JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - This is a plaintiffs appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27-4-1968 passed by Civil Judge, Mathura in Civil Appeal No. 181 of 1967, arising out of Original Suit No. 442 of 1966 decided by Munsif, Mathura on 30-8-1967. 2. The subject-matter of dispute is a shop situate in the town of Sonkh in district Mathura. It is undisputed that Ihe respondent was a tenant of the appellant in this shop at Rs. 40 p. m. rent. It is further undisputed that a sum of Rs. 440 was due as rent for the period 1-7-1965 to 30-6-1966 because the respondent had paid a sum of Rs. 40 to the appellants Pujari at Rs. 5 p.m. for 8 months only. On 11-7-1966, the appellant gave notice of demand through Sri Hoti Lal Sharma, Advocate, Ex. 3. In this notice it was stated that the arrears of rent be paid to his client. On 13-7-1966 the respondent sent a M. O. for Rs. 450 in the name of Sri Hoti Lal Sharma. The M. O. was refused. On 18-7-1966 the respondent gave reply of the appellants notice through Sri Ramesh Chandra Agrawal, Advocate. In this reply he asserted that he used to pay Rs. 5 to the appellants Pujari according to her directions, that he used to pay Rs. 35 to her in respect of which she did not give receipt, that despite that he was tendering Rs. 440 as demanded in the notice. This reply was addressed to Sri Hoti Lal Sharma, Advocate to the appellant. It reached the appellants counsel on 19-7-1966 vide acknowledgment receipt, Ex. A-2. Thereafter on 3-8-1966, the appellant gave another notice through Sri Hoti Lal Sharma, Advocate. In para 3 of the plaint it was stated that in the first notice of 11-7-1966, the appellant had committed a mistake in not deducting Rs. 40 paid to her Pujari and, therefore, another notice was given on 3-8-1966 mentioning that the respondent had paid Rs. 40 to her Pujari. At this stage it will be useful to mention that the appellant took cause of action for the suit from the first notice vide para 6 of the plaint. 3. On 6-9-1966, the appellant filed suit for the ejectment of the respondent and recovery of arrears of rent etc. 4. 40 to her Pujari. At this stage it will be useful to mention that the appellant took cause of action for the suit from the first notice vide para 6 of the plaint. 3. On 6-9-1966, the appellant filed suit for the ejectment of the respondent and recovery of arrears of rent etc. 4. The respondent resisted the suit for ejectment on the ground that he had tendered the entire arrears of rent claimed in the notice dated 11-7-1966 by M. O. which had been refused. On 5-12-1966 the trial court framed 5 issues in the case. First two issues read as follows: - "1. Whether the defendant has paid rent up to 30-4-1966? If not what arrears is due from the defendant? 2. Whether the defendant has defaulted in the payment of rent within the meaning of Section 3 (1) (a) of Act III of 1947? If so its effect?" 5. Evidence of the parties was recorded on 22-8-1967, arguments heard and case fixed for judgment on 23-8-1967. On 23-8-1967, the Munsif added issue No. 6 reading: "6. Whether the tender dated 18-7-1966 in compliance to notice dated 11-7-1966 was not a valid payment? If not, its effect?" 6. He made this specific issue feeling that it was material for decision. The Munsif then fixed another date for parties to lead evidence on the new issue. On 29-8-1967 the appellant examined herself. No evidence was led on behalf of the respondent. 7. The Munsif dealt with issues 2 and 6 together and found that the appellant had proved that the defendant had committed default in the payment of rent within the meaning of Section 3 (1) (a) of the U. P. Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947. Taking into account the language of the notice, Ex. 3, and the statement on oath of the appellant recorded on 29-8-1967, the Munsif held that the counsel who had given notice, Ex. 3, had no authority to receive rent on behalf of the appellant and as such the tender of the amount of rent by means of M. O. could not be deemed to be valid payment. 8. 3, and the statement on oath of the appellant recorded on 29-8-1967, the Munsif held that the counsel who had given notice, Ex. 3, had no authority to receive rent on behalf of the appellant and as such the tender of the amount of rent by means of M. O. could not be deemed to be valid payment. 8. In appeal by the respondent, the Civil Judge held: - (1) In the circumstances of the case the Munsif was not justified in framing issue No. 6 and then giving an opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence to the effect that her counsel had no authority to accept the money order and that the procedure adopted by the Munsif had caused great prejudice to the respondent, and (2) Tender of the arrears of rent by M. O. to the appellants counsel was a valid tender and as such the respondent was not in default. Consequently the Civil Judge set aside the decree of ejectment passed by the trial court. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant firstly urged that the lower appellate court was not justified in holding that the Munsif had committed any irregularity in framing issue No. -6 and thereby giving an opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence to the effect that her counsel had no authority to receive M. O. He further urged that the lower appellate court was not justified in observing that this irregularity had resulted in great prejudice to the respondent. 10. If is undisputed that the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947 is applicable to the case. Section 3 (1) (a) of this Act clearly lays down that no suit shall be filed for the ejectment of a tenant unless the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than 3 months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of the notice of demand. 11. Word 'landlord has been defined in Section 2 (c) as a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir or assignee of such person. It means that the landlord does not necessarily mean the person to whom the rent is payable under the contract but it also includes his agent. It means that the landlord does not necessarily mean the person to whom the rent is payable under the contract but it also includes his agent. In the instant case, it was the positive case of the respondent that he had sent M. O. to the appellants counsel. Therefore, issue No. 2 originally framed included the question of alleged payment. As the Munsif felt that this issue was not clear, he framed specific issue No. 6. Order XIV, Rule 5, C.P.C. empowers the court, at any time before passing the decree, to amend issues or frame additional issues. This rule envisages that issues which are necessary for determining the matters in controversy should be framed. As the Munsif felt that issues already framed were not quite clear or specific, he proceeded to frame issue No. 6. This he could easily do under O. XIV, R. 5. Notwithstanding the allegations made in the pleadings and the notice sent by the appellant and the oral evidence already led in the case, the Munsif was within his rights to frame a specific issue under Rule 5 of Order XIV. Therefore the lower appellate court was not justified in saying that the Munsif had committed a grave irregularity in the eyes of law. 12. It will be noticed that both the parties were allowed to lead evidence on the new issue framed. Therefore, the lower appellate court was further not justified in saying that the alleged irregularity committed by the Munsif had caused great hardship to the respondent, not only because the respondent was given an opportunity to lead further evidence, but also because the pleadings of the parties, the notices sent by the appellant and the oral evidence of the parties already recorded was there. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, notices sent by the appellant and the evidence already recorded, the evidence of the appellant recorded on 29-8-1967 could be appraised. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that the tender of the arrears of rent to the appellants counsel was not a valid tender and did not amount to payment to the appellant. He placed reliance on an unreported decision of this Court in Second Appeal No. 1425 of 1964 decided on 9-4-1971. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that the tender of the arrears of rent to the appellants counsel was not a valid tender and did not amount to payment to the appellant. He placed reliance on an unreported decision of this Court in Second Appeal No. 1425 of 1964 decided on 9-4-1971. The relevant observation in this case is: "There is a clear mention in the notice itself that the defendant was required to pay the arrears of rent to the plaintiff. This recital in the notice clearly shows that no authority was given by the plaintiff to his lawyer to accept the arrears of rent in his behalf and if this power was not conferred upon the agent or attorney, I do not think the agent had any power to accept the rent. Therefore, the finding by the lower appellate court against the defendant on the above point is not in any way erroneous." 14. This case was cited subsequently before this Court in the case of Noor Mohd. v. Nanwa, AIR 1973 All 31 . The view expressed in Second Appeal No. 1425 of 1964 was doubted. The matter was referred to a Division Bench. The Division Bench held that the observations made in the case of Haji Bundu v. Haji Bundu by K. N. Srivastava, J. ought to have been treated as a finding given on the merits of the case and that would not have any value as a precedent on the point of law. The Division Bench further observed that it was open to the learned single Judge to have reached his own conclusion on the facts and circumstances of the case. 15. In the case of Noor Mohd. Both the courts below on reading the contents of the notice, held that the lawyer was not authorised to receive the arrears of rent and as such the tender made to him would not amount to a compliance of the demand. 16. The learned single Judge did not agree to this finding. It was observed (at p. 32 of AIR): - "The 'landlord' has been defined by Section 2 (c) of the Act as 'a person to whom rent is payable by the tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir or assignee of such person. 16. The learned single Judge did not agree to this finding. It was observed (at p. 32 of AIR): - "The 'landlord' has been defined by Section 2 (c) of the Act as 'a person to whom rent is payable by the tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir or assignee of such person. I think if the definition of landlord under the Act did not include an agent or attorney of the landlord, then a notice of demand sent by a duly instructed lawyer could not be said to be a notice by landlord within the meaning of Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. It is by force of that definition that the notice by a duly instructed lawyer who will be the agent or attorney, achieves validity as one sent by the landlord within the meaning of Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. Once a duly instructed lawyer is a 'landlord competent to send a notice of demand, there is no reason why it should not be held as a matter of law that he is competent to accord satisfaction to the tenant who tenders the amount of arrears to him. There appears to be some force in the argument of the learned counsel for the defendant appellant, but it was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that in the notice it having been intimated to the defendant tenant that he must tender the arrears of rent within one month from the receipt of the notice to the landlord, it must be held that the lawyer was not authorised to receive the rent and accord satisfaction to the tenant. To my mind, a direction in the notice by the lawyer that the rent be paid to the landlord ought not to be construed as laying down the terms regarding the scope of the authority of the lawyer. Since the rent is always payable to the landlord, a mere mention in the notice that it be paid to the landlord is no more than repeating in the notice what the contract of tenancy expects the tenant to do. Since the rent is always payable to the landlord, a mere mention in the notice that it be paid to the landlord is no more than repeating in the notice what the contract of tenancy expects the tenant to do. A lawyer can be instructed by the landlord lo intimate to the tenant to tender the arrears of rent to somebody else and the lawyer then in the notice will intimate to whom the tender is to be made and in such a case if the tenant tenders the rent to landlord and not to the person nominated, then can it be said that the notice remains un-complied? I think not.............. As I understand the law, when an agent or attorney is authorised to make a demand of notice of any sum of money or chattel from another person and that person in compliance with the notice tenders the requisite sum of money or the requisite chattel to the agent, it would be compliance of the notice of demand*. It is not possible for me to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff - respondent that since the notice intimated that, the tender be made to the landlord, it would imply that the lawyer who gave the notice, had no authority to accord satisfaction by receiving the arrears of rent tendered by the tenant." 17. The facts of the present case may now be analysed. In the notice dated; 11-7-1966, Ex. 3, Sri Hoti Lal Sharma, Advocate, simply wrote that the arrears of rent be paid to his client. This is nothing unusual because rent is payable to the landlord i.e. the appellant in the present case. Within 2 weeks of the receipt of this notice, the respondent sent reply of the notice and also sent a M. O-Reply of the notice and. the M. O. both were addressed to Sri Hoti Lal Sharma. Sri Hoti Lal Sharma did not accept the M. O. Thereafter on 3-8-1966 Sri Hoti Lal Sharma gave another notice, Ex. 7. In this notice it was nowhere stated that the M-O. was refused by Sri Hoti Lal Sharma because he had no authority to receive it on behalf of the appellant The suit was instituted in September, 1966. Sri Hoti Lal Sharma did not accept the M. O. Thereafter on 3-8-1966 Sri Hoti Lal Sharma gave another notice, Ex. 7. In this notice it was nowhere stated that the M-O. was refused by Sri Hoti Lal Sharma because he had no authority to receive it on behalf of the appellant The suit was instituted in September, 1966. There is no averment in the plaint that the respondent had sent M. O. to a wrong person who was not authorised to accept it. The plaintiff appellant entered into the witness box first on 22-8-1967. In her statement she did not state that Sri Hoti Lal Sharma had no authority to accept rent tendered by the respondent. Sri Hoti Lal Sharma was not examined by the appellant. There is not a single document to show what authority was really conferred upon Sri Hoti Lal Sharma on or before the date of giving of the notice dated 11-7-1966. In all these circumstances there was hardly any question in the case that Sri Hoti Lal Sharma had no authority to accept the M. O. on behalf of the appellant. As Sri Hoti Lal Sharma gave notice of demand on behalf of the appellant, he became 'landlord within the meaning of the definition given in Section 2 (c). Therefore, I am in complete agreement with the observations in the case of Noor Mohd. cited above. With regard to the evidence of the appellant recorded on 29-8-1967, it is obvious that the appellant would state that Sri Hoti Lal Sharma had no authority to accept rent on her behalf. But her statement in the light of the circumstances already indicated above cannot be believed. Therefore, no reliance could be placed on that statement to find whether Sri Hoti Lal Sharma had or had not authority to accept rent on behalf of the appellant. 18. The position that follows is that on the question of law involved in the case the lower appellate court took a right view and as such it cannot be disturbed by this Court in second appeal. 19. The last argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial court recorded a clear finding that Sri Hoti Lal Sharma had no authority to accept rent on behalf of the appellant and that the lower appellate court had not disturbed this finding. 19. The last argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial court recorded a clear finding that Sri Hoti Lal Sharma had no authority to accept rent on behalf of the appellant and that the lower appellate court had not disturbed this finding. He referred to an observation made in the case of Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalimgam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 : (1963 All LJ 67) which is in the following words (at p. 71 of All LJ): - "If the lower appellate Court fails to consider an issue which had been tried and found upon by the trial court and proceeds to reverse the trial courts decision, without the consideration of such an issue, that may be regarded as an error or defect in procedure." 20. There is no dispute to this observation. But in the instant case the lower appellate court first went to consider whether the trial court was justified in framing issue No. 6 and taking further evidence of the parties on the new issue. In that connection he referred to the pleadings and other material on record. In this way he impliedly concluded that further evidence of the appellant was an afterthought. Moreover, the lower appellate court clearly stated, "It is noteworthy that in Ex. 3 though it was stated that the amount of rent demanded in the notice should be paid to the plaintiff but it was not stated therein that it Should be paid only to the plaintiff". This clearly shows that the lower appellate court, despite the "finding recorded by the trial court, was prepared to hold that the tender of the M. O. to the appellants counsel amounted to payment. In these circumstances the appellant cannot have any grievance. Besides, this point has been adjudicated upon by this Court in this judgment. 21. The result of what has been discussed above is that no interference can be made in the decree passed by the lower appellate court. Appeal, therefore, fails and is ..dismissed with costs.