JUDGMENT 1. - This execution second appeal has been filed by the judgment-debtor, Turab Ali and Gulam Mohamed against the judgment and decree dated 3rd November, 1973 passed by the District Judge, Pali, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree dated 26th April, 1973 passed by Civil Judge, Pali, in Execution Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 1972 was dismissed. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as under : There is a shop situate in the town of Pali The appellants are in occupation of the said shop. The respondent, Smt. Mariyam, filed a suit (Civil Original Suit No. 6 of 1970) on 1st June, 1971 in the Court of Civil Judge, Pali for the eviction of the respondents from the said shop; and for the recovery of a sum of L 3,880/- on account of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. In the said suit, the plaintiff-respondent had claimed the eviction of the appellants on two grounds, viz., (1) default in the payment of rent and (2) bona fide personal need of the plaintiff-respondent. In the said suit, the appellants filed the written statement dated 16th July, 1970 contesting the said suit and issues were framed on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. Issue No. 4 related to the question whether the shop in dispute was required bona fide by the plaintiff for her husband to carry on business therein. During the pandency of the aforesaid suit, a compromise was arrived at between the parties and a compromise petition dated 28th May, 1971 signed by the appellants and the Mukhtar Aam of the respondent was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Pali. In the said compromise petition, the parties agreed that the appellants would vacate the shop and deliver the same to the respondent on 1st June, 1974 because the said shop was needed personally by the respondent for her husband. In the said compromise petition, it was further agreed that the appellants would pay a sum of L 135/- per month by way of damages for use and occupation of the shop from 1st June, 1971 and that if the rent (damages) for three months fell in arrear, the respondent decree-holder would be entitled to get the shop vacated immediately and also to recover the amount of arrears. In the compromise petition, it was also provided that the rent would either be deposited in the court or sent by money order to the respondent or paid to Shri Ibrahim, the husband and the Mukhtiar Aam of the respondent. In the compromise petition, it was further provided that all the objections raised by the appellants should be treated as withdrawn and that the respondent was foregoing the rent in respect of the period prior to 1st June, 1971. After the said compromise petition was filed, the said petition was read over to the parties in the presence of the Civil Judge and it was accepted as correct. Thereafter, the Civil Judge passed an order dated 28th May, 1971 stating that he considered it proper to pass a decree in terms of the compromise and he decreed the suit of the respondent for the eviction of the appellants in terms of the said compromise. It appears that after the passing of the said decree, the appellants committed default in the payment of rent (damages) payable under the decree and a petition for execution of the said decree was filed by the respondent in the court of Civil Judge, Pali. In the said execution proceedings, the appellants filed an objection petition raising the grounds that the decree was inexecutable as it was a nullity. In the said objection petition, the appellants submitted that before passing the decree for eviction, it was incumbent upon the court to have arrived at a satisfaction that the appellants could be evicted on one of the grounds set out in sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and that on the date of the passing of the decree, there was no material on record before the Civil Judge on the basis of which the Civil Judge could have arrived at the satisfaction that the shop was required bona fide and reasonably by the landlord for use and occupation of herself or a member of her family. The Civil Judge, by his order dated 26th April, 1973, rejected the said objection petition filed by the appellants. The appellants filed an appeal against the said order passed by the Civil Judge. The said appeal was dismissed by the District Judge, Pali, by his judgment and decree dated 3rd November, 1973. The Civil Judge, by his order dated 26th April, 1973, rejected the said objection petition filed by the appellants. The appellants filed an appeal against the said order passed by the Civil Judge. The said appeal was dismissed by the District Judge, Pali, by his judgment and decree dated 3rd November, 1973. Thereafter, the appellants have filed this execution second appeal in this Court. 3. The first question which has been raised by Shri H. C. Jain, the learned counsel for appellants is that the decree for eviction passed by the Civil Judge on the basis of the compromise is a nullity inasmuch as while passing the said decree, the Civil Judge did not satisfy himself as to whether the appellants could be evicted on any of the grounds set out in sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. 4. The question as to the circumstances in which a compromise decree passed in a suit for eviction can be held to be nullity has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in a number of cases. 5. In Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal, 1969 R.C.J. 152 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case governed by the provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, observed that the compromise decree in a suit for eviction would be a nullity if the court had passed the decree without satisfying itself that the grounds of eviction as mentioned in Section 13 of the Act existed. In the said case, the Supreme Court found that the order which was passed by the Sub-Judge on the basis of the compromise did not indicate that any other statutory grounds mentioned in section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 existed and, therefore, the decree was held to be a nullity. 6. In Ferozi Lal Jain v. Matunal and another, 1971 R.C.J. 372 , the Supreme Court was again dealing with a case governed by the provisions of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. 6. In Ferozi Lal Jain v. Matunal and another, 1971 R.C.J. 372 , the Supreme Court was again dealing with a case governed by the provisions of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. In the said case, while reiterating the law laid down in Kaushalya Devi's case the Supreme Court has observed that a decree for recovery of possession can be passed by the Court only if the Court is satisfied that any one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) of the said Act are established and that without such a satisfaction, the Court is incompetent to pass a decree for possession. The Supreme Court has further laid-down that the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree for recovery of possession of any premises depends upon its satisfaction that one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 have been proved. While dealing with the question whether the Court which passed the decree, had arrived at the requisite satisfaction, the Supreme Court has observed. "Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to show that it was so satisfied." The Supreme Court thus laid-down that the question whether the Court, which passed the decree, was satisfied about the existence of one or more of the grounds for eviction set out in the relevant Act, can be determined on the basis of the order passed by the Court on the compromise or on the basis of any other material existing on record on the date of the passing of the decree. 7. In K. K. Chari v. R. M. Seshardri, 1973 R.C.J. 589 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case governed by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, reiterated the law laid-down in Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal and Ferozilal v. Manmal , Vaidialingam, J. (speaking for himself and Dua, J.) has observed : "The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional facts viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a prerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties, invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry." In K. K. Chari's case (supra), in the memo of compromise which was filed in the Court, it was stated as under : "The respondent hereby withdraws his defence in the aforesaid petition and submits to a decree for eviction unconditionally." The Supreme Court observed that the "withdrawal of the defence expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case regarding his requiring the premises for his own occupation being bona fide" and held the Court which passed the decree was satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord and that decree for eviction was neither void nor in executable. 8. 8. In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others, 1975 R.C.J. 48 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case governed by the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate, Control Act, 1947, has laid-down : "From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong." "Be that as it may, in cases where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity, is taken, the Executing Court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis of which, the Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. If, on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the Executing Court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial Court's jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding of the trial Court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the Rent Court could have...... as distinguished from Must have...... been satisfied to the statutory grounds for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super court sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court." In the said case, in the terms of the compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed, the tenant had agreed to pay a sum of money as arrears of rent and mesne profits and the Supreme Court held that : "By admitting to pay the arrears of rent and mesne profits at the rate of L 15/- per month, the tenant had clearly withdrawn or abandoned his application for fixation of standard rent. The admission in the compromise was thus an admission of the material facts which constituted a ground for eviction under Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act." 9. In Roshanlal and another v. Madanlal and others, 1975 R.C.J. 675 , the Supreme Court while dealing with a case governed by the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, has observed : "The Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation, the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In other words, parties cannot be permitted to have a tenant's eviction merely by agreement without any thing more. In such a situation, the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In other words, parties cannot be permitted to have a tenant's eviction merely by agreement without any thing more. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law." In the said case, the Supreme Court has further observed : "If the agreement or compromise for the eviction of the tenant is found, on the facts of a particular case, to be in violation of a particular Rent Restriction or Control Act, the Court would refuse to record the compromise as it will not be a lawful agreement. If on the other hand, the Court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of the compromise and, if necessary by considering them in the context of the pleadings and other materials in the case, that the agreement is lawful as in any other suit, so in an eviction suit, the Court is bound to record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith. Passing a decree for eviction on adjudication of the requisite facts or on their admission in a compromise either express or implied is not different." In that case, in the compromise petition, it was stated that "due to the necessity of the plaintiff for their own business-opening grocery shop, decree for ejectment may be granted to them against the defendants." The Supreme Court observed that the aforesaid statement contained in the compromise petition, in the background of the averments contained in plaint, squarely made out a case of eviction within the meaning of Section 12(l)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, on the admission of the defendant tenants. 10. 10. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions are equally applicable to decrees for eviction passed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, inasmuch as in sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the said Act, it is laid down that no court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by the Act, unless it is satisfied about the existence of the grounds for eviction as set out in clauses (a) to (1) of sub-section (I). A decree of eviction is, therefore open to challenge on the ground that while passing the said decree, the court which passed the decree did not satisfy itself with regard to the existence of one or more of the grounds set out in clauses (a) to (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. The satisfaction of the Court, which passed the decree, with regard to the existence of one or more of the grounds set out in clauses (a) to (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act can be established either from the order itself or from the other material on the record. The said material may consist of the pleadings in the case, the evidence recorded or produced in the case or an express or implied admission in the compromise agreement itself. If the decree, on the face of it discloses such material on the basis of which the Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, the Executing Court must accept it and execute the decree as it stands. Where the decree on the face of it does not show the existence of such material the executing court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was some material on the basis of which the Rent Court could have been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction, and if the executing court finds that prima facie such material existed, the executing court must execute the decree. 11. 11. In the present case, the Courts below have held that there was the admission of the appellants with regard to the premises being personally needed by the landlady for the use of her husband and that the said admission was sufficient for the court passing a decree for eviction against the appellants Shri H. C. Jain, the learned counsel for the appellants, has challenged the aforesaid finding and has submitted that an admission, in order to be finding must be clear and conclusive and that there should be no doubt or ambiguity in the said admission. The submission of Shri Jain is that under clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act, the landlord can seek the eviction if the premises are required reasonably and bona fide by the landlord for the use and occupation by himself or his family. According to Shri Jain, there is no admission by the appellants that the premises are required reasonably and bona fide by the respondent and the only admission which was made by the appellants in para (1) of the Compromise petition was that the shop was needed personally by the respondent for her husband. According to Shri Jain, the said admission could only be read as an admission about the premises being required by the respondent personally for the use and occupation of her husband but it could not be construed as an admission that the premises were required reasonably and bona fide by the respondent. In my opinion, the aforesaid contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted. The statement contained in para (1) of the Compromise petition must be read in the light of the pleadings as well as the issues. We find that one of the issues, issue No. 4, in the suit was as to whether the shop in dispute was needed bona fide by the respondent for starting business by her husband. The statement contained in para (1) of the Compromise petition must be read in the light of the pleadings as well as the issues. We find that one of the issues, issue No. 4, in the suit was as to whether the shop in dispute was needed bona fide by the respondent for starting business by her husband. The statement in para No. (1) of the Compromise petition that the appellants would vacate the shop on 1st June, 1974, because the respondent required it personally for her husband is an admission of the averments contained in the plaint in the said suit on the basis of which Issue No. 4 was framed and, therefore, it is an admission of the fact that the shop was required bona fide by the respondent for use and occupation of herself and members of her family. Apart from the aforesaid statement contained in para (1) of the Compromise petition, there is a further statement at the end of the para (2) of the Compromise petition wherein it is stated that the appellants were withdrawing all the other objections raised by them. In the aforesaid statement, the appellants admitted the assertions contained in the plaint with regard to the premises being required reasonably and Kona fide by the respondent for use and occupation of herself and the members of her family. In my opinion, the present case is fully covered by the decisions of the Supreme Court in K. K. Chari v. P. M. Seshadri , Nagindas Rarndas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others and Roshanlal's case (supra) and in view of the said decisions, it must be held that there was sufficient material on the record before the Civil Judge, Pali, on the date of the passing of the decree dated 28th May, 1971, on the basis of which the Civil Judge could have arrived at the satisfaction that the ground set out in clause (h) of sub-section (I) of Section 13 of the Act existed. The decree for eviction passed by the Civil Judge, therefore, cannot be held to be nullity and inexecutable. 12. The decree for eviction passed by the Civil Judge, therefore, cannot be held to be nullity and inexecutable. 12. The next submission of Shri H. C. Jain, the learned counsel for the appellants is that clause (2) of the decree which provides that in the event of rent (damages) falling in arrears for a period of three months, the respondents would be entitled to evict the appellants from the shop is illegal and void. The submission of Shri Jain is that under clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act, a tenant can be evicted only when he has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months whereas in the decree, a provision has been made for eviction of the defendants on non-payment of rent for a period of three months only. In support of his aforesaid submission, Shri Jain has placed reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in R. Thangasami Nadar v. A. R. Duraiswami Nadar, A.I.R. 1971 Mad. 429 , and the decision of the Patna High Court in Sureshwar Prasad v. Kedarnath, A.I.R. 1972 Pat. 223 . In my opinion, there is no merit in the aforesaid contention. The submission of the appellants that the decree is a nullity having been rejected, it having been held that the decree has been passed on the ground set out in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act, the decree is not open to challenge on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. In the decree a concession has been given to the appellants whereby they were permitted to remain in occupation of the shop till 1st June, 1974 provided they paid the rent regularly and it was stipulated that in case they fell in arrears for a period of three months, it would be open to the respondent to execute the decree. In the decree a concession has been given to the appellants whereby they were permitted to remain in occupation of the shop till 1st June, 1974 provided they paid the rent regularly and it was stipulated that in case they fell in arrears for a period of three months, it would be open to the respondent to execute the decree. Such a stipulation in the decree cannot be challenged on the ground that it enables the eviction of the appellants in violation of the provisions of clause (a) of sub-S. (1) of Section 13 of the Act because this was the condition on which the concession had been granted by the respondent to the appellants to remain in possession of the shop till 1st June, 1974 even though the decree for eviction had been passed against them. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Konchada Ramamurty Subudhi (dead) by his legal representatives v. Gopinath Naik and others, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 719 , it must be held that after the passing of the decree, the status of the appellants was that of licences only and not of tenants and therefore, there was no legal impediment in imposing the condition that in the event of the appellants failing to pay the rent (damages) for three months, it would be open to the respondent to execute the decree for eviction. The decision of the Madras High Court in Thangaswami Nadar's case and the decision of the Patna High Court in Sukheshwar Prasad's case to which reference has been made by the learned counsel for the appellants were cases where the decree was held to be a nullity and the contention raised by the landlord that he could seek the eviction of the tenant on the ground of default in the payment of future rent was rejected. The principles laid down in the said decision have no application to the present case inasmuch as here the compromise decree has not been found to be a nullity. 13. The learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Hazam Hussain Dadu and another v. Bai Kunverbai Prabhudass, 1974 R.C.J. 582 . 13. The learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Hazam Hussain Dadu and another v. Bai Kunverbai Prabhudass, 1974 R.C.J. 582 . A perusal of the said decision shows that in the case a distinction has been drawn between a compromise decree which provides that the passing of a decree for possession straightaway and giving a concession to the judgment-debtor to continue in possession for a particular period on condition that he continues to pay the rent regularly and a decree in which the tenant continues to remain possession indefinitely with a stipulation that the right of the tenant to continue in possession shall be forfeited on his committing default at any time in payment of rent. The case which came up for consideration before the Gujarat High Court fell in the latter category and the High Court held that the stipulation in the decree with regard to the forfeiture of the right of the tenant to continue in possession on his committing default was in the nature of a penal clause, intended to secure the payment of rent and the decree-holder could not seek the eviction of the tenant. The present case, however, falls in the first category because here a decree for eviction was passed against the appellants and in the said decree a concession was given to the appellants to remain in possession of the shop till 1st June, 1974 on condition that they would pay the rent (damages) regularly and in the event of rent falling in arrears for three months, the respondent could seek the eviction of the appellant. Such a provision in the decree was not in the nature of a penal clause to secure the payment of rent but was in the nature of concession granted to the appellants. 14. Shri H. C. Jain, the learned counsel for the appellants lastly contended that the decree for eviction could be put into execution only after 1st June, 1974 and the petition for execution filed by the decree-holder in 1972 was premature. I find that in the objection petition filed by the appellants no such ground has been raised and in view of the decision of this court in Chhaganraj v. Suganmal, I.L.R. (1958) 8 Raj. 295 , the appellants cannot be allowed to raise the said ground in second appeal. I find that in the objection petition filed by the appellants no such ground has been raised and in view of the decision of this court in Chhaganraj v. Suganmal, I.L.R. (1958) 8 Raj. 295 , the appellants cannot be allowed to raise the said ground in second appeal. Moreover in view of my finding that the stipulation in decree whereby the appellants were permitted to remain in possession of the shop till 1st June, 1974 was only a concession subject to the condition that they would pay the rent (damages) regularly and that the respondent is entitled to seek the eviction of the appellants on their failing to pay the rent (damages) for three months, there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the petition for execution of the decree filed by the respondent in 1972 was premature. 15. Thus none of the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellants merits acceptance. 16. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this appeal.Appeal dismissed. *******