B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) ). This Revision Application at the instance of the tenant is directed against the order of District Judge Surat rejecting the Revision Application No. 5 of 1977 of the tenant and confirming the order of the Additional Judge Small Causes Court Surat dismissing the application of the tenant for fixation of standard rent. ( 2 ) IT appears that the opponent-landlord herein had filed a suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 1131 of 1969 for possession of the premises comprising of a house property bearing census No. 319 situate in Ward No. 9 in the city of Surat on the ground of arrears of rent of Rs. 325. 00 for a period of four months from 1-4-1969 to 31-8-1969. ( 3 ) THE petitioner-tenant had joined issue with the landlord on the question of the standard rent of the aforesaid premises. A compromise was arrived at between the parties on March 25 1972 fixing the standard rent of the premises in question at Rs. 100. 00 per month in place of the contractual rent of Rs. 65/- per month and the petitioner-tenant herein had agreed to pay all the taxes and cesses over and above the monthly rent of Rs. 100. 00 and also agreed that the adjoining OTA situate on the north of the premises was in possession of the opponent-landlord herein and he was entitled to carry on his business on the said OTA by putting up a cabin or without cabin but he would not be entitled to let it out to any other person. The opponent-landlord also agreed to withdraw the suit. A consent order was made by the Court on April 12 1972 in terms of the said compromise. ( 4 ) THE petitioner-tenant having been aggrieved by the action of the opponent-landlord in letting out the OTA contrary to the consent order made the present application in the Small Causes Court at Surat being Miscellaneous Application No. 170 of 1976 for fixation of the standard rent. The Additional Judge of the Small Causes Court Surat dismissed the application as in his opinion the petitioner-tenant was estopped from re-agitating the question of standard rent once having obtained the consent order in terms of the compromise. The Additional Judge of the Small Causes Court Surat dismissed the application as in his opinion the petitioner-tenant was estopped from re-agitating the question of standard rent once having obtained the consent order in terms of the compromise. ( 5 ) THE tenant therefore carried the matter in revision before the District Court at Surat by his Civil Revision Application No. 5 of 1977. The learned District Judge did not agree with the trial Court that the consent order operated as an estoppel but was of the opinion that the application for fixation of the standard rent was barred on the principles of res judicata. He therefore by his order or August 4 1977 rejected the revision application. The petitioner-tenant has therefore come in this revision before this Court challenging the said order of the District Judge. ( 6 ) I am of the opinion that this revision application must succeed obviously for the following reasons: The view of the learned District Judge that the present application for fixation of standard rent is barred on principles of res-judicata is clearly erroneous and he has therefore failed to exercise his jurisdiction vested in him in law. The point whether a consent decree or for that matter a consent order operates as res-judicata or not is settled in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Baldevdas Shivlal and Another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others AIR 1970 SC 406 where it has been ruled that a consent decree does not operate as res-judicata because a consent decree is merely the record of a contract between the parties to a suit to which is superadded the seal of the Court and a matter in contest in a suit may operate as res-judicata only if there is an adjudication by the Court. The Supreme Court ruled accordingly on the plain reading of sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme Court ruled accordingly on the plain reading of sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 7 ) IN Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and Others v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao and Ors AIR 1967 SC 591 the Supreme Court held that a compromise decree is not a decision by the Court and that it is the acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed and a compromise decree merely sets the seal of the court on the agreement of the parties It is further held that the court does not decide anything; nor can it be said that a decision of the court was implicit in it; and that only a decision by the Court can be res judicata whether statutory under sec. 11 of the code of Civil Procedure or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as decision on a matter which was heard and finally decided and cannot operate as res judicata; such a decree might create an estoppel by conduct between the parties but such an estoppel must be specifically pleaded. ( 8 ) THE view of the learned District Judge with respect is therefore clearly erroneous and -therefore the only question which remains to be considered is whether the consent order creates an estoppel against the petitioner-tenant herein so that he is precluded from reagitating the question. The learned District Judge therefore did not go into the question of estoppel since he found himself bound by the decision of this Court (Coram: S. H. Sheth J) in Jayantilal Chunilal Pancholi v. Bai Jashoda (1975 16 Guj. L. R. 146 It is clear that the decision of the Supreme Court in Pulavarthi Venkatas case (supra) was not brought to the notice of S. H. Sheth J who has modified his earlier view in Civil Revision Application No. 657 of 1972 decided on 5th August 1974. Bhagwati J (as he then was) has in Civil Revision Application No. 1243 of 1967 decided on 10th December 1970 following the decision of the Supreme Court in Pulavarthi Venkatas case (supra) held that a consent decree fixing standard rent would not operate res judicata since it decides nothing. Application allowed. .