JUDGMENT: Uday Sinha, J. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing annexure-3 dated 25. 9. 1975 by which the Divisional Superintendent, North Eastern Railway, Samastipur ordered premature retirement of the petitioner from the afternoon of 30. 9. 1975. In terms of annexure-3 itself the petitioner had attained the age of more than 56 years. According to the petitioner the order for his retirement was without jurisdiction as well as malafide. 2. The first submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the Divisional Superintendent not being his appointing authority, had no jurisdiction to order his compulsory retirement. The facts not in controversy bearing on this aspect of the matter are that the petitioner was appointed to the Bengal and North Western Railway (here in after called B. & N. W. Railway for brevity) on 16-12-1939. He had been appointed by the Agent and General Manager of the said Railway. The said company ceased to work from 1-1-1943 and the management of the Railway was assumed from midnight of 31-12-1942 by Government of India. Prior to the termination of the contract of the company with Government the General Manager in May, 1942 gave Ii notice to the petitioner' that t be petitioner's services would be terminated at mid night on 31-12-1942. After the management of the Railway Company had been taken over by Government of India, the petitioner received fresh appointment from General Manager of the B. & N. W. Railway. The petitioner's stand is that he having been appointed by the General Manager of the B. & N. W. Railway his services could not have been terminated by the Divisional Superintendent, an authority subordinate to the General Manager. 3. The stand of the petitioner has been seriously challenged by the respondents. It is not disputed that the rank equivalent to the erstwhile General Manager of the B. & N. W, Railway under the company is the General Manager of the present North Eastern Railway (here in after to be called 'N. E. Railway'). The stand of the Railway is that the Divisional Superintendent, Samastipur under whom the petitioner was working as Station Master was the appointing authority of the petitioner in terms of Note (1) to Proviso (1) of rule 2046. The stand of the Railway is that the Divisional Superintendent, Samastipur under whom the petitioner was working as Station Master was the appointing authority of the petitioner in terms of Note (1) to Proviso (1) of rule 2046. The submission on behalf of the respondents is well founded and must succeed, Annexure 4 shows that the petitioner was appointed afresh by the Agent and General Manager, B. & N. W. and R. & K. Railways. This letter shows that the petitioner was offered employment under Government of India from the 1 st January, 1943 on terms and conditions specified on the reverse of the letter. By paragraph 3 of Annexure 4 it was informed that the B. & N. W. and R. & K. Railways would be run as one system and the cadres of the two systems would be combined. Paragraph 4 of the said letter which is rather important reads as follows- "Persons appointed on or after the 1st January, 1943 will be governed by the State Railway Rules in all matters and they will be entitled to any new scales of pay which may be fixed by Government. If the revised scales of pay involve an improvement over existing ones, they will be extended to the staff now being taken over from the company." The petitioners accepted the terms and conditions contained in Annexure 4. By acceptance of those terms the petitioner bound himself to be governed by State Railway Rules in all matters. Thus the petitioner •bound himself to be governed by the laws rules and regulations contained in the Indian Railway Establishment Code Paragraph 2046 (F. R. 56) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. Volume II lays down a some of the condition of service for Railway servants. Clause (h) of the said paragraph provides for compulsory retirement of Railway servants prior to their superannuation. By clause (h) the appointing authority has been vested with powers to compulsory retire any Railway servant if it is of opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. Note (1) to clause (i) of paragraph 2046 defines “Appointing Authority" to mean authority competent to make the first appointment to the grade which the Railway servant for the time being holds. It is not disputed that in relation to station Masters appointed after 1943, Divisional Superintendents are the appointing authority. Note (1) to clause (i) of paragraph 2046 defines “Appointing Authority" to mean authority competent to make the first appointment to the grade which the Railway servant for the time being holds. It is not disputed that in relation to station Masters appointed after 1943, Divisional Superintendents are the appointing authority. The submission, however, on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner had been appointed by the General Manager prior to 1-1-1943 and, therefore, the definition of appointing authority in Note (1) to paragraph 2046 (i) was not applicable to the petitioner. The submission is fallacious and must be rejected. The petitioner in terms of annexure-4 agreed to be bound by the State Railway Rules. He thus accepted that the Divisional Superintendent would be his appointing authority. Rule 134 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I lays down the authority competent to make first appointment. Clause (c) of the said Rule relates to posts in the Indian Railway and other Railway Administrations. The appointing authority for first appointments for such posts is the General Manager. General Administrative Officer or lower authority to whom he may delegate the power. It has been asserted on behalf of the respondents in paragraph 11 of their counter affidavit that the Divisional Superintendent has been empowered to appoint Railway servants to non-gazetted posts. Annexure A to the counter-affidavit shows that the Divisional Superintendent Is competent to compulsorily retire, remove or dismiss a non-gazetted servant from service. Paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit read with Annexure A there to leaves no manner of doubt that the Divisional Superintendent was the appointing authority in respect of the petitioner also although he had been initially appointed by the General Manager. The distinction sought to be made on behalf of the petitioner in regard to erstwhile company servants and purely State Railway servants is illusory and must be rejected. 4. learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in regard to erstwhile company servants like the petitioner special instructions bad been issued in regard to compulsory retirement and in terms of those instructions compulsory retirement, dismissal etc. can be ordered only by the General Manger. The special Instruction relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner has been quoted in P.K. Swamy versus South Eastern Railway by its General Manager Calcutta and another1 at paragraph 3. can be ordered only by the General Manger. The special Instruction relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner has been quoted in P.K. Swamy versus South Eastern Railway by its General Manager Calcutta and another1 at paragraph 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner on the basis of that case contended that the petitioner could have been compulsorily retired only, by the General Manager and not by the Divisional Superintendent. This submission is untenable. The special instructions quoted in the decision were only in regard to erstwhile employees of B. N. Railway Company (Bengal Nagpur Railway Company). No such provision was made for employees of other private Railway companies. At least learned counsel for the petitioner did not show us anything of the kind. It is, therefore patent that the special Instructions related to only B. N. Railway company staff and not to B. & N. W. Railway Company (Bengal and North Western Railway Company). The petitioner must, therefore, be restricted to the rules and regulations contained in the Indian Railway Establishment Code by which the petitioner bouud himself in 1942. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon Amar Nath Sur Versus General Managar, North Frontier Railway and others.2 The Andhra Pradesh and Assam decisions are clearly distinguishable. These were cases of dismissal from service or reversion. The instant case is not of dismissal or reversion, but compulsory retirement. It is now well established that compulsory retirement is neither dismissal nor reversion and therefore it is not within the vice of Article 311 of the Constitution. Without going into any great detail on this subject, I shall content myself by quoting what was said in Tara Singh etc. versus State of Rajasthan and others3 at paragraph 24 :- "The right to be in public employment is a right to hold it according to rules. The right to hold it defeasible according to rules. The rules speak of compulsory retirement. There is guidance in the rules as to when such compulsory retirement is made. When persons complete 25 years of service and the efficiency of such person is impaired and yet it Js desirable not to bring any charge of inefficiency or in-competency, the Government passes orders of such compulsory retirement. The Government servant in such a case does not loose the benefits which a Government servant has already earned. Thebe orders of compulsory retirement are made in public interest. The Government servant in such a case does not loose the benefits which a Government servant has already earned. Thebe orders of compulsory retirement are made in public interest. This is the safety valve of making such orders so that arbitrariness or bad faith creeps in." Their Lordships also held that orders of compulsory retirement did not violate Articles 14, 19, 31 and 311 of the Constitution. Again in P, Radha Kirshan Naidu and others versus Government of Andhra Pradesh and others4 at paragraph 12 A. N. Ray, C. J. laid down that compulsory retirement does not amount to a dismissal or removal and therefore, it is not within the vice of Article 311 of the Constitution. The Andhra Pradesh and Assam cases, therefore, can be of no assistance to the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon Chief Commercial Superintendent, North Eastern Railway versus Gorakh Nalh Upadhaya and others5. That was a case of removal from service which is entirely different from cases of compulsory retirement. In this view of the matter, this case also can be of no assistance to the petitioner. 6. The next point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the order dated 25-9-1975 for his premature retirement by annexure-3 was in the garb of punishment, having been inflicted without any departmental proceeding as contemplated by rule 9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, it was ultra vires Article 311 of the Constitution. To substantiate his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to annexure-1 which seems to show that by order dated 2-9-1975 the petitioner bad been suspended for cancelling a train continuously for two days, Thus put the submission appears attractive. The respondents, however, have averred that the petitioner was not retired compulsorily for any particular delinquency, but was retired on an appraisal of his entire service record. It has been stated in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit that the petitioner while working as Assistant Station Master, Sugauli on 26.7.1971 was held to have acted irresponsibly in regard to up troops special. Collision of train was some how averted. For that conduct the petitioner had been reduced to the post of signaller. Although the petitioner was restored to his original post on appeal on compassionate grounds yet the finding of irresponsible behaviour in regard to the petitioner was sustained. Collision of train was some how averted. For that conduct the petitioner had been reduced to the post of signaller. Although the petitioner was restored to his original post on appeal on compassionate grounds yet the finding of irresponsible behaviour in regard to the petitioner was sustained. It has also been averred that against specific control orders the petitioner cancelled SC 29 on 1-9-1975 and 2-9-1975 (we have been given to understand at the Bar that this was a goods train). The implication of such cancellation of a train is far reaching and shows serious delinquency. The respondents have also averred that the alleged suspension order (annexure-1) was never given effect to and the petitioner was never suspended. Upon the materials produced by the respondents, I am satisfied that the petitioner was compulsorily retired not for any specific delinquency, but with an eye to his entire service record. There was no contravention of rule 9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal). Rules. The retirement of the petitioner cannot be held to be ultra vires Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 7. The next submission urged on behalf of the petitioner was that although it was stated in the retirement order annexurt-3 that the petitioner would get three months pay in lieu of notice he was not paid in one lump sum, but was paid month to month and therefore, the order for compulsory retirement contravened paragraph 2046 (h) of the Indian Establishment Code, Volume II. The submission is entirely devoid of substance and must be rejected. All that the petitioner was entitled was three month's notice or three months pay in lieu of notice. If the petitioner was paid his salary month after month without taking any work from him, it follows that the petitioner had been given three month's notice of retirement. Rule 2046 was thus fully complied. 8. Lastly, it was submitted that the order (or compulsory retirement of the petitioner was not in public interest. The best judge -in regard to removal in public interest was the Divisional Superintendent and not this court. I would concede that the Divisional Superintendent could not retire any person without any reason, but where there were materials, this court cannot inflict its own judgment In regard to the needs of public interest. The facts, however, of this case speak eloquently that the petitioner had been removed in public lie Interest. I would concede that the Divisional Superintendent could not retire any person without any reason, but where there were materials, this court cannot inflict its own judgment In regard to the needs of public interest. The facts, however, of this case speak eloquently that the petitioner had been removed in public lie Interest. I am there fore, unable to see any force in this submission. 9. For the reasons, stated above, I find no merit in this application and it is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.