JUDGMENT : M.K. Shah, J. These ten appeals are preferred by the State and the original complainant-Food Inspector, against the orders of acquittal passed in five cases which were instituted against the respondents original accused for the offence under section 16(1) (a) (i) read with section 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, (the Act.) 2. Mr. M.B. Shah, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State and Mr. J.M. Panchal for Mr. N.R. Oza, learned Advocate appearing for the original complainant have raised several contentions in these appeals, but the main contention is as follows : - The learned Magistrate erred in holding that because the Chrnbu lying in the godown was used for the purpose of taking out groundnut oil from the tin and then pouring the same into bottles by dividing into three parts, there was defect fatal to the prosecution in taking the samples. 3. As against this, Mr. D.K. Shah, the learned Advocate appearing for the accused contends that apart from the main ground on which the learned Magistrate has acquitted the accused, he is in a position to support the acquittal on two more grounds viz. (1) there has been violation of the mandatory provisions contained in rule 16(b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules ('the Rules') inasmuch as, as proved by the evidence on record, the ends of the paper used for the purpose of wrapping the sample bottles had not been neatly folded in and affixed by means of gum or other adhesive as provided in part two of the said rule; (2) there was also violation of the mandatory provisions contained in rule 16 (c) of the Rules, inasmuch as hots of the string or thread to be fastened on the paper cover in which the sample was wrapped had not been covered by means of sealing wax bearing the impression of the seal of the sample. 4. Now, the instant case, in my opinion, Mr. D.K. Shah is on a very strong ground so far as his two contentions are concerned, and the order of acquittal, therefore, is maintainable on the ground that the mandatory provisions contained in Rules 16(b) and 16(c) are violated. In that view of the matter, it would not be necessary to go into other questions raised by both the sides in these appeals. 5. In that view of the matter, it would not be necessary to go into other questions raised by both the sides in these appeals. 5. The very first question therefore which arises is as to whether these two rules, with which we are concerned, are mandatory in their character or not. 6. Mr. D.K. Shah has, in this connection, first of all strongly relied on Jethalal Lallubhai v. Baroda Municipal Corporation and another, 1979 (2) FAC 83 where a single Judge of this High Court in terms, held that rules 16(b) and 16(c) were mandatory. My learned brother D.P. Desai J. who delivered the said judgment has made the following important observations at page 451 "The first question for determination is whether the provisions of rule 16(b) and (c) are mandatory. There can be no difficulty on this point. The object of these provisions is to see that the samples sent for analysis are doubly secured. This is, inter alia, with a view to prevent their being tempered with during transit. It is obvious that an accused person can be convicted on the basis of the report of the public analyst to whom the sample in question is sent. Therefore, it is necessary in order to protect the interest of the accused to see that the sample sent for analysis is properly secured in order to prevent its being tempered with. The non-performance of the duty to carry out these double safeguards may result in injustice to the accused. The language of clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 16 in itself shows that the Rule making authority intended to provide for a double safeguard in the manner of packing and sealing". 7. Mr. Shah has also relied on a recent unreported decision of this court delivered by Divan, C.J. and the observations relied upon appear in para 4 of the said judgment. They read thus (vide Criminal Revision Application No. 447 of 1978 decided on 8-2-79): - "I have carefully gone through the evidence and I find that nowhere has the complainant, the food inspector, stated that he had complied with all the requirements of the Rules about taking of the samples and sending the samples to the Public Analyst or the Director of Central Food Laboratory. Though the complainant, food inspector, has described in elaborate details all that he did at the time of taking samples, he has not mentioned specifically that the knot of the thread by which the wrappings were secured had been properly sealed or not nor has he mentioned any where that the container, that is, the tumbler in which the sample was taken was clean and dry These requirements of the rules have been prescribed with a view to see that injustice is not done to any particular accused who is alleged to have committed an offence punishable under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The mandatory requirements of the procedure regarding the sealing of the bottles and regarding the container in which the milk was poured by the accused have not been proved to have been complied with nor is there any statement to the effect that all the requirement of the sections and the rules were complied with in the instant case. In the absence of any such general statement or in the absence of specific details regarding the compliance with Rule 16(1)(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and as the requirements of the container being dry and clean have not been shown to have been complied with, the prosecution cannot be said to have established its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt". It would be thus seen that the requirements under Rules 16(1) (a) and 16(1)(c) are held to be mandatory by this court in these two decisions. I am in respectful agreement with these decisions. 8. The question, therefore, which will next arise will be as to whether in fact, these mandatory requirements have been complied with or not in the cases from which the aforesaid appeals before me arise. But before I go over to the material on record on the question, I would like to deal with a point raised by Mr. M.B. Shah. His point is that it should be presumed that the food inspectors had complied with the necessary requirements as per the rules and, therefore, unless the contrary is shown, the prosecution should succeed in its case. 9. Mr. M.B. Shah. His point is that it should be presumed that the food inspectors had complied with the necessary requirements as per the rules and, therefore, unless the contrary is shown, the prosecution should succeed in its case. 9. Mr. Shah has strongly relied on an unreported part of a decision of a single Judge of this court in criminal appeal No. 44.5 of 1976 decision on 8/10-3-1978 by Ahmadi, J. There also, the question arose as to whether there was any infraction of the mandatory requirement contained in rule 16(b) in as much as, neither the evidence of the food inspector, nor the panchnama, disclosed that the ends of the paper were folded and stuck by means of gum or other adhesive as required by clause (b) of Rule 16. Reliance was, however placed in this connection on section 114 of the Evidence Act read with illustration (e) laying down that the court may presume that the official act has been regularly performed. Reliance was also placed on P.J. Ratnam v. D. Kanikaram and others, AIR 1964 S.C. 244 , as also Kassim Kunju Popkunju and another v. K.K. Ramkrishna Pillai, 1976 (2) FAC (Old Judg.) 68. In the first case, while considering the question as to whether the statutory precondition of consultation with the Bar Council had taken place and whether the matter could not have been remitted for inquiry to the District Judge under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, the Supreme Court observed that there would be a presumption of regularity in respect of official and judicial acts and it would be for the party who challenged such regularity to plead and prove his case. In the second case, concerning prosecution under the Act, it was submitted on behalf of the accused that the rules framed under the Act had not been complied with inasmuch as it was not proved that the specimen impression of the seal had been sent to the public analyst as required by rule 18 of the rules. The High Court had relied on the principle that official act must be presumed to have been regularly performed. The evidence of the food inspector together with the report of the public analyst showed that all the requirements of the rules had been satisfied. The High Court had relied on the principle that official act must be presumed to have been regularly performed. The evidence of the food inspector together with the report of the public analyst showed that all the requirements of the rules had been satisfied. The Supreme Court did not interfere with the order of the High Court and my learned brother Ahmadi, J. observed that "in other words, the Supreme Court did not think that the High Court was not justified in raising the presumption which arose under section 114, illustration (e) of the Evidence Act". 10. In my opinion, this judgment does not help Mr. M. B. Shah, because, after the judgment was partly dictated, at the request of the learned Advocate for respondent No. 1, the food inspector was recalled for further cross-examination and his evidence disclosed that the ends of the wrapper were fixed by means of gum although that detail was not mentioned in the panchnama out of inadvertence. The food inspector also stated that it was his normal practice to affix the ends of the wrapper by means of gum and in the case before the court, he had followed the same practice but had omitted to mention details in the panchnama out of Inadvertence. Relying on this positive evidence so placed on record to indicate that the ends of the wrapper were affixed as required under rule 16 (b) of the Rules, my learned brother held that there was no merit in the contention that there had been infraction of rule 16(b) of the Rules. 11. So far as Kassim Kunju's case (supra) is concerned, it would be significant to note that the evidence of the food inspector together with the report of the public analyst showed that all the requirements of the rule had been satisfied. 12. In the instant case, there is no such evidence on record. But on the contrary, there is evidence showing that this requirement was not observed at all. 13. Food Inspector Pandya's evidence shows that when the sample bottle which was lying in the court was shown to him, he admitted that the ends of the wrapper were not affixed by means of gum and that the work of so affixing them was left out. 13. Food Inspector Pandya's evidence shows that when the sample bottle which was lying in the court was shown to him, he admitted that the ends of the wrapper were not affixed by means of gum and that the work of so affixing them was left out. Of course, later, in answer to further questions in cross-examination, he stated that similar thing must have also happened with regard to the bottle which was handed over to the accused as also to the bottle which was sent to the public analyst, but he could not say about the said two bottles without seeing them. Here, if all the these bottles were filled in at the tame time after dividing the sample into three parts and as Panday's evidence disclosed, the procedure followed for sampling was done as stated by the witness in examination-in-chief, without mentioning that this essential requirement of affixing ends of the paper in which the bottles were wrapped by means of gum or other adhesive, and if one of the three bottles which was in court with seals in tact was found not to have the ends affixed by means of gum or other adhesive, then, there cannot be any doubt that the same would be the position with regard to the other two bottles, unless there is some positive evidence pointing to the contrary which is missing in the instant case. 14. Soche, the other food inspector who was concerned in three out of five cases also, when the muddamal bottle was shown to him, not only made a similar admission with regard to the bottle lying in court, but also made a positive statement that he had packed the other two bottles in the same manner. In one case, viz. case No. 17073 of 1975 out of which arises criminal appeals Nos. 274 and 659 of 1977, Soche after admitting the said fact even admitted that he was not aware that there was such a requirement that two ends of the wrapper must be affixed by means of gum. 15. In one case, viz. case No. 17073 of 1975 out of which arises criminal appeals Nos. 274 and 659 of 1977, Soche after admitting the said fact even admitted that he was not aware that there was such a requirement that two ends of the wrapper must be affixed by means of gum. 15. Thus, there is no room for presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act with regard to the requirements under rule 16(b) of the Rules, and on the contrary, as definite evidence shows, this requirement was not fulfilled and there is, therefore, clear breach of the mandatory provisions of rule 16(b) which alone would be sufficient to entitle the accused to an order of acquittal. 16. With regard to the requirement of rule 16(c), there is no general statement by the food inspector, nor any other material on record showing any general statement to the effect that the food inspector had complied with ail the requirements of the said rule about packing of the sample, nor is there any specific statement either in the evidence of the food inspector concerned or in the concerned panchnama that this requirement was complied with and, therefore, as per the ratio laid down by Divan, C.J. in criminal revision application No.447 of 1978, in the absence of any such general or specific statement regarding compliance with rule 16 (1)(c) of the rules, the prosecution cannot be said to have established its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 17. Thus, both with regard to both of the aforesaid requirement contained in rules 16(b) and 16(c) which are held to be mandatory, there is a breach and the prosecution, therefore, has failed to establish the guilt of the accused in all the case. 18. Mr. Shah drew my attention to a decision of the Supreme court in State of Kerala v. Alasserry Mohammed, 1978 (1) FAC 145. The Supreme Court was concerned in this case with the interpretation of Rule 22 of the Rules and it held that the rule was directory and not mandatory. Mr. Shah wants to contend that on the same reasoning, all the rules that is rules 14 to 22A should be held as directory and not mandatory, or in any event, rules 16(b) and 16(c) should be held to be directory. I am unable to accede to this contention. Mr. Shah wants to contend that on the same reasoning, all the rules that is rules 14 to 22A should be held as directory and not mandatory, or in any event, rules 16(b) and 16(c) should be held to be directory. I am unable to accede to this contention. The interpretation which was placed by the Supreme Court on rule 22 holding it directory and not mandatory was based on the peculiar language of that rule and one of the main considerations was the use of the word 'approximate' in rule 22 which, as observed by the Supreme Court, does indicate the directory nature of the Rule but does not necessarily militate against the view that the rule is mandatory. Another consideration which weighed with the Supreme Court was that the quantity which was prescribed was almost double the quantity required for the purposes of analysis and that, therefore, the quantity sent though unless found to be insufficient would not matter less than the prescribed one. It was for the public analyst whether it was sufficient for his analysis or not. This decision, therefore, does not lay down any principle which, when applied with regard to the interpretation of rules 16(b) and 16(c) would make them directory and not mandatory. The rules themselves are enacted for the purpose of ensuring that the contents maintain the same quality both at the time the sample was taken as also at the time the same was examined by the public analyst, and that they do not deteriorate or become unfit for analysis by virtue of air getting in or any damages which might be caused with the passage of time if the same is not properly packed and preserved. It is also the object of these Rules to see that the sample is not tempered with and that the same sample which was collected from the vendor is sent to and received by the public analyst. It is, therefore, that the requirements of these two rules become mandatory, the same having been prescribed to ensure a correct analysis. As earlier observed, this court has specifically considered the question and has decided in previous decisions that the rule rules are mandatory and, there is nothing in the Supreme Court decision relied upon by Mr. Shah to suggest otherwise so far as rules 16(b) and 16(c) of the rules are concerned. 19. Mr. As earlier observed, this court has specifically considered the question and has decided in previous decisions that the rule rules are mandatory and, there is nothing in the Supreme Court decision relied upon by Mr. Shah to suggest otherwise so far as rules 16(b) and 16(c) of the rules are concerned. 19. Mr. Shah also placed reliance on a full bench decision of this court in Criminal appeal No. 312 of 1975 with criminal appeal No. 353 of 1975 decided on December 5, 1978 by S.H. Sheth, D.P. Desai and A.N. Surti, 11, Rule 9(j) of the Rules came up for interpretation before the full bench and the question which arose was as to whether failure to supply a copy of the report of the public analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken, within 10 days from the date of receipt of the report would be fatal to the prosecution, and after considering various aspects including the language of the rule itself, the full bench held that the infringement of the time limit laid down by rule 9(j) does not necessarily vitiate the prosecution, nor does it affect in any manner the validity or admissibility of the report of the public analyst. But u observed by the full bench, it is open to the accused to prove prejudice caused to him by such infringement and if an accused proves it, it is open to the court to consider its effect on the prosecution launched against him. This decision also interpretes rule 9 (j) on the basis of the language of the said role as also certain principles for interpretation and in my opinion, this decision also does not help the prosecution in its contention that rules 16(b) and 16(c) are directory in nature and not mandatory. 20. Similarly, the decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Martand Bahant Risaldar v. Chhaganlal Ambalal Gandhi and another, 1978 (2) FAC 49 , which also interpreted rule 9(j), so far as it provides for sending of the copy of the report of the public analyst by registered post to the person from whom the sample bad been taken, as merely procedural in nature and therefore directory, does not help the prosecution in showing that rules 16 (b)and 16(c) are also directory. There, the question was with regard to sending of the report by registered post and Division Bench observed that: - "The reason for which the Legislature enacted Rule 9(j) is that the accused can get the sample given to him analysed by an analyst of his choice or he may make an application to the court to send the sample produced in the court analysed by the Central Food Laboratory and obtain a certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. This being the object of the rule the questions as to how a copy of a report of the Public Analyst is to be supplied to the person from whom the sample was taken is definitely directory and procedural because the object can be achieved if a copy of the report of the public analyst is made available to the accused either by hand delivery or by registered post". Rules 16(b) and 16(c) operate in an entirely different field. They are enacted for the purpose earlier set out and they are, therefore, mandatory in nature. 21. The result of this discussion is that the orders, of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate in five cases from which these 10 appeals arise are supportable, though, not entirely on the reasons stated and grounds relied upon by the learned Magistrate, but on the ground that as the mandatory requirements of rules 16(b) and 16(c) were not complied with in all the cases, as is established by the material on record, the accused are entitled to be acquitted for the offence with which they were charged, and the result, therefore, will be the following order :- All appeals dismissed.