Judgment :- 1. What falls for consideration in this revision petition, preferred by a tenant, is whether one of the two co-owners of a building is entitled to independently file a petition against a tenant to seek his eviction on one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) without the consent or knowledge of the other co-owner. The facts of the case are as follows— 2. The petition premises, which is a residential building was originally owned by one Rayappa Pillai and the petitioner became a tenant under him. After the death of Rayappa Pillai, his nephews, viz., the respondent and his brother succeeded to the property. By arrangement, the respondent and his brother were collecting in equal share the rent of Rs. 27 paid by the petitioner for the building. In that situation, the respondent filed a petition before the Rent Controller, Salem, praying for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had committed wilful default in payment of rent and furthermore, he bona fide required the building for his sons occupation. To the said petition, the respondent did not implead his brother as a party, nor did he put forth a contention that the eviction of the tenant was sought for on behalf of the other co-owner also. The tenant, by means of an additional counter-affidavit, raised an objection to the maintainability of the petition without the other co-owner also being a party to the proceedings. The Rent Controller relying upon Shanmugha Appa v. Abdul Hameed 1973 1 M.L.J 241=84 L.W. 103 sustained the objection of the tenant and dismissed the petition. On the landlord filing an appeal, the Principal Subordinate Judge of Salem, who is the appellate authority, allowed the appeal and held that the petition was maintainable and that on merits, the landlord was entitled to get an order of eviction in his favour. It is as against this order, the tenant has come forward with this revision. 3. Mr. On the landlord filing an appeal, the Principal Subordinate Judge of Salem, who is the appellate authority, allowed the appeal and held that the petition was maintainable and that on merits, the landlord was entitled to get an order of eviction in his favour. It is as against this order, the tenant has come forward with this revision. 3. Mr. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that inasmuch as the petition building is owned by two persons, and they had also been receiving the rent in equal moieties from the tenant it is not open to one of the co-owners to file an independent action against the tenant and seek his eviction In support of his argument, the learned counsel relies on Kotiah v. Abdul Aziz Khan and Abdul Rahman v. Ganga Chandrasekhara 1978 2 M.L.J. 234=91 L.W. 519. On the other hand, Mr. T. S. Subramanian, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the petition, though filed by one of two co-owners, is fully maintainable, and as such the tenant is not entitled to put forth the contention that in the absence of the other co-owner, the respondent herein is not competent to file the eviction action all by himself. Mr. Subramamyam relies on Shanmugha Appa v. Abdul Hameed 1973 1 M.L.J. 244=86 L.W. 103 and Sriram Pasrich v. Jaganath 1976 4 S.C.C. 184 in support of his contentions. 4. Before considering the arguments of the learned counsel, it will be useful to refer to the definition of ‘landlord’ in S. 2 (6) of the Act, and interdiction contained in S. 10 (8) of the Act on agents acting as landlords from instituting eviction proceedings without the written consent of the landlord. 4. Before considering the arguments of the learned counsel, it will be useful to refer to the definition of ‘landlord’ in S. 2 (6) of the Act, and interdiction contained in S. 10 (8) of the Act on agents acting as landlords from instituting eviction proceedings without the written consent of the landlord. S. 2 (6) reads as follows— “Landlord” includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were left to a tenant; Explanation:.” S. 10 (8) reads as follows— “Notwithstanding anything contained in this section no person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building merely as an agent of the landlord shall, except with the previous written consent of the landlord, be entitled to apply for the eviction of tenant.” On reading S. 2 (6), it may be seen that the definition is an inclusive one and as per the definition not only the owner of the building but any other person entitled to receive the rent of a building on behalf of another as agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian, would also constitute a landlord for the purposes of the Act. Thus, the definition of the term ‘landlord’ in the Act is of a wide amplitude. However, when the Legislature dealt with the rights of landlords to seek eviction of the tenants on one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 10, the Legislature his imposed a restriction on the exercise of such rights by landlords who have only the status of an agent of the actual owner of the building. It is on account of that, it has been provided in sub-S. (8), that, where a person receives rent of a building merely as an agent of the landlord, he cannot file a petition for eviction of the tenant without first getting the previous written consent of the landlord to file such a petition. The scope and effect of Cl. (8) of S. 10 was considered in Shanmugha Appa. The scope and effect of Cl. (8) of S. 10 was considered in Shanmugha Appa. v. Abdul Hameed 1973 1 M.L.J. 244=86 L.W. 103 and it was held therein that written consent will have to be obtained only by that class of landlords who fall within the definition of agent, landlords, and not owner-landlords. 5. In the instant case, admittedly, the respondent is not an agent of his brother, but is a co-owner of the buildings with his brother. Moreover, the two co-owners, viz, the respondent and his brother, have been collecting their share of the rent directly from the tenant, and therefore, there is no question of one co-owner even collecting the rent on behalf of the other. In such circumstances, the question of the respondent obtaining the written consent of his brother to file the petition does not stop there. What we have to see is whether in his limited role as a co-owner, the respondent is entitled under the Act to file the eviction action all by himself without making his brother an effective party to the proceedings. 6. Having regard to the manner in which the term ‘landlord’ has been defined in the Act, it follows that the Act contemplates a plurality of landlords for the same building. But that will not entitle them to act in severalty. Any petition filed against a tenant by the owners of a building must, of necessity, reflect a conjoint action. Otherwise, we will be faced with the anomalous position of a tenant being sought to be evicted simultaneously, by different co-owners of the building on different grounds. Such a situation is not contemplated by the Act. Therefore, where there is more than one landlord for a building, it must necessarily be held that any action taken against the tenant of the building seeking his eviction must be instituted by all the landlords, or, at least, by one or more of them on behalf of and for the benefit of all of them. Such however, is not the case here. 7. Such however, is not the case here. 7. As early as in 1951, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) has held in Kotiah v. Abdul Aziz Khan 1951 M.L.J (S.N.) 68 that three out of four co-owners of a building who were not receiving the entire rent and who had not been authorised by the fourth co-owner to receive the rent on his behalf, were not entitled to take proceedings for eviction against the tenant without impleading the other co-owner. In Abdul Rahman v. Ganga Chandrasekhara 1978 2 M.L.J. 284=91 L.W. 519 this question did not directly arise for consideration, but Ramaprasada Rao, C.J. has proceeded on the basis that one co-owner cannot file an application for eviction without the consent of others. With respect to the learned Judges who have decided the abovesaid cases, I am in entire agreement with them. 8. The Appellate Authority has relied upon Shanmugha Appa v. Abdul Hameed 1973 M.L.J. 66=L.W. 108 to take the view that only an agent landlord is bound to get the written consent of the owner of the building to file a petition for eviction but there is no such interdiction for a co-owner. What the Appellate Authority has failed to see is that the decision does not lend support to the extended interpretation given by it, viz., that one co-owner is entitled to file an eviction petition all by himself without reference to the other co-owner. In the judgment itself, it has been made clear that where a petition is filed against the tenant for eviction by one of the landlords of the building, then the Rent Controller has to satisfy himself that the application has been made en behalf of all the others. The relevant passage occurring in page 243 reads as follows— “It will be open to the court to satisfy itself that the person making the application is making it on behalf of others receiving rent from ether materials placed before it.” Therefore, the appellate authority is not right in holding that on the basis of the ratio laid down in Shanmugha Appa v. Abdul Hameed 1973 M.L.J. 66=L.W. 108 the landlord is entitled to file a petition by himself without making his brother, a party to the action. 9. 9. So far as Sri Ram Pessicha v. Jagannath 1973 1 M.L.J 241=84 L.W. 103 is concerned, the ralio laid down therein has to be understood with reference to the facts of that case. That was a case where the plaintiff, though a co-sharer, filed the suit for recovery of possession for the benefit of all the members of the family including the other co-sharer. That apart, the court found that the plea regarding non-joinder of parties was not taken at the earliest possible opportunity, and further more, the tenant was not entitled to deny the title of his landlord. It was in that situation, the Supreme Court held that a co-owner owns every part of the composite property along with others and therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to establish that he was the sole owner of the property for maintaining his suit against the tenant for recovery of possession. The facts in this case are totally different. The respondent and his brother are living separately and they have been independently collecting the rent in equal shares from the tenant. It would also appear that there is a partition action between the two co-owners on account of differences of opinion between them. The respondent herein does not seek possession of the building for the benefit of all the co-owners, but he seeks eviction only for his personal benefit. In such circumstances, it can never be said that the petition filed by the respondent without reference to the other co-owner and his co-extensive rights in the building, is maintainable in law. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the revision will stand allowed and the order of the Rent Controller dismissing the petition will stand restored. There will be however, no order as to costs.