ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur dated 11-1-1973 in Revision No. 546/ 1744 under Sec. 48 of U. P. C. H. Act between Daya Shankar v. Shobh Nath, whereby the revision petition was dismissed. 2. It is admitted before me that the disputed land belonged to Ram Baran, who had mortgaged the disputed land to one Gajadhar. The contesting opposite party Shobh Nath had come into possession over the disputed land after paying money to the mortgagee. The petitioners being sons of aforesaid Ram Baran had claimed right in the disputed land whereas the contesting opposite parties Shobh Nath and another had denied the claim of the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners were not legitimate sons of Ram Baran, hence they were not entitled to the disputed land, and that the contesting opposite parties had also asserted that even if the petitioners had right in the disputed land, their right became extinguished due to adverse possession of the contesting opposite parties for more than statutory period. 3. It is also not disputed before me that in the basic year the contesting opposite parties were recorded over the disputed land and the petitioners had filed objection under Sec. 9 of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act with the allegations that the petitioners were sons of the original mortgagor Ram Baran and that the petitioners had filed a civil suit against the contesting opposite parties for their ejectment in the year 1958 and had obtained a decree for possession against the contesting opposite parties, but later on the aforesaid decree was held without jurisdiction and the possession taken by the petitioners in pursuance of the above mentioned decree was again taken back by the contesting opposite parties. Thereafter in the year 1966 the petitioners had filed a suit under Sec. 229-B of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act but the same was ultimately abated due to start of the consolidation in the village. The petitioners have lost their claim as is evident from the impugned judgments of all the consolidation authorities. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has patently erred in recognising the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of adverse possession. The petitioners have lost their claim as is evident from the impugned judgments of all the consolidation authorities. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has patently erred in recognising the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of adverse possession. He has emphasised that during the continuance of the mortgage the contesting opposite parties could not prescribe title to the disputed land on the basis of adverse possession. He has also emphasised that the consolidation authorities have failed to record categorical finding as to when the mortgage in respect of the disputed land executed by the petitioners father Ram Baran was redeemed. Unless the date of redemption is specifically found, the contesting opposite parties could not prescribe title to the disputed land on the basis of adverse possession against the petitioners. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also contended that some of the petitioners were minor hence the minor tenure-holders had a right to evict the trespassers after attaining majority within the prescribed time and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has accepted the claim of the contesting opposite parties without examining the question as to the minority of some of the petitioners tenure-holders of the disputed land. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. He has submitted that on the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that the contesting opposite parties continued in possession from 1357 Fasli onwards the claim or sirdari rights by the contesting opposite parties was rightly accepted by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. He has further submitted in reply that when some of the petitioners had filed a suit for ejectment against the contesting opposite parties they had alleged that the contesting opposite parties had trespassed over the disputed land in July, 1956, hence the contesting opposite parties acquired sirdari rights on the basis of their long continuous possession on the day when the consolidation operations started in the village. He has also submitted that when the contesting opposite parties had denied that the petitioners were not the sons of original mortgagor Ram Baran, the possession of the contesting opposite parties over the disputed land from 1357 F. became adverse against the mortgagee and mortgagor both and it has been established beyond doubt that the contesting opposite parties had acquired sirdari rights in the disputed land. He has also emphasised that in the basic year the contesting opposite parties were recorded over the disputed land, hence the petitioners can be held tenure-holders only when their claim is within time. According to the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties the petitioners rights have become extinguished and they are not entitled to maintain the writ petition. 7. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. Perusal of the impugned judgments does not indicate as to when the admitted mortgage in respect of the disputed land executed by Ram Baran stood redeemed. It is well known that ordinarily, during the continuance of a mortgage, a trespasser does not start prescribing title against the mortgagor or his heirs. The Deputy Director of Consolidation had conferred sirdari rights upon the contesting opposite parties only on the basis of adverse possession. The petitioners have been found to be the sons of the originall mortgagor Ram Baran. The contention of the contesting opposite parties that the petitioners were not legitimate sons of Ram Baran has been negatived by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Since the claim of the contesting opposite parties has been accepted by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on the basis of adverse possession, I have a feeling that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not approached the problem from the correct angle. Unless the date of redemption of the mortgage is categorically indicated, it is difficult to determine the acquisition of sirdari rights through adverse possession by the contesting opposite parties. It is admitted by both the parties that the mortgage executed by Ram Baran has been redeemed, but both the parties are not in agreement as to when the mortgage stood redeemed. 8. On the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation it is evident that the petitioners are sons of the original mortgagor Ram Baran. 9. It is admitted by both the parties that the mortgage executed by Ram Baran has been redeemed, but both the parties are not in agreement as to when the mortgage stood redeemed. 8. On the findings recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation it is evident that the petitioners are sons of the original mortgagor Ram Baran. 9. Now the question remains as to whether the contesting opposite parties have succeeded in acquiring sirdari rights in the disputed land on the basis of their adverse possession. 10. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties invited my attention to the ruling reported in AIR 1927 All 177 Munawar Ali v. Jag Milan Ram in support of his contention that the contesting opposite parties started prescribing title even during the continuance of mortgage as they had denied the claim of the petitioners being sons of original mortgagor Ram Baran. 11. I have gone through the aforesaid ruling and I find that the facts of the reported case are quite different from the facts involved in the present case. The contesting opposite parties claimed right on redeeming the disputed land from the mortgagee. They are not illegal transferees of the mortgagee as was the case in the reported ruling. The learned Judge in the above mentioned ruling has observed as below: - " ................... It is well settled that possession of mortgaged property obtained by ouster of a mortgagee in possession is not necessarily adverse to the mortgagor also, for the reason that such possession so far as the mortgagor is concerned, cannot become adverse until the mortgagor becomes entitled to immediate possession vide Muhammad Hussain v. Mulchand, ((1905) ILR 27 All 395) and Ishmdar Khan v. Ahmed Husain (1908-5 All LJ 85). If a person holding adversely to the mortgagee cannot prescribe a title to the equity of redemption as against the mortgagor, I find it difficult to hold that a person holding possession of the mortgaged property not adversely to the mortgagee, but claiming the title through a transfer made by some transferee from the mortgagee, can prescribe a title by adverse possession. So long as the mortgagor does not become entitled to immediate possession of the mortgaged property, it appears to me, it cannot be said that the person in possession of the mortgaged property is holding adversely to the mortgagor for the simple reason that possession can be adverse only against the person who is entitled to the possession of that property. True it is that if a trespasser dispossesses a mortgagee and enters into possession of the mortgaged property asserting a title adverse to the mortgagor also, his title will be adverse to the mortgagor from the time, the mortgagor has knowledge of the assertion." 12. In the present case I do not find that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has examined the claim of the parties in the light of the observations quoted above. Since the contesting opposite parties are claiming right on the basis of adverse possession, it is in the interest of justice that the Deputy Director of Consolidation may be asked to re-examine the question as to whether in the circumstances of the present case the claim of the petitioners has become extinguished due to adverse possession of the contesting opposite parties. 13. As regards, the claim of the contesting opposite parties that they continued in possession over the disputed land as trespassers, according to some of the petitioners, even from 1956, hence they had acquired sirdari rights before the start of consolidation in the village, I think the contentions are devoid of merits. Even if the contesting opposite parties were trespassers in the year 1956 some of the petitioners would get right to evict the contesting opposite parties after obtaining majority. In the earlier suit of the year 1958 some of the petitioners-plaintiffs were minors and they were aged about 11 or 13 years, and those minors would become major in the year 1965 or 1963 and the consolidation had started in the village in the year 1966, hence they had right to evict the contesting opposite parties on the day when consolidation started in the village. In this view of the matter the contesting opposite parties cannot acquire sirdari rights in disputed land under Section 210 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act (See 1976 All WC 318 : ( AIR 1976 All 510 ), Surendra v. Deputy Director of Consolidation). A Division Bench of this court has observed in paras. In this view of the matter the contesting opposite parties cannot acquire sirdari rights in disputed land under Section 210 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act (See 1976 All WC 318 : ( AIR 1976 All 510 ), Surendra v. Deputy Director of Consolidation). A Division Bench of this court has observed in paras. 5 and 6 of the aforesaid ruling as below: - Para 5. "Sec. 209 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act provides for a suit for ejectment of a trespasser. Under it, a suit can be filed by a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami concerned. Sec. 13 of U. P. General Clauses Act provides that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, the words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa. The word 'bhumidhar occurring in Section 209 of U.P.Z.A. and L. R. Act will also mean bhumidhars where there are more than one person entitled to the plots in dispute as bhumidhars. In the present case the two brothers were bhumidhars. Section 209 will cover both of them. In other words both of them were entitled to file the suit under Section 209 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act." Para. 6. "Sec. 210 of the said Act provides that if the suit is not brought under Section 209 the person retaining possession shall become sirdar where the land forms part of the holding of bhumidhar. Section 209 inter alia lays down the condition that a person should not only have taken or retained possession of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force, but also without the consent of the bhumidhar concerned. So, if there are more than one bhumidhar entitled to a holding, the trespasser must be in possession without the consent of all of them. Proof of lack of consent of one of them, or proof of consent of one of them, will not enure to the benefit of the trespasser in acquiring sirdari rights under Section 210 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act even in case where the suit is not brought under Section 209 of the said Act." 14. Proof of lack of consent of one of them, or proof of consent of one of them, will not enure to the benefit of the trespasser in acquiring sirdari rights under Section 210 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act even in case where the suit is not brought under Section 209 of the said Act." 14. Since the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not indicated in his impugned judgment when the mortgage stood redeemed and when the possession of the contesting opposite parties be- came without consent of the minor tenure-holders, I think that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has patently erred in conferring sirdari rights upon the contesting opposite parties on the basis of adverse possession. 15. During the course of arguments the contesting opposite parties had urged that when the contesting opposite parties got back possession over the disputed land from the petitioners, who had obtained a decree from the civil court without jurisdiction and had succeeded in taking possession over the contesting opposite parties in pursuance of the decree, the possession of the contesting opposite parties was not disrupted and their possession should be held as continuous because their possession was disrupted through a decree without jurisdiction and to support his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the ruling reported in AIR 1916 Mad 738; Kaliaperummal Keerudayan v. Chidambaram Thanjiran. In view of what I have said in the earlier paragraph it is not necessary for me to determine this question in the present case. Even if the possession of the contesting opposite parties continued from 1956 they do not succeed in acquiring sirdari rights in the disputed land. In the circumstances of the present case it is desirable that the Deputy Director of Consolidation may be asked to re-examine the question as to whether the contesting opposite parties have succeeded in acquiring sirdari rights in the disputed land. The findings of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that the petitioners are sons of original mortgagor Ram Baran, are based on appraisal of evidence and are being confirmed. 16. The findings of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that the petitioners are sons of original mortgagor Ram Baran, are based on appraisal of evidence and are being confirmed. 16. On the allegations in the objection filed by the contesting opposite parties they being heirs of Ram Baran had redeemed the mortgage and if the aforesaid averment is correct, they stepped into shoes of the mortgagees and it is difficult to believe that they acquired sirdari rights on the basis of their possession in the light of their own allegations. However, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has recognised the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of adverge possession and has not adhered to the averments made by them in their own objection. I think that the Deputy Director of Consolidation may be asked to re-examine the claim of the contesting opposite parties in the light of their own pleadings and legal evidence on record. To my mind the Deputy Director of Consolidation has failed to appreciate the controversial point involved in the present case and has also failed to record categorical findings in relation to the evidence on record and has patently erred in conferring sirdari rights upon the contesting opposite parties without determining the relevant question, hence his judgment deserves to be quashed. 17. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment is hereby quashed and the Deputy Director of Consolidation is directed to decide the question as to whether the contesting opposite parties have acquired right in the disputed land treating the petitioners as sons of the original mortgagor Ratft Baran and thus entitled to the disputed land by inheritance. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.