JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition is directed against a judgment of the District Judge, Jhansi dated 17-2-1977. 2. An application under section 21(l)(a) and (b) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by Maniram, respondent No. 2 or release of shop No. 12 Subhashganj, Jhansi. Respondent No. 2 alleged that he has got six sons. The eldest son of the respondent no. 2 was Dr. Dhirendra Kumar, who was doing private medical practice at Jhansi. Second son was Dayaram who has completed his M.B.B.S. The fourth son was Govindram has also done his B. E. Examination. The third son was Jai Ram who was then a student of final year of M.B.B S. The Landlord claimed that he wanted to settle second and 4th sons in life and, as such, he wanted the disputed shop which had been let out to the petitioner for occupation. The landlord also asserted that the firm M/s. Chhitarmal Narayin Das to whom the premises had been let out had closed his business and that the shop was no longer required by it. The respondent No. 2 also alleged that he wanted the shop for the expansion of his own business as well. Another ground mentioned in the application was that the shop was in a dilapidated condition and was required to be demolished. 3. The application was contested by the petitioners. They disputed that the need of the respondent No. 2 was bonafide. The respondent filed a list of the properties which were in possession of the respondent No. 2, for showing that the respondent No. 2 had a number of properties available to him and that the disputed shop was not required by him for the purposes disclosed in the application. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application. Against the said order, the respondent no. 2 filed an appeal. In the appeal, the learned District Judge found that the shop was in a dilapidated condition and was required to be reconstructed after demolition. The further finding given was that the premises was bonafide required by the landlord for the need of the two sons mentioned in the application. With regard to the petitioners, the finding given was that another firm in the name of M/s. Mansukhlal Durga Prasad was doing business in the premises in dispute. The further finding given was that the premises was bonafide required by the landlord for the need of the two sons mentioned in the application. With regard to the petitioners, the finding given was that another firm in the name of M/s. Mansukhlal Durga Prasad was doing business in the premises in dispute. On this finding, the appeal was allowed and the application made by respondent no. 2 was accepted. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 4. As already stated above, the respondent No. 2 has filed a combined application under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section (21s). There could be no objection to the filing of the combined application by respondent No. 2. But the consequences of allowing an application under the aforesaid clauses were different. In case an order is made in favour of a landlord under clause (a) of Section 21(1), the landlord would be entitled to take possession of the premises but in case of clause (b) of Section 21(1), a landlord has to part with the possession of the premises after reconstruction. 5. Coming to clause (b) of Section 21(1) of the Act, it may be stated that the landlord could get an order, made in his favour, if he establishes that the building was in a dilapidated condition and was required for the purposes of demolition and new construction. This clause has to be read along with rule 17 of the Rules. Rule 17 lays down the various requirements which are to be established by a landlord before an order under clause (b) of Section 21(1) can be made. The necessary requirements are (i) that the building requires demolition, (ii) that proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and new construction has been prepared, (iii) that a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or regulations of the local authority and (iv) that the landlord has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new construction. 6. In the instant case, it appears that the attention of the court, was not invited to rule 17 and that appears to be the reason that the learned District Judge did not record any finding. The finding given was that the building was a dilapidated condition. That by itself was not sufficient to allow the application under clause (b) of section 21(1). The finding given was that the building was a dilapidated condition. That by itself was not sufficient to allow the application under clause (b) of section 21(1). In this writ petition, the landlord has filed a number of papers showing that he fulfilled all the four requirements of Rule 17. It is not possible for me to accept the additional evidence and to decide the rights of the parties on its basis. The proper course is to set aside the judgment of the District Judge and to send back the case to him for a fresh decision. The learned District Judge shall permit the parties to adduce evidence in support of all these points. 7. Another ground on which the application had been allowed is clause (a). As stated above, the ground stated was that too of the sons were required to be established. In para 5 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that he had filed a list of the various building which belong to the respondent No. 2 and that they were available to him for his sons. The grievance raised by the petitioners' learned counsel was that the learned District Judge committed an error in finding that the need of respondent No. 2 is bonafide without referring to the aforesaid list and without holding whether the respondent no. 2 was possessed of other properties. In the rejoinder affidavit in the writ the petitioners have further stated that those two sons, for whom the application had been made by respondent No. 2, were now settled and that the premises was not required by the respondent No. 2 for their purposes. The grievance of the petitioners appears to be justified. The learned District Judge was called upon to decide whether the need of the respondent No. 2 was bonafide. For that purpose, he should not have simply confide himself to the consideration of the question that two sons were required to be settled. He should have further discussed and found whether the respondent No. 2 was not possessed of any other property in which the sons of respondent No. 2 could be settled. For that purpose, he should not have simply confide himself to the consideration of the question that two sons were required to be settled. He should have further discussed and found whether the respondent No. 2 was not possessed of any other property in which the sons of respondent No. 2 could be settled. As this had a material bearing on the question of the bonafide requirement of the premises by respondent No. 2, it appears appropriate that the finding of the learned District Judge, holding that the need of the respondent No. 2 was bonafide, is also quashed and he is directed to decide the application afresh. For deciding the bonafide requirement, the court is required to find that the application was filed by the landlord for his need or that of his family members. 8. Sri G.P. Bhargava counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 pointed out that as the petitioner had vacated the premises and had handed over the possession of the same to a new firm, which was not his tenant, the need of the petitioners was not required to be considered. It is settled law that a landlord can succeed in application under clause (a) of Section 21(1) if he has proved his requirement. The comparison of the need of a tenant with that of the landlord arose only after the landlord has established his bonafide need. Since I am sending back the case to the District Judge, it appears appropriate to direct that if he finds that the need of the respondent No. 2 is bonafide, it will be necessary for him to consider this aspect of the case which has been pointed out by Sri G.P. Bhargava. 9. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the District Judge, Jhansi dated 17-2-1977 is quashed. The Appellate Authority is directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. There shall be no order as to costs.