ORDER V.K. Mehrotra, J. - Both these petitions relate to different stages of the controversy between the petitioner-tenant of shop no. 4/388, Gali Hakim Kanhaiya lal, Beharipur, Barreilly and the third respondent. Smt. Narvada Devi, who is its owner landlord. These are, consequently, being decided by a common judgment. 2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts leading to these two petitions are that an application under section 21 of U.P. Act. XIII of 1972 for release of the accommodation in her favour and for the ejectment of the petitioner therefrom was moved by the third respondent before the Prescribed Authority on August, 8, 1973. It could not be heard and decided in spite of repeated adjournments for a considerable period. At one stage, under the order of the District Judge, Barreilly dated August, 5, 1976 the case was transferred to the court of the City Munsif and was received in that court on August, 11, 1976. On September, 1, 1976, which had been fixed as the date for appearance of the parties before the City Munsif, it was discovered that acknowledgement of the service of the summons upon the petitioner who was opposite party in the proceeding before the learned Munsif, had not been received back. The case was, however, directed to be put up on September 4, 1976 for ex parte hearing. It is not clear as to what happened on September, 4, 1976 because there is no entry of that date in the certified copy of the order-sheet produced before us by the learned counsel for the third respondent nor in annexure 1' to the counter affidavit of Vishwa Nath Misra, the son of the third respondent, on her behalf which purported to be a true copy of the order sheet. However, the case was heard and decided ex parte against the petitioner on September, 10, 1976. The learned Munsif allowed the application of the third respondent and released the premises in her favour. He directed the petitioner to vacate the premises in dispute within, one month. It may be noticed at this stage that the application of the third respondent under section 21 had earlier been dismissed for want of prosecution on some occasions, the last being on January, 30, 1976 which was, however, restored and registered once again by the order dated May, 20, 1976 and June, 8, 1976 was fixed for hearing. It may be noticed at this stage that the application of the third respondent under section 21 had earlier been dismissed for want of prosecution on some occasions, the last being on January, 30, 1976 which was, however, restored and registered once again by the order dated May, 20, 1976 and June, 8, 1976 was fixed for hearing. On that date, the petitioner was not present. The order-sheet relating to May, 20, 1976 shows that summons had not been returned after service upon the petitioner and the third respondent was directed to take fresh steps for effecting service upon the petitioner for July, 31, 1976. A copy of the order of the learned Munsif is Annexure 2' to writ petition No. 1746 of 1978. A perusal of this order shows that the learned Munsif heard the counsel for the third respondent and perused the affidavit filed on her behalf wherein it was mentioned that the house was in a dangerous condition and was also required for personal use. The learned Munsif observed that he saw no reason to disbelieve the affidavit of the third respondent and was, therefore, satisfied that her need was genuine and bona fide in comparison to that of the petitioner. With these observations, the application of the third respondent was, as noticed earlier, allowed by the learned Munsif. 3. The petitioner filed an appeal against the order of the learned Munsif. This appeal was filed long after thirty days of the date of the order without being accompanied by an application praying for condonation of delay in its presentation. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed by the learned District Judge by his order dated September, 1, 1977 of which a copy has been filed as Annexure 7' to the same writ petition. The petitioner's application for reviewing the aforesaid order was also dismissed by the learned District Judge by his order dated January 14, 1978 , a copy whereof has been appended as Annexure 8' to the writ petition. Meanwhile, an application for setting aside the ex parte order dated September, 10, 1976 made by the petitioner with a prayer for restoring the case to its original number for hearing afresh was dismissed by the learned Munsif on March 1, 1977. Meanwhile, an application for setting aside the ex parte order dated September, 10, 1976 made by the petitioner with a prayer for restoring the case to its original number for hearing afresh was dismissed by the learned Munsif on March 1, 1977. The allegation of the petitioner is that he had absolutely no knowledge about the proceeding which took place in the case before the learned Munsif and resulted in the ex parte order dated September, 10, 1976 and that it was only when efforts were made by the third respondent to take possession of the accommodation from him that he learnt about the order dated September, 10, 1976. Consequently, he made the aforesaid application for recalling that order on September, 18, 1976. This application was taken up for disposal on March, 1, 1977 after notice to the third respondent. On that date, the petitioner's son Devendra Pal Singh was present in court before the learned Munsif. When the application was called for hearing, Devendra Pal Singh appeared and informed the learned Munsif that he was the son of the petitioner and was present on his behalf. Since, however, the third respondent was neither present nor represented before the learned Munsif on that date, the Munsif passed an order rejecting the application of the third respondent under section 21 of the Act. The petitioner's son after reading the order aforesaid left the court. Later on, however, it was found that the learned Munsif scored out the words "application under section 21" and substituted it by the words "restoration application" in the order passed by him on that date after he had left the court room so that the order about the dismissal of the restoration application made by the petitioner on September, 18, 1976 was not within the petitioner's knowledge. It was only after a parwana for delivery of possession was issued that the petitioner came to know of the dismissal of his restoration application dated September, 18, 1976 by order dated March, 1, 1977 and applied to the learned Munsif to set aside the order dated March, 1, 1977. This application was, however, rejected by the learned Munsif on February, 17, 1978 by an order of which Annexure 6' to writ petition no. 1746 of 1968 is a copy. This application was, however, rejected by the learned Munsif on February, 17, 1978 by an order of which Annexure 6' to writ petition no. 1746 of 1968 is a copy. This writ petition was filed by the petitioner in this Court on February, 21, 1978 and the eviction of the petitioner from the disputed shop was stayed. The connected writ petition was filed on April, 3 1978 with the prayer, inter alia, for setting aside the orders passed by the learned District Judge on September, 1, 1978 and January 14, 197h referred to earlier. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length we are of opinion that both the petitions deserve to be allowed. From the facts noticed earlier in this judgment, it is clear that after the dismissal of the application of the third respondent under section 21 of the Act for want of prosecution on January 30, 1976, the case was restored on the application of the third respondent on May 20, 1976 and was posted for hearing on June 8, 1976 on which date it was found that summons had not been received back after service on the petitioner who was opposite party in the case. Direction to take out fresh summons fixing July 31, 1976 for service upon the petitioner was issued on that date. The case was subsequently transferred to the Court of the learned Munsif under the orders of learned District Judge and the parties were to appear before the Munsif on September, 1, 1976. When the case was taken up that day it was found that the acknowledgement due (in token of service of notice upon the petitioner) had not been received back. September, 4, 1976 was fixed for ex parte hearing in the matter on that date. From the order-sheet of the case it is not clear as to what impelled the learned Munsif to fix ex parte hearing in the matter on September, 4, 1976. September, 4, 1976 was fixed for ex parte hearing in the matter on that date. From the order-sheet of the case it is not clear as to what impelled the learned Munsif to fix ex parte hearing in the matter on September, 4, 1976. What is, however, more surprising is the fact that the case was taken up and decided ex parte against the petitioner on September, 10, 1976 which, from the certified copy of the order-sheet produced before us by the learned counsel for the third respondent and from the copy of the same order-sheet appended as annexure 1' to the counter affidavit sworn by her son, was not a date fixed for hearing of the case. The disposal of the case in the absence of the petitioner and without notice to him clearly was without authority of law and in violation of the principles of natural justice. The order passed on September, 10, 1976 is, therefore, void. Its affirmance in appeal by the learned District Judge who dismissed it as barred by limitation, does not render it valid. We are, consequently, not prepared to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the third respondent that unless the appellate order, which was admittedly passed after hearing the counsel for the petitioner, is found to suffer from any infirmity this Court should not interfere with the ex parte order dated September, 10, 1976. In the circumstances in which the order of September, 10, 1976 has been passed it is clear that the same is nonest, Affirmance of such an order by the appellate authority does not make it valid or sacrosanct. See, State of U.P. v. Molyd. Nooh, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 86, Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders, 1971(2) L.L.J. 86 and Dr. Madan Gopal Gupta v. The Agra University and others, 1975 Lab. and Ind. Cases 3. 5. We may now briefly deal with the order dated March, 1, 1977 by which the petitioner's application for recalling the ex parte order dated September 10, 1976 was rejected. The fact that the petitioner's son Devendra Pal was present in the court of the learned Munsif on March, 1977 is established beyond doubt Annexure 5' to writ petition no 1746 of 1978 is a copy of the statement made by Vishwa Nath Sharma the son of the third respondent made on oath before the learned Munsif. The fact that the petitioner's son Devendra Pal was present in the court of the learned Munsif on March, 1977 is established beyond doubt Annexure 5' to writ petition no 1746 of 1978 is a copy of the statement made by Vishwa Nath Sharma the son of the third respondent made on oath before the learned Munsif. In this statement it was categorically stated by Vishwa Nath Sharma in cross examination that the petitioner's son Devendra Pal Singh was present in court on March, 1, 1977. The statement clearly supports the assertion of the petitioner that his son was present in court on the date aforesaid and it appears to us that the learned Munsif was in error in dismissing the application made by the petitioner for recalling the ex parte order dated September, 10, 1976 in default and in observing in his order dated February, 17, 1978 that "neither Chanan Singh (petitioner) nor his son appeared in the case on March, 1, 1977". The restoration application for setting aside the order dated September, 10. 1976 was dismissed in default. In the latter part of the order, the learned Munsif has also observed that in fact the applicant was the petitioner and that he had not been vigilant enough in the matter. Be that as it may, the conclusion to which we have arrived at in respect of the ex parte order dated September, 10, 1976 is enough to give relief to the petitioner. That order being void, the subsequent orders assailed in the writ petition automatically fall. It is not necessary for us, therefore, to deal in detail with the rival contentions in regard to the merits of the various orders passed by the learned Munsif and the learned District Judge which have been impugned in these writ petitions. 6. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the various orders assailed in these writ petitions deserve to be set aside and the application made by the third respondent under section 21 of the Act liable to be heard afresh on merits. 7. 6. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the various orders assailed in these writ petitions deserve to be set aside and the application made by the third respondent under section 21 of the Act liable to be heard afresh on merits. 7. We, accordingly, allow both the petitions and quash the orders dated September, 10, 1976, March 1, 1977 and February, 17, 1978 passed by the second respondent as well as the orders dated September, 1, 1977 and January 14, 1978 passed by the first respondent and direct the second respondent to hear and decide the application of the third respondent under section 21 of U.P. Act. XIII of 1972 in accordance with law after notice to the petitioner expeditiously. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs in both these petitions.