JUDGMENT S. Malik, J. 1. This is a revision application by Ram Narain against the judgment and order dated 17-1-1974 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Varanasi. 2. Briefly stated, the facts, giving rise to this revision application, are that on 21-7-1973 Bechan Prasad opposite party no. 2 gave an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Varanasi (south), for proceeding (presumably under Section 107 CrPC) against the revisionist and nineteen others. It was alleged that plot no. 174 (11 decimal) situate In Mauja Naraur, P. S. Rohania District Varanasi, was purchased by him in the names of his sons on 4-12-1970. A suit under Section 229-B of the UP ZA and LR Act was filed against Kunj Behari and others but it was dismissed on 16-9-1972. An appeal filed against it was allowed on 12-6-1973. On 20-7-1973 Ram Narain and others demolished the boundaries of plot no. 174 and included this land in their own plot and were giving out that if any one came there he would be killed. Hence there was a reasonable apprehension of breach of the peace from the side of Ram Narain and others, and they should be bound down. On this application the learned Sub- Divisional Magistrate concerned ordered an inquiry by the Station Officer of police station Rohania. In pursuance of this order S. I. Asha Ram Tripathi submitted a report on 2-8-1973 to the effect that there was no apprehension of breach of the peace on account of plot no. 174 but the dispute really existed between the parties in respect of a house and it had given rise to breach of the peace. He, therefore, recommended that proceedings under Section 145 CrPC be initiated and the property (house) be attached. After perusing this report the learned Magistrate passed a preliminary order under section 145 (1) of the old CrPC on 4-8-1973 and directed attachment of the house. It was attached on 7-8-1973. There was no attachment of the plot. On 16-8-1973 Bechan Prasad filed a complaint under Section 219 and 219/109 IPC against five persons, namely, Asha Ram S. I., Shiv Prasad, Ram Murat, Shiv Narain and Ram Narain revisionist. It was alleged that S. I. Asha Ram Tripathi had made a report in collusion with the remaining four persons corruptly and maliciously knowing that it was wholly false. His report was invited in respect of plot no. It was alleged that S. I. Asha Ram Tripathi had made a report in collusion with the remaining four persons corruptly and maliciously knowing that it was wholly false. His report was invited in respect of plot no. 174 yet he falsely represented that the controversy existed over a house. By this corrupt and malicious practice he obtained an order and got the house attached. 3. On 8-9-1973 Ram Narain, the present revisionist, moved an application before the learned Magistrate that no case under Section 219 IPC was made out and the complaint be rejected. The learned Magistrate rejected the application and ordered that summons be issued to the persons complained against. Ram Narain filed a revision application and the learned Sessions Judge, relying on the case of Yunus v. State, 1969 CrLJ 73 , came to the conclusion that the proceedings under Section 107 CrPC before an order under Section 112 CrPC is passed, are both judicial and administrative. Accordingly the revision application was dismissed and the present revision application was filed, It came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court and he found that there were two conflicting single Judge decisions; of this Court inasmuch as in Laxmi Narain v. Emperor, AIR 1932 All. 67)) it was held that a Magistrate acting under Sections 107 to 110 of the Code does not act judicially so long as he does not record an order in accordance with Section 112 while in Yunus v. State (supra), it was held that the function of the Magistrate up to the stage of forming opinion under Sec. 107 CrPC is not (only judicial but administrative also. The question being of considerable importance the learned single Judge referred the whole case for decision to a larger Bench. This is how this revision application has come up before us for disposal. 4. We have heard learned counsel for both the sides and have given our anxious consideration to the whole matter. The question being of considerable importance the learned single Judge referred the whole case for decision to a larger Bench. This is how this revision application has come up before us for disposal. 4. We have heard learned counsel for both the sides and have given our anxious consideration to the whole matter. The complaint was filed under Section 219 of the Penal Code which reads as follows :- "Whoever, being a public servant, corruptly or maliciously makes or pronounces in any stage of a judicial proceedings, any report, order, verdict,, or decision which he knows to be contrary to law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both." The gravamen of the charge under this section is that (a) there must be a judicial proceedings and (b) there must be making of a real report or a real pronouncement of an order, verdict or decision. In the instant case Bechan Singh, opposite party no. 2 had moved that application for binding down the revisionist and others presumably under Section 107 CrPC and in order to satisfy himself whether there existed any apprehension of breach of the peace from the side of the persons complained against, the Magistrate had invited a report from the police officer. The crucial point, therefore, for consideration is whether proceedings before an order under Section 112 of the Code is drawn up are administrative or judicial. This question has been exhaustively considered in the aforesaid two cases in our judgment there is no real conflict between the two decisions. This revision application was pending when the new Code came into force and by virtue of Section 484 (2) of the new Code it will have to be disposed off according to the provisions of the Code of 1898. In that Code "judicial proceeding" was defined in Section 4 (m) as under :- "Judicial proceeding" includes any proceedings in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath." 5. An inquiry is judicial if the object of it is to determine a jural relation between one person and another or a group of persons or between him and the community generally. An inquiry is judicial if the object of it is to determine a jural relation between one person and another or a group of persons or between him and the community generally. A report invited by a Magistrate from a Police Officer in order to satisfy himself whether an order under Section 112 of the Code should be passed or not is a purely administrative function. The moment he draws an order under Section 112 of the Code it becomes a judicial proceeding. This view finds support from the case of Laxmi Narain v. Emperor (supra) in which it was observed :- "Section 107 CrPC is in Chapter VIII of the Code which is headed "Prevention of Offences." The Magistrate is responsible for the maintenance of peace in the district. This responsibility is cast on him in his administrative and not in his judicial capacity. He is the sole authority to decide whether or not it is imperative for maintenance of peace to set the law in motion by initiating proceedings under Section 107 or other preventive sections in Chapter 8 of the Code His discretion in this respect is absolute and unqualified. Accordingly his discretion to initiate proceedings under Section 107 or other preventive sections in Chapter 8 of the Code has not been trammelled by such conditions the fulfilment of which is a condition precedent to the issue of a process to a person to answer a charge formulated against him in a complaint. Complaints are for the redress of wrongs already committed, and from the moment a Magistrate takes cognizance of a complaint he acts judicially and therefore is bound to proceed in accordance with law, and in coming to a decision one way or the other to take cognizance only of such matters that constitute legal evidence in the case." 6. As regards the preventive measures it was observed that : "But in acting under Sections 107, 108 and 109 or Section 110 of the Code the Magistrate does not so long as he does not record an order in writing in accordance with Section 112 of the Code calling upon any person to show cause, act judicially. In those sections complete discretion is given to the Magistrate either to act or not to act on the information received by him. In those sections complete discretion is given to the Magistrate either to act or not to act on the information received by him. The discretion to issue a notice under Section 112 in pursuance of an information received by him is absolute and uncontrolled by any conditions whatsoever. It is nowhere provided that the information contemplated by those sections must be information gathered from legal evidence, nor is there any provision as to the source from which the information may be received." The information may be conveyed to the Magistrate by a private individual or by an officer of the police. But in either case he is given a discretion to issue or not to issue a notice to the person against whom he has received the information to show cause why he should not furnish security for keeping the peace or to be of good behaviour. With a view to satisfy himself as to the desirability or urgency of issuing a notice under Section 112 the Magistrate has, for obvious reasons, the right to test the accuracy of the information [received by him before issuing the notice. The manner in which he is to do so is not provided for in the Code. The reason is not far to seek. The above sections being enacted simply with a view to prevent commission of offences and being a part of the administrative machinery for maintaining law and order, the legislature did not think it fit to circumscribe the administrative powers of the magistrates under those sections by making it obligatory on them to follow the procedure that by law they are bound to follow while dealing with complaint. A reference to Section 117 of the Code makes it clear that it is only after an order has been made under Section 112 that the Magistrate is to proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary. 7. Clause 2 of that section provides that "such enquiry" is to be made in the manner prescribed in the Code for "conducting trials and recording evidence" either in summons cases or in warrant cases as the case may be. It is only from the stage that the inquiry under Section 117 begins that the proceedings before the Magistrate become judicial proceedings. It is only from the stage that the inquiry under Section 117 begins that the proceedings before the Magistrate become judicial proceedings. Before that stage the proceedings are more or less of an administrative character, and the Magistrate till then is not bound by rules of evidence. For the maintenance of law and order, Magistrates have control over the police, and it is open to them to seek their assistance in the discharge of their duties. If a Magistrate before issuing a notice under section 112 thinks it fit to consult the police in order to form an opinion as to whether or not he should issue such a notice there is nothing in the Code to prevent him from doing so." 8. It was therefore, held that apart from the provisions of Section 202 of the Code a Magistrate proceeding under Chapter 8 has the right to call for a report from the police before issuing a notice under Section 112. In support of this view reliance was placed on the case of P. Sanjiv Reddy v. K. Koneri Reddy, AIR 1926 Mad. 521 and it was held that "the moment a notice is issued under Section 112, the Crown has the right: to conduct the case against the person called upon to show cause and section 495 CrPC gives discretion to the Magistrate to permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person mentioned in that section. That person may or may nor be a police officer." In the case of Yunus v. State (supra) full reliance was placed on the case of Laxmi Narain v. Emperor and absolutely no note of dissent was expressed. The venue for controversy has arisen on account of the following observation made in that case :- "It has been held by this Court in the case of Laxmi Narain v. Emperor, AIR 1932 All. 670 that the function of the Magistrate up to the stage of forming opinion under Section 107, CrPC is not only judicial but administrative also and ordinarily there would be no interference with the same by this Court." The use of the words "not only judicial but administrative also" are being construed to mean that the proceedings up to the stage of forming opinion are not purely administrative but judicial also. In our opinion there is absolutely no scope for this argument because in the case of Laxmi Narain v. Emperor the learned single Judge has nowhere held that the function of the Magistrate up to the stage of forming opinion under Section 107, CrPC is "not only judicial but administrative also". The clear expression in that case is that the function of the Magistrate up to that stage is purely administrative. The learned Judge deciding the case of yunus v. State also appears to have fully subscribed to this view when he observed in paragraph 6 of the judgment; "The function of the learned Magistrate after taking that decision certainly becomes judicial function and he has to implement his decision or opinion by complying with the provisions of the CrPC." They make it clear that proceedings up to the stage of drawing an order under Section 112 CrPC are only administrative and thereafter they become judicial. Be that as it may, we are inclined to agree with the view expressed in Laxmi Narain v. Emperor. 9. It will make no difference if the Magistrate proceeded to make an inquiry presumably under Section 107 and the police officer submitted a report that proceedings be initiated under Section 145 of the Code. In either case the Magistrate had to ascertain whether reasonable apprehension of breach of the peace existed. It is only when an order under section 145 (1) of the Code was passed that proceedings could become judicial and any report etc. corruptly or maliciously made thereafter could attract Section 219 of the Penal Code. In the instant case the police report was made earlier and Section 219 could not be applied to it. 10. The learned counsel for the opposite party has relied on the case of Queen Empress v. Tirunarasimha Chart, ILR XIX Mad. 18, which lays down that: "A Magistrate, making an enquiry before issue of an order under CrPC Section 144, is acting in a stage of a judicial proceeding and has, therefore, jurisdiction to take action under Section 476, if he is of opinion that false evidence has been given before him." No advantage can be derived from this decision because it relates to the exercise of power under Section 144 and furnishes no answer to an inquiry under Section 107 or 145. Besides it, the following observation made in that case is important: "He may, It is true, act on information received or on his own knowledge, without taking evidence but the proviso in the third clause which in certain cases authorises the Magistrate to pass an order exparte seems to contemplate that ordinarily an order under the section should not be made, without an opportunity being afforded to the person against whom it is proposed to make it, to show cause why It should not be passed. This necessarily implies the power to take evidence before coming to a decision, though a Magistrate is empowered to act upon what is not legal evidence in cases of special urgency." It makes it clear that Section 144 ordinarily contemplates an inquiry and implies the power to record evidence, while a Magistrate proceeding under Chapter VIII has a right to call for a report from the police before issuing a notice under Section 112. Section 107 confers wide and unusual powers" on the officers concerned. Sine qua non for the institution of a proceeding under this section is that the Magistrate shall be of opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This opinion can be based on the information received from the police or from any other credible source. The discretion is entirely of the Magistrate whether in the circumstances of a particular case he would like to proceed under Section 107 or 145 of the Code. We are, therefore, of the view that till an order under Section 112 of the Code is drawn up there is no judicial proceeding and any report submitted by the police up to that stage does not fall within the scope of judicial proceeding and Section 219 of the Penal Code is not: attracted even if the report is found to have been furnished corruptly or maliciously. In this view of the matter the complaint filed by Bechan Prasad was legally not maintainable. 11. The revision application is allowed and the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is set aside. The complaint filed by Bechan Prasad against. Asha Ram Tripathi and four others is accordingly dismissed. K.J.C. Revision allowed.