respondent. Since the respondent wanted the building for her own occupation, she applied in R.C.O.P. 10 of 1973 for an order of eviction. That application was allowed and the petitioner preferred an appeal in C.M.A. 112 of 1973, Sub-Court of Kumbakonam. That appeal was of no avail. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a civil revision petition to this Court in Vedanayagam v. Janakiammal C.R.P. No 3309 of 1974, and the revision ultimateiy was dismissed confirming the order of eviction passed by the courts below. It was after the dismissal of the C.R.P., the respondent filed E. P. No. 124 of 1976 in R.C.O.P. 10 of 1973, and took delivery of the property through court on 31st July, 1976. According to the respondent, at the time when she took delivery, the delivery account showed that the petitioner had committed acts of waste and caused damage wantonly to the building, viz, he had removed four entranses, one almirah fixed in the wall and the planks in the almirah and also removed all electrical wirings, rafters, fence etc. The respondent claimed that in order to carry out the repairs, it would cost her Rs. 2,690 as per the estimate obtained by her. The respondent claimed that in order to carry out the repairs, it would cost her Rs. 2,690 as per the estimate obtained by her. To a notice issued by the respondent on 16th September 1977 calling upon the petitioner to pay the amount, the petitioner sent a reply setting out false and untenable contentions was totally unsustainable and she is, therefore, entitled to maintain an application under S. 47 C.P.C. as the claim of damages is one relating to and arise out of the execution of a decree. That application was resisted by the petitioner herein on the ground that he did not cause any damage to the property either wantonly or by removing the entrances, almirah, pillars, rafters, fence etc. Apart from denying that he had caused damage to the property as alleged by the respondent, the petitioner proceeded to state that he had made improvements to the property and had incurred expenses to the tune of Rs. 1500 towards the same. The estimate of damage set out by the respondent and claimed by her was characterised as exaggerated and totally unreal. The contents of the delivery account were disputed and it was also stated by petitioner that that must have been done perhaps in order to fasten liability on him. A legal objection was also raised that S. 4/C.P.C. will not apply and therefore the respondent cannot maintain the application filed by her. 3. The learned District Munsif, Kumbakonam who enquired into this application framed a preliminary point for consideration, viz, whether the petition as framed is maintainable under S. 47 C.P.C. Relying upon a judgment of this court reported in Poomalai v. Ramalingam 1977-1-MLJ, 494=90 L.W. 191 the learned District Munsif proceeded to-hold that the instance case would also be governed by that decision and therefore, the petitioner cannot maintain that the petition is not maintainable under S. 47 C.P.C It was also farther found that the only course open to the respondent is to claim damages and, therefore, the petition under S. 47 C.P.C. is maintainable? 4. In this civil revision petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the decision in Poomalai v. Ramalingam 1977-1-MLJ, 494=90 L.W. 191 does not govern this case. 4. In this civil revision petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the decision in Poomalai v. Ramalingam 1977-1-MLJ, 494=90 L.W. 191 does not govern this case. In that case, Ramanujam, J. was dealing with the question of maintainability of an application under S. 47 C.P.C. with reference to a claim of damages by the decreehotder who had obtained a decree for recovery of possession of a building against the judgment debtor. At the time of taking delivery of the property pursuant to the decree for possession, the property was found to be roofless and the walls had been damaged. Thereafter, the decreeholder filed an application under S. 47 C.P.C. claiming damages and that application was resisted by the judgment debtor on the ground that the claim for damages in the circumstances of that case cannot come within the scope of S. 47 C.P.C. In dealing with that contention, the learned Judge referred to a decision of the Calcuta High Court reported in Bacharan Paul v. Bhagwan Chander Ghose , 5 C.L.R. 522 stated that decision did not concern itself with the scope of S. 47 C.P.C. and that the question which arose in that case was entirely different. It was further pointed out that relying on that, a Division Bench consisting of Sadasiva Iyer and Moore, JJ. in Ramu Shettith v. Mangappn-Shettithi, 33 I.C. 520 had held that as regards the damages for the judgment debtors alleged negligence in having allowed the decreed house to be burnt down, it could not be a matter to be dealt with in execution of the decree, A reference to the judgment reported in Bacharan Paul v. Bhugwan Chander Ghouse 5 C.L.R. 522 on which the Division Bench purports to rely does not deal with the question which had arisen before the court in Ramu Shettithi v. Manniappa Shettithi 33 I.C. 520. 5. On the other hand, in Dhanarajagerji v. Raja Panuganti Parthasarathi Rayanim Veru A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 825=38, L.W. 714, another Division Bench consisting of Venkatasubba Rao and Reilly, JJ. had occasion to deal with this question. In that case, an application was filled for compensation or loss sustained by the plaintiff on account of the wrongful conduct of the defendant-judgment debtor in having fraudulently and dishonestly let into possession a number of tenants, on whom, according to the plaintiff, occupancy rights were unlawfully conferred. had occasion to deal with this question. In that case, an application was filled for compensation or loss sustained by the plaintiff on account of the wrongful conduct of the defendant-judgment debtor in having fraudulently and dishonestly let into possession a number of tenants, on whom, according to the plaintiff, occupancy rights were unlawfully conferred. Considering the question whether the lower court was justified in entertaining the question whether the lower court was justified in entertaining the application at all and dealing with the contention of the counsel that when a decree awards a person a certain property, he is entitled to get it in the state in which it was when the decree was passeu and whether when the property was delivered it continued to be in the same state or in the meantime underwent deterioration is a question to be determined in execution, the Bench referred to, with approval the following passage in Harishdar Prabhu v. Sankaran Padmanna Magdum AIR 1923 Bom. 391, and stated that passage contained the correct statement of the law— “But we think that the question with regard to the waste committed by the judgment debtor after decree was a question between the parties relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, and must be determined by the court executing the decree, and not by a separate suit. The appellant is entitled under the decree to the property of which possession was directed to be given to him, If the properly has depreciated in value or been damaged since the decree, owing to the wilful action of the defendant, it is a question in execution whether the defendants are liable to make good the loss,” After referring to Bailalbu v. Mohanlal AIR 1925 Bom, 385 which followed the decision in Harishridhar Prabhu v. Shakaram Padmanna Magdum AIR 1923 Bom. 391 the Division Bench Dhanarajagar v. Raja Panuganti Parthasarathi Rayanim Varu, A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 391 the Division Bench Dhanarajagar v. Raja Panuganti Parthasarathi Rayanim Varu, A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 821=38 L.W. 714 held thus— “The question is whether a successful party can be said to get possession of what has directed to be given to him by the decree, if the property, while in the opponents possession, suffered deterioration by damage subsequent to the decree; and whether a claim to compensation is well four dad or not is a matter that should be considered in exeeution under S. 47 C.P.C. A different view was no doubt taken in Ramu Shetty v. Maniappa Shetti A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 79=33 I.C. 520. The point was there disposed of in a brief sentence and no reasons were given in support of the view taken. The learned Judge purport to rely uopn Beecharam Payl v. Bhagwan Chander Ghouse 5 C.L.R. 522 which on examination does not support their conclusion. We therrefore think that both in principle and on authority the the plaintiffs contention must be upheld. An application under S. 47 C.P.C. is therefore maintainable even in respect of damages sustained by a decreeholder with reference to property in respect of which he had obtained a decree, but which continues to remain in the possession of the judgment debtor. 6. The next question that ariset for consideration is whether this principle is confined only to cases where there is a decree for recovery of possession of the immovable property passed by a civil Court but is applicable to cases of orders of eviction passed by the authorities constituted under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, as amended by Act 23 of 1973. For the purposes of executing orders of eviction, provision has been made under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The question of the applicability of Sec. 47 C.P.C. with reference to execution proceedings under the Rent Control Act has been considered in several decisions of our court. In K.P.S. Thangasami Chettiar v. Bapoo Sahib 1949 2 M.L.J.,=62 L.W. 876 Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar, JJ had occasion to consider the applicability of S. 144 C.P.C. with reference to the proceedings under Rent Control Act. S. 9 of the Madras Act XV of 1946, as it them stood, provided for execution of eviction orders passed under the Act. In K.P.S. Thangasami Chettiar v. Bapoo Sahib 1949 2 M.L.J.,=62 L.W. 876 Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar, JJ had occasion to consider the applicability of S. 144 C.P.C. with reference to the proceedings under Rent Control Act. S. 9 of the Madras Act XV of 1946, as it them stood, provided for execution of eviction orders passed under the Act. Dealing with the contention that S. 144 C.P.C. does not apply to proceedings under Madras Act XV of 1946, the Division Bench stated that it must be held that once the execution proceedings under Madras Act XV of 1946 are committed to the care of ordinary courts, the provisions of C.P. Code, relating to the subject would apply mutatis mutandis and so far as the machinery set up by that Act and provisions thereof permit. An application for restitution was held to be one for execution and therefore it was competent for the Rent Controller to entertain an application for restitution and that no separate suit for restitution would lie. In Sashadri Iyengar v. Narayana Nair 1951 1 M.L.J. 55=64 L.W. 212 another Division Bench consisting of Rajamannar, C.J. and Viswanatha Sastri. J. while dealing with an objection as regards the maintainability of the appeal to the High Court, held, that in execution an order for aviction under the provisions of the Madras Act XV of 1946, the court was functioning as an ordinary civil court, and doing the ordinary business of an executing court with regard to whose procedure and orders the provisions of the C.P. Code including those providing for a right of appeal would apply. It was further held that the dismissal of the execution petition of the landlord attracted to itself the provisions of S. 2(2) and S. 47 C.P. Code, with the consequential right of appeal given by S. 96 C.P.C. In Abbul Fatha v. Md. Jabbar 1956 2 M.L.J. 475, Govinda Menon, J. had occasion to consider an objection with reference to the execution of an order of eviction against the legal representative. 7. The objection that was raised was that the provisions of tae Act, as they stood, at the time when the Order was made, did not make the provisions of the Order 22 C.P.C applicable to orders of eviction. 7. The objection that was raised was that the provisions of tae Act, as they stood, at the time when the Order was made, did not make the provisions of the Order 22 C.P.C applicable to orders of eviction. The scope of S. 9 of the Rent Control Act, 1949, was considered by the learned Judge and it was held that S. 9 of the Madras Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act 1949, definitely lays down that an order for eviction can be executed before a civie court as if it is a decree and this means that in the execution of such an order, all the provisions of S. 47 and Or 21 are attracted. In V. Ramaswami Iyer v. Ramakrishnayya (1969) 2 M.L.J. 272 =82 L.W. 482 Ramaprasada Rao, J. (as he then as) considered the scope of S. 18 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 4960. Dealing with the question of the execution of orders passed by the Rent Controller, the learned Judge observed at page 274 thus— “This leads on to the question as to how and in what manner the order for eviction passed by the Rent Controller could be executed. In fact this point involves a consideration of the second point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is conceded that the execution of the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was sought by the respondent under Sec. 18 of the Madras Act 18 of 1960. While dealing with the execution of orders, this section provides that every order passed by the Rent Controller (it is not necessary to set out other details in this section for the purpose of this case) shall be executed by the city civil court in the City of Madras, as if it were a decree passed by the said court. By such a fiction the order passed by the Reet Controller is converted in to a decree of a civil court, and this notional conversion by the, operation of the fiction makes is a decree of a civil court. By such a fiction the order passed by the Reet Controller is converted in to a decree of a civil court, and this notional conversion by the, operation of the fiction makes is a decree of a civil court. In fact, the effect, content and a real purpose of S, 18 of Madras Act 18 of 1960 is to clothe the City Civil Court with the jurisdiction to execute the order of a Tribunal constituted under Act 18 of 1968 or a Rent Controller for the matter of that as if it were Us own decree, meaning thereby a decree of a civil court”: The question of the applicability of the provisions of S. 144 C.P.C. to eviction proceedings under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1980, came up for consideration again before Ramanujam J, in Md. Hussain v. Pitchai 1970 2 M.L.J. 663=82. L.W. 773, The learned Judge held thus— ‘Since the eviction order is treated as a decree of court and taken to a civil court for execution as per S. 18 such proceedings will be governed by the provisions of the C.P. code, relating to execution of decrees so long as the provisions of the Rent Control Act, did not modify or restrict the power of the civil court under the Code. It is well established that an application for execution. Unlike Under the Madras Act 15 of 1955, the order of eviction passed under the Rent Control Act has been specifically made executable only in a civil court and there is no provision in the Madras Act 18 of 1960, itself curtailing or modifying its powers under the code in matters of execution. Therefore, it has to be held that the tower court i.e. the executing court, had the power to order restitution under its inherent power and direct redelivery under S. 144 C.P.C. The decisions referred to above have all been rendered with reference to S. 9 of the Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1946 or Act 25 of 1949 and S. 18 of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. 8. 8. By Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent (Control) Amendilg Act 23 of 1973, for S. 18 of the principal Act, the following section was substituted: Execution of orders: (i) Every order made under Ss 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 and every order passed on appeal under Sec 23 or on revision under S. 25 shall be executed by the controller, as if such, order is an order of a civil court and for this purpose, the Controller shall I havet all the powers of a civil court. 2. An order passed in execution under subject (1) shall not be subject to any appeal or revision” The change that has been brought about by this amending Act is to treat the powers of execution in the Controller and in the discharge of duties as an executing court, the Rent Controller shall have all the powers of a civil court. Even after amendment, S. 18 (1) provides that the Controller shall execute the order as if such an order is an order of a civil court and the Controller shall also have all the powers of civil court. The entrustment of the powers of execution to the Rent Controller and the conferment of all the powers of civil court on him with reference to such execution would take in all the provisions of Or. 21 C.P.C. as well as Sec, 47 C.P.C. Though it has been held that S. 47 C.P.C. would apply in relation to the execution proceedings in respect of orders of eviction under S. 9 of the Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1946 and 25 of 1949 and S. 18 of Act 18 of 1960, the same would be the position under S. 18 as amended by Act 23 of 1973. 9. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the application under S. 47 C.P.C. is not maintainable is not acceptable. In my view, therefore, the objection of the petitioner was rightly overruled by the lower court. The civil revision petition therefore fails and is dismissed but there will, however, be no order as to costs.