JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated June 8, 1972 passed by the Addl. Commissioner Allahabad Division, dismissing the First Appeal against the judgment and decree dated June 27, 1970 passed by the Assistant Collector First Class, Allahabad in suit No. 152 of 1970-71 under Sec. 229-B, UPZA and LR Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The appellant, Yogendra Pratap Singh alongwith Ravindra Pratap Singh, respondent No. 6 filed a suit seeking declaration of their Sirdari rights in plot No. 180 in village Kotwa on the ground of continuous adverse possession for more than twelve years. The defendant, Srimati Prabhu Nath Kunwari contested the suit by claiming that she was the widow of Ram Bhawan Singh, the original tenure holder, ads she had executed a registered sale deed in favour of the defendant-respondents No. 2 and 3, Raghu Ram and Vishnu Nath who are since then in possession. Ragho Ram and Vishunath also filed a written statement to the same effect. The courts below have accepted this plea and have dismissed the suit. 4. The first ground taken in the appeal is that when the learned Additional Commissioner found the possession of the appellant's father from 1365 Fasli to 1374 Fasli, or at least from 1367 Fasli to 1374 Fasli, he had become a full fledged Sirdar by prescription under Sec. 210 of the UPZA and LR Act, and this Sirdari right was heritable under the law, and the learned Additional Commissioner's view to the contrary is legally erroneous. This ground has no force. Nowhere has the learned Additional Commissioner recorded the finding that the appellant's father was in continuous possession from 1365 Fasli to 1374 Fasli or at least from 1367 Fasli to 1374 Fasli, on the other hand, the learned Additional Commissioner has found that Srimati Prabhu Naath Kunwari has been recorded as the tenure-holder in the main column. The name of the father of the plaintiff is recorded for the first time in 1367 Fasli in the column of sub-tenant with red ink. This means that the plaintiff's father was a trespasser. After the death of the plaintiff's father the trespass has ended as there is no record of anybody (either the plaintiff or his father) being in possession from 1375 to 1377 Fasli. This means that the plaintiff's father was a trespasser. After the death of the plaintiff's father the trespass has ended as there is no record of anybody (either the plaintiff or his father) being in possession from 1375 to 1377 Fasli. The appellant has never been recorded in possession of the land. A trespasser's right is not a heritable right and there is no provision in the revenue law laying down an order of succession for trespassers. A trespasser relies upon force to assert his rights. This means that the moment the rightful tenure holder has sufficient force to counter the trespasser's force, the trespasser's possession ceases without conferring any rights on him or on his heirs. 5. The second ground taken in the appeal is that the entries of 1375 to 1377 Fasli are practically entries made during the pendency of the controversy culminating in the instant suit and the plaintiffs have been continuing in possession though one of them is in military service. This ground is also incorrect. The suit has been filed on September 29, 1969, that is to say, after the entries of 1375 to 1377 Fasli had been recorded. These entries were not thus made during the pendency of the suit. Further, the argument that one of the plaintiffs was in adverse possession even though he was in military service is an absurd one. Perhaps, the appellant is under the impression that adverse possession is like the military conquest and the conqueror need not be present at the scene of his conquest once the conquest has been made. Possession in the revenue law has only two connotations-one is constructive possession of the rightful tenure holder, and the other is the cultivatory possession, i.e., possession of the tiller of the soil. Obviously, a person in military service who is not a rightful tenure-holder, and not the tiller of the soil cannot claim possession of any kind unless of course he is an absconder from the Army and is living in the village and not at the place of his military duty. 6. The third contention is that the law presumes continuity of possession, and the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in the exercise of his jurisdiction by failing to consider the statements of the appellant's witnesses to this effect. 6. The third contention is that the law presumes continuity of possession, and the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in the exercise of his jurisdiction by failing to consider the statements of the appellant's witnesses to this effect. No law presuming the continuity of possession of a trespasser has been shown to me and, in fact, no such law exists in the country. The law only presumes the continuity of possession of the rightful owner. Supposing a burglar enters a house at night and occupies it, will the law of the country be reduced to the absurdity of propounding that thereafter the burglar shall be presumed to continue in possession for ever ? The concept of continuity of possession has been drawn out merely to protect the rightful owner. As regards a trespasser, he has to prove his possession at every step and at every step it is open to the rightful owner to dispossess the trespasser. 7. Another ground taken in the appeal is that the claim for declaration made by the appellant could not be negatived simply on the ground that they may not have been in actual possession at the time of the suit or shortly before that. This is a most perverse logic. The plaintiff-appellant seems to claim some kind of divine right as a trespasser even without the necessity of proving his actual possession. The argument indeed is so illogical that it hardly need be contradicted. 8. The other grounds taken in the appeal are that correct and proper issues were not framed and the judgment is not a proper judgment as required by law. These grounds have not the slightest force. As many as seven issues covering all the material points were framed, and the judgment has been properly written discussing the evidence and the points of law arising. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited Jai Narain Pandey v. Lallen Tiwari 1974 RD 59 . This decision does not help the appellant in any manner. 10. As many as seven issues covering all the material points were framed, and the judgment has been properly written discussing the evidence and the points of law arising. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited Jai Narain Pandey v. Lallen Tiwari 1974 RD 59 . This decision does not help the appellant in any manner. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents has cited Keshaw Dass v. Gaon Sabha 1973 RD 80 in which learned Member B.K. Misra has held as follows : "Presumption of continuity in favour of a lawful tenure-holder can certainly be urged even if there are gaps of a year or two in these entries, but where the plaintiff wants to establish that the has prescribed rights by continuous possession, then he has to establish his continuous possession yer after year until such time as the period of limitation has expired." 11. The above observation, to my mind, is the correct view of law and been rightly adopted by the courts below. 12. I find no force in the second appeal and hereby dismiss it with costs.